

1999

Reporting Vietnam: Media and the Military at War

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Recommended Citation

Stearns, Scott (1999) "Reporting Vietnam: Media and the Military at War," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 52 : No. 3 , Article 15.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol52/iss3/15>

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of interviews with Russian and American negotiators and supports his conclusions with their experience.

Schechter argues throughout the book that not much of the Russian style of negotiation has changed in the post-Soviet period. Russians stake out a hard opening position and try to stick to it, looking for accommodation and compromise from their opponent. Americans, on the other hand, see negotiation as a mutual problem-solving endeavor, do not expect to get their initial proposal, and are willing to deal. Generally, Americans are empowered to vary from initial guidance; Russians are not. Russians do not have the inclination to split a difference, Schechter warns.

Russian Negotiating Behavior is well organized, in five chapters and a conclusion. The opening chapters explain Russian characteristics through personal and inherited experience. The book next draws from recent experience, outlining what to expect in negotiations. Schechter follows with suggestions for the strategies and tactics that might be effectively used with Russians. His penultimate chapter is a treatment of current circumstances for doing business.

Apparently meant as a practical handbook for those in government and business, the book is worthy of much wider attention. Both the footnoting and bibliography are excellent. Those interested in Russian culture and politics would do well to read this book.

In summary, although *Russian Negotiating Behavior* serves its purpose of assisting those who may negotiate with Russians, it is a better book than it was designed to be. It is

a wise choice for anyone with an interest in Russia.

RONALD KURTH
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired

Hammond, William M. *Reporting Vietnam: Media and the Military at War*. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1998. 296pp. \$34.95

"What went wrong between the military and the news media in Vietnam?" With this sentence, William M. Hammond, Ph.D., begins his well researched historical analysis of the media-military relationship that developed during the Vietnam conflict.

Hammond, a senior historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History and a lecturer at the University of Maryland, is considered a leading expert in the field of media-military relations. This book, which focuses on 1962-1973, is actually a synthesis of two of his previous works: *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968* and *Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968-1973*.

In the present book, Hammond effectively challenges the belief, long held by many military professionals, that the news media caused the United States to lose the war, by turning public opinion and support against it. Hammond skillfully demonstrates how the public relations policies of the Johnson administration, with the help of the State and Defense Departments, slowly eroded the credibility of the U.S. government. President Johnson's failure to criticize three obviously corrupt South Vietnamese regimes, and the continued use

of overly optimistic official statements about the course of the war, soon led the news media, especially the Saigon-based correspondents, to question all government pronouncements.

One often overlooked factor that had a profound impact on the media-military relationship was the perceived "politicization" of the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), General William C. Westmoreland. Hammond carefully explains how Westmoreland, who was initially respected by the media, came to be viewed as a spokesman for the administration and a tool of the president, ruining his credibility in the eyes of the war correspondents. This had a profound effect on the reporting of the event that changed the course of American policy in Vietnam—the 1968 Tet offensive.

Today's military professional can see throughout this text the birth of our modern public affairs doctrine. The stipulated policy during the course of the war, "maximum candor and disclosure consistent with the requirements of security," closely mirrors our current joint public affairs doctrine of "maximum disclosure with minimum delay." The MACV public affairs practitioner dealt with a complicated list of problems: media ground rules, accreditation, press pools, security violations, international media representatives, embedded media, violations of the law of war, and off-the-record comments. Unfortunately, many of these problems resurfaced during the Gulf War and will likely appear again during our next conflict.

This book is a must read for any military officer or member of the national

security community responsible for developing plans or strategies that may have an impact on public opinion. This text readily demonstrates the critical need for well developed information strategies. Censoring of the media in this age of instant communications is highly unlikely, so public affairs considerations must enter early in the deliberate planning cycle.

The student of military history, as well as the casual reader, will find this innovative view of the Vietnam War very interesting. President Nixon once stated, "Our worst enemy seems to be the press." In truth, the situation was much more complicated, and this book does a good job explaining the actual root issues.

SCOTT STEARNS
Captain, U.S. Army

Murphy, Edward F. *Semper Fi—Vietnam: From Da Nang to the DMZ: Marine Corps Campaigns, 1965–1975*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1997. 356pp. \$24.95

Consisting primarily of densely packed battle narratives reaching down to platoon level and even to the exploits of heroic individuals, Edward Murphy's one-volume history of the U.S. Marines in the Vietnam War illustrates vividly what a difficult war it was—especially for the Marines. During the early years in particular, as Murphy portrays them, it was a particularly dreary experience. Forced by Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) commander General William C. Westmoreland