

1999

Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy

Jeffrey Schueler

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Schueler, Jeffrey (1999) "Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 52 : No. 3 , Article 13.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol52/iss3/13>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

cyberwar in the year 2002. Through his careful legal analysis of these issues, Dunlap brings us inexorably to the conclusion that, legally, cyberwar is not much different from any other war in which the United States has been involved. He leaves us with the thought-provoking admonition that "cyberwarriors need to remember that *how* they fight the war may well determine the kind of peace that emerges." This hearkens back to his recurring theme that despite all the high-tech aspects of the new medium, the basic policy considerations are not very different from those used by the United States to cope with and understand its international relations in the past.

One of the most convenient aspects of *Cybenvar 2.0* is its organization. Its articles cover a broad diversity of subjects, but readers are able to refer easily to those of interest and relevance to them. One who is well versed in a particular discipline can easily and quickly review the relevant material before delving into other areas, thus gaining a more fulfilling, intellectually enriching, and educational experience. Although many of the articles here could be viewed as building blocks for others, the earlier book, *Cybenvar*, is probably a better foundation. *Cybenvar 2.0* may well prove invaluable for any "expert" in cyberwar trying to stay abreast of the latest issues.

The *Naval War College Review's* readership would benefit from the concepts and considerations raised in *Cybenvar 2.0*. As the United States moves toward greater use of the World Wide Web for military applications, as we become more dependent upon technology, and as we exploit this new battlespace, these

issues will become increasingly important. Surely the warrior of tomorrow will need to understand and operate effectively in this environment. Those who do not embrace the technology of tomorrow will fall prey to it. *Cybenvar 2.0* should appeal to the military community, system administrators, and network analysts, as well as the general public. It provides a fairly accurate assessment of where we are in the world of cyberwar and where we are likely headed. Campen and Dearth's efforts to educate the reader are effective, and the contributions of each "area expert" are on target. Each book, *Cybenvar* and *Cybenvar 2.0*, is a stand-alone product, and readers do not need any external information to understand the material. Warriors of tomorrow would be well advised to add both to their "must read" lists.

DAVID DICENSO
Major, U.S. Air Force

Freeman, Charles W., Jr. *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997. 159pp. \$14.95

"Challenging" is the only way to describe the goal of Ambassador Freeman's *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy*—to fill a gap in the professional literature concerning the modern practice of statecraft by diplomats. Freeman wanted to create a "handy means" for diplomatic practitioners to revisit "the fundamental principles of the arts of power they practice," and he wanted to state the principles of diplomacy in relation to the power of state.

156 Naval War College Review

Freeman is well qualified for this challenging task. During a long and distinguished career with the foreign service, he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, U.S. ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. His diplomatic service took him to China, Thailand, Saudi Arabia, the U.S. Information Agency, and numerous positions within the State Department. He was also the principal American interpreter on President Richard Nixon's historic 1972 visit to China.

Arts of Power is organized into three broad parts: the power of the state, diplomatic maneuver, and the skills of a diplomat. Under the power of the state, the author discusses the concept of a national interest; the nature of national power; the use of economic, military, and nonviolent military power; and the interrelations between diplomacy and espionage and covert operations, political actions, and cultural influence. In the second part, he continues his survey with a review of diplomatic strategy, tactics, maneuver, and negotiation, relations between states, and the uses of diplomats. Finally, he highlights the roles of a diplomat, such as advocacy, reporting and analysis, counsel, and stewardship, as well as the tasks and skills of a diplomat and the relationship between the state, the diplomat, and the systems of diplomacy.

Overall, the work provides a good outline and introduction to diplomatic thought. For example, military officers thrust for the first time into an assignment requiring diplomatic skill or work with foreign service officers could use

this text to familiarize themselves with the diplomatic environment. It sets out the fundamental principles—no more than that. The author's earlier work, *The Diplomat's Dictionary*, revised and republished in 1997, acts as "footnotes" to this work, providing descriptions or quotations of words or phrases relevant to diplomacy. Both works should be read together; *Arts of Power* distills the observations from *The Diplomat's Dictionary*, restating them in short essays. The author feels each may be read separately, but the wealth of information is only liberated when the two works are jointly consulted.

Both the military and the legal professions have developed an educational tradition around the case method, wherein general principles are derived from the study of case scenarios. As Freeman writes, the profession of diplomacy has not matched this educational tradition, and *Arts of Power* could have benefited from some case illustrations. For example, the negotiations leading to Nixon's trip to China in 1972, or the development of the Gulf War coalition, or the Mideast peace process over the years would have offered valuable color to the somewhat dry recitation of principles. Even some of the more mundane areas, such as cultural relations, might have benefited from specific incidents from the author's own experience. The case method could have worked well and broadened the audience to which this work would be useful.

Arts of Power, together with *The Diplomat's Dictionary*, provides a collection of diplomatic principles derived from Ambassador Freeman's long career of foreign service. They both

serve as reference tools, though it is difficult to conclude that even together they meet the challenge of completely filling a gap in the professional literature of diplomacy.

JEFFREY SCHUELER
Gaithersburg, Maryland

Schecter, Jerrold L. *Russian Negotiating Behavior*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998. 225pp. \$14.95

In the late 1960s, Jerrold Schecter served in Moscow as *Time* magazine's bureau chief. During the Carter administration, he served on the staff of the National Security Council and gained firsthand experience in negotiating with Soviet Russians. He was a founding editor of a joint-venture Russian-English language newspaper for several years, and over the last three decades he has had a great deal of contact with leading Russian political figures. Schecter has written and published extensively on subjects associated with Russia. He is eminently well qualified to undertake an analysis of how Russians negotiate, and his long years of close experience and searching inquiry promise a good and useful book. He delivers nicely on this promise.

In his introduction, Schecter writes that he has tried with this book to construct a road map "to the constants of Russian negotiating style" and to show how things have changed since Mikhail Gorbachev and the 1991 coup. The author is modest, for there is more here than one expects to find. The large

audience of Americans who have long been fascinated by Russia and the former Soviet Union will enjoy this book. It will encapsulate for them the impressions and lessons that they have drawn from their own reading. Russian scholars too will find themselves nodding in agreement at frequent intervals. Moving through this book, the reader will encounter impressively distilled and to-the-point aspects of the Russian experience and mindset that form the way they negotiate. A few examples are closely paraphrased. (1) The (Russian) official whose career was established under communist rule remains psychologically confined by Soviet-era approaches and attitudes. (2) There is a duality in the Russian personality: one side is spiritual, generous, and nature loving, while the other is cynical and cruel, distrusting neighbors and betraying friendships for survival and personal gain. (3) The role of authority, the avoidance of risk, and the necessity for control are vital to understanding Russian negotiating behavior. (4) The Soviet Union kept its negotiators not only on a tight rein but often in the dark. The Soviets jealously guarded access to details on weapons capabilities and numbers. (5) It will take at least a generation before the effects of Marxist-Leninist thinking and instruction diminish significantly. (6) Neither the tsarist nor the Soviet past offers the tradition and institutional structure of a business culture.

While Schecter has his own broad experience with Russians to rely on, he has also done excellent research. He has digested an extensive literature on Russians and enriches his book with it. Furthermore, he conducted a large number