Naval War College Review

Volume 52
Number 3 *Summer*

Article 9

1999

Book Reviews

The U.S. Naval War College

BOOK REVIEWS

A Systems-Level Theory of Politics and International Relations

Jervis, Robert. *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1997. 328pp. $45

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY'S ROBERT JERVIS has consistently been one of the most interesting and influential scholars of international relations for nearly thirty years. With such pathbreaking studies to his credit as *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1976) and *The Logic of Images in International Relations* (Columbia University Press, 1989), Jervis long ago solidified his place among the elite scholars studying international affairs. *System Effects* continues this tradition of first-rate scholarship and maintains Jervis's relevance to contemporary international relations debates.

This book explores the possibility of applying "a systems level theory of politics" to the study of international relations, although Jervis is careful to note that the general concepts he develops are applicable to a broader range of social phenomena. Systems-level theorizing holds that "the whole is different from, not greater than the sum of its parts"; in short, we should be able to identify the "emergent properties" of a system and trace "interconnections" among different units within the system at different points of time. Jervis does a terrific job explaining systems-level concepts like positive and negative feedback, path dependence, and nonlinearity, among others.

Paradoxically, *System Effects* represents an example of both the most modern and the most traditional in international relations research. It is modern in that it demonstrates a daunting familiarity with some of the best research currently under way at the boundaries where the natural and physical sciences meet the social sciences. For example, the author explains ideas developed by such evolutionary biologists as Stephen Jay Gould and suggests how such insights might be applied to political phenomena. He does so in a manner accessible to those unfamiliar with the conceptual and theoretical intricacies of chaos and complexity theories, among others.

A paradox emerges, because although Jervis operates at the cutting edge with his application of natural science concepts to the social sciences, the "meat and potatoes" of *System Effects* will be largely familiar to most international relations scholars and casual students alike. The specific cases, historical examples, and research used by

Jervis to elucidate systems-level thinking are drawn from the international relations canon; in fact, Jervis's evidence comes largely from one subfield of international relations theory—national security studies. To explain the advantages of thinking about international affairs in system terms, Jervis relies on historical examples that many scholars know intimately. He often supports his analysis with discussions of alliance politics prior to World War I and of the bipolar machinations of the Cold War era.

Further, Jervis sometimes ignores or at least implicitly discounts large bodies of recent international relations scholarship. Two examples will help illustrate this criticism. First, Realist scholarship that reifies the role of the state in international affairs is passé in much of the discipline. Many scholars of international political economy and international organizations, for example, now recognize that states are not the sole actors relevant to understanding international affairs, and that state interests are varied and complex. Yet, in Jervis's understanding of inrernational affairs, the system in question is a system of states. Moreover, these states operate in largely similar ways—they seek to balance the system and maintain their own national interests againsr other states, holding competing and often contradictory interesrs. Many scholars have now moved beyond such formulations to explore the role of nonstate actors and even of preference formation in understanding world politics. Second, Jervis pays only the briefest attention to the influence of domestic politics, institutions (domestic and international), and ideas on international outcomes. Perhaps the weakest section of the book is his brief effort to consider the importance of "perceptions and choice" for explaining state behavior.

Although international relations scholars will find *System Effects* to be a useful and evocative study despite its weaknesses, policy makers and other practitioners may find the book somewhat less inviting. Wading through the social science theorizing and permutations of various systems-level phenomena in international politics will be a tall order for many nonspecialists. Even history buffs may cringe at the examples drawn from coalitions and alliances formed over the past several hundred years. Yet those who devote the time to following Jervis's arguments will be amply rewarded. His detailed discussions of system effects provide correctives to simplistic arguments about how and why national policies might be altered to shape the international system as a whole.

Peter Dombrowski
Naval War College

Woodcock, Alexander E. R., and David F. Davis, eds. *Analytic Approaches to the Study of Future Conflict*. Clementsport, N.S., Canada: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1996. 300pp. $28.95

Although there are hundreds of contemporary books about future warfare, there are very few about how to analyze it. This book is an excellent example of the latter. The keynote chapter by Eugene Visco, "Then and Now," offers a hint why this is so. During World War II the Allies, surprised by new methods and means of warfare, invented a new science, operations research (OR). Throughout the course of the subsequent Cold War, military establishments "perfected" it, bringing it from a means to evaluate the tactical employment of new technologies to an ignominious heyday during Vietnam, in which quantitative measures outpaced common sense. In the post-Cold War era, OR has been the tool of choice for right-sizing a bloated military. Presently, however, both analysts and decision makers find that it has remained static while warfare has changed dramatically. Old methods of analysis have not been validated for new operations, and new methods are not yet mature.

This work, the published proceedings of an international conference that focused on OR and future warfare, has an ambitious goal: to offer new ways of analyzing something that does not yet exist. The inventors of operations research enjoyed the analytic luxury of testing their scientific theories with real combat data, a technique obviously problematic for developing analytic methods for future warfare. Some of the articles here describe how modeling and simulation can overcome this deficiency. This book is best where real science is employed, even when lacking real data. The "new sciences" are well represented and well applied. Of particular note are applications of complex adaptive systems, decision theory, complexity theory, and cellular automata. "Entropy Modeling" by Donald Barr and Major E. Todd Sherrill, U.S. Army, "Adaptive C3I Modeling" by Loraine Dodd and Sean Richardson, and "Emergent Conflict and the Challenge of Complexity" by J. P. MacIntosh are right on the money. It is hard to find other writers who can go beyond an academic discussion of these topics into what they will contribute to military decision makers.

Operations research, like many professions, claims to be both an art and a science. Regrettably, however, some in the warfare analysis world, when faced with flawed science, try to compensate with flawed art. This genre is represented in R. G. Coyle's, "A Semi-Quantitative Approach to Threat Assessment" and in "Developing Doctrine for Peace Support Operations" by Lieutenant Colonel Philip R. Wilkinson, M.B.E., British Army. Neither Coyle's questionable buzzwords nor Wilkinson's antiseptic, untested doctrine can make up for a lack of real analysis. Operations research is about applying analytical tools to real-world problems. Relying too much on art is like putting a paint brush in the same category of tool as a wrench; a good-looking product results, but not nearly as much work is done. Still, even the more artful techniques

presented are helpful for organizing studies and brainstorming for alternatives.

Even today, not all warfare is active, lethal combat; campaigns will likely include peacekeeping, for example. In the founding spirit of Operations research, one excellent article by Hugh Richardson, "United Kingdom Operational Analysis Techniques in Bosnia," contains the results of contemporary, real-world, in situ analysis of peacekeeping operations. Although the anthor predictably has more data than answers, his approach confirms the best, time-honored analytical approach to the study of conflict: get out and study it!

JEFFREY CARES
Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Campen, Alan D., and Douglas H. Dearth, contributing eds. *Cyberwar 2.0: Myths, Mysteries and Reality.* Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press (AIP), 1998. 403pp. $29.95

Cyberwar 2.0 is a book about war and warfare in the intangible realm we now refer to as "cyberspace." Examining the competition, crises, and conflicts that exist in cyberspace, this book explores the parameters of warfare in this new battlespace. The editors have compiled an outstanding collection of works from a variety of authors who are predominantly leaders in their areas of expertise.

This work is a companion to an earlier book, *Cyberwar: Security, Strategy, and Conflict in the Information Age,* in which contributing editors Alan Campen, Douglas Dearth, and R. Thomas Goodden assembled a fine cast of authorities on a variety of subjects that helped illuminate many of the vaguer aspects of cyberwar. It gave the information age historical perspective, articulated many concerns regarding the interaction of cyberwar and society, and started us on our journey to a better understanding of information warfare.

Where *Cyberwar* left off, *Cyberwar 2.0* begins. Many of the same authors have contributed to it, adding new, insightful information. For example, Chuck de Caro's excellent "Softwar" in the first book outlined exactly how television and media affect our perception of an international conflict—and of ourselves. In *Cyberwar 2.0,* he further articulates a proposal actually to incorporate these concepts into U.S. strategy, in an article entitled "Operationalizing Softwar."

Cyberwar 2.0 is divided into five sections: Strategy and Diplomacy; Society, Law, and Commerce; Operations and Information Warfare; Intelligence, Assessment, and Modeling; and Reality. The contributing authors "flesh out" the concepts of each section and give both depth and breadth to one's understanding of the topical area. Since the topics raised are all on the cutting edge and deal with new technology, many of the assertions are extrapolations that could well be the harbingers of reality in the not-too-distant future. Despite such prophecy and articulation of future expectations, however, the discussions, taken as a whole, are well grounded in fact, based on the perspective of known paradigms. For example, the excellent contribution by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., illustrates the issues that could arise during a hypothetical

cyberwar in the year 2002. Through his careful legal analysis of these issues, Dunlap brings us inexorably to the conclusion that, legally, cyberwar is not much different from any other war in which the United States has been involved. He leaves us with the thought-provoking admonition that "cyberwarriors need to remember that *how* they fight the war may well determine the kind of peace that emerges." This hearkens back to his recurring theme that despite all the high-tech aspects of the new medium, the basic policy considerations are not very different from those used by the United States to cope with and understand its international relations in the past.

One of the most convenient aspects of *Cyberwar* 2.0 is its organization. Its articles cover a broad diversity of subjects, but readers are able to refer easily to those of interest and relevance to them. One who is well versed in a particular discipline can easily and quickly review the relevant material before delving into other areas, thus gaining a more fulfilling, intellectually enriching, and educational experience. Although many of the articles here could be viewed as building blocks for others, the earlier book, *Cyberwar,* is probably a better foundation. *Cyberwar 2.0* may well prove invaluable for any "expert" in cyberwar trying to stay abreast of the latest issues.

The *Naval War College Review*'s readership would benefit from the concepts and considerations raised in *Cyberwar 2.0.* As the United States moves toward greater use of the World Wide Web for military applications, as we become more dependent upon technology, and as we exploit this new battlespace, these issues will become increasingly important. Surely the warrior of tomorrow will need to understand and operate effectively in this environment. Those who do not embrace the technology of tomorrow will fall prey to it. *Cyberwar 2.0* should appeal to the military community, system administrators, and network analysts, as well as the general public. It provides a fairly accurate assessment of where we are in the world of cyberwar and where we are likely headed. Campen and Dearth's efforts to educate the reader are effective, and the contributions of each "area expert" are on target. Each book, *Cyberwar* and *Cyberwar 2.0,* is a stand-alone product, and readers do not need any external information to understand the material. Warriors of tomorrow would be well advised to add both to their "must read" lists.

DAVID DICENSO
Major, U.S. Air Force

Freeman, Charles W., Jr. *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy.* Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997. 159pp. $14.95

"Challenging" is the only way to describe the goal of Ambassador Freeman's *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy*—to fill a gap in the professional literature concerning the modern practice of statecraft by diplomats. Freeman wanted to create a "handy means" for diplomatic practitioners to revisit "the fundamental principles of the arts of power they practice," and he wanted to state the principles of diplomacy in relation to the power of state.

Freeman is well qualified for this challenging task. During a long and distinguished career with the foreign service, he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. His diplomatic service took him to China, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Information Agency, and numerous positions within the State Department. He was also the principal American interpreter on President Richard Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China.

Arts of Power is organized into three broad parts: the power of the state, diplomatic maneuver, and the skills of a diplomat. Under the power of the state, the author discusses the concept of a national interest; the nature of national power; the use of economic, military, and nonviolent military power; and the interrelations between diplomacy and espionage and covert operations, political actions, and cultural influence. In the second part, he continues his survey with a review of diplomatic strategy, tactics, maneuver, and negotiation, relations between states, and the uses of diplomats. Finally, he highlights the roles of a diplomat, such as advocacy, reporting and analysis, counsel, and stewardship, as well as the tasks and skills of a diplomat and the relationship between the state, the diplomat, and the systems of diplomacy.

Overall, the work provides a good outline and introduction to diplomatic thought. For example, military officers thrust for the first time into an assignment requiring diplomatic skill or work with foreign service officers could use this text to familiarize themselves with the diplomatic environment. It sets out the fundamental principles—no more than that. The author's earlier work, *The Diplomat's Dictionary*, revised and republished in 1997, acts as "footnotes" to this work, providing descriptions or quotations of words or phrases relevant to diplomacy. Both works should be read together; *Arts of Power* distills the observations from *The Diplomat's Dictionary*, restating them in short essays. The author feels each may be read separately, but the wealth of information is only liberated when the two works are jointly consulted.

Both the military and the legal professions have developed an educational tradition around the case method, wherein general principles are derived from the study of case scenarios. As Freeman writes, the profession of diplomacy has not matched this educational tradition, and *Arts of Power* could have benefited from some case illustrations. For example, the negotiations leading to Nixon's trip to China in 1972, or the development of the Gulf War coalition, or the Mideast peace process over the years would have offered valuable color to the somewhat dry recitation of principles. Even some of the more mundane areas, such as cultural relations, might have benefited from specific incidents from the author's own experience. The case method could have worked well and broadened the audience to which this work would be useful.

Arts of Power, together with *The Diplomat's Dictionary*, provides a collection of diplomatic principles derived from Ambassador Freeman's long career of foreign service. They both

serve as reference tools, though it is difficult to conclude that even together they meet the challenge of completely filling a gap in the professional literature of diplomacy.

JEFFREY SCHUELER
Gaithersburg, Maryland

Schecter, Jerrold L. *Russian Negotiating Behavior*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998. 225pp. $14.95

In the late 1960s, Jerrold Schecter served in Moscow as *Time* magazine's bureau chief. During the Carter administration, he served on the staff of the National Security Council and gained firsthand experience in negotiating with Soviet Russians. He was a founding editor of a joint-venture Russian-English language newspaper for several years, and over the last three decades he has had a great deal of contact with leading Russian political figures. Schecter has written and published extensively on subjects associated with Russia. He is eminently well qualified to undertake an analysis of how Russians negotiate, and his long years of close experience and searching inquiry promise a good and useful book. He delivers nicely on this promise.

In his introduction, Schecter writes that he has tried with this book to construct a road map "to the constants of Russian negotiating style" and to show how things have changed since Mikhail Gorbachev and the 1991 coup. The author is modest, for there is more here than one expects to find. The large audience of Americans who have long been fascinated by Russia and the former Soviet Union will enjoy this book. It will encapsulate for them the impressions and lessons that they have drawn from their own reading. Russian scholars too will find themselves nodding in agreement at frequent intervals. Moving through this book, the reader will encounter impressively distilled and to-the-point aspects of the Russian experience and mindset that form the way they negotiate. A few examples are closely paraphrased. (1) The (Russian) official whose career was established under communist rule remains psychologically confined by Soviet-era approaches and attitudes. (2) There is a duality in the Russian personality: one side is spiritual, generous, and nature loving, while the other is cynical and cruel, distrusting neighbors and betraying friendships for survival and personal gain. (3) The role of authority, the avoidance of risk, and the necessity for control are vital to understanding Russian negotiating behavior. (4) The Soviet Union kept its negotiators not only on a tight rein but often in the dark. The Soviets jealously guarded access to details on weapons capabilities and numbers. (5) It will take at least a generation before the effects of Marxist-Leninist thinking and instruction diminish significantly. (6) Neither the tsarist nor the Soviet past offers the tradition and institutional structure of a business culture.

While Schecter has his own broad experience with Russians to rely on, he has also done excellent research. He has digested an extensive literature on Russians and enriches his book with it. Furthermore, he conducted a large number

of interviews with Russian and American negotiators and supports his conclusions with their experience.

Schecter argues throughout the book that not much of the Russian style of negotiation has changed in the post-Soviet period. Russians stake out a hard opening position and try to stick to it, looking for accommodation and compromise from their opponent. Americans, on the other hand, see negotiation as a mutual problem-solving endeavor, do not expect to get their initial proposal, and are willing to deal. Generally, Americans are empowered to vary from initial guidance; Russians are not. Russians do not have the inclination to split a difference, Schecter warns.

Russian Negotiating Behavior is well organized, in five chapters and a conclusion. The opening chapters explain Russian characteristics through personal and inherited experience. The book next draws from recent experience, outlining what to expect in negotiations. Schecter follows with suggestions for the strategies and tactics that might be effectively used with Russians. His penultimate chapter is a treatment of current circumstances for doing business.

Apparently meant as a practical handbook for those in government and business, the book is worthy of much wider attention. Both the footnoting and bibliography are excellent. Those interested in Russian culture and politics would do well to read this book.

In summary, although *Russian Negotiating Behavior* serves its purpose of assisting those who may negotiate with Russians, it is a better book than it was designed to be. It is a wise choice for anyone with an interest in Russia.

RONALD KURTH
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired

Hammond, William M. *Reporting Vietnam: Media and the Military at War.* Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1998. 296pp. $34.95

"What went wrong between the military and the news media in Vietnam?" With this sentence, William M. Hammond, Ph.D., begins his well researched historical analysis of the media-military relationship that developed during the Vietnam conflict.

Hammond, a senior historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and a lecturer at the University of Maryland, is considered a leading expert in the field of media-military relations. This book, which focuses on 1962–1973, is actually a synthesis of two of his previous works: *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968* and *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968–1973.*

In the present book, Hammond effectively challenges the belief, long held by many military professionals, that the news media caused the United States to lose the war, by turning public opinion and support against it. Hammond skillfully demonstrates how the public relations policies of the Johnson administration, with the help of the State and Defense Departments, slowly eroded the credibility of the U.S. government. President Johnson's failure to criticize three obviously corrupt South Vietnamese regimes, and the continued use

of overly optimistic official statements about the course of the war, soon led the news media, especially the Saigon-based correspondents, to question all government pronouncements.

One often overlooked factor that had a profound impact on the media-military relationship was the perceived "politicization" of the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), General William C. Westmoreland. Hammond carefully explains how Westmoreland, who was initially respected by the media, came to be viewed as a spokesman for the administration and a tool of the president, ruining his credibility in the eyes of the war correspondents. This had a profound effect on the reporting of the event that changed the course of American policy in Vietnam—the 1968 Tet offensive.

Today's military professional can see throughout this text the birth of our modern public affairs doctrine. The stipulated policy during the course of the war, "maximum candor and disclosure consistent with the requirements of security," closely mirrors our current joint public affairs doctrine of "maximum disclosure with minimum delay." The MACV public affairs practitioner dealt with a complicated list of problems: media ground rules, accreditation, press pools, security violations, international media representatives, embedded media, violations of the law of war, and off-the-record comments. Unfortunately, many of these problems resurfaced during the Gulf War and will likely appear again during our next conflict.

This book is a must read for any military officer or member of the national security community responsible for developing plans or strategies that may have an impact on public opinion. This text readily demonstrates the critical need for well developed information strategies. Censoring of the media in this age of instant communications is highly unlikely, so public affairs considerations must enter early in the deliberate planning cycle.

The student of military history, as well as the casual reader, will find this innovative view of the Vietnam War very interesting. President Nixon once stated, "Our worst enemy seems to be the press." In truth, the situation was much more complicated, and this book does a good job explaining the actual root issues.

SCOTT STEARNS
Captain, U.S. Army

Murphy, Edward F. *Semper Fi—Vietnam: From Da Nang to the DMZ: Marine Corps Campaigns, 1965–1975.* Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1997. 356pp. $24.95

Consisting primarily of densely packed battle narratives reaching down to platoon level and even to the exploits of heroic individuals, Edward Murphy's one-volume history of the U.S. Marines in the Vietnam War illustrates vividly what a difficult war it was—especially for the Marines. During the early years in particular, as Murphy portrays them, it was a particularly dreary experience. Forced by Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) commander General William C. Westmoreland

into search-and-destroy operations for which they were ill attuned, the Marines experienced long periods of frustrating inability to find the enemy or bring him to battle, periods punctuated by sudden crises in which pinned-down units took heavy casualties.

The Marines' long ordeal at Khe Sanh is also attributed to Westmoreland's insistence that Khe Sanh be occupied, overriding Lieutenant General Lewis Walt's objection that it had no military value. Murphy describes case after case of search-and-destroy operations experiencing significant problems, but he concludes that they were a success after all, on the basis of comparative casualties.

It was in fact only in terms of Westmoreland's body-count measure of merit that the typical exchange could be counted a success—and the Marines *knew* it. From General Wallace M. Greene, Jr., the Commandant, and Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, commanding Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, on down, they understood that the real war was in the villages. Murphy states that the Marines became so frustrated that at one point the 9th Marines launched Operation KINGS, which they "reported to MACV as a search and destroy mission" even though it "was actually designed to be a long-term occupation of the area."

Not until General Creighton Abrams succeeded to the top command in Vietnam was the Marines' preferred approach—emphasizing pacification—reinforced from the top. Surprisingly, however, Murphy characterizes pacification as "a tough, unappreciated, unrewarding, and deadly task." The degree to which it succeeded, though, is underscored by his observation that in the final week before withdrawing from Vietnam, the last operational Marine infantry battalion conducted over a hundred small-unit patrols yet "experienced no enemy contact, encountered no booby traps, and took no casualties."

While almost uniformly admiring of Marine accomplishments, Murphy misses no opportunity to criticize the South Vietnamese. They are by turns "much vaunted," "skittish," "detached observers," and "lackluster." The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong are, by contrast, typically described in such admiring terms as "crafty," "slippery," and "well disciplined and determined."

This book is notable for what it omits as well as what it includes. Despite a multitude of tactical detail, there are no maps, save one outline sketch of the five northern provinces of South Vietnam. Such matters as troop morale and discipline receive virtually no mention. The emphasis of the later years on pacification and neutralization of the enemy infrastructure is also overlooked.

A far more disturbing omission is the lack of any notes or citations of any kind. Even when rendering direct quotations, Murphy does not provide sources. Yet there is no indication that he has interviewed the people quoted or that he has conducted any research in relevant archives. The reader is forced to surmise that Murphy appropriated to his own use the work of other scholars without acknowledging the fact or providing citations that would enable readers to verify the accuracy and context of the quoted

material. Even the photographs are printed without credit lines.

There is a bibliography, a very skimpy one listing fewer than three dozen titles, and these almost entirely volumes from the Boston Publishing Company's *Vietnam Experience* series and the official Marine Corps history of the Vietnam War (but not the very important volume covering 1968). Presumably these two series are the sources for the large number of unattributed quorations. Nevertheless, the publisher (specifically, this book's editor) ought to have required the author to comply with one of the most basic obligations of scholarship: acknowledgment of one's reliance on the achievement of others.

Those major shortcomings detract greatly from the usefulness of the work. What does come through, however, is the valor of individuals and small units in what Murphy concludes was for the Marine Corps "the most difficult mission in its history."

LEWIS SORLEY
author of *Thunderbolt*

Friends and Volunteers of the Australian Naval Aviation Museum. *Flying Stations: A Story of Australian Naval Aviation*. New York: Allen and Unwin, 1998. 289pp. $A45

This book is a celebration of fifty years of Australian naval aviation. It accomplishes this celebration in two ways: first, it allows several of the participants of that history to tell their stories, humorous and sad. Second, and more important to the foreign or serious naval affairs reader, it tells the trials and tribulations of interservice rivalry, politics of economy, strategic choices, and attempts to stake out a specific naval aviation role.

The first chapters deal with the years when naval aviation in Australia simply meant aviators assigned to shipboard flying (the scout/spotter plane role) or flying in support of naval operations (antisubmarine warfare in and around a land operation). Concurrent with the place of Australians in these operations are the stories of the development of naval aviation in the British navy and the U.S. Navy. The role of the Aussie aviator was within the framework of the Royal Navy, but that was to change with the Second World War.

By the 1950s, Australia was no longer a simple pastoral nation within the Commonwealth. The Aussies looked about and saw their place—naval aviation had a role to play in protecting Australia, as well as in keeping problems from its shoreline. After all, several Japanese attacks on parts of Australia had exposed its vulnerability. So began the real story of Australian naval aviation.

The problems were monumental. Like the big-bomber people of the fledgling U.S. Air Force, so too the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) challenged the need for maritime aviation. It controlled several of the pilot training bases. Many aviators, deck handlers, etc., were borrowed from the Royal Navy. The RAAF was a difficult partner in defense. Because the Australian population grew from five million in 1945 to fifteen million today, social service demands on tax dollars generally meant that defense budgets were slim, making demands on tax dollars even greater. Also, lacking a major

shipbuilding and aircraft construction capability, Australia depended at first on Britain and then on the United States for its ships and aircraft. Even overhaul and repairs were points of political pressure; there was no natural constituency to benefit from increased appropriations. These problems, along with their solutions, are explored in a fashion that will keep the serious student of naval aviation attentive.

The two light carriers Australia once possessed had their share of problems. HMAS *Sydney* was already old at the time of its acquisition, and its glory days were short. During Vietnam it was brought out of retirement to serve as a troop transport—dubbed the "Vung Tau ferry." However, the story of HMAS *Melbourne* was different: it would be a mainstay for close to forty years. It lent its name to two major collisions with plane-guard destroyers—HMAS *Voyager* and later the USS *Frank E. Evans*.

An aside, but an important one in the story of naval aviation "down under," was suppressing illegal activities along the very long and sparsely populated Australian coastline. Indonesian fishermen, as well as others (like the Japanese pearlers prior to World War II), have preyed on the coastline with an eye toward scarce wildlife resources. Originally, several S2F Trackers were assigned to remote settlements, and they played a major role in interdicting and deterring incursions. Today that same service, now called Coastwatch, is contracted out, with Australian Customs being the lead agency. The Navy still assigns *Fremantle* class vessels at Darwin to Coastwatch.

Flying Stations is an excellent combination of serious study and a "looking back" by personnel who served. The unknown author(s) did an excellent job of combining the two. This book should interest the scholar, veterans of Australia's Naval Air Service, and the general reader.

PETER CHARLES UNSINGER
San Jose State University

Labaree, Benjamin W., et al. *America and the Sea: A Maritime History*. Mystic, Conn.: Mystic Seaport, 1998. 686pp. $49.95

This is a gorgeous book—big, colorful, user friendly, and authoritative. The first thing you notice is its size: the 686 glossy pages are laid out in double or even triple-column format, so the book is packed with information. Indeed, one of the few disappointing things about this volume is that it is so big (and heavy) that it is difficult to read lying down or even while sitting in a chair; this book requires a table—though not necessarily a *coffee* table! Second, it is a colorful book. There is full color on virtually every page, with hundreds of museum-quality reproductions of contemporary paintings and photographs to illustrate the text. Even the subheadings and captions are rendered in color. Third, in addition to the rich narrative, which is a chronological narrative of America's maritime history from the colonial era to the present, there are scores of stand-alone essays and sidebars on specific topics, which allow the reader to dip into the book like a Christmas pudding. Fourth, it is authoritative. The six

principal authors are all respected scholars, and the editing has been accomplished with such skill that the text has a single "voice." Finally, when compared to similar books of this quality, the retail price is a bargain.

Though *America and the Sea* is a cohesive narrative, not a collection of essays, one of its most attractive and valuable features is the sprinkling of short pieces on specific aspects of America's maritime heritage throughout the text. These run the gamut from "The Slave Trade" to "John Paul Jones," from "Seaman's Morals" to "The Great White Fleet," and from "Navigational Instruments" to "The Boat People of Cuba and Haiti." There are even sections on "Recreational Boating and Racing in the Interwar Years," on "Hollywood and the Sea," and a discussion of how America's maritime heritage has been portrayed on the silver screen, from *Moby Dick* (1955) to *The Hunt for Red October* (1990). Each of these essays is between two and five pages long (triple column), and though each essay supports and complements the main narrative, they may also be read independently.

Not a few of the inserts offer contemporary views of America's maritime heritage. Many are literary; there are excerpts from the likes of Richard Henry Dana (*Two Years before the Mast*), Mark Twain (*Life on the Mississippi*), and Herman Melville (*Redburn*). Others are firsthand accounts culled from the letters and diaries of historical figures. Margaret Perkins Forbes, wife of the captain of the fishing schooner *Midas*, recalls a harrowing ocean crossing in 1811; Charles A. Post, a seaman on the blockading vessel USS *Florida*, recounts the tedium of blockade service in the Civil War; and Newell B. Jordan, captain of down-easter *R. D. Rice*, writes to the ship's owner in 1889 that his return trip will be delayed because he simply cannot get enough sailors to man the ship.

Easily the most arresting aspect of the book is the presence of several hundred full-color illustrations, the captions of which are little essays in themselves. Some are a full page in length. It is possible (and rewarding) to page through the book reading from caption to caption. It is, in short, the kind of book that can be (and most likely will be) sampled in small pieces over a long period.

There are a few disappointments, such as the absence of any reference notes (mostly overcome by a useful suggested reading list). In addition, there are no graphs or diagrams to illustrate, for example, the rising and falling fortunes of America's maritime industry or naval expenditures. Then, too, the maps are too few, and generally too small and nonspecific, to be of much help. But these few shortfalls should not detract from a splendid accomplishment.

CRAIG L. SYMONDS
U.S. Naval Academy

Wildenberg, Thomas. *Destined for Glory: Dive Bombing, Midway, and the Evolution of Carrier Airpower.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998. 258pp. $34.95

As discussions of a potential revolution in military affairs (RMA) percolated in recent years, the Department of Defense sponsored a number

of case studies of military innovation leading to revolutionary changes during the period between the world wars. One of the most interesting and widely discussed concerned the development of the aircraft carrier. But given the focus on the carrier itself, there was less emphasis on the slower evolution of its principal weapon—aircraft. Indeed, while U.S. carrier development was completed in most of its essentials with the commissioning of *Lexington* and *Saratoga* in the late 1920s, as late as 1930 senior naval aviators were still forced to admit that "aircraft are not shipkillers." Consequently, the carrier was not then widely perceived to have radically changed naval warfare. Yet Midway was only a dozen years away.

Destined for Glory is a thoroughly researched discussion of the evolution of U.S. carrier aircraft from the flimsy biplanes of the late 1920s into the robust aircraft whose devastating attacks at Coral Sea and Midway dramatically demonstrated the radical transformation of naval warfare. This evolution entailed far more than mere technological improvements to aircraft; rather, it resulted from a highly complex interplay of technological possibilities, competing operational and tactical concepts and tradeoffs, and political and budgetary struggles both within and outside the Navy. Wildenberg does a nice job of coherently sorting out the various factors and their interactions and of placing them in their chronological context.

The operational concept of near-vertical dive bombing of ships was first demonstrated in October 1926, when a fighter squadron, VF 2, conducted a dramatic simulated attack on the battle fleet in the presence of the U.S. Fleet commander in chief. The technique appeared promising in solving the dual problem of hitting a moving target while not running an excessive risk of being shot down. But in the 1920s, hitting an armored ship with the light ordnance aircraft then could carry did not translate into significant combat effects. Torpedo bombers could carry ship-killing ordnance, but they were considered too vulnerable to defensive fire to be effective. However, incremental developments in technology and operational concepts throughout the 1930s cumulatively greatly increased aircraft combat effectiveness, though the full war-fighting implications of the changes were far from clear even to most enthusiasts, as evidenced by the tremendous surprise at Pearl Harbor.

The author traces aircraft technological improvements from the perspective of both "demand" and "supply." Naval officers faced particular tactical problems—for instance, how can a moving target be hit by aircraft? Experience and experimentation suggested solutions, whether in practice or in theory. If in theory, solutions might be made practical when aircraft could attain certain performance specifications. Conversely, technological improvements in actual aircraft might suggest new operational methods or possibilities. The key in this interaction between multiple complex factors was the Navy's felicitous reliance on evidentiary processes over a sustained period.

Rigorous questioning is crucial to such processes. One of the book's central themes is the constant posing of

critical questions by key individuals throughout the development of both the carrier and its aircraft. Within a month of reporting aboard USS *Langley* (CV 1), then Captain J. M. Reeves, one of the fathers of naval aviation, told his officers that they had "no conception of either the capabilities or the limitations of the air force." He subsequently generated a set of "A Thousand and One Questions" and issues that had to be answered before aircraft could be considered an effective weapon for use by the fleet.

Later, when *Lexington* and *Saratoga* entered the fleet, Reeves and others ceaselessly asked how carriers and their aircraft might be best employed in attacking different targets, how they would operate in support of the fleet, how they could be defended from enemy ships and aircraft, and so on.

The book is especially valuable for its emphasis on the intellectual processes and empirical experimentation that culminated in the "glory" of its title. It is often forgotten, after the fact, that so many of the decisions and choices that led to great successes were by no means obvious at the time and that many errors and "dry holes," easily ignored today, littered the ultimately successful path taken. This may be a particularly useful reminder to those who now easily attach the term "revolutionary" to the favored project *du jour* without having done the hard work of proving just how and why the claim is justified.

Thomas Wildenberg is a naval historian whose special interest is the U.S. Navy during the interwar period. He is currently a Fellow for Naval Aviation at the National Air and Space museum. Wildenberg has also authored *Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, 1912–1992*. He is now working on a biography of Admiral J. M. Reeves, one that we hope will heighten the profile of this underappreciated pioneer of carrier aviation.

JAN VAN TOL
Commander, U.S. Navy

Wooldridge, E. T., ed. *The Golden Age Remembered: U.S. Naval Aviation, 1919–1941*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998. 376pp. $34.95

Third in a series that uses the Naval Institute's copious oral-history collection, this book features first-person accounts of one of the least-described periods of naval aviation. Little of any length or depth has been written about naval air's interwar developments, especially from such a deeply personal aspect, and so this new effort, from an experienced author, historian, and naval aviator, is welcome. It is also arguably the best of the three published works in the series.

The Golden Age Remembered is a tale of pioneers shepherding their nascent charge through its infancy, fighting off those who wished it stillborn, and through an adolescence rife with tortuous developments. Important names and actions abound in these pages. The narrative gives ample glimpses of early giants whose deeds, if perhaps not personalities, are unknown. There are men like Mel Pride, who gives a fascinating account of developing carrier-landing systems. Figures come more to life here than in a mere historical chronology.

The personal accounts describe the conversion of the collier *Jupiter* to the Navy's first aircraft carrier, renamed *Langley*, and its early vital use as a trainer for carrier aviators. An interesting aside relates how early air operations were frequently filmed, so that aviators could study launching and recovery techniques. As a natural result, a lot of mishaps, crashes, and near misses were caught on film. Where did all that film go? Given the terrible storage practices as well as the deterioration that old motion picture film suffered, it's likely it has disappeared long ago. Pity.

The danger of flying wood-and-canvas aircraft is clearly shown and can be juxtaposed against the current hazards. Maybe the planes of today are more durable, but when they fail or their operators do not fly them properly, the results are the same as sixty years ago.

This book highlights a basic difference between today's way of doing business and how things were done then. One recent review notes this difference also, but with more sadness at perceived freedoms lost than I am ready to allow. It is an interesting quandary: operations between 1919 and 1941 seem to have accepted losses in lives and machines for the sake of greater freedom and more colorful personalities. Do we now enjoy our far greater margin of safety and mission readiness at the expense of our professional souls and individual expression? We can wax philosophical on this question forever and probably never resolve a thing. However, reading this book certainly tells me we have lost our innocence over the years, that we have exchanged it for a more worldly, even tougher, outlook on what it takes to fly military machines, especially from such tenuous places as aircraft carriers.

This book also features forty-six photographs. I place great store in a book's selection of photos, and I sometimes lament poor layout or presentation, to say nothing of poor reproduction, especially at today's highly inflated retail prices. Current publishers often print photos on the same stock as the text, which is usually uncoated paper—fine for black type but not for the often graying black-and-white images. The Naval Institute Press occasionally falls in this category, and it does in this case. *The Golden Age Remembered* has some excellent photos, but I wish the publisher had spent a little more money and used traditional folio of coated stock. There are several really good views of men and aircraft—a few I have never seen before, such as photo numbers 40, 41, and 42—that show close-ups of SBUs, PM-1s, and P2Ds on the flight deck, at anchor, or in flight. Though not nearly as well known as some types of the day, these evocative aircraft were part of a truly colorful era.

Tim Wooldridge is doing a great service in his project by giving the U.S. Naval Institute's oral histories a public airing. They represent primary sources far too important simply to keep on file.

PETER MERSKY
Norfolk, Virginia

Koistinen, Paul A. *Mobilizing for War: The Political Economy of American Warfare*, 1865–1919. Lawrence:

Univ. Press of Kansas, 1997. 391pp. $45

This work constitutes the second volume in a five-volume series on the political economy of warfare in America.

One of this book's strengths is the documented depth of the author's research. The very richness of detail concerning the motivations and interactions of "elite" individuals in government, industry, and the military can, however, quickly overwhelm, and test the resolve of, the reader.

Of particular interest to the student of naval affairs are the sections dealing with the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century modernization and expansion of the Navy. There are multiple references to the pivotal role assumed by the Naval War College in the command of the Navy. The author specifically notes the initiative of Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, who "[breathed] life into the Naval War College by making attendance important for all officers and mandatory for senior officers." The Naval War College, naval logistics organizations, and the U.S. Navy itself are cited throughout the text as organizationally efficient and effective, as opposed to the antiquated and dysfunctional organizational structure of the U.S. Army. The autbor repeatedly notes that the president and civilian leadership controlled the naval bureaucracy and that on the whole the Navy adapted to the nation's foreign policy "instead of shaping it any significant way." He remarks that "in retrospect, the building of a modern navy at least suggested that heavy military spending over a prolonged period of time in an industrialized economy could lead to circumstances in which the armed services could significantly and dangerously distort the nation's defense and foreign policies and its economic structure."

The reader is then left to wonder if, despite his own observations, the author is intentionally casting the Navy (and Army) as shadow usurpers of the nation's foreign policy. If he is, Koistinen's earlier socioeconomic classification of the United States' power centers as "elites" may be central to that view.

"Elites" and "elitist structures," one assumes, must consist of the decision makers of industry and those of capital formation and finance, commerce, and the armed forces. If so, one can only conclude that the author has made the case for a self-evident fact. Conversely, he may be surreptitiously interjecting a pseudo-Marxist issue into his text, the issue being the lack of an egalitarian decision process during times of national crises, and responses at the ultimate expense of the worker. If the latter is true, Koistinen fails to pursue his thesis adequately. He simply proves the obvious—that power elites do exist, that they attract other power elites, often to the exclusion of others, and that our system of constitutional democracy serves to control them. One cannot deny that wealth often begets wealth, that wealth often begets influence, and that influence often determines national policy and practice. The categorization of such individuals as either "elites" or "nation builders" must then remain a function of personal political choice.

The author's liberal views on the profit principle and power of wealth are

further demonstrated in his observations of the 1915 agreement between J. P. Morgan and Company and Great Britain, which designated Morgan as the U.S. commercial agent for His Majesty's government.

The later sections of this volume bear greater relevance to contemporary debates on the questions of continued research, the development and production of the American arsenal, and on the role of the military in today's global affairs. Who is best qualified to research new technologies, to test new technologies, to develop modern industrial capabilities, and to produce the many wants of war? If the military is best qualified, will that process become inbred and therefore inefficient? If civilian industry is best qualified, will that process be solely a profit-oriented one, without ultimate regard to true military need? The answer then, as today, is that a combination of the two is effective, albeit not always efficient. War is a process of destruction and waste, despite motive and slogans, or social beliefs to the contrary. Controlling waste while determining the most efficient forms of defensive capability remains a valid national objective. An egalitarian approach to the management of conflict may have been successful in certain instances of war during the eons of man's existence. In this age of global threat and involvement, military power is most certainly an instrument of a nation's foreign policy, and decisions as to its effectiveness and use must remain within the purview of the nation's elected and appointed power elites.

The author notably succeeds in pointing out and documenting numerous instances of abuse in both government and private-sector actions leading up to, and during, national mobilization for World War I. Sadly, contemporary examples of such abuses, as excessive cost and profiteering, exist today. The author concludes with a realistic assessment of U.S. World War I economic experiences.

This book is recommended for the fact driven, for the student of organizational behavior within large organizations, and for the student of evolving power structures within the U.S. constitutional form of democratic government. It is also recommended background reading for the serious student of military mobilization theory and practice. However, it is recommended only with reservations for the casual reader of military history.

SAVERIO DE RUGGIERO
Newport, Rhode Island

Shulman, Mark Russell. *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882–1893*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 239pp. $39.95

Mark Shulman's study of the emergence of the "New Navy" is a thoroughly reworked version of the doctoral dissertation he completed some years ago at the University of California, Berkeley. His thesis is clearly summarized in the opening paragraph to his concluding chapter: "A new aggressive American naval strategy emerged in the 1880s and nineties as the product of a distinct political agenda formulated and effected by a small group of energetic, progressive, intellectual timocrats.

Although the navalists provided the catalyst for the new navy, the process of its creation required popular support. The general public, as well as the political and intellectual elites, determined the shape and consequently the strategy of the new navy. Together, they created an imperial service."

Such views do not echo the conventional view of American naval history, and they defy in particular the U.S. Navy's view of itself. An early version of the book's opening chapter, "The Influence of History upon Sea Power: The Navalist Reinterpretation of the War of 1812," was harshly received when it was first published in *The Journal of Military History* in April 1992. Thus, it is particularly appropriate to note that the U.S. Naval Institute has published this important study and to congratulate the Naval Institute Press for its foresight and wisdom in doing so.

Those of us who have spent years studying naval history within the Navy all too often find ourselves unable to see our own world in a wider perspective, even when we think we are striving especially to do so. We too often accept the explanations that we find in the archives that the Navy itself has created and think that we have found truth. Shulman's work is a particularly good antidote for that problem. It may be his choice of a descriptive word, his juxtaposition of facts, or just the general trend of his argument; but throughout, Shulman wrenches the reader into thinking about his subject in new ways. Some may find Shulman's work irritating and inflammatory, but it is nevertheless enlightening.

It is not easy, but it is useful, for us to see the work of Luce and Mahan seriously described alongside that of those "flapdoodle pacifists and molly-coddlers" that Teddy Roosevelt ridiculed. Putting the two views together and placing them within the context of a broad national debate helps to reveal the strengths, weaknesses, and effects of both sides. In this context, Shulman's argument, that national politics created strategy, strikes home. While we tend to see the work of the Naval War College as a serious and positive professionalization and intellectualization of the Navy, Shulman shows that often there were spin-offs from it that served only to popularize the public and political image of the naval service in a wide variety of media. Equally, he shows that the American effort "to polish up that handle so carefully," as Gilbert and Sullivan described it in *HMS Pinafore*, also had a widespread effect in the improvement of conditions in the U.S. Navy. Through all of this, Shulman shows how naval officers developed a new mentality that complemented the growing discrepancy between the nation's perceived and actual defense needs. Navalists who sought a large battleship navy, he argues, were able to succeed by creating historical and strategic justifications, by improving the Navy's organization and efficiency, and by marketing to a public that welcomed the large and the heroic. Above all, the Navy succeeded because those who were politically and philosophically opposed to the growth of the armed forces were splintered and failed to develop a mature conceptual basis for their opposition.

Shulman's arguments and insights pose a new interpretation, based on useful and important research. While

many will disagree with his conclusions and characterization, his thoughts deserve careful consideration. Shulman clearly places the development of the U.S. Navy in the 1880s and 1890s within a new and different context, leading us toward a deeper understanding of circumstances surrounding the climate that allowed its growth. He points out factors that, heretofore, have often been ignored by naval historians.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Beeler, John F. *British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era 1866–1880.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1997. 354pp. $49.50

Now that the United Kingdom has emerged, battle scarred but wiser, from its Strategic Defence Review (the equivalent of the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR), with aspirations for leaner, more expeditionary and joint armed forces, and a clear challenge to deliver its promises, Beeler's introduction will strike a chord—not only with officers in the Royal Navy but also with naval officers around the world. With its references to a period of changing political leadership; a revolution in technology; an expectation of a "peace dividend"; an increasing awareness of public opinion; the power of the press; and a drive to do more with less, better, faster, and cheaper, all of it superimposed on a changing geopolitical map, one could be forgiven for having a very strong feeling of déja vu.

However, John Beeler, currently assistant professor at the University of Alabama, cautions against drawing parallels too hastily between the past and present. He stresses the importance of acknowledging the uniqueness of each historical era and of assessing each period on its own terms. Covering the period between the mid-1860s and mid-1880s, Beeler has produced a classic work of scholarly historical analysis, one based on at least a decade of painstaking research. Most naval historians tend to view the latter half of the nineteenth century as a period of relative peace for Britain, marked by political vacillation and strategic myopia of British naval policy makers, who were in the midst of an expanding colonial empire and a surge in technological innovation. He points out that this notion of peace was compounded by those who viewed that period through a Mahanian lens, resulting in an analysis of "pre-Mahanian British naval policy in a post-Mahanian framework"—all of which has distorted the interpretation of a largely neglected period of history prior to the Naval Defence Act of 1889.

Beeler's alternative and broader view acts as a counter to this negative appraisal. His research goes far beyond, and to greater depth than, the work of most naval historians in penetrating the complex web of social and political forces at work beneath the highly visible flagship of technological revolution. He draws out the influence of the British domestic political scene, as well as of the media, in shaping government fiscal policy, the shortfalls of the Admiralty Board in

administrating the fleet, the disproportionate effect of individual personalities on national policy makers, and British perceptions of foreign governments and navies.

His thesis focuses on the fact that whilst the strategic planning and administration of the mid-Victorian navy may have been flawed and contradictory in retrospect, at the time—and when compared with those of Britain's naval rivals—its policies and strategy were deemed to be wholly adequate and no more flawed than what had previously passed as a coherent foreign and domestic policy. Beeler does not dispute that the lack of a sustained threat from abroad encouraged the Admiralty to experiment with ship design, often with mixed results (viz. the *Captain*, which ended in disaster and the loss of five hundred lives), which opened it to the criticism of having a "fleet of samples, the miscellaneous collection of bizarre and ill-assorted designs." However, Beeler stresses the wider significance of their deterrent effect on Britain's rivals and their influence on shaping foreign policy—whatever the vessels' operational value in reality.

Readers of the *Naval War College Review*, especially students of the Naval War College's Strategy and Policy Department, will find useful how Beeler begins and ends his book with an extremely good analysis of the prevailing strategic perspective of the period. The first two chapters illustrate the strategic boundaries, constraints, and limitations within which British policy makers were operating. In the final chapters and epilogue, Beeler refutes the charges that the Admiralty's strategic naval planning received short shrift during the period and that British strategic aims were poorly articulated. He argues that it was more a case of not being able to develop a coherent and practical strategy, given the incompatibility between the aims of the policy makers and the limitations of the technology at the time.

Where this book sets itself apart from others is in Beeler's in-depth analysis of the personalities of the admirals, senior civil servants, and politicians, and their influence on the policy-making process, often through political manoeuvring and manipulation of the media. One reference that I will never forget comes from the *United Services Gazette* in 1871: "The present Board of Admiralty may be described in one word—Chaos." Consequently, the heart of his book lies between Chapters 5 and 7, which focus on the impact of the Liberal politician Hugh Childers's reforms of naval administration, the machinations and mutiny of the naval lords, the demise of Childers as a result, and the ascendance of his successor, George Goshen, as the First Lord.

This is an important piece of work, one that transcends a single readership group and deserves the attention of serving officers, naval historians, economists, and political scientists alike. It is a unique insight into a period of history when a great power was facing economic and geopolitical global changes and a rapidly transforming technology that was sweeping away previous experience and perceptions and demanding a new strategy underpinned by an innovative regime of tactics. Does this sound familiar? However, in this case the policy makers lacked a coherent vision of the future of naval

warfare in the coming twentieth century. Is our vision penetrating enough for the twenty-first?

TONY JOHNSTONE-BURT, OBE
Captain, Royal Navy

Brown, David K. *Warrior to Dreadnought: Warship Development 1860–1905.* Annapolis, Md: NIP, 1997. 224pp. $35

This large-format volume comprises a detailed textual and pictorial history of Royal Navy ship design and construction in the latter half of the nineteenth century. A number of dominant themes convey the author's purpose. First is the influence of innovative technology on hull design, armor, propulsion, guns, and projectiles. Second is the manner in which the ship design process evolved from experience-based, single-person artistry to a standards-based, scientific team effort. Third is the noteworthy progress made in the understanding and application of ship stability factors. Finally, each chapter offers fascinating insights concerning why and how design and construction decisions were made (dispelling certain historical myths in the process) and the forceful personalities involved.

Although the Royal Navy did not participate in a major conflict during the period addressed by this book, the author weaves his themes into a nonetheless dynamic, fast-paced story of warship development. The transformation begins with HMS *Warrior,* whose "ultimate technology of 1860" was represented by iron hull and soft armor, broadside batteries of short-range guns, and dual propulsion of sail and box boilers to achieve a speed of fourteen knots. It concludes with HMS *Dreadnought,* whose all-steel construction, armored rotating turrets with guns that could "reach the horizon," and a steam turbine plant (twenty-one knots top speed) defined big-warship character and capabilities in advance of World War I.

The author documents meticulously the many influences that contributed to this transformation. Categories and examples (not exhaustive) of such influences are: science (the quest for stability principles, the introduction of modeling), technology (wood/iron/steel, engine design, guns, and projectiles), combat lessons (the U.S. Civil War and the Sino-Japanese, Spanish-American, and Russo-Japanese Wars), maritime commerce (availability of coaling stations, the telegraph's impact on trade routes), culture (the relationship between strategy, ship design, tactics, and armaments), national politics (defining the Royal Navy's role, budgets and funding, its search for "cheap wonder ships"), and geopolitical considerations (the two-power standard).

Trite as it may sound, this is truly an instance where an author brings significant experience and expertise to his subject. David K. Brown retired in 1988 as the Deputy Chief Naval Architect of the Royal Corps of Naval Constructors, and he currently serves as vice president of the Royal Institution of Naval Architects and the World Ship Society. He is widely published, with more than 130 books, articles, and papers to his credit. *Warrior to Dreadnought* is the chronological companion to his

earlier work, *Before the Ironclad* (1990). Brown's affection for his profession, its history, and players is evident in the research (much of it from primary sources) and in the sense of humor he applies to the task. He explains ship design complexities in layman's terms and provides useful appendices on the basics of ship stability and related subjects. The text is liberally supplied with diagrams, drawings, charts, and photographs, many from the author's personal collection. A detailed index, a glossary and abbreviations page, and the author's commentary on principal sources round out the comprehensive attributes of the book.

Warrior to Dreadnought should appeal to many tastes. Those who enjoy the narrative style and personality descriptions of Daniel Boorstin's histories will be delighted with this effort. Those attracted to the lore of ships, whether to their physical beauty, technological intricacies, or battles with the elements, will be equally satisfied, especially given the book's visual strengths. On a third level, readers familiar with the U.S. Navy's contemporary effort to redefine itself in the post–Cold War era will be quite interested in the many parallels to the Royal Navy experience a century ago. Chief among these are the struggle to identify the capital-ship role ("Strategy should govern the types of ships to be designed; ship design should govern tactics; tactics should govern armaments") and specify needs. (There had never been a full study of the naval requirements of the Empire; the procedure had been for the First Lord to get as much money as he could from the cabinet and for the Board to do the best they could with those funds.") Others are resource debates ("Few were disposed to pay for a large navy to defend against a distant and ill-defined threat"), and the timeless battle concerning change ("Many did not understand new technologies and sought for wonder-weapons, which would give them victory at low cost").

On a concluding, lighter note, young U.S. Navy officers currently serving in that most dreaded of division officer assignments, "damage control assistant," may find a concise, coherent "bootstrap" on ship stability in the appendices of this book. The measure of effectiveness is that if this reviewer could understand the author's explanation, anyone can.

PAUL ROMANSKI
Naval War College

Greene, Jack, and Alessandro Massignani. *Ironclads at War: The Origin and Development of the Armored Warship, 1854–1891*. Conshohocken, Penna.: Combined Publishing, 1998. 423pp. $34.95

If asked for the first image that comes to mind upon seeing the title of this book, most knowledgeable readers would probably respond with something from the American Civil War or the battle of Lissa. However, as Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani make abundantly clear, ironclads consistently saw service in one form or another worldwide during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The authors, better known for their work in twentieth-century

military history, tell that larger story in *Ironclads at War.* Beginning with French and British use of ironclad batteries in the Crimean War, they discuss in turn the American Civil War, the German and Italian wars of unification, South America's Pacific Coast wars, the Spanish Cartagena revolt, and a number of smaller actions in Asia, the Middle East, South America, and the Ottoman Empire.

Greene and Massignani had three goals in mind when writing this book. First, they wanted to present detailed accounts of the various naval actions in which ironclads took part. Second, they hoped to explore the evolution of technology as it applied to these warships. Finally, they wanted to examine briefly the naval policies of the major powers that incorporated ironclads into their fleets. They have met their goals with varying degrees of success.

The authors' descriptions of battles are detailed and thorough. They have, as intended, offered an "adventure in history" that seems to include every minor action in which ironclads participated. However, their decision to omit notes from the text detracts from the overall quality of the work. As they move from battle to battle, the authors rectify errors they have found in published sources, often with archival materials. Unfortunately, they rarely tell their readers where they obtained their information, which will doubtlessly frustrate those who wish to incorporate that information in their own later works.

One might also question what seems to be a glaring omission in the list of ironclad engagements. The chapters devoted to the American Civil War, which constitute almost half the book, make only cursory mention of ironclads on the Mississippi River. Here they functioned in almost every conceivable capacity: against fixed fortifications, against other ironclads, against wooden ships, as rams, and in support of army operations. These themes appear throughout the narrative, and their inclusion here would have materially strengthened the evolutionary context of the rest of the book. One might also question the authors' assertion that "it may be said that the Confederacy lost the war when she lost the war at sea, and she might have won it if she had won the war at sea," particularly in light of their concentration on blockade and coastal operations at the expense of riverine warfare. The navies were important, but the war did not hinge on their success or failure.

Greene and Massignani are more successful in their second and third goals. They explore the continuing competition between armor and ordnance, discuss the shift from broadside to turret ironclads, and address the impact on the combat experience of ancillary technologies like mines, torpedoes, and armor-piercing ammunition. Their explanation of the battle of Lissa and its contribution to "ram fever" in the 1870s and 1880s is particularly good. At times the amount of space devoted to battle narratives makes it difficult to spot some of the trends; a concise chapter tracing the general course of technological developments would have been welcome. A concluding chapter, which the book lacks, might also have tied together loose ends. The author's brief coverage of great-power naval policies, presented primarily in a series of sidebars, is clear,

succinct, and broad ranging in scope. Not surprisingly, the United States appears only peripherally in these sidebars; American naval ascendance is still on the horizon as the book comes to a close.

Ironclads at War is not the last word on the subject, but it does have much to offer. Those with an interest in ironclad operations outside the United States will find it a valuable resource that synthesizes scholarship otherwise unavailable to most American readers. Specialists might not always agree with the authors' conclusions and will want to consult more focused monographs, but the tradeoff, a global perspective, makes this book a worthwhile contribution to naval history.

KURT HACKEMER
University of South Dakota

Anders, Curt. *Disaster in Damp Sand: The Red River Expedition*. Carmel: Guild Press of Indiana, 1998. 175pp. $21

The Red River expedition? Why would anyone want to write a book about that? Whoever heard of it? Curt Anders has chosen to write about a little-known yet actually significant episode in the American Civil War. His is an absorbing account of a campaign that failed.

The purposes of the expedition, as defined by the general in chief, Henry Halleck, to General Nathaniel P. Banks in November 1862, were to open the lower Mississippi by capturing Vicksburg; destroy the railroad yards at Jackson and Marion, Mississippi; and open the Red River as far as it was navigable to provide an outlet for the sugar and cotton of northern Louisiana. Halleck also suggested that the Red River in Union possession would be the best base for operations in Texas.

The campaign opened in February 1863 with a strike by Confederate general Richard Taylor (a protégé of Stonewall Jackson) against a Federal installation west of New Orleans. Banks retaliated by attempting to encircle and annihilate Taylor, which permitted some cotton and commodities to get through to New Orleans but delayed Banks's operations in furtherance of his mission. By May 1863, Banks was finally ready to start, with an assault against Confederate fortifications. He had a three-to-one advantage, but his vague orders resulted in failure and heavy Union losses. General Ulysses S. Grant's success at Vicksburg, however, caused the Confederate commander at Port Hudson, southeast of the juncture of the Red River and the Mississippi, to surrender. However, General Taylor, in almost guerrilla warfare style, stymied further Union advances. This led Banks to a variety of operations in western Louisiana, including a failed amphibious attempt on Galveston, Texas, and a land movement via the Sabine Pass at the Texas-Louisiana border in September 1863. The balance of 1863 and the period up to May 1864 was taken up with a series of assaults, retreats, successes, and disasters, up and down and around the Red and Sabine Rivers. When Taylor was transferred east of the Mississippi in the summer of 1864, the generals and troops he left behind kept Banks and the Yankees from making any more attempts for the balance of the war in the Trans-Mississippi. They

would have destroyed the Union army had it not been for the ineptness of the Confederate theater commander, Edmund Kirby Smith. Rivers and other waters were essential parts of the war. However, the problem with water in this expedition was that there was too little of it. Hence the book's title, *Disaster in Damp Sand.*

General Banks's conduct during the campaign was so bad as to be ludicrous. It is hard to believe that someone so inept could have gained a generalship, much less retained it. But he had, and Anders makes skillful use of quotations from Banks's subordinates to show that he was not only unable to come up with a good plan but could not stick to the one he chose.

The Navy comes out well. It is hard to believe that it sailed on damp sand, but sail it did. Time and again it came to the rescue in tight situations, and when it failed, Admiral David Porter did not seek to evade responsibility. In that he was a refreshing change from the generals, most of whom were constantly finding fault with everyone and every thing but themselves and were most proficient in advancing their own causes and reputations.

The Red River expedition was significant as the final undoing of a general whom Lincoln had appointed for political reasons and had then been stuck with too long. Its failure also provided the Radical Republicans with grist for their mill. It is, however, regarded as the last decisive Confederate victory in the Civil War.

Anders's book makes dramatic use of the participants' own words, as taken from official Union and Confederate records. Particularly effective is the testimony given before the joint congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. Here we are introduced to the nefarious "Bluff" Ben Wade, chairman of the committee, leading witnesses and documenting conclusions in favor of the Radical Republicans, who were in charge of the committee. Happily, Congress does not do that any more.

The author's use of quotations and excerpts from primary sources does not hamper the flow of the book, as so often happens. I have observed the author's talent in the use of sources in his other works. It is one of the hallmarks of his writing, and an effective one. We can rely on Curt Anders as a historian.

He is also the author of *Hearts in Conflict* (a one-volume history of the Civil War), *Fighting Generals, Fighting Confederates,* and a soon-to-be-published biography of Henry Halleck, *Henry Halleck's War: A Fresh Look at Lincoln's General-in-Chief.*

Disaster in Damp Sand is a good read. It moves along, and it tells about the Red River expedition from a viewpoint different from that of previous accounts: "As was the case with better-known battles—Shiloh, Fredericksburg, Stones River, Chancellorsville—the Red River Campaign settled nothing, at enormous cost."

GEORGE M. CRALL
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired