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## Policy Making in Israel

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and growing tension between the United States and its allies over the wisdom of embargoes and sanctions. The essays are well researched and well written, and they provide keen analysis and practical suggestions for policy improvement. They are also interactive, in that the authors comment on each other's work throughout—a useful technique for highlighting points of agreement and differences of opinion.

In their final analysis the editors suggest that a decade of regional tranquility would render moot the many diverging transatlantic interests and policies that bedevil regional politics today.

Unfortunately, they see little chance that the next decade will bring tranquillity or stability. That leaves the United States and its allies at odds over a series of serious problems, which none can solve unilaterally. The editors' bottom line is that neither the United States nor Europe can go it alone in the Middle East. A failure on the part of the allies to get their collective act together, however, will lead to damaged interests for all in the region, with the added threat of collateral political damage in Europe, Central Asia, and other dimensions of the transatlantic partnership.

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Sharkansky, Ira. *Policy Making in Israel*.  
Penna.: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press,  
1997. 216pp. \$19.95

At a time when government policies in Israel seem to be encouraging "war"

between Jew and Jew, or between Israel and the diaspora, it is useful to come across a short work that attempts to explain the "routines for simple problems and coping with the complex." At the outset, Ira Sharkansky of the Hebrew University warns us that while Israel is a Western-style democracy, it is "not truly egalitarian, [since it] proclaims itself a Jewish state . . . [and] the style of its democracy rewards aggressive activists, who know how to maneuver for opportunities outside the framework of formal rules." It is also interesting to find an Israeli writer who candidly discusses the issue of emigration, and equally, who uses the term "occupied" when referring to the "administered" territories.

The author reminds us of the dangers of too closely comparing Israel with other democracies, for it suffers from memories of the Holocaust as well as the effects of wars with its neighbors and sustained terrorist attacks. Moreover, Israel's circumstances require a financial outlay five to ten times greater than that of other democracies, while the needs for censorship and security-directed regulations—including "moderate physical pressure" when interrogating detainees—exceed what is acceptable elsewhere. It is also useful to be reminded that the "Arab-Israeli problem is a loosely related cluster of problems involving Israelis and Palestinians, Jews and Moslems, the government of Israel and several Arab states, and rival groups within the Israeli and Arab populations. No problem has an objective existence."

Insofar as the Middle East peace process is concerned, it is "multidimensional with numerous parties, each

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having some claims against the other that may get in the way of the primary Arab-Israeli dispute. At times, Syria and Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians, and Syria and Lebanon have preferred to secure points against one another at the expense of progress in resolving their disputes with Israel. Many kinds of antagonism affect the peace bargaining. Negotiators must be patient in waiting for opportunities," recognizing that any Israeli government (not merely Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud administration) has internal problems to contend with as well, not the least of them the "Holy Land" contentions of the ultra religious.

Writing in 1997 not long after Netanyahu's election, Sharkansky commented that "it is too early to determine whether the differences in style from the Rabin-Peres governments signal differences in the substance of Israel's policy" regarding Mideast peace. By mid-1998 the answer had become clear, even if one restricts oneself to noting the manner in which the government no longer sought to prevent Jews from moving into what might be considered Arab areas of Jerusalem. Moreover, we may be inclined to question the political acumen of one who could honestly suggest that the "end of the Arab-Israeli conflicts, or at least the prospect of an end, has come with the collapse of the Soviet Union."

Is it only Arab activists who view Jerusalem as the locus of a military crusade by government-assisted fanatics who want to march on the holy city, slaughter the infidels, and restore religious purity, especially if one bears in mind that the three religions

competing for it rely on "theological notions of monopoly and exclusivity"? Sharkansky suggests that one way out of the Jerusalem dilemma might be to recognize the dual meaning of that name, distinguishing the "holy city" from the municipality, enabling the sharing of the responsibilities of administration, granting control of the holy places to particular religions affected, recognizing Orient House as a Palestinian government centre, devolving control over local services, and giving the city's inhabitants the "opportunity to choose which national entity they want to associate with. The status of Jerusalem's Palestinian residents could resemble that of Israelis who are also citizens of the United States or other countries that permit dual citizenship." But does United States nationality law recognize dual citizenship? It is irrelevant that Israeli law may do so.

Another problem facing Israel is the desire of large segments of its population to proclaim the need to abide by the words of the Torah, while others cling to the nation's position as it was in 1948, and yet others remind the authorities that the world does not stand still and that accommodation to meet political and technological changes and developments is essential (a situation perhaps similar to U.S. Supreme Court judgments made when interpreting modern legislation in light of the eighteenth-century Constitution). In other words, Israel must "cope," as does every other country, and "the elemental requirements of coping are to avoid impossible aspirations and to continue with the theme of accommodations where they already

show signs of evolving. Since 1967 things could have been much worse, but they can be made better." It is for this reason, Sharkansky suggests, while conceding that Israel has special problems, that the manner in which it seeks to cope with them is "useful for understanding other places as well. The treatment of each problem examined in this book has parallels elsewhere."

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Levison, Jeffrey L., and Randy L. Edwards. *Missile Inbound: The Attack on the Stark in the Persian Gulf*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997. 160pp. \$28.95

In 1987, while patrolling the Persian Gulf in international waters, USS *Stark* (FFG 31) was attacked by an Iraqi F-1 aircraft with two Exocet missiles. Although *Stark* had correctly identified and tracked the aircraft, the ship did not fire a shot in self-defense, and it was struck by both missiles. *Missile Inbound* comprehensively documents the attack, the damage control effort, and the subsequent investigation. The story is both an inspiring tale of heroism and a stern warning of how well-intentioned people can fail with disastrous consequences.

Damage control, though not the main focus of the book, deserves special mention. The second chapter contains an exciting account; it reads like a Tom Clancy novel but has the advantage of being true. Although the inevitable

use of Navy terminology may make it difficult for some readers, anyone who has ever participated in a shipboard fire drill will enjoy this section. Useful diagrams are included that illustrate the challenge faced by the crew of the *Stark*.

However, the book does contain some flaws. The heart of *Missile Inbound* is devoted to the investigation of the attack. Most of the information presented is taken directly from testimony given during the investigation and is thoroughly documented. However, the choice of quotes seems to display a bias in favor of the executive officer and tactical action officer (TAO) and against the commanding officer. For example, Levison and Edwards severely criticize the commanding officer of the *Stark*, Commander G. R. Brindel, for not having accepted full responsibility for the incident at the investigation—possibly shielding subordinate officers from punishment. They speculate that Commander Brindel did this on the advice of counsel, but they seem not to have attempted to ask either person if that was actually the case. In contrast, the TAO's attorney is quoted extensively. Randy Edwards himself represented the executive officer. The absence of input from either Commander Brindel or his counsel makes the discussion unbalanced.

The chapters on the investigation also fail to clarify two important points. First, the *Stark* apparently never detected the incoming missiles on radar, but the text is unclear as to whether or not it should have expected to detect them. Secondly, there is extensive discussion about at what point *Stark* should have issued UHF radio warnings to the Iraqi aircraft, whereas in the