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Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power

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further demonstrated in his observations of the 1915 agreement between J. P. Morgan and Company and Great Britain, which designated Morgan as the U.S. commercial agent for His Majesty's government.

The later sections of this volume bear greater relevance to contemporary debates on the questions of continued research, the development and production of the American arsenal, and on the role of the military in today's global affairs. Who is best qualified to research new technologies, to test new technologies, to develop modern industrial capabilities, and to produce the many wants of war? If the military is best qualified, will that process become inbred and therefore inefficient? If civilian industry is best qualified, will that process be solely a profit-oriented one, without ultimate regard to true military need? The answer then, as today, is that a combination of the two is effective, albeit not always efficient. War is a process of destruction and waste, despite motive and slogans, or social beliefs to the contrary. Controlling waste while determining the most efficient forms of defensive capability remains a valid national objective. An egalitarian approach to the management of conflict may have been successful in certain instances of war during the eons of man's existence. In this age of global threat and involvement, military power is most certainly an instrument of a nation's foreign policy, and decisions as to its effectiveness and use must remain within the purview of the nation's elected and appointed power elites.

The author notably succeeds in pointing out and documenting numerous instances of abuse in both

government and private-sector actions leading up to, and during, national mobilization for World War I. Sadly, contemporary examples of such abuses, as excessive cost and profiteering, exist today. The author concludes with a realistic assessment of U.S. World War I economic experiences.

This book is recommended for the fact driven, for the student of organizational behavior within large organizations, and for the student of evolving power structures within the U.S. constitutional form of democratic government. It is also recommended background reading for the serious student of military mobilization theory and practice. However, it is recommended only with reservations for the casual reader of military history.

SAVERIO DE RUGGIERO
Newport, Rhode Island

Shulman, Mark Russell. *Navalism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882-1893*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 239pp. \$39.95

Mark Shulman's study of the emergence of the "New Navy" is a thoroughly reworked version of the doctoral dissertation he completed some years ago at the University of California, Berkeley. His thesis is clearly summarized in the opening paragraph to his concluding chapter: "A new aggressive American naval strategy emerged in the 1880s and nineties as the product of a distinct political agenda formulated and effected by a small group of energetic, progressive, intellectual timocrats.

Although the navalists provided the catalyst for the new navy, the process of its creation required popular support. The general public, as well as the political and intellectual elites, determined the shape and consequently the strategy of the new navy. Together, they created an imperial service."

Such views do not echo the conventional view of American naval history, and they defy in particular the U.S. Navy's view of itself. An early version of the book's opening chapter, "The Influence of History upon Sea Power: The Navalist Reinterpretation of the War of 1812," was harshly received when it was first published in *The Journal of Military History* in April 1992. Thus, it is particularly appropriate to note that the U.S. Naval Institute has published this important study and to congratulate the Naval Institute Press for its foresight and wisdom in doing so.

Those of us who have spent years studying naval history within the Navy all too often find ourselves unable to see our own world in a wider perspective, even when we think we are striving especially to do so. We too often accept the explanations that we find in the archives that the Navy itself has created and think that we have found truth. Shulman's work is a particularly good antidote for that problem. It may be his choice of a descriptive word, his juxtaposition of facts, or just the general trend of his argument; but throughout, Shulman wrenches the reader into thinking about his subject in new ways. Some may find Shulman's work irritating and inflammatory, but it is nevertheless enlightening.

It is not easy, but it is useful, for us to

see the work of Luce and Mahan seriously described alongside that of those "flapdoodle pacifists and mollycoddlers" that Teddy Roosevelt ridiculed. Putting the two views together and placing them within the context of a broad national debate helps to reveal the strengths, weaknesses, and effects of both sides. In this context, Shulman's argument, that national politics created strategy, strikes home. While we tend to see the work of the Naval War College as a serious and positive professionalization and intellectualization of the Navy, Shulman shows that often there were spin-offs from it that served only to popularize the public and political image of the naval service in a wide variety of media. Equally, he shows that the American effort "to polish up that handle so carefully," as Gilbert and Sullivan described it in *HMS Pinafore*, also had a widespread effect in the improvement of conditions in the U.S. Navy. Through all of this, Shulman shows how naval officers developed a new mentality that complemented the growing discrepancy between the nation's perceived and actual defense needs. Navalists who sought a large battleship navy, he argues, were able to succeed by creating historical and strategic justifications, by improving the Navy's organization and efficiency, and by marketing to a public that welcomed the large and the heroic. Above all, the Navy succeeded because those who were politically and philosophically opposed to the growth of the armed forces were splintered and failed to develop a mature conceptual basis for their opposition.

Shulman's arguments and insights pose a new interpretation, based on useful and important research. While

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many will disagree with his conclusions and characterization, his thoughts deserve careful consideration. Shulman clearly places the development of the U.S. Navy in the 1880s and 1890s within a new and different context, leading us toward a deeper understanding of circumstances surrounding the climate that allowed its growth. He points out factors that, heretofore, have often been ignored by naval historians.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Beeler, John F. *British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era 1866-1880*.

Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1997. 354pp. \$49.50

Now that the United Kingdom has emerged, battle scarred but wiser, from its Strategic Defence Review (the equivalent of the U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR), with aspirations for leaner, more expeditionary and joint armed forces, and a clear challenge to deliver its promises, Beeler's introduction will strike a chord—not only with officers in the Royal Navy but also with naval officers around the world. With its references to a period of changing political leadership; a revolution in technology; an expectation of a "peace dividend"; an increasing awareness of public opinion; the power of the press; and a drive to do more with less, better, faster, and cheaper, all of it superimposed on a changing geopolitical map, one could be forgiven

for having a very strong feeling of *déjà vu*.

However, John Beeler, currently assistant professor at the University of Alabama, cautions against drawing parallels too hastily between the past and present. He stresses the importance of acknowledging the uniqueness of each historical era and of assessing each period on its own terms. Covering the period between the mid-1860s and mid-1880s, Beeler has produced a classic work of scholarly historical analysis, one based on at least a decade of painstaking research. Most naval historians tend to view the latter half of the nineteenth century as a period of relative peace for Britain, marked by political vacillation and strategic myopia of British naval policy makers, who were in the midst of an expanding colonial empire and a surge in technological innovation. He points out that this notion of peace was compounded by those who viewed that period through a Mahanian lens, resulting in an analysis of "pre-Mahanian British naval policy in a post-Mahanian framework"—all of which has distorted the interpretation of a largely neglected period of history prior to the Naval Defence Act of 1889.

Beeler's alternative and broader view acts as a counter to this negative appraisal. His research goes far beyond, and to greater depth than, the work of most naval historians in penetrating the complex web of social and political forces at work beneath the highly visible flagship of technological revolution. He draws out the influence of the British domestic political scene, as well as of the media, in shaping government fiscal policy, the shortfalls of the Admiralty Board in