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Ethnic Conflict: What Kind of War Is This?

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M ENTION THE WORD "ETHNICITY" to a military officer, and there will be a visible cringe. The term has become associated with conflict arenas to which armed forces are sent without a clear idea of who the protagonists are, why they are fighting, and what the intervening forces are really supposed to accomplish.[1] One senior military officer coming out of a three-year experience in Bosnia remarked, "We didn't know whose side we were supposed to be taking. . . . [We] ended up hating everybody equally and feeling guilty for it. There were no good guys. Serbs? Croats? Bosniacs?"[2] No side had a clear claim to righteousness, justice, or truth. American military servicemen and women are basically uncomfortable fighting without a cause, and they want to be on the side of righteousness—to be a force for justice, democracy, equality, and freedom (and maybe even capitalism).

Part of the problem has been that U.S. military personnel have become involved in ethnic wars without a game plan.[3] In the early 1990s, when the Defense Department decided to take low-intensity conflict seriously, it was already behind. There were at the time about sixty such situations, with the threat of many more as a result of the fragmentation of the Soviet Union. That disintegration was wholly unforeseen, of course; for forty years during the Cold War most internal disturbances in the developing world had been interpreted as manifestations of the superpower rivalry, hence treated as insurgencies against a

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"friendly" government or "freedom movements" against a communist tyranny.[4] In addition, the Cold War had become comfortable; ethnic conflict seemed messy in comparison. It was difficult for some of the Cold Warriors to move from the precise calculations of nuclear and conventional war gaming to these small, disturbing wars with their unfamiliar requirements and unconventional tasks. It required a whole new set of thinking and planning skills and even a level of risk to careers.

Reality eventually overcame reluctance, and there has been a slow but progressive realization by the military bureaucracy that these wars are important—because, like it or not, U.S. forces will be involved. The questions now are: What is an ethnic group? What are the causes of ethnic conflict? What is the proper role of intervening military forces?

War between ethnic groups is not new. What may be new is that the implications for warfighting suggested here derive specifically from the nature of ethnic groups and ethnic groups in conflict.

The literature on ethnic conflict is not very helpful. Whether produced by the academic or military community, professional writing on the subject has been fairly bewildering. Even the names given to "ethnic conflict" by the military, policy, and academic communities—guerrilla warfare, operations other than war, complex contingency operations, low intensity conflict, and irregular warfare—are confusing, overlapping, and of limited value in formal explanation. These categories are not based on a consistent description of protagonists, means, or goals of warfare.

This article will provide basic definitions that are useful for the U.S. military, describe how ethnic wars differ from other kinds of conflicts in basic ways, and discuss preliminary implications for warfighting. If the U.S. military wants operational success, it must have an operational definition of "winning" (or "prevailing") that can contribute to credibility. Credibility is a vital component in deterrence of future wars among ethnic groups.[5]

The first major issue is whether a specific ethnic conflict is of U.S. national security concern. Not all ethnic wars are or should be considered security concerns of the United States. Some conflicts are not on the national security "scope"—because they are not lethal enough (Corsica), are not in a "critical interest area" (Burma), or simply have not shown up on CNN (Togo). American policy makers may need a "criticality" list to prioritize possible demands for U.S. involvement, based perhaps on what Robert Pfaltzgraff calls "wars of conscience" or "wars of interest" (or some combination).[6]

The second decision, when to become involved, is equally critical and perhaps even more complicated. It has been suggested that "timing is everything." Once violence spins out of control, it is often too late to do anything except pick up the pieces. Entering a conflict with either too little preparation or when

it is too late to prevent irreversible damage is plainly not the best way to do the nation's business. It is not a matter of lack of prior knowledge: the intelligence community can give sufficient indication and warning of imminent ethnic wars. Any country expert, or for that matter anyone reading a current newspaper, can identify twenty or more potential ethnic "trouble spots." The exact day and hour may not be evident, but certainly these ethnic wars come as no surprise. There is, however, a reluctance to keep potential conflicts "on the scope." Perhaps this is best explained by the Carnegie Commission report on the warning-response problem: some policy makers simply do not want to know, because "knowing" implies responsibility for acting.[7] Such self-imposed restraint creates great difficulties for the military community.

Specific missions need to be tailored to what is happening at a given moment on the ground. Not all military capabilities are appropriate at differing points in the escalation or de-escalation of violence. Too little force can be as problematic as too much, and the measure is highly time dependent. There are also issues of joint force structure and of cooperation with allies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international governmental organizations (IGOs). Preparation of complex operations requires time to assess measures appropriate to the general nature of ethnic conflict as well as to collect situation-specific information.

The third major question involves the connection of goals and military activities meant to achieve them. Mission statements commonly include a general goal of "promoting stability." Many would argue, however, that long-term stability is not possible without justice and social order. These, in turn, are contingent on the security of individuals and groups as well as of states. This is not just a theoretical issue; it has practical ramifications. Are U.S. military operations meant to restore an unjust status quo ante by simply preventing violence, or should military operations be designed to help ensure long-lasting security? Ensuring short-term stability may be counterproductive to long-term security and justice. Indeed, this is a major policy dilemma. During the Cold War, regional stability was a primary goal, because it was believed that it would help contain the Communist threat. By the current decade, policy makers realized that stability may mean government repression of legitimate demands on the part of a mobilized citizenry.

The fourth group of questions is perhaps the most difficult, and yet it is the most important. How can the individual service person contribute to mission success in the management of daily, weekly, and monthly on-the-ground operations? What do key players need to know about ethnic warfare in order to accomplish the mission? What kind of training is appropriate, what on-the-scene support is required? What problems are associated with debriefing and reassignment?

Ethnic Groups, and Ethnic Groups in Conflict

At its most basic level, an ethnic group is simply a set of people with common beliefs and behaviors. These beliefs and behaviors are manifest in both symbolic and behavioral patterning in language, territory, religion, economics, and politics. For example, land use is important for the continued functioning of an ethnic group, but it also has symbolic importance—as in birthplaces of heroes. Distributing money and clothing to the poor may be a "function" of a religion, but the symbols of religion evoke more than rationally calculated behaviors. (The emotive value of the cross is a familiar example.) Language serves a group by facilitating communication; it also is a symbol of access to the goods and services of modern technological societies. Ethnic groups are dependent on economic resources, but economic resources are also symbolic of group status and individual prestige. Objective political authority patterns are found in all social structures; the political authority of a leader is also often symbolized in ritual speech. These factors are interrelated and complex, which makes them all the more interesting—but certainly not mysterious.[8]

Membership in an ethnic group is generally by birth. The "quick and dirty" method of telling whether a person is a member of a group is through patterns of endogamy, who marries whom.[9] The group ensures its continuation by teaching beliefs and behaviors to children through the process of enculturation. It is occasionally possible to "pass," and most societies have rather clear regulations (written or unwritten) about how outsiders may become insiders. People may acquire the identity of an ethnic group through rites of passage that ensure the stranger becomes suitable for group membership, however loosely defined. Women who marry into a group are often accorded group rights (generally not property rights). Children have full rights, depending on rules of descent patterns, whether patrilineal or matrilineal.[10]

Ethnic groups in themselves, contrary to public opinion, are inherently neither good nor bad—they simply organize life for groups of people. When life is threatened, the members of a group will respond in some way to ensure survival.[11]

Ethnic groups are found in time (history) and space (territory); paraphrasing Bismarck, when all else is said and done you have history and geography. Ethnic groups do not live in isolation but are found in *ecospheres* with many other ethnic groups. Accordingly, they exploit the environment for resources, and they compete with other groups in order to maintain and augment their prospects for survival.[12]

Ethnic groups interact in three basic ways: they exclusively populate a geographically defined territory and exploit its resources; coexisting with other groups who are exploiting other resources, they find a specific resource and exploit it widely; or they move from place to place in order to exploit either the

resources of other groups or of a "niche" complementary to those of other groups in the ecosphere. (This is a biological model of resource exploitation and allocation, not one based on traditional economic forces alone.) In each case, a group develops a traditional set of relationships with other groups in the ecosphere. Intergroup activities are generally patterned, mutually beneficial, and basically harmonious. However, if a change in the environment threatens the survivability of a group, in either relative or absolute terms, the adaptation patterns must change. Under most conditions, groups adapt peacefully to social, biological, and climatic change.[13]

When the limits of a group's adaptive capacity have been reached but a threat to survival persists, conflict with other groups in the social environment is likely to ensue. If the group relationship has been territorially defined and the groups are contiguous, the conflict may occur on the traditional boundary, as in the Serbian-Croatian conflict. When groups that have exploited a specific resource are dispersed among other groups, conflict is less concentrated geographically and more defined "socially"; examples are Bosnia, Rwanda, and Malaysia. When the group has traditionally exploited the resources of other groups but now cannot find another source to ensure its survival, it may be at the mercy of its previous "host" and be singled out for genocide or removal. The Romany in Hungary, Lebanese in Brazil, and Huguenots in early modern France are useful examples.

There is a further "intervening variable" that complicates the analysis: the sovereign state. In comparison to ethnic groups, which have existed for millennia, sovereign states are a relatively new phenomenon. The contemporary composition of states reflects when and how they came into being, but almost all comprise more than one ethnic group. Without taking the state into consideration, ethnic conflict would seem to be simply one ethnic group in violent confrontation with another. In reality, these populations live within states and are subject to "state" parameters—political, social, economic, and territorial.[14]

In most cases, one group has at its disposal the resources of the state in addition to its traditional power base. This group dominates the internal representation, institutions, and policies of the state and, importantly, monopolizes the legitimate use of force. Therefore, the political culture and basic definition of the "nation," with its supporting ideology of nationalism, are those of this majority or dominant group. Other groups are, by definition, rebels and traitors if they take up arms against the ethnic group that controls the state. In fact, most analysts of ethnic conflict define it as occurring between a state and an ethnic group. This is not entirely accurate: rather, if the violence is "ethnic conflict" it is between ethnic groups, one of which is likely to control the mechanisms of state.[15]

A final aspect of this relationship, then, is that ethnic violence is between unequal actors. This is asymmetrical warfare at its starkest. The majority group

may face disruption but generally not extinction, especially if it controls the mechanisms of state; the minority group—whose resources, inferior to begin with, may be further diminished by the denial of state services and assets—may be annihilated. Genocide is often related to the organization, and centralization, of state resources during and after a war to destroy competing populations.[16]

Profiling Ethnic Violence

The case for looking at ethnic violence as a separate genre and species of warfare is compelling. Each of the dimensions of differentiation must be considered individually, but they are also multiplicative in effect. We will discuss here some aspects—and only ten of the most important ones—that are clearly derived from the uniqueness of ethnicity and ethnic conflict. They are not equally important, and military people with experience in this area will be able to suggest others.[17]

Where Does the Fighting Occur? Ethnic war is limited geographically to a specific territory or locality. The reason has to do with the basic characteristics of ethnic groups, which include having specific living spaces. A group's territory may be found within a single state or it may cross borders, but the fighting will stay within its traditional territories. Groups may train in other countries and other forms of support may be received, but the fighting itself is localized. If contending ethnic groups have lived in overlapping territories or one is a minority within the other, there usually will be physical movement of people, for group solidarity and security.[18]

If an ethnicity's land is not clearly delineated in time and space at the beginning of a conflict, it will become so as geographic borders are strengthened to protect the group. The borders will take on other functions, including psychological cohesion, the patterning of authority, and the organization of violence. The fighting will often occur on the border and across it. It will be most intense after an ethnic group stakes claims to territory and when claims are in dispute.[19]

Related to the actual location of the ethnic war is the idea of localization of the violence. The ideologies, goals, tactics, strategies, and organization of one ethnic group are not easily transposable to others; ethnic groups may encourage each other, but each is essentially on its own. Neighboring populations may support a legitimate government, but generally speaking minorities have a great deal of difficulty getting any kind of help from anyone—let alone money or weapons.

Several implications for intervention forces arise from the localization of the conflict. First, because the areas of operation and interest are more specific than in most other forms of warfare, military training and preparation can be more focused. Second, the critical geographical points are those that have either

symbolic or economic value. These should be identified early, as it will be here that actual fighting occurs. Each side is aware of the other's sensitivities, having been neighbors for a long time. For one side to target such a place has particular emotional impact, because it is irreplaceable as a symbol, and everybody knows it—the viciousness of the intention is unmistakable.[20] Third, intelligence support will be largely in the form of human intelligence, due to the limited geographical scope and proportionately low intensity of the conflict. Signals and tactical intelligence may be less helpful in ethnic wars than in other types of war. Fourth, establishing a "safety" or "security" zone clearly raises the moral issues of ethnic cleansing. The longer the war, the more difficult it will be to reverse such "cleansing," whether peaceable or forcible. It is important therefore to make every effort to discourage separation.

Finally, when ethnic tensions erupt into armed conflict, the reaction of neighboring countries, more distant allies or other interested nations, and international bodies is fairly predictable. Neighbors (although, as noted, such fighting seldom spreads) will close their borders, unless the group at risk has strong kinship ties within the neighboring state. More distant allied and interested nations will involve themselves only to an extent that does not damage their own positions. International bodies, for the most part, will declare illegitimate the use of violence by subnational ethnic groups to achieve political goals.

Another aspect of the localization of violence is that terrorism in neighboring countries is generally counterproductive. Ethnic groups that perpetrate terrorist acts in Western Europe or the United States are quickly consigned to the category of international criminals, and any sympathy they might already have garnered for the righteousness of their cause is quickly lost.[21] The movement of money, people, and other contraband such as weapons or drugs becomes increasingly difficult for them. The availability of neighboring countries for training and as refuges for insurgent leaders or as staging areas for aid operations or intervening forces will depend to a great extent on the neighbors' formal relationships with the embattled state.

Leadership. In traditional warfare, generals meet on a relatively equal footing with regard to professionalism, capabilities, known resources, and civil-military relationships. Opposing generals often have great respect for their adversaries. However, if the leader of a sovereign state calls his opponent a "guerrilla," "terrorist," or "war criminal," they do not meet on an equal footing. When intervention forces must deal with someone so characterized, they find themselves in a most difficult position.

The leader of the ethnic faction's armed element may have been trained by the state military but not have achieved senior rank. He does not have the trained cadre, resources for rewards or threats, or even the political legitimacy required to keep men under arms in difficult conditions. He is basically a

"criminal," as are all of those who fight with him—quite irrespective of personal behavior or the legitimacy of goals. When a force intervenes in an ethnic conflict, usually with the permission of the established (majority faction) government, it also (as a matter of practical necessity) must find a leader from the other side with whom to negotiate. Whoever they choose automatically gains significant legitimacy by that choice, whether he be a criminal, rebel, military commander, or elected politician.

The political leaders of minority ethnic groups generally assume secondary roles during the fighting itself but take on primary leadership when it is halted. Political leaders may then turn against military leaders and disavow wartime actions that did not conform to human rights conventions; the military leader becomes expendable. If the military leader takes on the role of politician, he may expect the base of his political legitimacy to be questioned. In either scenario, it appears to outsiders that the ethnic group is "fragmented" and has no basic social consensus. Seemingly divided leadership undermines the group's credibility and can be used in a divide-and-conquer strategy during negotiations.

The leader of a legitimate sovereign state may be a ruthless individual with few democratic credentials, but it is this individual with whom the intervening military commanders must consult and coordinate. How the intervening force assesses that individual's characteristics, base of political support, and proclivity to unrestrained violence are on-the-ground judgment calls.[22] This head of state draws power from his assumed legitimacy and his control of military and police forces. However, his problems are legion: he must restore civil order using his own forces; maintain control of the military; preclude political rivals from exploiting his apparent weakness, suggested by the presence of outsiders; and (not least) deal with the "intruders"—the international aid officials, human rights monitors, government advisors, and foreign armed forces operating in his sovereign state territory.

An assumption that one group is the victim and the other the victimizer may lead to two snap judgments: that the leader of the victimizing group is undemocratic, repressive, and cruel, whereas the leader of the victim group deserves pity (often mixed with contempt). If the latter appears to be leading a relatively powerless group to certain defeat, he is presumed to be either irrational or simply not very smart.

It is clear, however, that no single individual embodies a group. Any intervening organization, including a military command, must identify each faction's leaders, characteristics, power bases, decision-making criteria, strengths and weaknesses, and relative power position vis-à-vis other factions. Many leaders of ethnic factions are surprisingly charismatic. With the charm and good manners of cosmopolitans, they are uncomfortably easy to like even when they clearly are pursuing their own or their group's narrow goals. Diplomats, military commanders, and other intervening personnel must be able to listen, learn, and

withhold opinion until every faction's position within an ethnic group is represented.

Brigadier General Trent Thomas, U.S. Army, has argued that mobilizing minority ethnic groups requires a high degree of "popular commitment, politicization, and participation." There has to be an extremely energized core whose members share motivations and interests. This means that leaders not having the institutionalized resources of a state must make up the difference in the commitment of their followers. This very commitment, however, restricts the leader's ability to compromise or bargain.[23] The leader may be replaced if he is seen as having become "soft," radical splinter groups may appear, or individuals may defect. The group may be left even more vulnerable to political manipulation by its enemies.

Very few comparative case studies have been done on ethnic insurgency leadership, its relationship to political and ideological forces, decision-making factors, the constraints implied by mass mobilization, or other important dimensions. There is considerable ignorance about this important matter.

How Many People Are Killed? The relative gravity of an incident involving killings is measured primarily by its *severity* and by its *intensity*. Its severity is the absolute number killed, and its intensity the number killed in a given period.

With regard to severity, ethnic conflicts may produce fewer dead than do other kinds of warfare. It is also true that the percentage of the total population killed will be higher in the minority (or losing) group than in the majority group. These numbers may be influenced by the types of weapons available, the ease of targeting (as affected by geographical proximity), the presence of indigenous and international press, and attempts at genocide. Whether one group controls the military and police forces is an important factor, regardless of respective sizes. The group without those resources will generally lose a large percentage of its population.[24]

There are several implications here. One is that when a specific conflict does not result in a large number of deaths, it may not seize world attention; therefore it may prompt little international outcry, even if it results in the virtual disappearance of an ethnicity—an important enough matter to its members.[25]

As for intensity, ethnic conflicts tend to alternate between short periods of high intensity and interludes of more "acceptable" levels, even almost total quiet. Interestingly, violence does not seem to "spiral" but to describe a stepwise series of escalations and de-escalations. Unfortunately, the cycle durations used by some academics and military analysts vary so significantly as to be virtually useless. Until more systematic work is done, the primary value of the pattern may be that the spikes of extreme brutality could come to world attention.

Intensity may also give clues as to the nature of the dominant group. Intensity tends to be high when military forces are neither disciplined nor professional.

Other important factors include the nature of local civilian-military relations, the presence of exclusivist, nationalist ideologies, and the extent of military conformity with the rule of law. A government that has little to lose by engaging in genocidal activities (an "outlaw state" with few of the responsibilities inherent in democracy) will tend to fight conflicts having high levels of intensity, characterized by unrestrained brutality. Preventive diplomacy becomes relatively ineffective during periods of high intensity. As hard as it is for them to swallow, diplomats may need to defer to military forces during the most violent of episodes. The implication for military peacekeepers is that damage limitation may require the intervening forces to address the professionalism (or lack thereof) of government forces.

How Long Do Ethnic Wars Last? It is important to distinguish between the duration of periods of actual fighting and the periods (sometimes much more protracted) of general competition or struggle. Journalists and commentators often confuse these measurements and make statements such as, "These groups have been fighting for centuries"—a blatant overstatement, since even those groups with histories of bad relationships do not engage in constant warfare. There are more and longer periods of peace than of warfare. For example, it may be true that the conflicts in Bosnia and Northern Ireland have "gone on forever," but communal violence producing death has occurred only within narrow time frames. Interludes of quiescence have been far more common than outbursts of violence.

With regard to the duration of actual fighting, there seems to be a five-year rule.[26] The first two years of conflict see escalation, the third is the peak of fighting, and the fourth year is exhaustion; during the fifth year, the parties are in a "hurting stalemate" and thus ready to sue for peace of almost any kind. This rather limited time span may be partly explained by the requirement for ethnic groups to maintain their economic, political, and social viability. If the group cannot maintain schools for its children, for example, the "opportunity cost" is unacceptably high. If the group loses a large percentage of women of childbearing age, it cannot reproduce its population. There is mixed evidence that the level and form of external support affect the time period by adding to the capabilities of one side or another.

A history of violence (protractedness) does not "explain" a current episode. Groups tend to bring forward aspects of history in a selective manner to justify or rationalize their behavior, but these reasons are not basic to the timing of conflict. One must cut through the rhetoric and investigate the *immediate* causes of violence.

It is instructive to go back to basic reasons for killing and war. These generally include the categories of instinct, self-defense, territory, patriotism, loyalty, and duty. A historical or primitive memory of something that happened five

hundred years previously is seldom enough reason to kill. The overriding reality is that contending ethnic groups have lived more in peace than at war; otherwise one group would have been eliminated. No "final" resolution to ethnic conflict is possible, probable, or even (quite often) truly desired by those apparently seeking one. In fact, when a "final solution" is said to have occurred, it usually has been achieved by ethnic cleansing, or even genocide.

The implication for an intervening military is nuanced. If ethnic groups are always in competition but fighting is relatively uncommon, the goal should be to encourage a movement toward interactions that are more, rather than less, peaceful. Peace, or even an "acceptable" level of violence, will require the reestablishment of normal interactions and the invention of new ones that build on traditional patterns. An illustration of this is the situation in Northern Ireland. There, the causes of conflict have remained fairly constant for generations; the level of death-producing violence has seldom gone to zero, but it has been maintained at a tolerable level by the British forces and the cooperation of both parties.

Comprehensiveness. This is undoubtedly the most significant area of difference between ethnic warfare and other types of war. It is immediately apparent that ethnic wars involve more members of societies, and to a greater degree, than do wars fought, say, by sending armies into other countries for conquest. Even revolutionary wars tend to involve a concentration of members of a single class, occupation, religion, or other kind of special interest.

That ethnic wars involve more individuals to a greater extent than other forms of war is often noted but seldom measured in any meaningful way.[27] At the initiation of a conflict, the minority ethnic group will see a particular need to be mobilized, coherent, cohesive, and organized. Those who do not wish to participate or are invited not to participate are likely to leave the area. Parents often send their children out of the country to attend school, for example; this is one of the "indications and warnings" of incipient violence. Ethnic group mobilization for conflict may evince specific patterns that have been underreported.

Ethnic conflicts tend to involve all members of the minority ethnic group but not all of the dominant or majority group. This reflects the size and capabilities of each group. Where minority groups need virtually full participation of every segment of their population, majority groups need contribute only a portion of their resources. But the more the majority participate (particularly if it greatly outnumbers the minority group), the more ominous the implications.

The comprehensiveness of public participation in war fighting adds an unprecedented complexity and difficulty to military operations. Everyone seems to be involved: the elderly, teachers, priests, women, entrepreneurs, children, artists, musicians, criminals. Each of these groups must be dealt with separately

and together by the intervening military as well as NGOs and IGOs. A wide array of formal and informal communication modalities is required. This is complicated but certainly not impossible. Success in this area is fundamental to the possibility of overall mission success, so any limitation (particularly if self-imposed) on effective interaction with all parties in the conflict should be resisted.

Women and Children. The involvement of women and children in ethnic warfare is related to its comprehensiveness. All members of a society generally serve to protect "home and hearth"—and ethnic conflict occurs precisely *at* the home and hearth. Some scholars have estimated that as many as 70 percent of the victims of ethnic wars are women and children. In the early stages of a conflict, this may be an unanticipated effect of men leaving the area for economic or political activities or to join remote units. Also, states may target civilian areas where women and children make up the majority of the population, in an attempt to reach or punish the men. The war in Bosnia has lent some credence to the position that militarization, although it may enhance overall group security, may be of significant detriment to the security of women, whether on the side of "winners" or "losers."

It is well understood that rape is a common form of violence against women during war. Other detrimental effects for women include the diversion of resources to war efforts rather than social programs; the special burdens placed on mothers of children (especially dependent infants and toddlers); unequal treatment in refugee camps; and the difficulties resulting from losing—temporarily or permanently—the physical, financial, and emotional support of husbands, fathers, brothers, sons, and uncles. There is a general assumption that because war has historically been a man's problem, women's issues take second place both during and after the conflict.[28]

But in fact, in sharp contrast to traditional warfare, in ethnic wars women and children, the elderly, and the infirm, are not "innocent bystanders": they are central figures, generally as significant as combatant males, in the motivations and purposes of ethnic warfare. Their deaths (or at least their flights from disputed territory) are precisely what the hostile ethnic group is striving to impose if repression fails and armed conflict ensues. Knowing what is at stake in ethnic warfare, all members of the targeted group must see themselves as participants, even if only reluctantly.

For the intervening military, the implications are indeed sobering. On the one hand, when women and children are perpetrators, they enter the battlefield willing to kill and be killed. Although women are often surprisingly good at killing, few traditional armies are anxious to fight and kill what they believe to be unequal adversaries. This is a significant moral and ethical dilemma. On the other hand, when women, children, the elderly, and the infirm are victims,

intervening forces can be seen as protecting the most vulnerable—clearly an appealing motivation. Unfortunately, "victims" can also be "perpetrators"—recall what is at stake for them—and the sense of betrayal on the part of intervening military forces unfamiliar with what is entailed in ethnic conflict may be devastating. Morale problems escalate, especially among professional military forces.

On the more practical side, awareness of women's resources and needs can win civilian support. Providing for children also brings long-term payback. Whether by providing essential food, medical care, and security or merely distributing candy or comic books warning of land mines, the U.S. military has often left good memories. Most importantly, the children report back to parents about their treatment by the servicemen and women. Considerate behavior maintains and augments a positive environment. It is the epitome, perhaps, of "winning the hearts and minds." Nevertheless, when intervening in an ethnic war, a military force cannot lose sight of the fact that *all* members of an ethnic group see themselves as participants.

During a war, the problems of refugees (displaced persons), food distribution, disease, unclaimed children, and criminality are largely borne by women and children. Military forces, often obliged to "take care" of these problems, may feel that this takes time and energy away from combat. More accurately, it is just another facet of ethnic warfare, where women, children, and the elderly are central to what is at stake.

Weapons. The state system relies on the premise that the state holds a legitimate monopoly on violence. Weapons procurement and use are functions of state authority and resources. Any group in armed resistance to police or military forces is by definition engaging in illegal activity. Ethnic group violence, by extension, challenges not only the state in which it is perpetrated but the notion of the legitimacy of the international state system itself. Minority groups, regardless of the moral or ethical arguments of justice and "just war," have no legal right to use force against the state. It is treasonous.

The state has an organized military, with units, bases, weapons, munitions, supplies, and support equipment; it has practices and procedures, international agreements and contacts, training, and (very importantly) established funding for procurement and operations. These give the state a notable head start over any insurgents.

Nonmajority ethnic groups, by contrast, must procure weapons from illegal sources, grey and black markets, using funds obtained in some surreptitious manner. The choice of weapons may be limited by the amount of money available. One obvious possibility is the "poor man's atom bomb"—chemical and biological weapons, which are relatively inexpensive. Chemical and biological weapons may be chosen not out of deliberate evil or inherent brutality but as weapons of last resort. It is commonly understood, however, that states are

more likely to use weapons of mass destruction than are ethnic minorities. There are probably two major reasons: the deeper pockets of the state and the assumed legitimacy of their right to quell rebellion. (This may change in the future as a direct consequence of growing international acceptance of ethnic minority rights.)

An important derivative question, then, is whether stopping the supply of weapons to one or both of the protagonists will limit damage or be inherently "unfair."[29] In the initial stages of ethnic conflict there is generally an extreme disparity between the technological support for central government forces and that available to insurgent ethnic groups. Groups need money, training, and organization (doctrine) to use high-tech equipment, including sophisticated weapons. But the implications are not straightforward. While it would seem logical to assume that a profile of technological asymmetry would parallel other aspects of asymmetrical warfare, this is not always the case. For example, a sophisticated World Wide Web operation may be able to coordinate insurgent activities in battle zones, track enemy movements, disrupt national computer systems, acquire monetary and political support from expatriates, or provide other forms of communication capabilities. This, however, tends to be related to a "whiz-kid" factor—one or a few individuals with appropriate equipment and superb computer skills willing to use them on behalf of a cause. Technology, preponderantly on the government's side in most conflicts, may be of some distinct benefit to a minority force. Against an enemy using unencrypted radio communications, for example, even a scanning receiver offers the weaker side vital intelligence.

Neutrality and Taking Sides. The assumption that an intervening third party can be neutral and evenhanded, an honest broker, is naive and misguided. It reveals a total misunderstanding of the nature of ethnic conflict. As has been rightly pointed out by others, when any third party intervenes for any reason, the balance of forces changes. The more powerful actors prevail, even if intervention forces do not care who wins or who was initially responsible for the conflict. As noted, ethnic conflict epitomizes asymmetrical warfare: the government generally has a predominance of force, compared to the insurgent group. When an intervening force comes in on the side of a minority, it effectively equalizes the power relationship; if it is on the side of the government, the minority group is even more disadvantaged. Third-party support simply for an "end to the war" invariably supports the status quo ante.[30]

To ensure that the West is on the right side, we must be aware of the local problem, care about it to some degree, and have some potential to make a difference. Vivid media portrayal of ethnic cleansing, genocide, and mass destruction tends to mobilize international public opinion and then policy makers. By that time, it is too late for preventive measures and certainly too late for the

victims. Such coverage also sharply reduces the possibility that international public opinion will remain impartial; if an intervention is undertaken, the sense "back home" is very likely to be that one side is the villain and the other the victim.

All parties to a conflict realize the potential value of being able to manipulate intervening forces for their own benefit. Both sides, or rather all sides, to a dispute also know that the intervention forces will eventually leave and that the consequences of the conflict will be their own responsibility. This makes both formal alliances and even informal friendships transitory and manipulative by nature. Many Western service people report being distressed to see sincere professional and even personal friendships exploited or betrayed. The interveners can make no permanent friends. While this undoubtedly is disappointing to high-minded "peacekeepers," it hardly can be otherwise for those who must always calculate their abiding life-long (or longer) group interests.

The implication for the intervening forces is that they must clearly face the fact that intervention is not, and cannot be, "neutral." The intrusion of force works to the benefit of one side or another. When the West accepts a side, its military forces can and should be allowed to do their job according to the rules of the game, which are exceedingly complex and usually zero sum.

Regional and International Stability*.* If the nature of the military services is to fight enemies, ethnic conflict has a particular problem: the belligerents are both "bad," because they threaten international stability, and because they kill each other instead of negotiating differences. The "enemy" becomes war itself. There is a fine line between encouraging an unjust status quo and supporting peaceful change. Stability need not imply preserving injustice, supporting repressive governments, or accepting "anything" for peace.

It is important to note that the chances for a minority ethnic group's survival are enhanced to the degree to which it can align itself with an external power. The power exerted by the third party changes the intrastate relationships in perception, power projection, threat capabilities, and resource control. This tends to be more important and effective in intrastate conflicts than in international ones, because when a foreign nation sides with a minority group it thereby challenges the sovereignty of the state involved. This is unusual and therefore represents a strong message. In the case of neighboring states, it plainly threatens regional stability.

It is debatable in any case how often the international community may be willing to oppose sovereign states in order to protect threatened populations. There is little payback, especially if a friendly government or access to a valuable resource is involved. The dilemma of ethnic minorities within the new states of the former Soviet Union provides a clear example.[31]

In this kind of arena, police and military operations have an uncomfortable overlap. Combatants are not always uniformed, which blurs the distinctions in the rules in the war. The problem has been seriously addressed in European and American military and legal fora for several decades. The Norwegian experience in Hebron, Israel, under UN auspices seems to have been one of the most successful, and it is often used as a template.[32] The key seems to be related to communication and commitment on the part of the intervening force.

It is increasingly rare for any military force to intervene in subnational conflict without the support and cooperation of the international community. United Nations peacekeeping forces have been perplexed by ethnic conflict since their first experiences in Cyprus, in 1963.[33] IGOs and NGOs also have become more involved in ethnic conflict, changing in so doing the balance of force, communication requirements, and mobility of troops. The importance of military cooperation with these groups is increasingly understood, even when it seems to make matters far more complex on the ground.

The use of force by the international community also raises a dilemma: stopping violence by the use of violence seems counterintuitive and counterproductive. As one U.S. Marine put it, "How can you say, 'Don't shoot or I'll kill you'?" Suggested alternatives to the use of force always raise questions of the primary obligation of a military force: is it to win wars or make peace?

Penalty for the Loser. There is a fundamental difference in penalties arising in a system of nominal equals (that is, in the Westphalian state system) and those in the hierarchical, substate realm. At the end of interstate wars, diplomatic practice and international law ensure viable cease-fires and treaty negotiations. Having learned from the experience of World War I, the international community today discourages harsh and retributive penalties for the loser, in favor of arrangements that will bring the state back into compliance and "into the fold." There is a common understanding that both winner and loser will continue to be parts of the international system.

This is not true for substate conflict: there is no generally agreed-upon process for ending ethnic conflicts, at least not with the weight of international treaties, and there is no international body to ensure even a modicum of equity.

In ethnic conflict, the penalties incurred by individuals and groups for losing are staggering. Individuals will suffer everything from societal deprivation, to prison, to death. Calculations of the bleak chances of staying alive drive many to become political or economic refugees. Individual members of the group will be targeted simply by association. The majority group will be hostile, suspicious, and contemptuous.

State policies will be used to diminish further the group's prospects. There will be increased restrictions with regard to access to schools and universities, public housing, living space, religious freedom, economic opportunity, and

political participation. Police and military control, backed by the threat of continued violence, will become ever more severe. The winners may initiate programs of reeducation, expulsion, ethnic cleansing, and other forms of punishment, deeming them justified retribution. (If there are international monitors present, these activities will occur when they have ceased to be attentive.)

There is little mystery about why ethnic groups continue to fight losing battles: the alternative is worse.[34] Ethnic groups are more than aware of the penalties of losing and will often persevere in an apparently irrational, inexplicable fashion. Suicidal military operations, seeming miscalculation of odds, use of children in battle, and other uncommon acts of war become common. This is usually one reason journalists and casual observers get the idea that ethnic conflict itself is more brutal, savage, and sickening than other forms of war.[35] Intervening forces should expect, and plan for, these rational-irrational acts of desperation.

The penalty for losing is also manifest in the seeming obduracy of military leaders when encouraged to negotiate cease-fires and peace agreements. Ethnic group leaders recognize that negotiation puts the balance of authority back into the hands of the government; thus, after a negotiated settlement, the domination techniques and tools of the state will increase faster than the options of the minority ethnic group. Even when the group's strategy is to fight a war of attrition, it inevitably ends up with a lower standard of living. If an ethnic group cannot achieve some degree of political autonomy (independent statehood), the only good outcome of armed conflict may be a period of time in which to regroup and explore alternatives to direct confrontation.

Military leaders are especially aware of the costs of losing: retribution, retaliation, revenge, and reintegration. They often become the focus of tribunals, imprisonment, and even assassination attempts. Some are overcome by the tragedy of their personal losses; some leave the legitimate war arena and become renegade warriors, militia leaders, or common criminals.

The Future

Ethnic wars are not going away. Neither the Samuel Huntington scenario of great clashes of civilizations nor the Robert Kaplan vision of total social disintegration is likely. With neither bang nor whimper, the world will muddle through. The propensity of human beings to organize in groups seems to be a constant. It is also apparent that world political, social, and environmental changes threaten some of these groups and that their struggles to survive may bring violence.[36]

As others have maintained, the intractability of some of these conflicts in no way excuses the United States or the West from appropriate action. To argue

against any intervention is to limit choices concerning the nation's security. The military will be actively engaged in ethnic wars and therefore needs adequate preparation and planning.

Five general recommendations would be to support democracy, expect problems, emphasize training of the individual service person, appropriate the necessary monies and resources, and use all diplomatic and military resources available to support the desired outcome.

Democracy and peace tend to go together. Most working democratic countries wage war neither on their neighbors nor on their own populations. Inclusive, participatory democracy is supported by values and practices associated with liberty, justice, equality, property, and law. Ethnic groups are able to aggregate interests and articulate demands in a legitimate, institutionalized system. The policies that emanate from that system are seen as resulting from adherence to constitutional principles and as reflecting principles of distributive justice. This is the basic definition of legitimate government in American political thought—that individuals have rights and responsibilities, that government should be of, by, and for the people.

The alternative to this is the movement of peoples in a manner commonly referred to as "ethnic cleansing." Whether inherently or by design, however, ethnic enclaves seem no more conducive to peace than ethnic "mixing." As John Coakley points out, "The new units are typically also polyethnic, and the conflicts have been simply moved to a different level and multiplied, with the original conflict possibly being reproduced in microcosm."[37] The management of ethnic pluralism within a liberal state requires commitment to democratic processes and the rule of law. It also requires patience.

Realistic expectations. That a country is involved in ethnic conflict is a sign that it has never tried democracy or that it has tried and so far failed. Even while the conflict is in progress, however, some advances can be made toward democratization. Democracy is a process, not a product. In certain cases the United States and others, having brokered a peace agreement, have attempted to introduce democracy through "nation building." Not surprisingly, the new institutions failed: unfulfilled expectations led to disappointment and disillusionment, hope failed, despair emerged, and democracy itself was blamed. To erect democratic institutions does not ensure a functioning democracy; the idea that it can be installed like a fully working machine simply by setting up the parts (voting, parties, etc.) is nonsense. By definition, a system of governance has to reflect a people's needs, goals, and ways of doing things. On the other hand, if any viable democratic elements existed before a conflict, they need not be suspended until it is over; democracy can be "in process" at any and all stages.

Training. It is often said that the American serviceman wears "the Bill of Rights on one shoulder and the Ten Commandments" on the other. This may be a bit overstated, but Americans do tend to support democratic principles and

practices as a matter of course, to the point of refusing even to recognize less at-
tractive options. The effects of this tendency have not been systematically inves-
tigated, but anecdotal evidence, such as reports on the U.S. experience in Haiti
and Bosnia, may provide insight. The United States would do well to improve
its education efforts in the fundamentals of democracy. Belief in the values of
democracy and an understanding of democratic processes on the part of inter-
vening forces would contribute to unity of purpose and mission success—there
is nothing quite like a good attitude. In ethnic wars, the soldier is often face to
face with the unknown: individuals, situations, and technologies that present
new kinds of challenges. Without adequate training, these service people will be
more vulnerable to protracted and nebulous stress.

Budget. Ethnic wars are no longer the "country cousins" of nuclear and con-
ventional warfare. It is time to study the nature of ethnic wars in the same way,
and with the same level of concern, as traditional interstate wars. The term
"ethnic conflict" itself seems to diminish the importance of these wars. Until
and unless these struggles are acknowledged as "wars," neither policy makers
nor military people will be able to focus on their lethality. The U.S. defense
budget should be reprioritized, and promotions and assignments realigned, in
accordance with a change of emphasis from theater to local wars. Current allo-
cations do not support these labor-intensive operations; they are concentrated
instead on more flashy, high-tech, capital-intensive ones.

Using all available resources in support of national security, including those of the
international community, is vital. This is simply in keeping with the require-
ment to achieve an objective by all appropriate means. International law with
respect to ethnic conflict is another valuable resource.[38]

Ethnic conflict is another form of war. It needs to be studied, analyzed, and
dealt with as a separate category of war. The United States and its military com-
munity will be involved in such wars, whether by choice or default. It is there-
fore incumbent on those with a responsibility in these matters to pay close
attention to the nature of ethnic conflict and determine how most effectively to
use the twin pillars of diplomacy and force in support of peace and justice.

Notes

1. The U.S. Army alone has eighteen thousand soldiers deployed in over a thousand operational missions
in some sixty countries in addition to the 125,000 in Europe, Korea, and (until recently) Panama. Missions in-
clude humanitarian, peacekeeping, training, counterdrug, nation-building, and medical support operations.

2. Source speaking off the record.

3. Understanding is not a prerequisite to involvement. As General Gordon R. Sullivan has stated, "The
fact that neither the U.S. nor anyone else fully understands the dynamics of these conflicts does not mean that
we will not become involved in them." In Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and Richard Shultz, Jr., eds., *Ethnic Conflict
and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and U.S. Army Roles and Missions* (Carlisle Barracks, Penna.:
Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, and U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1994), p. 3.

4. See Susan L. Woodward, "Failed States: Warlordism and 'Tribal' Warfare," *Naval War College Review*, Spring 1999, esp. pp. 56–7.

5. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and the U.S. Army War College recognized the importance of these issues when in 1993 they held a joint conference on Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and U.S. Army Roles and Missions. It resulted in the book cited above.

6. Pfaltzgraff and Shultz, eds., p. 21.

7. Alexander L. George and Jane E. Holl, *The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy*, Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (New York: Carnegie, 1997).

8. There are two major ways of defining ethnicity: one emphasizes beliefs and behaviors, the other the social construction of identity. Certainly ethnicity is changing, evolving, and can be mobilized for political purposes; it is maintained here that ethnicity is a basic level of social organization and can be treated as such.

9. One of the most thorough and controversial treatments of this topic is R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, *Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, and Patriotism* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).

10. Some of the best work available on this question was done by Pierre van den Berghe, in *The Ethnic Phenomenon* (Oxford, U.K.: Elsevier, 1981). His ideas of inclusive fitness and kin selection are basic to Peter Corning, *The Synergism Hypothesis* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983). Corning provides a beautifully constructed argument concerning the synergistic relationship between environment and heredity as explanations of human behavior.

11. The contradiction between individual and group rights (the liberal state and ethnic groups) has been the subject of a number of recent publications. See Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996); Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994); John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 2d ed. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1994); Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996); and Jeff Spinner, *The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality in the Liberal State* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1994).

12. This was first outlined by Margaret Mead in *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1937). It was her position that groups cooperate and compete in integrated ways that maximize group welfare and thereby enhance chances for survival.

13. Shaw and Wong.

14. Biersteker and Weber, eds., offers some of the clearest and most comprehensible writing on this subject.

15. A great deal has been written on how to "manage" ethnic diversity within a liberal political system that is based on the individual-state relationship, not on ethnic-group pluralism. Early writers used such terms as consociationalism, federalism, and confederalism. Their studies emphasized the organization of politics within the institutions of the state but neglected both interest aggregation and analysis of policy process outcomes.

16. Charles B. Strozier and Michael Flynn, *Genocide, War, and Human Survival* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996).

17. A large number of journal articles and edited volumes profile specific ethnic conflicts. There have been few efforts to find out what all or most ethnic wars have in common and how they differ insofar as the actual fighting is concerned.

18. Reference could be made to the training of resistance fighters in Sudan, Afghanistan, Palestine, Syria, or the Philippines. These fighters have not been as effective as expected, possibly as a result of not being trained as professional armies, suffering thereby from amateur leadership, uneven sources of funding, inconsistent supplies of weaponry, and pressure by the international community. In addition, there seems to have been little "contagion effect," again as a result of problems incumbent in any international training situation (cultural behaviors, language, racism, etc.).

19. John Coakley, ed., *The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict* (London: Frank Cass, 1993), provides a theoretical treatment of the relationship between territory and ethnic conflict, as well as a number of valuable case studies, including Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Canada, Sri Lanka, Kenya, and Israel.

20. John Vasquez reminds us of the "law of effect" and the "law of least effort" in his book *The War Puzzle* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), p. 286.

21. In an interview with a leader of a known resistance group, the author asked why the group had not used terrorism to advance its cause. The unexpected answer was: "When we find a man threatening to use those tactics, we shoot him. Terrorism is counterproductive and we would lose what few friends we have in the Western world."

22. In *Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo*, General Louis McKenzie notes this point a number of times.

23. N. Thomas Trent, "Global Assessment of Current and Future Trends in Ethnic and Religious Conflict," in Pfaltzgraff and Shultz, eds., p. 39.

24. There are many lists of ethnic conflicts giving numbers of casualties, produced by U.S. government and other official sources, academics, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, and various countries. There is no single, complete source that is universally quoted, but Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Early Warning of Communal Conflicts and Genocide* (Japan: United Nations University, 1996), pp. 2–4, has several tables devoted to listing these sources.

25. The best source of information on these groups may be the Minority Rights Study Group in London.

26. This is the author's conclusion and "best guess." The literature is inconclusive basically because researchers have been unwilling to take intellectual risks by defining ethnic conflict as being between ethnic groups rather than "state versus ethnic group." The literature on state failure is extensive; measurements of duration, severity, intensity, scope, and comprehensiveness of ethnic wars are limited.

27. It would be helpful to have numbers that tell us something about participation of both vertical and horizontal social groupings in ethnic conflict ("vertical" referring to age, gender, occupation, and income groups, and "horizontal" meaning ethnic groups or social group organizations—religious, community, political, etc.). This information has not been collected.

28. One of the best works on refugee women is Susan Forbes Martin, *Refugee Women* (London: Zed Books, 1992), prepared for the Joint UN/NGO Group on Women and Development.

29. This argument was most cogently presented by Muhamed Sacirbey in a speech delivered to the United Nations Security Council on 29 June 1993.

30. Andre L. LeSage suggests that the reality of ethnic conflict is that it *is* conflict (war) and that peacekeeping operations should assume a more aggressive role, forsaking "neutrality in favour of direct political engagement" ("Engaging the Political Economy of Conflict: Towards a Radical Humanitarianism," *Civil Wars*, Winter 1998, pp. 27–55). LeSage's analysis is based on a quasi-realpolitik position rather than the neoliberal humanitarian paradigm, and it supports the author's premise that ethnic conflict involves entire populations and distorts definitions of victim and victimizer, civilian and military, peacemakers and peacekeepers. This implies proactive military and political engagement.

31. This has been especially problematic in the Baltic states. The organization Women in International Security sponsored a volume largely devoted to these issues, *Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World: Case Studies and Analysis* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996).

32. Norwegian Police Commissioner Arnstein Overkil provided an overview of the Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH) in a seminar at National Defense University, Washington, D.C., in 1997. For this and other issues of policing and peacekeeping, see Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, eds., *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 1998).

33. Anthony McDermott, ed., *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, no. 2, *Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, June 1994). This small booklet provides a wealth of information concerning the problems associated with ethnic conflict as faced by international peacekeeping forces.

34. There are few discussions of this in the literature. It may be that individuals engage in altruistic sacrifice for the good of the group, that the men and women fighting know they may be killed but take that risk in loyalty to the group. This thinking would be supported by Peter Corning (*The Synergism Hypothesis*) and understood by anyone with combat experience who has watched someone throw himself on a grenade—clearly nonrational, even irrational, behavior.

35. For a fine discussion of the usefulness of assuming rational calculation in war, see Peter Sederberg, *Fires Within: Political Violence and Revolutionary Change* (New York: HarperCollins, 1994).

36. David Turton, ed., *War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence* (New York: Univ. of Rochester Press, 1997). This volume contains the papers presented at the second conference on "Studies on the Nature of War," organized by the Center for Interdisciplinary Research on Social Stress and held in San Marino in 1994 under the auspices of the Department of Public Education and Culture of the Republic of San Marino.

37. Coakley, p. 19.

38. David Wippman's new edited volume *International Law and Ethnic Conflict* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1998) includes a number of extremely interesting and valuable contributions, including his own overview of "Ethnic Claims and International Law"; "Ethnic Conflict and Territorial Claims," by Steven R. Ratner; and "Genocide and Ethnic Conflict," by Lori Fisler Damrosch. While the chapter "U.N. Engagement in Ethnic Conflicts" by David J. Scheffer focuses on UN interventions, its suggestions are also pertinent to U.S. actions. Another valuable source is McDermott, cited above.

Ψ