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Cyberwar 2.0: Myths, Mysteries and Reality

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presented are helpful for organizing studies and brainstorming for alternatives.

Even today, not all warfare is active, lethal combat; campaigns will likely include peacekeeping, for example. In the founding spirit of Operations research, one excellent article by Hugh Richardson, "United Kingdom Operational Analysis Techniques in Bosnia," contains the results of contemporary, real-world, in situ analysis of peacekeeping operations. Although the author predictably has more data than answers, his approach confirms the best, time-honored analytical approach to the study of conflict: get out and study it!

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Campen, Alan D., and Douglas H. Dearth, contributing eds. *Cyberwar 2.0: Myths, Mysteries and Reality.* Fairfax, Va.: AFCEA International Press (AIP), 1998. 403pp. $29.95

Cyberwar 2.0 is a book about war and warfare in the intangible realm we now refer to as "cyberspace." Examining the competition, crises, and conflicts that exist in cyberspace, this book explores the parameters of warfare in this new battlespace. The editors have compiled an outstanding collection of works from a variety of authors who are predominantly leaders in their areas of expertise.

This work is a companion to an earlier book, *Cyberwar: Security, Strategy, and Conflict in the Information Age,* in which contributing editors Alan Campen,

Douglas Dearth, and R. Thomas Goodden assembled a fine cast of authorities on a variety of subjects that helped illuminate many of the vaguer aspects of cyberwar. It gave the information age historical perspective, articulated many concerns regarding the interaction of cyberwar and society, and started us on our journey to a better understanding of information warfare.

Where *Cyberwar* left off, *Cyberwar 2.0* begins. Many of the same authors have contributed to it, adding new, insightful information. For example, Chuck de Caro's excellent "Softwar" in the first book outlined exactly how television and media affect our perception of an international conflict—and of ourselves. In *Cyberwar 2.0,* he further articulates a proposal actually to incorporate these concepts into U.S. strategy, in an article entitled "Operationalizing Softwar."

Cyberwar 2.0 is divided into five sections: Strategy and Diplomacy; Society, Law, and Commerce; Operations and Information Warfare; Intelligence, Assessment, and Modeling; and Reality. The contributing authors "flesh out" the concepts of each section and give both depth and breadth to one's understanding of the topical area. Since the topics raised are all on the cutting edge and deal with new technology, many of the assertions are extrapolations that could well be the harbingers of reality in the not-too-distant future. Despite such prophecy and articulation of future expectations, however, the discussions, taken as a whole, are well grounded in fact, based on the perspective of known paradigms. For example, the excellent contribution by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., illustrates the issues that could arise during a hypothetical

cyberwar in the year 2002. Through his careful legal analysis of these issues, Dunlap brings us inexorably to the conclusion that, legally, cyberwar is not much different from any other war in which the United States has been involved. He leaves us with the thought-provoking admonition that "cyberwarriors need to remember that *how* they fight the war may well determine the kind of peace that emerges." This hearkens back to his recurring theme that despite all the high-tech aspects of the new medium, the basic policy considerations are not very different from those used by the United States to cope with and understand its international relations in the past.

One of the most convenient aspects of *Cyberwar* 2.0 is its organization. Its articles cover a broad diversity of subjects, but readers are able to refer easily to those of interest and relevance to them. One who is well versed in a particular discipline can easily and quickly review the relevant material before delving into other areas, thus gaining a more fulfilling, intellectually enriching, and educational experience. Although many of the articles here could be viewed as building blocks for others, the earlier book, *Cyberwar*, is probably a better foundation. *Cyberwar 2.0* may well prove invaluable for any "expert" in cyberwar trying to stay abreast of the latest issues.

The *Naval War College Review*'s readership would benefit from the concepts and considerations raised in *Cyberwar 2.0.* As the United States moves toward greater use of the World Wide Web for military applications, as we become more dependent upon technology, and as we exploit this new battlespace, these

issues will become increasingly important. Surely the warrior of tomorrow will need to understand and operate effectively in this environment. Those who do not embrace the technology of tomorrow will fall prey to it. *Cyberwar 2.0* should appeal to the military community, system administrators, and network analysts, as well as the general public. It provides a fairly accurate assessment of where we are in the world of cyberwar and where we are likely headed. Campen and Dearth's efforts to educate the reader are effective, and the contributions of each "area expert" are on target. Each book, *Cyberwar* and *Cyberwar 2.0*, is a stand-alone product, and readers do not need any external information to understand the material. Warriors of tomorrow would be well advised to add both to their "must read" lists.

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Freeman, Charles W., Jr. *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997. 159pp. $14.95

"Challenging" is the only way to describe the goal of Ambassador Freeman's *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy*—to fill a gap in the professional literature concerning the modern practice of statecraft by diplomats. Freeman wanted to create a "handy means" for diplomatic practitioners to revisit "the fundamental principles of the arts of power they practice," and he wanted to state the principles of diplomacy in relation to the power of state.