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Digital War: A View from the Front Lines

Erik J. Dahl

Robert L. Bateman

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discussion of the value of using such weapons to deter their use by rogue states. Finally, the chapter by retired general Charles Horner and Barry Schneider examines the feasibility of using counterforce attacks to destroy WMD facilities.

I mention these chapters in particular because they contribute new and useful insights. Unfortunately, while many other chapters are also useful, their value is weakened by their failure to advance our thinking about this problem—surprisingly, since the overall quality of the chapters, which are unusually tightly organized for edited works, suggests that the editors went to considerable lengths to harmonize all the parts into a coherent whole.

As a general observation, this is a useful work that contributes to what we could call the proliferation, nonproliferation, or counterproliferation debates. But the variety of views highlights the underlying weakness of the current debate about WMD. In essence, counterproliferation is a logical extension of nonproliferation, because, as these words suggest, the success of nonproliferation has been less than stellar. The concept of counterproliferation not only implies but trumpets that we must be prepared to counter proliferation because nonproliferation has failed to contain the number of states that possess WMD. This change in the strategic landscape has profound implications for U.S. national security and foreign policy. Yet author after author feels obliged to pay homage to the critical and enduring value of nonproliferation, despite the fact that, as the title of this work suggests, we have moved from preventing proliferation to managing nonproliferation's failures.

As the editors note in the conclusion, "much remains to be done." Their book is an important first step toward analyzing how counterproliferation represents the next step in the search for new ways to deal with the weapons that dominated strategic thinking during much of the twentieth century.

WILLIAM C. MARTEL
Naval War College

Bateman, Robert L., ed. *Digital War: A View from the Front Lines.* Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1999. 299pp. $29.95

In *Digital War*, Captain Robert L. Bateman III, U.S. Army, a history instructor at West Point, has assembled an interesting collection of essays discussing the future of the Army in the digital age. The articles are "from the front lines" in that most of the authors are active-duty Army officers, which makes the book a useful review of what some of the service's most thoughtful writers have to say about such future Army visions as Force XXI and the "Army after Next."

For the most part, the essays take a careful, critical view of the Army's official visions of the future battlefield. Many of the potential problems discussed will be familiar to readers of *Parameters* and other military journals; they include such issues as: Can the United States afford the systems that will truly digitize (or network) the entire military? If we do achieve a completely "networked" force, how will that affect command and control?

One article, by Lieutenant Colonel John A. Antal, veers off into the sort of *Blade Runner* future that Phillip K. Dick describes in his novel of that name. However, for the United States, Antal believes the real bad guys are not the enemies

shooting at us but the craven politicians and other leaders who began making wrong decisions back in the 1990s. In this analysis, the United States has abandoned its conventional military might in favor of an arsenal of long-range precision guided munitions backed up by perfect situational awareness. An Army colonel calls the president on his holographic eyepiece to ask for guidance; before she can answer him, the connection to the global Hypernet goes down, leaving him and his squad alone and very much afraid.

Fortunately, most of the essays are more grounded in reality. The first chapter, by Bateman, discusses how digitization (which is used as shorthand for the current revolution in military affairs) is affecting the tactical battlefield. Bateman uses as a case study the story of the Army's reluctant development of radio between the world wars. This may sound familiar to military personnel today who are trying to adapt to computerization under such rubrics as IT-21.

Radios were issued in the 1920s with little or no technical support—the policy was that infantrymen would install, maintain, and operate their own equipment. During maneuvers, commanders would routinely decline to use their radios and also hide any problems that arose with them, because to acknowledge communications problems might interfere with "real" training. Eventually, the Army was saved from its own failure to embrace technology by simply adopting a commercial, off-the-shelf system: the FM radio used by the Connecticut State Police.

Bateman also discusses the impact that shock and fear may have on the battlefield of the future. He proposes that a "digitized" soldier, equipped with far more information and able to learn about every loss and setback throughout the entire battlespace, may become more, not less, susceptible to shock and fear. This raises questions for proponents of network-centric warfare who argue that the ability to create shock and fear in the enemy will be a great asset to the netted force of the future.

Bateman offers one solution to the problem of equipping and training a military in the age of expensive, quickly changing technology: instead of trying to bring everyone up to the same level, accept the fact that technology changes too quickly. The solution would be a modular army, with one echelon equipped with the latest and greatest technology while the second echelon retains today's equipment. In another five years or so, their positions are reversed; the second echelon receives the latest equipment while the other half retains its now older gear.

A common theme of several of these essays, including a second chapter by Lieutenant Colonel Antal and another by Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Leonhard, is the question of whether or not the use of indirect "fires," enabled by improved targeting data, is replacing maneuver and direct combat on the battlefield. Simply stated, are precision guided munitions the dominant method of future warfare? As far as several of these authors are concerned, the answer is a firm no. "Precision strikes that are not backed up with a continuous battle of decisive maneuver are merely artillery raids set out to punish, not defeat, an opponent," writes Antal.

The final chapter differs from the rest in that it is not written by a serving Army officer; Ed Offley is a military reporter for the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*. He describes "The Military-Media Relationship

in the Digital Age" in an insightful review of current issues in the military-press relationship. One lesson of the Gulf War, he writes, is that "the news media is not the enemy, but rather the battleground on which the struggle for public support, congressional funding, and political decision making will be fought." Despite the generally improved relations between the military and the press in recent years, Offley believes this relationship will face several challenges in the future. Advances in satellite communications and portable computing will continue to make reporters more independent of military control. At the same time, military units will face even closer media scrutiny in the future, as investigative reporters use "data mining" techniques to search through quantities of information on the Internet and elsewhere, and as commercial satellite imagery becomes more widely available. In addition, Offley predicts there will be increasing pressure to allow recording and actual broadcast of live combat.

Several chapters, such as those discussing the future of the Army National Guard and Army education and officer personnel policies, may hold little interest for a joint audience. But there is a great deal in this book that will interest anyone following the debate over the shape of the U.S. military in the information age.

ERIK J. DAHL
Commander, U.S. Navy

Holbrooke, Richard. *To End a War.* New York: Random House, 1998. 410pp. $15.95

To End a War is an interesting visit to the inner workings of the art of international negotiations. The reader accompanies Ambassador Holbrooke on his journey in search of an end to the war in

Bosnia-Herzegovina. The path he takes is winding and laced with harrowing twists, switchbacks, and a few dead ends. He writes in a clear and forthright manner that keeps the reader's attention throughout the book even though the outcome is known.

Holbrooke opens with a review of his trip over Mount Igman in August 1995, in which three of his colleagues were killed in a tragic military vehicle accident. This loss is still deeply felt by the author; however, he often points out how little it meant to others outside his circle when placed in perspective of the tens of thousands who had already died.

The remainder of the book is divided into four sections. The first, "Bosnia at War," covers Holbrooke's introduction to the conflict and introduces the key players. He gives a candid and bleak description of the situation at the time that the United States was still considering its options and the UN was already deep in the morass of the Balkans. The Clinton administration, still smarting after the Somalia debacle, had little appetite for another adventure into a seemingly endless civil war. Europe and the UN were simply not achieving their aims, and conditions were only getting worse.

"The Shuttle," the second section, is perhaps the most interesting. Holbrooke details how he and his team patched together a shaky consensus among a diverse group of international leaders and power brokers in the Balkans, Europe, and America. The negotiations leading up to the Dayton accord were filled with intrigue, plots, and subplots. Since many of the parties involved were the same ones we later see in the Kosovo crisis, the insights provided are absorbing. The description of Slobodan Milosevic leaves one with a deep appreciation for his