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## Russian Negotiating Behavior

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serve as reference tools, though it is difficult to conclude that even together they meet the challenge of completely filling a gap in the professional literature of diplomacy.

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Schecter, Jerrold L. *Russian Negotiating Behavior*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998. 225pp. \$14.95

In the late 1960s, Jerrold Schecter served in Moscow as *Time* magazine's bureau chief. During the Carter administration, he served on the staff of the National Security Council and gained firsthand experience in negotiating with Soviet Russians. He was a founding editor of a joint-venture Russian-English language newspaper for several years, and over the last three decades he has had a great deal of contact with leading Russian political figures. Schecter has written and published extensively on subjects associated with Russia. He is eminently well qualified to undertake an analysis of how Russians negotiate, and his long years of close experience and searching inquiry promise a good and useful book. He delivers nicely on this promise.

In his introduction, Schecter writes that he has tried with this book to construct a road map "to the constants of Russian negotiating style" and to show how things have changed since Mikhail Gorbachev and the 1991 coup. The author is modest, for there is more here than one expects to find. The large

audience of Americans who have long been fascinated by Russia and the former Soviet Union will enjoy this book. It will encapsulate for them the impressions and lessons that they have drawn from their own reading. Russian scholars too will find themselves nodding in agreement at frequent intervals. Moving through this book, the reader will encounter impressively distilled and to-the-point aspects of the Russian experience and mindset that form the way they negotiate. A few examples are closely paraphrased. (1) The (Russian) official whose career was established under communist rule remains psychologically confined by Soviet-era approaches and attitudes. (2) There is a duality in the Russian personality: one side is spiritual, generous, and nature loving, while the other is cynical and cruel, distrusting neighbors and betraying friendships for survival and personal gain. (3) The role of authority, the avoidance of risk, and the necessity for control are vital to understanding Russian negotiating behavior. (4) The Soviet Union kept its negotiators not only on a tight rein but often in the dark. The Soviets jealously guarded access to details on weapons capabilities and numbers. (5) It will take at least a generation before the effects of Marxist-Leninist thinking and instruction diminish significantly. (6) Neither the tsarist nor the Soviet past offers the tradition and institutional structure of a business culture.

While Schecter has his own broad experience with Russians to rely on, he has also done excellent research. He has digested an extensive literature on Russians and enriches his book with it. Furthermore, he conducted a large number

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of interviews with Russian and American negotiators and supports his conclusions with their experience.

Schechter argues throughout the book that not much of the Russian style of negotiation has changed in the post-Soviet period. Russians stake out a hard opening position and try to stick to it, looking for accommodation and compromise from their opponent. Americans, on the other hand, see negotiation as a mutual problem-solving endeavor, do not expect to get their initial proposal, and are willing to deal. Generally, Americans are empowered to vary from initial guidance; Russians are not. Russians do not have the inclination to split a difference, Schechter warns.

*Russian Negotiating Behavior* is well organized, in five chapters and a conclusion. The opening chapters explain Russian characteristics through personal and inherited experience. The book next draws from recent experience, outlining what to expect in negotiations. Schechter follows with suggestions for the strategies and tactics that might be effectively used with Russians. His penultimate chapter is a treatment of current circumstances for doing business.

Apparently meant as a practical handbook for those in government and business, the book is worthy of much wider attention. Both the footnoting and bibliography are excellent. Those interested in Russian culture and politics would do well to read this book.

In summary, although *Russian Negotiating Behavior* serves its purpose of assisting those who may negotiate with Russians, it is a better book than it was designed to be. It is

a wise choice for anyone with an interest in Russia.

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Hammond, William M. *Reporting Vietnam: Media and the Military at War*. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1998. 296pp. \$34.95

“What went wrong between the military and the news media in Vietnam?” With this sentence, William M. Hammond, Ph.D., begins his well researched historical analysis of the media-military relationship that developed during the Vietnam conflict.

Hammond, a senior historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and a lecturer at the University of Maryland, is considered a leading expert in the field of media-military relations. This book, which focuses on 1962–1973, is actually a synthesis of two of his previous works: *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968* and *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968–1973*.

In the present book, Hammond effectively challenges the belief, long held by many military professionals, that the news media caused the United States to lose the war, by turning public opinion and support against it. Hammond skillfully demonstrates how the public relations policies of the Johnson administration, with the help of the State and Defense Departments, slowly eroded the credibility of the U.S. government. President Johnson’s failure to criticize three obviously corrupt South Vietnamese regimes, and the continued use