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BOOK REVIEWS

"A New Way of War?"

Hoffman, F. G. *Decisive Force: The New American Way of War.* Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996. 150pp. $52.95

BY INSISTING THAT ANY U.S. MILITARY ACTION must employ decisive force, American military leaders have come to believe in the past two decades that they have established a new American way of war that precludes repetition of the frustrations of Vietnam. Yet it is the loud and clear message of F. G. Hoffman that any such conclusion is almost certainly wrong. The strategy of decisive force will usually prove inappropriate to the kinds of scenarios requiring military intervention that the United States will actually confront. An American military strategy for the post–Cold War world has yet to be formulated. The nation still has to rethink its strategy anew. Hoffman, who published the book while Historian, Studies and Analysis Division, Marine Corps Development Command, offers a sharp critique of where America is and has been in its strategic thought, and some valuable suggestions about where to go, and especially where not to go.

Hoffman's book skillfully blends history with rigorous strategic and policy analysis. He accepts the conventional view of the old American way of war, that through 1945 U.S. history has conditioned its citizens, especially the military, into believing that the natural object of war is the absolute defeat of the enemy and that the appropriate means whereby a power as rich and mighty as the United States should seek that object is decisive force. After World War II, however, and particularly in Vietnam, political constraints prevented applications of the concept, thwarting both the pursuit of absolute victory and the invocation of decisive force.

Reviewing in detail the Vietnam War, the intervention in Lebanon between 1981 and 1984, the invasion of Panama in 1989, and the Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991, Hoffman argues that the perceived failures of the two former events and the apparent successes of the latter two shaped the current accepted principles of decisive force. To prevent repetition of failures, we have concluded that American military actions must be guided by clearly defined objectives. To repeat recent successes, we must return, even when the defined objectives are limited, to employing force on a scale so overwhelming as to assure its decisiveness.

Hoffman's analysis of his four critical events, however, disputes the lessons commonly drawn from them, thus laying the foundation for his critique of the decisive force concept drawn from the generally accepted lessons. His book is so tightly reasoned that a summary is even less able than usual to do more than scratch the surface of the analysis. With that caveat, nevertheless, it can be stated that as for Vietnam, Hoffman does not accept that a failure to define objectives lay at the root of U.S. problems: the purpose of creating a viable noncommunist Vietnamese state was a sufficiently clear military and political objective. Similarly, in the Lebanon fiasco the Ronald Reagan administration had an objective that was clearly enough defined: "A sovereign and peaceful Lebanon, secure within its own borders, without either civil war or foreign forces, was the objective." Conversely, in neither of the perceived successes was the objective so clearly defined as those who laud operations JUST CAUSE (Panama) and DESERT STORM allege. In Panama, bewilderment about how to complete the mission of creating a democracy was symbolized by blatantly installing a new government under U.S. auspices, with American colors and military personnel conspicuously on the scene—a sure recipe for Panamanian disaffection.

In the last hours of DESERT STORM the confusion about how to deal with the Republican Guard and with the stop-lines for the advance undercuts the notion that we had clearly decided what we intended to accomplish.

The real difference between Vietnam and Lebanon on the one hand and Panama and the Persian Gulf on the other, Hoffman contends, is not in clarity or objectives but in the civilian administration's having given military leaders a virtually free hand to conduct the latter two actions as they chose—that is the true reason for the military's satisfaction with JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM. Hoffman's implication is that if we look instead to the clarity-of-purpose myth, we are unlikely to draw the appropriate conclusions; further, he finds the military insistence on a free hand unpromising for future problems.

Civil-military relations were outwardly correct during the four events on which he focuses, but Hoffman finds those relations nevertheless fundamentally unsound, because of the wide gap between civil and military perceptions that has existed since World War II. Both sides must share the blame, Hoffman believes, but when the military complained about the conduct of the Vietnam War, it refused to accept opportunities given it to try better options. In Lebanon there was military foot-dragging, ostensibly because of the unclear-objectives bogey but actually because the forcible measures employed were not what the military leadership wanted. Only the autonomy of Panama and the Gulf satisfied the military. The complex post–Cold War world is unlikely to present many scenarios in which such autonomy will be possible.

In all these circumstances Hoffman finds walking the ghost of the nineteenth-century military intellectual Emory Upton. Almost complete autonomy

from civilian control is what Upton insisted the military must always have, and the author believes that Upton's influence has been so lasting that there has been a certain illusory quality to the apparently harmonious civil-military relations of the post–World War II era.

It is indicative of Hoffman's strong historical sense that he links Upton's ideas, which emphasized military administration, with strategy and policy—a connection not often recognized. That same historical sense, combined with strategic insight, warns Hoffman that the supposedly new American way of war is too much like the old way, in its unsubtle vision of the application of force, to be likely to serve much better than the old version did after 1945. We cannot separate military force from civilian policy. We will rarely be able to apply overwhelming force in politically ambiguous scenarios. The invocation of military force almost never comes without risks, including those of prolonged involvement, unanticipated political consequences, and casualties. This cautionary book is indispensable reading for military professionals.

Russell F. Weigley
Temple University

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Khalilzad, Zalmay M., and David A. Ochmanek, eds. *Strategy and Defense Planning for the 21st Century: Strategic Appraisal 1997.* Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997. 377pp. $20

This is the second in what is intended to be an annual series of books published by RAND to provide current insights into broad national security and defense planning issues. It was intentionally produced prior to the final reports of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Defense Panel (NDP), with the hope of informing participants in those efforts.

The volume is a collection of nine essays covering a broad range of defense planning issues, with a primary focus on the development of force planning criteria in the post–Cold War era. The common point of departure for the collection is that the United States has entered a very challenging period that should call into question existing assumptions about long-term U.S. military sufficiency. At the very least, the declining force structure driven by defense budget reductions is seen to be incompatible with a U.S. national security strategy of forward engagement and global leadership. At worst, the book foresees the possible emergence of new types of threats that will require military capabilities very different from those that are now planned for the coming decades.

Both the QDR and NDP efforts sought to address these challenges, but the fact that their respective final reports came to diametrically opposed conclusions clearly indicates a continuing lack of consensus among senior

defense leaders regarding future military challenges for the United States, and regarding the adequacy of programmed forces to meet those challenges. *Strategic Appraisal 1997* will be valuable to the extent that it assists in choosing between the findings of the QDR and NDP, or makes a convincing case for some alternative course of action.

The editors profess that the book seeks not to provide answers but rather to identify the primary factors behind the critical issues in order to help decision makers make informed choices. For those who are not current on the parameters of the debate, the volume provides a useful overview of some of the most relevant issues. However, whether the essays serve to further the analytical basis for the promotion of major change to the current force structure remains to be seen. In general, this appraisal takes a "top down" approach to future military force structure planning; in other words, it moves from specific requirements to generic capabilities as the best way to position the military optimally for a broad range of potential missions. Despite its apparent logic, the difficulty with this approach is that major changes within military forces have in the past been driven not by top-down requirements for broad capabilities but by a common recognition of very narrowly defined and urgent operational problems—problems so compelling as to overcome the multitude of military, industrial, and congressional interests in maintaining the status quo. The argument in this book notwithstanding, the prospect of severe constraints on defense spending does not appear to be compelling enough to foster significant force changes; indeed, the inability to articulate a severe military problem seems to be the primary cause of the present defense drawdown. Thus one must be skeptical that the top-down strategy recommended in this collection will have any more impact on the defense planning process than has the similarly argued report of the NDP.

This is not to say that there are no indications of emergent problems serious enough to stimulate major force restructuring. The increasing risk to U.S. forward-presence and power-projection forces posed by the proliferation of precision guided weapons and associated targeting capabilities would seem to be such an issue. This issue of regional "denial" is raised in the book, but it tends to be lost in a vast catalog of challenges ranging across the broad spectrum of warfare—some very difficult, and some relatively trivial. Moreover, proposed responses to some of the most vexing military problems—such as reliance on dubious active missile-defense concepts to counter growing arsenals of theater ballistic missiles—seem remarkably linear for a volume that seeks to promote innovation and change. Indeed a questionable theme throughout the book is that future problems will require expensive new technologies to counter, and thus substantial dollar investments for U.S. force modernization that must be squeezed out of a static defense budget. However, before accepting this conclusion, one would like a convincing argument that new and innovative ways of operating with our existing systems will be unable to reduce

adequately the growing risks from these emerging threats.

In sum, *Strategic Appraisal 1997* offers a good benchmark of the state of the art of current thinking with regard to long-range defense issues in an era of great change. It is also indicative of how much intellectual work lies ahead if a compelling case is to be made for a radical restructuring of the U.S. military.

JAMES R. FITZSIMONDS
Captain, U.S. Navy

Ricks, Thomas E. *Making the Corps.* New York: Scribner's, 1997. 320pp. $24

"Now! Sit up straight. Get your eyes on me. Now, get off my bus. Let's go. Now. Move. Move! *Move!*"

Welcome to Marine Corps basic training.

In *Making the Corps*, Thomas E. Ricks follows the members of Platoon 3086 through the most difficult eleven weeks of their lives. Ricks, a Pentagon correspondent for the *Wall Street Journal*, is there when the recruits get off the bus and when, nearly three months later, most of them graduate. He then follows them onto active duty, showing how their personalities and performance in training relate to their ultimate success or failure in the Corps. Looking through the eyes of not only the recruits but also the drill instructors, the reader will watch as the culture of the Marine Corps is developed within its newest members.

Ricks accompanies the recruits through all phases of their training at Parris Island. In doing so he explains the Marine Corps culture and shows how new Marines are brought into the fold. The reader comes away understanding that unlike that of the other services, the Marine Corps' basic training is primarily designed to indoctrinate new members into the culture rather than to develop military skills; combat readiness comes later. Parris Island (and its counterpart in San Diego) forces new recruits into the Marine mold, through drill, weapons training, physical conditioning, and constant reminders of their heritage and obligations.

The discussion of Marine culture is a timely one. The other services seem to be going through an identity crisis as the world changes around them, and they appear to be looking to Marine culture as a template. The Army has created contingency forces, smaller and lighter than its main formations, ready to deploy rapidly, much as the Marines have always done. The Air Force is developing an Air and Space Basic Course for new officers that seeks to develop a common identity among lieutenants from all the commissioning sources, similar to what The Basic School does for new Marine officers. In *Making the Corps*, leaders from the other services are given the opportunity to see what it takes to create an organization like the Marine Corps; they may decide the cost of doing it right is too high. After all, if their soldiers, sailors, and airmen wanted to be Marines, they likely would have joined the Marine Corps in the first place.

What is it that makes a Marine? Ricks does not pull any punches. He portrays the recruits and their indoctrination honestly, using their words and

those of the drill instructors, as well as his own observations. To hear him talk, many of the recruits he knew were the dregs of society. "They are, with a few exceptions, denizens of the bottom half of the American economy, or on their way there—poor kids with lousy educations, and a few wealthier ones sliding off the professional tracks their parents had taken." There are university graduates and community college dropouts, pacifists and bullies, gang-bangers, and skinheads. Turning them into contributing members of society is tough enough; turning them into Marines is an especially daunting task, and Ricks does an excellent job of showing the transformation.

The author addresses more than just the culture of the Marines; he goes on to discuss the state of civil-military relations today. As the recruits become indoctrinated into Marine culture they shed their civilian values, at least on the surface. Most take on a holier-than-thou attitude, looking down on the civilian culture from which they came. The fact that many do not actually internalize these beliefs is reflected in the fact that out of 3,086 graduates, nearly 15 percent will not finish their first year in the Corps. It is also a little scary how some of these recruits come together: the gang member from Washington, D.C., and the skinhead from Alabama find their common bond in anti-Semitism. Ricks uses the recruits' harsh opinions of civilian society to demonstrate the perceived division between today's military and the population at large. It is here that the book's only real fault becomes glaringly evident: it is difficult to tell where the recruits' and the drill instructors' views end and the author's opinions begin. Is he merely explaining their perspective, or is he adding his own commentary on the subject? It is hard to be sure, but when examining the issue Ricks seems to fall into the social science trap of looking for views that support one's own while missing other important evidence.

That is not, however, a fatal flaw. This is an excellent book for anyone who is interested in how the Marine Corps turns young men and women into a force that, to paraphrase one sergeant major, can hold babies one day, kill the next, and know the difference between the two. Given the changes in the world, it is helpful to see how one small service has already addressed many of the challenges facing the larger services today. Conducting military operations other than war, operating as an expeditionary force, and getting by with limited resources are issues that have always been a part of the Marine Corps. *Making the Corps* will be an excellent stroll down memory lane for every Marine, and an excellent guidebook for everyone else.

WILLIAM C. THOMAS
Captain, U.S. Air Force

Zartman, I. William, and J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds. *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques.* Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997. 412pp. $19.95

William Zartman and Lewis Rasmussen have assembled a stable of contributors whose experience encompasses scholarship and field work in

international relations theory, international law, conflict resolution, diplomacy, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) operations. Zartman, a senior academic at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, brings thirty years of conflict resolution scholarship to the project. Rasmussen, a program officer at the United States Institute of Peace, has coauthored a study of Middle East conflict resolution. The qualifications of each of the other contributors are strong, reflecting extensive experience in each of their specialties. The articles are supplemented with lists of additional readings.

The book consists of four parts: "Mapping the Field" and "Approaches to Peacemaking" deal in theory, while "Practitioners" and "Training" discuss practical matters.

In Zartman's introduction, he notes the state's preeminence in world politics but observes that conflict transcends the state, pulling it into struggles with subgroups and embroiling it in regional contests.

In Part One, "Mapping the Field," Rasmussen's "Peacemaking in the 21st Century" summarizes the development of international relations theory since World War II. Louis Kriesberg, a professor of sociology, complements Rasmussen with his comprehensive essay, "The Development of the Conflict-Resolution Field."

Part Two, "Approaches to Peacemaking," explores various peacemaking possibilities, such as negotiation, mediation, adjudication, social-psychological techniques, "interactive conflict resolution," and religion. Daniel Druckman, a professor of conflict management, in his essay "Negotiating in the International Context" explains state-to-state negotiations as puzzle solving, bargaining, organization management, or diplomatic politics. Law professor Richard Bilder introduces "Adjudication: International Arbitral Tribunals and Courts." He explains them, discusses the differences between arbitration and judicial settlement, and points to the benefits of a strengthened international judicial system. In "The Social-Psychological Dimensions of International Conflict," Herbert Kelman, professor of social ethics, looks at human processes promoting hostility. Psychology professor Ronald Fisher describes "Interactive Conflict Resolution," which draws representatives of groups into prohlem-solving workshops, supplementing conventional diplomatic and governmental activities. "Religion and Peacebuilding" by Cynthia Sampson discusses the roles of lay and ecclesiastical figures who have become advocates, intermediaries, observers, and educators in the most intractable conflicts.

Part Three, "Practitioners," highlights diplomats and nongovernmental organizations. Cameron Hume, a senior member of the American United Nations mission, contributes "A Diplomat's View," discussing the relative decrease of the state's powers to contain conflicts, and pointing out their reliance on the executive agency of the Security Council. Experiences of nongovernmental organizations are presented by Andrew Natsios, vice president of World Vision U.S., in "An NGO Perspective." For military officers, his is one of the most useful chapters, addressing NGO strengths

(endurance in the community, commitment to long-term resolution) and weaknesses (lack of hierarchy, multiplicity of programs and doctrines, etc.).

In Part Four, "Training," Eileen Babbitt, an international politics professor, illuminates the topic of "Contributions of Training to International Conflict Resolution," describing training appropriate to specific conflicts and also the more general training of entry and midgrade foreign affairs professionals.

Peacemaking in International Conflict is not about international relations or the military's post–Cold War role. Rather, it concentrates on resolution of conflict by means other than force. Though couched in state-based terminology, it ignores the state itself as a political actor. One strength of this work is that it goes beyond state and national interests to focus on the socially confined arena where violent conflicts find their solutions. By explaining international relations theory; shortcomings in conflict resolution theory; subtleties in negotiation, adjudication, and mediation; and the part that religion plays, this book contributes to a richness of understanding in a complex world. Another strength of this work lies in its exposition of the character of many nonstate actors. Religious organizations and secular NGOs have assumed larger roles. The salience of diplomacy, tied to the sovereign state, continues to recede. This book helps the reader to understand why.

The major weakness of this book is the absence of the military. At this late date, its exclusion cannot be understood. Military organizations are routinely employed in the implementation of cease-fires, delivery of humanitarian assistance, and the assurance of confidence-building measures. Local commanders often find themselves involved in immediate and highly dangerous conflict resolution. A chapter by an experienced military source would have been welcome.

Nonetheless, this book is a valuable addition to the library of those whose careers will expose them to the conflict resolution process. Zartman is incorrect to refer to his latest volume as a "tool kit." Rather, it provides a rough map and a compass, and it indicates where additional maps may be found.

DANIEL H. ELSE
Reston, Virginia

McDougal, Walter A. *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776.* New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997. 286pp. $26

Walter A. McDougal's *Promised Land, Crusader State* is a necessity for those with an interest in foreign policy and America's future. A Pulitzer Prize–winning author and editor of *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, McDougal here provides a survey based on his extensive historical studies of American diplomatic history. More importantly, he presents an original view of America as first a promised land and then a crusader state.

Rejecting the "sterile debate" over foreign policy doctrines following the post–Cold War era, and annoyed by the "flip" use of such terms as Wilsonianism and isolationism, McDougal

develops an alternative analytical structure built around a biblical analogy. Just as the Bible has an Old Testament and a New Testament, so too does American foreign policy, each covering about a century and divided into four "books" that are focused on a foreign policy tradition. In the foreign policy "old testament," these books are liberty, unilateralism, the American system of states, and expansionism.

McDougal begins his study with the realization by the first generation of American leadership that American liberty was being made meaningless by the interference of foreign powers. As the weaker nation encountering foreign colonial powers in North America in its expansion across the continent, it saw the need for freedom of action. McDougal postulates that the old testament books flow logically one into the next—liberty at home, unilateral action abroad, an American system of states for the Americas, and territorial and commercial expansion—all reinforcing each other and serving the interests of an agricultural nation. It was a realistic view of America's place in the world.

The "new testament" of the twentieth century includes progressive imperialism, Wilsonianism, containment, and meliorism. The end of the nineteenth century ushered in a transitional period: as America reached parity with other powers across both oceans, it had an opportunity and a need to alter its conduct. The social progressivism seen at home in the early twentieth century merged with a desire to transmit those policy goals into U.S. relations with others. McDougal sees progressive imperialism as consistent with expansionism beyond our shores to preserve freedom of action; first with Wilsonianism and then with global meliorism during the Vietnam era, America sought goals beyond balances of power, through democratic institutions, Third World development, and human rights. Containment was consistent with an understanding of the balances of power, but McDougal clearly is uncomfortable with the willingness of some to fashion national security goals in terms of melioristic interests.

He forcefully argues that while all of the traditions purported to serve liberty, Wilsonianism and global meliorism sought to expand that purpose beyond America's shores, to serve others' interests in liberty rather than our own. He sees the "old testament" traditions as acknowledging and working within a balance-of-power system and argues that in the end, liberty for America requires a balance of power in the world. As to the future, McDougal's hypothesis clearly implies that the United States must craft a foreign policy based on a realistic projection of that balance, in light of a solid definition of its interests, and should not subordinate these interests to an overarching global desire to improve world conditions.

Missing, though, is a strong recommendation as to where the United States should go in the future. McDougal makes a good argument for limiting the scope of his work, saying that there need be no overarching foreign policy like containment to follow in the post–Cold War world. Where the author shines is in providing a unique analytical framework, grounded in historical inquiry, through which one

may view America's place in the world. Also, his extensive bibliography is a wonderful resource. Not only an original analysis, *Promised Land, Crusader State* is fine historical writing.

As we reach the millennium, the debate over foreign policy rages on a wide range of issues, from Bosnia to Nato and NAFTA to China. McDougal provides a historical framework from which readers, rather than the author, must draw their own conclusions.

JEFFREY J. SCHUELER
Gaithersburg, Maryland

Evans, G. Russell. *Death Knell of the Panama Canal?*. Fairfax, Va.: National Security Center, 1997. 237pp. $4.95 (paperback)

On 31 December 1999 the Panama Canal and all its installations are scheduled to revert to the Republic of Panama, in accordance with the 1977 treaty between the United States and Panama. This book, published by the National Security Center, was written by G. Russell Evans, a retired United States Coast Guard captain who is a student of the U.S.-Panama interplay on the canal. Evans argues for a treaty revision and a partnership of mutual benefit for both countries to take the place of what he calls the present "illegal" treaty. That the introduction was written by the greatly respected Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, requires that Evans's arguments be heard and considered.

The book undeniably raises an alarm about a strategic issue of vital security to the United States—the canal's future. Unfortunately, the author's presentation of the events leading to the approval of the canal treaty and of its subsequent governmental examinations is offered in parochial, passionate, and inflammatory language that mars the often laudable critiques offered.

The canal's completion in 1914 was in the interest of every seagoing nation, providing easy passage between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The canal was also smack in the middle of every military logistician's calculations on strategy. There it has remained, although with the passage of time and the concurrent changes in military technology, estimates of the canal's utility to the United States and its vulnerability to terrorism have waxed and waned. Regrettably, these issues have been assessed in a cavalier and erroneous manner by many U.S. strategists, whose thinking has been befuddled by the issues of aircraft carriers too wide to make passage, the threat of long-range offensive missiles, and the possibility that locks could be disabled by explosives.

The reality is that the canal could be defended against missiles hy U.S. Army Patriot missiles or the impending Navy theater missile defense system. Surveillance techniques, now well practiced, could counter the transportable explosives threat. Regarding the canal's military utility, slim-hulled naval combatants now have great offensive lethality and accuracy in their missile systems, such as the Tomahawk missile. Meanwhile, the role of supporting military actions with beans, bullets, and oil is undiminished. Thus the book could be more effective if it offered a

substantial defense of the canal's strategic use by the United States, measured against present-day military scenarios. It would be an examination worthy of a naval war college. The canal represents an obvious, incontestable, and enduring fact: the saving of fifteen to twenty days' sailing time between the Atlantic and the Pacific. No thinking politician or military strategist can deny the vital importance of *time* as a factor in any crisis, large or small.

It is probably safe to say that neither military utility nor the canal's so-called vulnerability are dominant considerations in a peacetime environment where the United States is seen as the superpower. International relations and even domestic political issues weigh more heavily today in considering what the United States should do in the short time before the treaty is enacted. Unfortunately, the Evans book fails to consider what impact, if any, a reconsideration of the canal treaty might have on the U.S. position in Latin America or elsewhere. Recent interest by China and Japan in the canal is, however, noted and commented on.

As it now stands, the book offers only an accusation against the many who negotiated and approved an "illegal" treaty in 1977. The plea for a U.S. review that would salvage a position of partnership for the United States is buttressed only by complaints concerning the prospects of inadequate maintenance, and loss of drug-monitoring sites and physical property. A measure of partnership based on sound military interest is a good cause. Unfortunately, the game is already in play, and the voice of diplomacy seems to be muttering "going . . . going. . . ." Can this book's impact thwart the last word? Gone?

RAYMOND A. KOMOROWSKI
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Lowry, Robert. *The Armed Forces of Indonesia.* St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1996. 282pp. $29.95

Robert Lowry is an Australian graduate of Indonesia's Army Staff and Command College, and his book is one of a series produced by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. The Centre has a distinguished array of volumes on the region and its problems. Although published in 1996, this book is still relevant to the present situation in Indonesia, even after the transfer of power from the hands of Suharto to his protégé Dr. B. J. Habibie. Many of the players, institutions, and philosophical, political, and cultural beliefs are still in place. Lowry's views are endorsed in the book's foreword by General L. B. ("Bernie") Murdani, who, according to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, is the former head of Kopkamtib (an intelligence and coordinating arm) and the officer in charge of the invasion of East Timor. Presently, Murdani is director of a Jakarta international relations "think tank."

Basically, Indonesia sees threats from several sources. First, it views many areas as potential internal threats—that is, areas that may seek possible separation, at the extreme, or readjustment of terms between the central government and local control, at the minimum. The

chief areas posing such threats are Aceh, Timor, and West Irian. Next, China is perceived as a future problem. Recent riots and revelations of sexual assaults against the Chinese during those riots have once again shown that the Chinese have never been accepted in the Indonesian midst. The possibility of China acting as a "big brother" and intervening worries the military. Lastly, there is a myriad of maritime problems facing the nation. A short list would include piracy, smuggling, and illegal fishing. Lowry examines them all.

This book lays out the command and control structure of the Indonesian armed forces, called the ABRI. The descriptions address strategical and geographical needs, as the Indonesians perceive them. Good use of Indonesia's history is interwoven in the telling, and examples are frequently used to illustrate key points.

The descriptions of the Navy are outweighed by those of the Army. It becomes obvious that Lowry feels compelled to be circumspect. He provides some examination of just what works and what is in bad need of overhaul, but without being too specific. To the author's credit, he points out the shortcomings of many units of the Army. However, the same cannot be said about the descriptions of the police, a vital component of the ABRI and partner in providing internal security. In examining the Navy, Lowry is not as critical of Habibie's past role in the purchase of the bulk of the former East German navy as the Asian press has been. While these are criticisms of the book, they are minimal in light of its general value.

Recent revelations about the ABRI, the Chinese role in the Indonesian economy, and transfers of money to the United States for political contributions makes Lowry's section on the ABRI and business very important to understanding tensions that could develop if U.S. congressional and journalistic investigations are pursued. As Lowry correctly points out, the Indonesian officer corps is allowed, maybe even expected, to augment its income by associating with the Chinese business interests; the encouragement continues into retirement. In this way not only do individuals receive income but the ABRI profits. So one sees the Indonesian Navy receiving, like any stockholder, its share of the profits of such entities as the Admiral Lines (shipping, what else!) and Bank Bahari. While this reduces the dependence on the treasury for funding (Indonesia requires less public money for its armed forces than others in the region), it can be problematic. The ABRI is close to the business community, many of whose members are overseas Chinese. Because it was felt that closeness would reduce dislike or even hatred, key Indonesians were brought into the Chinese business groupings. One of these entities, the Lippo Group, has been making political donations in the United States.

These revelations have not helped the ABRI image. They are too recent for Lowry's work, but the book is nevertheless a good foundation for understanding the monied overseas Chinese in Indonesia and the ABRI connection.

PETER CHARLES UNSINGER
San Jose University

Oberdorfer, Don. *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1997. 480pp. $30

By most measures, the Korean Peninsula remains one of the most volatile places on earth—a place where three of the world's largest armies stand poised for war across a misnamed Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The thirty-seven thousand American troops currently stationed in the Republic of Korea would certainly be immediately involved in any hostilities with the communist North Korean regime. The preservation of peace and the deterrence of war on the Korean Peninsula remain a central objective of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia.

While the Cold War ended for all practical purposes in the early 1990s, its existence is still firmly entrenched on the Peninsula, where forces of "good" and "evil" battle for supremacy. In some strategic sense the Peninsula is a land frozen in time. This situation (little has changed since the end of the Korean War in 1953) makes Don Oberdorfer's account of contemporary Korean history an important read for policy makers, East Asia hands, and even the casual reader of international affairs. His book provides outstanding background on events that have shaped the Peninsula since the early 1970s—many of them witnessed personally by Oberdorfer while he was a *Washington Post* journalist and bureau chief covering the Far East.

Considered by many to be one of the finest American journalists on the Northeast Asian beat, Oberdorfer is often called "the dean of American reporters on East Asia." An award-winning writer and a veteran of military service in Korea, the author conducted hundreds of interviews during the course of writing *The Two Koreas*. All the big names are here, including past secretaries of state, national security advisors, senior field commanders, and current policy makers. While academics might be disappointed with the references and documentation for further study, Oberdorfer's effort to interview all the main players and retain a balanced perspective is laudable. This book is likely to be the standard against which other books on modern Korea will be judged.

The Two Koreas chronicles the trials and tribulations of the Korean people as they struggle to deal with the challenges they have faced and that have divided their land over the past twenty-five years. It explains the tensions—and intrigues—which have surrounded the "Hermit Kingdom," including secret efforts at reconciliation and peace between the North and South, classic Cold War espionage, violence along the DMZ, and the assassination of senior political leaders, including a South Korean president. Most interesting perhaps for the American reader is the role (sometimes ineffective) that the United States has played in shaping contemporary Korean history.

A particularly important aspect of this book is the section on the nuclear question of the 1990s and how the United States and North Korea slid "precipitously" toward war over P'yongyang's brinkmanship in the spring of 1994. Many informed Korea observers believe that the likelihood of armed conflict at that time was misjudged and greatly overstated by the

Clinton administration. To his credit, the author acknowledges the differences of opinion over the threat and laments that it will be years before we learn just how close the Korean Peninsula came to war—again.

North Korea's aspirations to become a nuclear power have not been completely resolved, and the give-and-take over the 1994 Agreed Framework to "denuclearize" North Korea is likely to be a major issue in American foreign policy toward Northeast Asia for the foreseeable future. The history of the agreement, as detailed by Oberdorfer, will give readers an informed perspective on the complexity of the politics of the Peninsula and likely scenarios for the future as the present Asian financial crisis stresses the implementation of the pact.

Oberdorfer has made a significant contribution to our general knowledge of modern Korea over the last twenty-five years. In fact, it may be the best account yet of the current history of this tragically divided land. This book will help the layman to understand the dynamics of current events on the Korean Peninsula as well as assist policy makers and their staffs make better-informed decisions regarding the unique challenges it will continue to present to Washington and East Asia.

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Mandelbaum, Michael, ed. *Post-Communism: Four Perspectives*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996. 208pp. $17.95

After seventy-two years, in 1989 communism dissolved before the astonished eyes of the world. Within two years a total of twenty-seven sovereign states emerged from the former Second World. These states have embarked on a journey with a clear destination: the Western club of nations, with their advanced free-market economies, liberal democratic political processes, and international institutions.

Michael Mandelbaum, a Council on Foreign Relations fellow and a professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, brings together the perspectives of four leading economists and political scientists in this valuable work. The book offers insights into what is arguably the most important social, political, and economic development of the past several decades: the demise of the Soviet bloc and of communism in Eastern Europe.

Mandelbaum provides a good overview of the transition process and the effect of regional differences on the speed and form of this process. Stephen Holmes and Robert Skidelsky argue that success depends on the adoption of certain policies that will allow a strong central state to arise at the same time as economic markets are developing. John Mueller and Charles Gati, on the other hand, believe that the transition has already completed its initial phase and is in fact essentially complete, although they differ on the result of that transformation.

One underlying factor in the success of the transition within a particular country is the legitimacy, rather than the effectiveness, of a state regime. This

becomes most apparent when using a regional filter. The three regions of concern—western, eastern, and southern—may have shared recent history, but they have markedly dissimilar pasts. The West (what we call Central Europe) was Habsburg, Catholic, and most susceptible to Western European influences. The East, on the other hand, was Romanov and Orthodox and less affected by such Western movements as the Enlightenment and the Reformation. The South was Ottoman and most removed from the social and cultural influences that affected the other regions. The states most successful in their transition to Western democracies and free economies are those closest geographically, culturally, and historically to the region from whence the definition of success comes. As Mandelbaum puts it, "In the political geography of post-communist Eurasia . . . the conntries of the West are struggling to establish effective states while those of the South face the task of creating legitimate ones. The pathology that besets the first group is crime and corruption, the second is plagued by civil war."

Stephen Holmes argues that the overused term "transition" should be done away with, because it implies that the states involved somehow know where they are headed. That is not the case, he says; the concepts of chaos and fluidity better describe Eastern Europe today. Old habits and mentalities die hard, and these cultural legacies impede progress toward the creation of viable democratic and market institutions.

Holmes remains an optimist, however, and points out the relative lack of extremist political parties in the post-1989 picture, in contrast to Weimar Germany in a similarly unsettled period. Nevertheless, the administrative decay of state governments combined with the rise in criminal activity make prospects for successful democratic or market institutions problematic. As he puts it, "The Hobbesian problem has to be solved before the Lockean solution looks attractive." The crisis of ungovernability is the universal and central problem of postcommunist regimes. Liberal pluralism requires a strong state. Only when a government has achieved performance legitimacy by providing basic services and guaranteed liberal civic rights to its populace will its people gain confidence and optimism about the future necessary for a working free-market economy to develop and thrive.

Robert Skidelsky's chapter focuses on the economic transition from communism to capitalism in Russia. Skidelsky believes that the key to ensuring a successful transformation is first to create the legal and political institutions necessary for a capitalist market economy. This state-building exercise is more important than sequencing particular economic policies in the new states. The problem facing Moscow is that the state effectively lost control of nearly all its revenues, money now going to the various autonomous republics and provinces as well as the informal economy. Communism collapsed, he believes, because the state no longer had the will to enforce the command economy. Tbis loss of centralized economic power is what we really mean when we describe the collapse of the Soviet Union.

John Mueller's central theme is that the new states of Eastern Europe and central Eurasia have completed their transitions to democracy and free market economies. What they have now is probably as close as they are going to get to the Western ideal. The most optimistic writer in this group, he argues that transforming a society is really quite simple, because people are naturally inclined to democracy and markets. They are prevented from achieving those systems only when blocked from doing so by authoritarian power. As Mueller puts it, "Democracy is fundamentally about leaving people free to complain and capitalism is fundamentally about leaving people free to be greedy." The prospects for continued evolution toward these goals are quite good, he suggests.

Charles Gati conducts a tour of new postcommunist societies, rank-ordering the states according to their success in transitioning to democracy and capitalism. His conclusion differs sharply from Mueller's, in that he does not believe many of the new states have achieved either of these goals. The dominant trend of the mid-1990s has been at least partial retrenchment, and most of these states face a future of neither totalitarianism nor democracy but something as yet undefined. The first goal of the revolution, sovereignty, has been largely achieved. The other two goals, however—political pluralism and a market economy—are less certain. Only a few states in Central Europe (and perhaps the Baltics) are likely to succeed in achieving democracy. Governments must deliver the economic goods if they expect to survive and thrive. By this criteria, most people in the postcommunist world feel cheated. The revolution has not delivered their dreams. Gati provides poll data that shows "discontent so acute and so pervasive as to invite comparison with public sentiments that prevailed prior to the fall of communism. As vast majorities consider the postcommunist course to be a failure, they are bent on checking its direction and arresting its development."

The book's contributors all bring authoritative views to their chapters, and the four perspectives together are a valuable contribution to European area studies. One comes away from this work with a sense of modest pessimism about the future of Russia and many of the other former Soviet states, particularly if one started reading with a preconceived belief that these states will achieve success only if they move to a nation-state system with a democratic, capitalist society much like our own. Such cultural biases are identified and questioned by the authors. At the end, one realizes that perhaps it is not the role of the West, or of the United States, to attempt to push these societies too quickly or with too many demands in the direction of our preconceived notions. A supportive but reactive policy may result in a better international situation than will interventionism.

JEFFREY A. LARSEN
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Blackwell, Robert D., and Michael Sturmer, eds. *Allies Divided: Transatlantic*

Policies for the Greater Middle East. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997. 305pp. $22.50

Allies Divided is a book about alliances, interests, and priorities. It is also about consensus, and the dangers and opportunity costs to allies who fail to achieve one. Given the current situation in the Middle East, the book is important for two reasons. First, it presents a well balanced, insightful, and timely treatment of problems stemming from the increasingly divergent policies followed by America and Europe in what its editors call the "Greater Middle East." Second, it addresses these problems in a refreshingly broad context of geography, strategic issues, and time. Breaking as it does the sometimes narrow bounds of Middle East analysis and focusing on long-term political, economic, and military effects of current policy options, the book has a utility far beyond the narrow focus of today's headlines.

The editors are Ambassador Robert D. Blackwell of Harvard and Michael Strummer of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, Germany. They define the "Greater Middle East" as the area from the Maghreb through Egypt, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf to the Muslim republics of the Caspian basin. Both take a broad view of the region and of changing interrelationships and issues stemming from the end of the Cold War. Even with that broad definition, Russia, Afghanistan, and Greece loom large as major players in the analysis of regional problems and opportunities. Relationships with America and Europe are, of course, also central to the discussion. Key issues concerning the United States are the changing nature of American leadership in the post–Cold War era, the decisive role of domestic politics in foreign policy formulation, and a growing imbalance between the United States and allied military capabilities. The European connection covers these same points, but from two perspectives—of Europe as a political entity and of Europe as a collection of sovereign states with divergent attitudes and interests. Watching how both views sometimes play simultaneously is one of the more interesting aspects of this work.

Blackwell and Strummer see a basic concurrence between U.S. and European interests in the region: continuing access to affordable oil, curbing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and avoiding the spread of Islamic extremism. The editors also see a number of issues that divide the allies. They include significant differences of opinion over the relative importance of Israeli versus Arab interests, preference for engagement versus confrontation with Iran, choosing between either unseating Saddam Hussein or trying to modify his behavior, Turkey's proper role in Europe and in the region, and attitudes toward coercion as policy and the ability of states to apply it. All of these issues, and others, are analyzed and debated in a series of twelve articles written by noted area experts from both sides of the Atlantic. The essays cover a host of political, economic, and military issues, to include Nato and Western European Union expansion, Nato operations in Bosnia, a foundering Arab-Israeli peace process, renewed provocations by Iraq, growing domestic pressure by ethnic interest groups,

and growing tension between the United States and its allies over the wisdom of embargoes and sanctions. The essays are well researched and well written, and they provide keen analysis and practical suggestions for policy improvement. They are also interactive, in that the authors comment on each other's work throughout—a useful technique for highlighting points of agreement and differences of opinion.

In their final analysis the editors suggest that a decade of regional tranquillity would render moot the many diverging transatlantic interests and policies that bedevil regional politics today.

Unfortunately, they see little chance that the next decade will bring tranquillity or stability. That leaves the United States and its allies at odds over a series of serious problems, which none can solve unilaterally. The editors' bottom line is that neither the United States nor Europe can go it alone in the Middle East. A failure on the part of the allies to get their collective act together, however, will lead to damaged interests for all in the region, with the added threat of collateral political damage in Europe, Central Asia, and other dimensions of the transatlantic partnership.

THOMAS E. SEAL
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Sharkansky, Ira. *Policy Making in Israel.* Penna.: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1997. 216pp. $19.95

At a time when government policies in Israel seem to be encouraging "war" between Jew and Jew, or between Israel and the diaspora, it is useful to come across a short work that attempts to explain the "routines for simple problems and coping with the complex." At the outset, Ira Sharkansky of the Hebrew University warns us that while Israel is a Western-style democracy, it is "not truly egalitarian, [since it] proclaims itself a Jewish state . . . [and] the style of its democracy rewards aggressive activists, who know how to maneuver for opportunities outside the framework of formal rules." It is also interesting to find an Israeli writer who candidly discusses the issue of emigration, and equally, who uses the term "occupied" when referring to the "administered" territories.

The author reminds us of the dangers of too closely comparing Israel with other democracies, for it suffers from memories of the Holocaust as well as the effects of wars with its neighbors and sustained terrorist attacks. Moreover, Israel's circumstances require a financial outlay five to ten times greater than that of other democracies, while the needs for censorship and security-directed regulations—including "moderate physical pressure" when interrogating detainees—exceed what is acceptable elsewhere. It is also useful to be reminded that the "Arab-Israeli problem is a loosely related cluster of problems involving Israelis and Palestinians, Jews and Moslems, the government of Israel and several Arab states, and rival groups within the Israeli and Arab populations. No problem has an objective existence."

Insofar as the Middle East peace process is concerned, it is "multidimensional with numerous parties, each

having some claims against the other that may get in the way of the primary Arab-Israeli dispute. At times, Syria and Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians, and Syria and Lebanon have preferred to secure points against one another at the expense of progress in resolving their disputes with Israel. Many kinds of antagonism affect the peace bargaining. Negotiators must be patient in waiting for opportunities," recognizing that any Israeli government (not merely Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud administration) has internal problems to contend with as well, not the least of them the "Holy Land" contentions of the ultra religious.

Writing in 1997 not long after Netanyahu's election, Sharkansky commented that "it is too early to determine whether the differences in style from the Rabin-Peres governments signal differences in the substance of Israel's policy" regarding Mideast peace. By mid-1998 the answer had become clear, even if one restricts oneself to noting the manner in which the government no longer sought to prevent Jews from moving into what might be considered Arab areas of Jerusalem. Moreover, we may be inclined to question the political acumen of one who could honestly suggest that the "end of the Arab-Israeli conflicts, or at least the prospect of an end, has come with the collapse of the Soviet Union."

Is it only Arab activists who view Jerusalem as the locus of a military crusade by government-assisted fanatics who want to march on the holy city, slaughter the infidels, and restore religious purity, especially if one bears in mind that the three religions competing for it rely on "theological notions of monopoly and exclusivity"? Sharkansky suggests that one way out of the Jerusalem dilemma might be to recognize the dual meaning of that name, distinguishing the "holy city" from the municipality, enabling the sharing of the responsibilities of administration, granting control of the hole places to particular religions affected, recognizing Orient House as a Palestinian government centre, devolving control over local services, and giving the city's inhabitants the "opportunity to choose which national entity they want to associate with. The status of Jerusalem's Palestinian residents could resemble that of Israelis who are also citizens of the United States or other countries that permit dual citizenship." But does United States nationality law recognize dual citizenship? It is irrelevant that Israeli law may do so.

Another problem facing Israel is the desire of large segments of its population to proclaim the need to abide by the words of the Torah, while others cling to the nation's position as it was in 1948, and yet others remind the authorities that the world does not stand still and that accommodation to meet political and technological changes and developments is essential (a situation perhaps similar to U.S. Supreme Court judgments made when interpreting modern legislation in light of the eighteenth-century Constitution). In other words, Israel must "cope," as does every other country, and "the elemental requirements of coping are to avoid impossible aspirations and to continue with the theme of accommodations where they already

show signs of evolving. Since 1967 things could have been much worse, but they can be made better." It is for this reason, Sharkansky suggests, while conceding that Israel has special problems, that the manner in which it seeks to cope with them is "useful for understanding other places as well. The treatment of each problem examined in this book has parallels elsewhere."

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Levison, Jeffrey L., and Randy L. Edwards. *Missile Inbound: The Attack on the **Stark** in the Persian Gulf.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. 160pp. $28.95

In 1987, while patrolling the Persian Gulf in international waters, USS *Stark* (FFG 31) was attacked by an Iraqi F-1 aircraft with two Exocet missiles. Although *Stark* had correctly identified and tracked the aircraft, the ship did not fire a shot in self-defense, and it was struck by both missiles. *Missile Inbound* comprehensively documents the attack, the damage control effort, and the subsequent investigation. The story is both an inspiring tale of heroism and a stern warning of how well-intentioned people can fail with disastrous consequences.

Damage control, though not the main focus of the book, deserves special mention. The second chapter contains an exciting account; it reads like a Tom Clancy novel but has the advantage of being true. Although the inevitable use of Navy terminology may make it difficult for some readers, anyone who has ever participated in a shipboard fire drill will enjoy this section. Useful diagrams are included that illustrate rhe challenge faced by the crew of the *Stark*.

However, the book does contain some flaws. The heart of *Missile Inbound* is devoted to the investigation of the attack. Most of the information presented is taken directly from testimony given during the investigation and is thoroughly documented. However, the choice of quotes seems to display a bias in favor of the executive officer and tactical action officer (TAO) and against the commanding officer. For example, Levison and Edwards severely criticize the commanding officer of the *Stark*, Commander G. R. Brindel, for not having accepted full responsibility for rhe incident at the investigation—possibly shielding subordinate officers from punishment. They speculate that Commander Brindel did this on the advice of counsel, but they seem not to have attempted to ask either person if that was actually the case. In contrast, the TAO's attorney is quoted extensively. Randy Edwards himself represented the executive officer. The absence of input from either Commander Brindel or his counsel makes the discussion unbalanced.

The chapters on the investigation also fail to clarify two important points. First, the *Stark* apparently never detected the incoming missiles on radar, but the text is unclear as to whether or not it should have expected to detect them. Secondly, there is extensive discussion about at what point *Stark* should have issued UHF radio warnings to the Iraqi aircraft, whereas in the

last chapter the authors state that the aircraft did not even have a UHF radio. If this is the case, then the question should have been why U.S. forces did not know that planes flown by our "allies" did not have UHF capability.

Both authors are attorneys, and the chapters describing the investigation and legal proceedings benefit greatly from their expertise. Edwards has over twenty years of military experience in the active and reserve Marine Corps, as is clearly evident in his ability to place events in their proper context. All legal terms are clearly explained so that a layman may follow the proceedings without difficulty. Levison and Edwards also spell out every Navy acronym. Unfortunately, in many cases the words behind the acronyms are not enough to convey to someone without recent Navy experience what the term means. A glossary would have made the book accessible to a wider range of readers.

Missile Inbound presents its story in a manner sympathetic to the officers of the *Stark* while maintaining overall loyalty to the concept of accountability. The authors question whether any other ship would have done better in the same circumstances. The *Stark* incident challenges anyone interested in national security: how well will units untested in actual combat perform in the first minutes of battle? How do we know when training has been sufficient? In peacetime, how does one choose officers who will be effective in combat? While *Missile Inbound* does not answer these questions, it provides interesting material for the debate.

LILLIAN A. BURKE
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

(*We note with sadness Lieutenant Burke's passing on 2 May 1998.*)

Hynes, Samuel. *The Soldiers' Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War.* New York: Penguin, 1997. 318pp. $24.95

Based on a series of lectures given by Samuel Hynes at the University of Toronto in 1994, this book is an extended rumination on twentieth-century war memoirs. The author's stated purpose is to understand what war is actually like by studying the stories of veterans about their wartime experiences. He contends that because wars exact such great costs from society, it has been deemed necessary to surround them with "myths." These myths are not untruths, he writes, but rather simplified narratives that have evolved from war to give it meaning. There are "bad," "good," and "necessary" wars; nonetheless, and however politically necessary they may be in justifying war's terrible costs, these myths obscure its grim realities—realities found only in personal narratives. Hynes believes that by setting these personal narratives against the myths of war we can learn the whole story, not just what is politically acceptable.

However, in his search to discover what war is really like (not just the "war in the head" we imagine), the author faced considerable obstacles. For one, he concedes that war narratives are ultimately contradictory. Indeed, some say that war is an unmitigated disaster, others that it is an experience not to be missed. Another problem is that most veterans are emphatic that the experience cannot be communicated—if you

were not there, you cannot understand. (There is, of course, an element of irony in this stance; why write about an event that cannot be communicated?) Yet despite the lack of agreement about the nature of wartime experience and the consensus that the experience, in any case, cannot be communicated, Hynes maintains that reading such works are indispensable, because they bring us closer to understanding what war is really like.

Hynes brings impressive credentials to the book, as a Marine pilot in World War II, the author of a number of books on war and literature, and a former professor of literature at Swarthmore College, Northwestern University, and Princeton University. His military experience affords him an insider's insight into war, while his scholarly background equips him to judge the literary merits of war narratives and to render his judgments in a fine prose style. In short, Hynes possesses a sharp eye for detail, a good ear for authenticity, and the ability to communicate in an authoritative and engaging fashion.

The book's six chapters examine, in order: World Wars I and II, "which made modern war global and technological and democratic"; Vietnam, "which changed the way Americans thought about their nation in the world"; and what Hynes considers the undeclared war waged in this century against the weak—prisoners of war, victims of the Holocaust, and Japanese civilians in Hiroshima during the atomic bomb attack. According to Hynes, each of the above is a mythmaking conflict that has shaped our understanding of the meaning of war.

The book begins slowly. Despite Hynes's knowledge of World War I, his treatment of that war is relatively uninspired. There are few memorable lines, save for the quotes, and his examination is more descriptive than analytical. Given the historical richness and complexity of World War I and Hynes's considerable credentials, his handling of it is somewhat disappointing.

Fortunately, the book picks up steam as it goes along; each chapter is better than the one preceding it. Hynes's writing becomes more passionate and his analysis cuts deeper.

In the chapter on the Second World War, Hynes argues that the men who fought in it had read, and were powerfully influenced by, the canonical literature of World War I. Ironically, the "antiwar" myth created by that literature had fostered among its readers a new kind of romanticism about war. As a result, the World War II generation of soldiers was as enamored of, as much as appalled by, the carnage described in these books. Hynes argues that deep down these men, who were coming into manhood in the late 1930s, longed to fight their own war rather than experience it vicariously.

The chapter on the Vietnam War is perhaps the most emotionally charged in the book. Hynes clearly has strong feelings about it and makes no attempt to hide them. He states that Vietnam brought new voices to the genre of war literature. In previous wars of the twentieth century the most notable memoirs had been written by members of the middle class. Vietnam broke this pattern. This war was largely fought and recorded by America's poor, unemployed, urban youth. Culturally and

socially distinct from earlier generations of soldiers, Vietnam veterans changed the vocabulary of war memoirs. They introduced into the genre a more prominent role for sex and a coarseness of language heretofore mostly absent. Hynes also notes the direct influence of music on U.S. soldiers in Vietnam. Rock and roll was the voice of this generation of soldiers, and their music's defiant antiestablishment, and often antiwar, stance is a constant undercurrent throughout most of the narratives. Indeed, Hynes finds that Vietnam memoirs are uniquely filled with bitterness and humiliation.

An unexpected treat is the chapter on victims of war who are routinely forgotten in standard histories of armed conflict. The author makes a compelling case that these individuals' experiences are just as valuable to our understanding of war as those of soldiers in the thick of battle. We learn in their writings much, for example, about the psychology of prisoners of war: how they view themselves, how they view each other, and how they are viewed by their captors. The sections on the survivors of the Holocaust and of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima are also fascinating. They offer gripping accounts of merely surviving in the face of unbelievable horrors.

One useful category of individuals left out of the book is war correspondents. The members of the Fourth Estate make a brief appearance in the chapter on Vietnam, but only to illustrate America's growing disillusionment with the conflict. Their absence from the book is unfortunate. They are distinct from the other groups represented here, as noncombatants who voluntarily place themselves on the frontlines; yet like the groups represented in the book, journalists have experienced the blasts of war, and many have lost their lives as a result of it (the legendary Ernie Pyle comes to mind). Their inclusion would have offered the perspective of trained observers duty bound to report events as accurately as possible.

Another shortcoming of the book, albeit minor, is the lack of subheadings. The text moves through various topics with no breaks, save for additional space between certain paragraphs. Had the author instead used more prominent visual clues and made more of an effort to divide the chapters into sections, he would have imposed greater order on the text and made it easier to read and understand.

The book's positives far outweigh its negatives. Hynes has sifted through a large set of war memoirs and come up with a gem of a book. *The Soldiers' Tale* is a judicious, entertaining, and surehanded examination of wartime experience through the prism of twentieth-century war narratives. This book deserves the attention of those who wish to understand war beyond tactics, battles, campaigns, and high policy by confronting the voice of raw experience.

MICHAEL CRESWELL
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Knott, Richard A. *A Heritage of Wings: An Illustrated History of Naval Aviation*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. 339pp. $49.95

Interesting and informative, this book offers a well written introduction to

U.S. naval aviation for those new to the subject. It also offers an appealing compendium of facts and anecdotes for the aviation devotee. Dick Knott's book is easy to read and provides well organized summaries of the principal actors and key events in the history of aviation in the maritime service. The subject lends itself to the visual sense, and reader appeal is enhanced by roughly two hundred photographs of notables, aircraft, and incidents, and by helpful diagrams and charts. The illustrations provide the reader with a link to the humanity of the history, to the sometimes obscure and occasionally larger-than-life men about whom the book is written, and to their legacy.

Knott begins by tracing the general evolution of nascent military aviation but soon abandons parallel developments of U.S. Army and European aviation to focus on the United States Navy. For the rest of the book the center of attention, except for an occasional foray to the Marine Corps, is on the Navy and its people. Rich detail is plentiful in the early chapters, less so in the chapters on more recent years—probably reflecting the greater number of primary sources from earlier in this century. The author recounts many hair-raising adventures of the early aviation pioneers, and he details the bureaucratic trials and tribulations of those laboring to establish aviation in a service not noted for easy adaptation to change. All branches of aviation development receive their due: seaplanes, lighter-than-air machines, rotary and fixed-wing aircraft, and naval astronauts in space. The evolution of the aircraft carrier and of its aircraft and the principal role they have played in U.S. naval history are discussed in detail. The author's background in maritime patrol aviation is evident in frequent references to milestones in land-based naval air. Early aircraft and related equipment designs are chronicled and highlighted as "dry holes" or as winners. The impact of combat, the world wars in particular, and the interesting boost to fledging carrier aviation provided by the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty make good reading.

Knott delivers his punch line midway in the book, at the end of an excellent section on World War II: "Naval aviation was no longer a question mark. . . . The old myth put forth by Billy Mitchell and others that carrier aircraft could not operate against land-based aviation had been debunked repeatedly. . . . The stalwart advocates of naval aviation in general, and carrier aviation in particular, had been fully vindicated."

I concur with the author's assessment in a later chapter that the misapplication of U.S. air power during the Vietnam War presaged eventual defeat for the United States. Knott outlines the errors of civilian leadership and policy in those years, injecting numerous anecdotes highlighting the courage and sacrifice by naval aviators in Southeast Asia, but he fails to hold naval or other U.S. military leaders accountable for not speaking out publicly or exposing the flawed policies.

The most recent two decades of Navy aviation history are examined in less depth than the previous seven, but overall the book provides a good, encapsulated, and visually stimulating history. I found only a few errors regarding units and numbers with which

I am personally familiar, and I give the author high marks for accuracy.

In conclusion, it was a pleasure for this former midshipman fourth class to read, and an honor to review, this book written by Richard C. Knott, his first naval science instructor at the Villanova University Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) Unit. No doubt the author's admiration and enthusiasm for, and advocation of, naval aviation thirty-five years ago had some influence on the future career path of this reviewer. It is a proud heritage of wings.

WILLIAM J. FALLON
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

Poolman, Kenneth. *The Winning Edge: Naval Technology in Action, 1939–1945.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. 256pp. $32.95

In this study on the impact of technology on World War II's naval campaigns, Kenneth Poolman describes the development of a variety of naval sensor and weapon systems and analyzes their use during the war at sea. Poolman, a World War II veteran of the Royal Navy, is a prolific writer on naval combat, and his book demonstrates his mastery of naval technology.

The author begins by describing how Allied navies turned to new technology—including Asdic (sonar), radar, high-frequency direction finding, antisubmarine mortars, and rockets—in response to Germany's naval campaign against Allied supply lines. He also describes how the Germans fielded acoustic torpedoes, the *Schnörkel*, and radio-controlled bombs to strengthen their blockade. While the author gives greatest emphasis to the Battle of the Atlantic, he also devotes considerable attention to the war in the Pacific, examining the development of carrier aviation, surface-search and fire-control radar, and cryptanalysis by the U.S. Navy.

Given the breadth of his subject and the brevity of the volume, the author's description of naval technology is occasionally terse to the point of confusion. Even the technologically proficient reader is likely to stumble, for example, over the author's discussion of the evolution of sonar systems. The book also contains a number of mistakes. Poolman argues that the German air force dropped its plans to develop a heavy bomber because such an aircraft was unnecessary; in fact, the Luftwaffe canceled its heavy-bomber programs—the Do-19 and Ju-89—in 1937 because of slow progress in developing engines for the aircraft and resource constraints as much as the low priority of the aircraft in a continental war.

While the book's title makes it "the winning edge," naval technology is at best a partial explanation of tactical success and failure. At the outbreak of World War II the Japanese navy possessed the world's best fighter aircraft, the Mitsubishi A6N Zeke (or Zero), as well as the world's most highly trained aviators. In the end, the United States beat Japan not by fielding its own superior technology but by developing tactics to counter superior Japanese aircraft technology. Similarly, the U.S. Navy took a pounding during the Guadalcanal campaign despite its substantial lead in naval radar. Technology clearly

played a role in the Japanese navy's effectiveness; the Japanese possessed the Type 93 (Long Lance) oxygen-propelled torpedo, a weapon with range, speed, and payload much greater than those of contemporary American and British weapons. Here again, however, technology is at best a partial explanation: the Japanese navy inflicted considerable losses upon Allied naval forces off Guadalcanal because it had developed a coherent tactical system for conducting night combat, one that included operational concepts and organizations allowing it to employ its technology (much of it seeming today decidedly "low-tech," such as high-quality optics) to maximum effect. These examples suggest that while technology is an important element of victory, it does not by itself offer a winning edge.

THOMAS MAHNKEN
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Stevens, David, ed. *The Royal Australian Navy in World War II.* Allen & Unwin, 1996. 212pp. (approximately $23 U.S.)

This book represents the outcome of a conference titled "The Royal Australian Navy in World War II," which was held in Australia in 1995 as part of a nationwide program, sponsored by the Australian federal government, called "Australia Remembers 1945–95." The book is an edited collection of papers presented at that conference, and as such it is quite different from many of the more traditional histories with which many of us are familiar.

I was immediately struck by the diversity of subjects covered, which range from analysis of strategic and policy considerations, through commentary on selected operations, to discussion of industrial and demographic influences. Indeed it would be fair to say that there is something for everyone in this collection, which is well edited and presents a readable and coherent account of its subjects.

The contributors to the book are as diverse as its topics, including both professional and part-time historians, as well as people who were actually involved in the events discussed. This adds a unique dimension to the book, and the mixture of backgrounds and treatments generally works well.

The book contains an excellent summary chapter by Frank Broeze, and for many readers this might be a very good place to start; it will serve to focus consideration of the individual chapters. Because of its nature, this publication does not attempt to address any topic in great depth; however, enough detail of events is provided to support the commentary and analysis. What this does is invite the reader to conduct further reading and research.

Many chapters represent only a first step in examining issues that have in the past received scant attention. Typical of this are the chapters on the industry perspective by Chris Coulthard-Clark, the role of women by Kathryn Spurling, and social and demographic issues by Jason Sears. As a surface warfare specialist, I was particularly interested in Bruce Loxton's account of the loss of HMAS *Canberra* in the battle of Savo Island. The author was serving in *Canberra* at the time and has made a

detailed, long-term study of that battle to support his conclusion that the ship was lost to friendly fire, in the form of torpedoes from a U.S. destroyer. His chapter inspires one to read his more complete work on the battle.

There is one chapter, however, that left me wondering at its inclusion: "The Forgotten Bases: The Royal Navies in the Pacific, 1945." This contribution by David Brown has an almost total Royal Navy focus and is not in harmony with the remainder of the book.

Those who had the vision to organize the conference from which this collection of papers was derived deserve particular praise. The result has quite significantly improved our understanding of the history of the Royal Australian Navy during the Second World War. We are all products of history, and the way we operate and continue to develop into the future is heavily influenced by that history. This book points to why the Royal Australian Navy has developed the way it has since the end of World War II. There is much more history to be written and evaluated. This volume sets a firm foundation for that work.

GEOFF MORTON
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Walker, Mark. *Nazi Science: Myth, Truth, and the German Atomic Bomb.* New York: Plenum Press, 1995. 325pp. $28.95

Among the many books to have come to press concerning the behavior of German scientists in the environment created by Hitler, *Nazi Science* presents the most balanced view. The popular conception of German scientists, especially nuclear physicists, in that era is that they easily fit into three distinct categories, Nazi, anti-Nazi, and neither one nor the other. This trichotomy is too simplistic a categorization of the mixed motivations that existed and induced individual behavior. For most scientists then, day-to-day realities made them behave in a complex and inconsistent manner.

Mark Walker presents a coherent view of German science and dispels the myths presented to us by proponents with varying agendas. The selective disclosure of excerpts of the Farm Hall recordings by Leslie Groves in *Now It Can Be Told* (2nd ed., Da Capo, 1983); Samuel A. Goudsmit's *Alsos* (2nd ed., Tomash, 1983); self-serving revisionism by Carl Friedrich von Weizsacker and Werner Heisenberg, propagated by Robert Jungk's 1958 bestseller *Brighter than a Thousand Suns* (Harcourt, Brace) and by Thomas Powers's *Heisenberg's War: The Secret History of the German Bomb* (Knopf, 1993) are all placed into context in this well documented history. Walker shows how one of Hitler's first and most loyal followers, the Nobel laureate Johannes Stark, was rejected in the end by the Third Reich establishment in favor of "White Jews," like Werner Heisenberg. Science under National Socialism remains controversial, fascinating, and disturbing, because it is the history of scientists as *fellow travelers*, adjusting their behavior and what they said to avoid difficulty with authorities. This pattern abetted opportunistic individuals who

rode the party bandwagon for the purpose of self-aggrandizement.

Nazi Science is recommended reading for the student of history who appreciates the complexities of human motivations and who can accept a world containing many shades of gray. In order best to appreciate Mark Walker's book, one is encouraged to read beforehand at least one of the many books about the era, such as *Lise Meitner: A Life in Physics*, by Ruth Lewin Sime (Univ. of California Press, 1996), or *Hitler's Uranium Club: The Secret Recordings at Farm Hall*, by Jeremy Bernstein and David Cassidy (American Institute of Physics, 1995), or one of the books mentioned above. With some prior knowledge of the Nazi nuclear effort, the reader should be able to comprehend and appreciate the nuances exposed here.

If there is a shortcoming in this book, it is perhaps in the title. *Nazi Science* pertains almost exclusively to Nazi nuclear science and neglects the other subfields of physics, let alone the disciplines of genetics, anthropology, biology, and so on. These fields were perhaps more adversely affected than was nuclear science.

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Vause, Jordan. *Wolf: U-Boat Commanders in World War II.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. 249pp. $29.95

Jordan Vause captures the history and tradition of Germany's submarine service through an exemplary analysis of its commanders. Determined to find common threads of character and personality, he begins his narrative with imperial Germany's World War I strategy of unlimited submarine warfare, continues through the murderously effective World War II wolf pack, and concludes with a relevant postmortem on the ultimate tragedy of that war's destructive aftermath. Ironically, rather than proving the existence of a common *anima* of personal and professional behavior, in the end the author finds that "the man [U-boat commander] was stubborn in eluding any image at all." Nonetheless, the richness of Jordan's research and his comfortable manner of narration perfectly complement the considerable historical value of this book.

Wolf is not a sympathetic treatment of the often relentlessly effective German submarine service (U-Bootwaffe). Vause's success lies in his development of a personal, understanding, and yet incisive portrayal of Germany's World War II U-Bootwaffe commanders—uniform, and yet individually unique. Attempting to construct the persona of the Reichmarine's undersea service, Vause functions as a forensic pathologist, largely disproving a propagandist view of savagely efficient automatons bent on mindless slaughter at sea. He lays open to critical review the professional zeal and individual élan of the U-boat commanders, who sank millions of tons of Allied shipping at a cost of thousands of lives—actions that came perilously close to bringing Great Britain to its knees. Carefully fitting personalities over the stick-figure caricatures, he allows individual U-boat commanders to emerge as crafted

images subside. Of particular interest is Vause's treatment of Karl Dönitz—paternalistic submarine force commander, commander in chief of the German navy, National Socialist sympathizer, Führer, and ultimately convicted war criminal.

Wolf is an excellent book, highly recommended for both the casual reader and the serious student of military history. An extract from the foreword by Jürgen Oesten, commander of U-61, U-106, and U-861 and recipient of the Knight's Cross, is fitting: "In the beginning, a war is exciting; toward the end, it is a bloody gamble in which you try to achieve the maximum result with an acceptable risk so as to have at least some chance of staying alive. If the U-boat commander had the ability to detach himself from the actual situation, if he had been able to look at himself as though on a movie screen and judge on that basis, his decisions might have been better. You, the reader, have that ability. Please judge fairly."

SAVERIO DE RUGGIERO
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Sondhaus, Lawrence. *Preparing for Weltpolitik: German Sea Power before the Tirpitz Era*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. 344pp. $39.95

As Lawrence Sondhaus tells us, for a long time the North German coastal kingdoms and independent city-states got along without a navy. It was not until 1848 that the idea of a navy arose seriously. This was when, despite the wishes of their German populations, the king of Denmark decided to incorporate into his realm the adjacent duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. After the Danish army defeated the king's opponents, Prussia and other neighbors sprang to the rescue. In response, the Danish navy blockaded the German ports, strangled their trade, and thus forced a stalemate.

It was this embarrassing condition that led to the sentiment among Germans for a navy of their own. What they got was slow in coming, uncertain of purpose, and—while the German armies were winning wars against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870)—barren of accomplishment.

Commanded for years by a succession of Prussian generals, after the unification of Germany the navy (now called the Imperial Navy) acquired enough new ships for the work it attempted, though for long those ships and their engines, armor, and weapons came from foreign builders. Though the generals saw the navy's politico-military value, they ensured that its budget never grew so large as to affect that of the army. Each winter most of the ships went into hibernation and the sailors learned infantry tactics. Perhaps as a consequence, German seamanship was abominable, German accidents were numerous, and German naval tactics hardly existed.

It was not until 1888, many years after its beginning, that the German navy came under the command of an admiral. Even so, it was a service with little to boast about. In 1892, of Europe's six great navies it was fifth in size, just behind that of Italy and just ahead of Austria-Hungary's.

But change was coming. In 1890 Rear Admiral Alfred Tirpitz took command of the Baltic station. Tirpitz saw that there was no connection between a shore-bound admiral's sparse operational plans (focused on fighting Russia, France, or both together) and the fleet's tactical abilities to carry out such plans. Tirpitz "argued that the best tactics were worthless if the captains and crews of the fleet could not execute simple maneuvers." Officers and crews had to be able to "operate individual ships competently, as a prerequisite to maneuvering with other ships in a squadron." (This new emphasis on shiphandling and tactics was to last; at Jutland in 1916 the High Seas Fleet demonstrated both fine individual ship skills and excellent large-formation tactics.)

Not because he was well liked, nor because he was a man of principle (he was neither), but because he was brighter and more forceful than any of the kaiser's other admirals, in 1897 Tirpitz became state secretary of the Imperial Navy Office and the most influential officer of his time. Sondhaus tells us that his political victories in the Reichstag in 1898 and 1900 "set Tirpitz on a course to become the most successful political figure in the history of the Second Reich, after Bismarck."

Adept as he was at both political and naval tactics, Tirpitz was not a strategist of any sort, diplomatic, military, or naval. But his vigorous activities in those lines pleased his emperor, the unsuitable Wilhelm II, and made the admiral world famous. As Sondhaus illustrates, Tirpitz's naval strategic thought was that of a child, his diplomatic strategic thought that of a lunatic. Though it is just beyond the scope of this book, between them Tirpitz and the kaiser built in German shipyards, with German engines, armor, and weapons, a great fleet. They also created out of a once-friendly Great Britain an even greater enemy, an achievement that made their great fleet unemployable.

Sondhaus brings these people and events (most of them unknown in the United States) to our attention in this handy-sized book, a book written clearly, concisely, and interestingly. Moreover, he has made sure that his publisher provided both sufficient illustrations of the people, ships, and events of which he writes and enough maps of the areas that his readers will need to know. Together Sondhaus and the Naval Institute Press have given us an excellent book.

FRANK UHLIG, JR.
Naval War College

Martin, James Kirby. *Benedict Arnold, Revolutionary Hero: An American Warrior Reconsidered.* New York: New York Univ. Press, 1997. 540pp. $34.95

No military officer has received such universal condemnation as Benedict Arnold, the Continental general who sought to deliver George Washington and Fortress West Point to the British in 1780. Arnold has attracted his share of biographers in recent years, including Clare Brandt (*The Man in the Mirror*) and Willard Sterne Randall (*Benedict Arnold: Patriot and Traitor*). Adding his name to this list is James Kirby Martin,

a professor of history at the University of Houston and author of *A Respectable Army*, who succeeds admirably in presenting the most comprehensive view of his controversial subject.

Martin seeks not to remodel our perception of Arnold but to place Arnold in the context of historical realism, as part of his overall objective of reconsidering all the evidence and avoiding facile judgments. Too frequently, Martin posits, our perception of Arnold has been shaped by the retrospective prism of his treason. To comprehend Arnold more completely, the author reckons properly with Arnold's times. Arnold was hardly the only patriot who returned his allegiance to the crown, but the magnitude of his contributions to the revolutionary effort made his treason all the more reprehensible. What Martin does effectively is restore balance to our study of Arnold and explain Arnold's subsequent treason.

The beginning of Arnold is not 1780, the year of bis treason, but 1741, that of his birth. Detailing his troubled childhood and his ascent to social and economic prominence as a New Haven merchant, Martin chronicles Arnold's emergence as the finest tactical commander in the Continental Army during the initial years of the Revolution. Along with Ethan Allen and his "Green Mountain boys," Arnold participated in the capture of Fort Ticonderoga in May 1775 and later commanded a wing of the American army that invaded Canada. Though he was wounded in the unsuccessful assault on Quebec, Arnold returned to a hero's welcome.

Promoted to brigadier general, he enhanced his martial reputation by destroying a British flotilla on Lake Champlain in 1776. Though denied a promotion that he felt he deserved, Arnold put personal bitterness aside to rout the right wing of "Gentleman Johnny" Burgoyne's army at the crucial battle of Saratoga. Had Arnold been among the slain at Saratoga, he would have been remembered as an American Hannibal. Instead, Martin's Arnold is an embittered officer, smarting from congressional bickering and favoritism that repeatedly led to promotion of officers far junior to him and far less conspicuous in battle.

It is with Saratoga that the reader begins to see the darker side of Arnold's character. By Arnold's standards Congress was corrupting the ideals of the Revolution, as evidenced not by his personal humiliation but the near deification of Horatio Gates as the "hero of Saratoga." Whereas Gates obtained a gold medal to commemorate the victory, Arnold sustained a debilitating would that left him a cripple and "defamed his personal honor."

Arnold's post-Saratoga career validated his worst conceptions of the Continental Congress. By the spring of 1778, Arnold had evolved into a disenchanted patriot. Given command of Philadelphia after the British evacuation of the American capital in June, he again ran afoul of Congress when several delegates accused him of improprieties and demanded a court-martial. Though he was exonerated on all but two minor charges, Arnold's disillusionment was complere. In the eyes of this officer, who had put aside personal prosperity and family obligations to serve the Continental cause, Congress had abandoned its principles.

His final descent into treachery was problematic and needs little scrutiny here. Indeed Martin reserves but a few pages to address the actual betrayal at West Point. By 1780 the Revolution had reached its nadir, and Arnold himself had discarded its ideals. With his commitment to virtuous service completely eroded, he forsook the cause to which he had dedicated so much energy. Therein lies the true tragedy of Benedict Arnold.

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Shenk, David. *Data Smog: Surviving the Information Glut.* San Francisco, Calif.: Harper Edge, 1997. 250pp. $24

For most of history, the quest for knowledge and its component, information, promised to improve the quality of people's lives. In this century many in the national security community have come to believe that more information will increase the quality of policy makers' decisions. But is information *power*? Shenk argues that technology has increased the amount of information available to such an extent that very little of it is of any use. Scholars, researchers, and decision makers can become stricken with "analysis paralysis"—either swamped in too much information that is of too little use, or forever waiting for the next piece of information to come in before taking action or making a decision. Shenk is not antitechnology but rather a techno-skeptic: technology allows us to do what we do faster and in more abundance, but not always better. Technology does not fix systemic organizational problems; applying it as a cure-all increases implementation costs and does not lead to solutions of management difficulties. Moreover, it is not a substitute for sound thinking and good policy.

For the first time in history, then, increasing the amount of information is not the automatic solution to a problem. While this book is written for a general, almost "pop," audience, it should be of interest to crisis decision makers and the intelligence community in particular. It is written in easy-to-understand, conversational language, which makes the author's points easy to generalize to other contexts.

What the book lacks, however, is a satisfactory suggestion for dealing with today's increase of information. The author suggests limiting our overload by decreasing our use of technology (the Internet, e-mail, faxes, etc.) to gather information, and increasing the amount of time set aside for reflection about a *reasonable* amount of data. This is a good start, but what is needed to deal with "data smog" is more rigorous thinking *about* the information and where a given piece of information "fits." In short, we need better theory and policy regarding what is being observed, sought, and so on. Pieces of information are like grains of sand—you should not need to see each grain to know that you are on a beach, and you should not need to see each grain to know that there will be high and low tides on that beach. We can know these things because we have a general theory of the sea. The result is the development of "rules of thumb," or shortcuts to information, which speed up its evaluation and interpretation and

thus prevent analysis paralysis. Policy makers and commanders in the field do not need all the information that technology affords them, because, as Shenk points out, beyond a certain level of information the quality of the decision product diminishes. Increasing information results in a need for better frameworks for evaluating that information. *Data Smog* provides little insight toward developing them; nonetheless, it is a helpful book for identifying information overload and its consequences, as well as an important first step toward solving the problem.

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