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International Law Documents

Neutrality

Breaking of Diplomatic Relations

War

With Notes

U.S. Naval War College (Editor)

The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.
Italian Declaration, 1915.

The Government of the Republic will not tolerate any departure from the principles flowing from neutrality.

PORT-AU-PRINCE, October 3, 1914.

ITALY.

WAR DECLARATIONS.

Declaration of war against Austria-Hungary, May 23, 1915.\(^1\)

[2nd Austro-Hungarian Red Book.]

No. 204.—Baron Burian to Baron Macchio.

[Telegram.]

VIENNA, May 23, 1915.

The Duke of Avarna this afternoon handed to me the following declaration of war:

[Translation from the French.]

In compliance with the orders of his noble Sovereign the King, the undersigned Royal Italian ambassador has the honor to communicate the following to his excellency the Austro-Hungarian minister of foreign affairs:

On the 4th of this month the Austro-Hungarian Government was informed of the grave reasons for which Italy, confident of being in the right, declared that her alliance with Austria-Hungary was null and void, and without effect in future, since this alliance had been violated by the Austro-Hungarian Government, and that Italy resumed her full freedom of action. Fully determined to protect Italian rights and interests with all the means at its disposal, the Italian Government can not evade its duty to take such measures as events may impose upon it against all present and future menaces to the fulfillment of Italy's national aspirations. His Majesty the King declares that from to-morrow he will consider himself in a state of war with Austria-Hungary.

The undersigned has the honor at the same time to inform his excellency the minister of foreign affairs that to-day the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in Rome will receive his passports, and he would be grateful if his excellency would hand him likewise his own passports.

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\(^1\) San Marino is reported to have declared war upon Austria-Hungary June 3, 1915. (American Year Book, 1915, p. 813; Am. Jour. Int. Law, 9: 27.)
Notification of war with Austria-Hungary, May 23, 1915.

[Italian Green Book.]

No. 77, Annex 2.—Note of Baron Sonnino, Italian Foreign Minister.

[Communicated to Italian representatives abroad and to foreign Governments on May 23, 1915.]


A clear proof of the eminently conservative and defensive character of the triple alliance is to be found in the letter and spirit of the treaty, and in the policy clearly manifested and confirmed by the official acts of the ministers who created the alliance and who were responsible for its renewals.

Italian policy has ever been inspired with the ideals of peace. Austria-Hungary, in provoking a European war, in refusing to accept Serbia's reply which gave Austria-Hungary all the satisfaction which she could legitimately demand, in refusing to listen to the conciliatory proposals which Italy had made in conjunction with other powers in order to preserve Europe from an immense conflict, which would drench it in blood and pile up ruins on a scale hitherto unknown and undreamed of—Austria-Hungary tore up with her own hands the treaty of alliance with Italy, which, so long as it was loyally interpreted other than as an instrument of aggression against others, had been a valuable factor in eliminating and settling disputes, and in securing for many years to come the inestimable benefits of peace.

The first article of the treaty reaffirmed the logical and general principle of every treaty of alliance, namely, the obligation to exchange views on political and economic questions of a general nature which might arise. It followed that neither contracting party was at liberty to undertake, without previous mutual agreement, action by which the other contracting parties might incur any obligation under the treaty of alliance, and in any way affect their most important interests. Austria-Hungary, by sending her note of July 23, 1914, to Serbia without previously consulting Italy failed in this duty; Austria-Hungary thus violated unquestionably one of the fundamental clauses of the treaty. Austria-Hungary was all the more under the obligation to consult Italy first, inasmuch as her uncompromising action against Serbia had created a situation directly tending to provoke a European war, and as early as the beginning of July, 1914, the Royal Government, who were anxious in regard to the way things were shaping at Vienna, had repeatedly counseled moderation, and had warned the Imperial and Royal Government of the possible danger of a general European crisis.

1 See also Journal Officiel, May 27, 1915, p. 3335.
The action taken by Austria-Hungary against Serbia was, moreover, directly in opposition to Italian general political and economic interests in the Balkan Peninsula. It is not possible that Austria could have thought that Italy would remain indifferent to any diminution of Serbian independence. Our warnings had not been lacking on this point. For many years Italy had from time to time warned Austria, in friendly but unequivocal terms, that she considered the independence of Serbia an essential factor in the balance of power in the Balkans, which Italy herself could never allow to be disturbed to her detriment. And this spirit was not only expressed in the private conversations of her diplomats, but her statesmen proclaimed it loudly and publicly in her Parliament.

When, in delivering an ultimatum to Serbia, Austria not only failed—in defiance of all custom—to consult us beforehand, but used every effort to conceal it from us, so that we only heard of it simultaneously with the public through the telegraphic agencies before we were informed diplomatically, she not only placed herself outside the alliance with Italy but showed herself an enemy of Italian interests.

It became clear to the Royal Government, from trustworthy information in their possession, that the whole trend of Austro-Hungarian action in the Balkans would lead to a very serious impairment of the political and economic position of Italy, because it aimed directly or indirectly at the subjugation of Serbia, the political and territorial isolation of Montenegro, and the diminution of her political importance. This impairment of Italy's position in the Balkans would have been brought about even if Austria-Hungary had had no idea of territorial aggrandizement. It is sufficient to remark that the Austro-Hungarian Government were under an express obligation to take Italy into consultation by virtue of a special article of the treaty of the triple alliance, which established the bond of a defensive agreement and the right to compensation among the allies in the case of the temporary or permanent occupation of any part of the Balkans. The Royal Government began conversations on the subject with the Imperial and Royal Government immediately at the beginning of hostile action by Austria-Hungary against Serbia, receiving, after some reluctance, an adhesion in principle.

Those conversations were begun immediately after July 23, with a view to giving to the treaty, which had been violated and therefore annulled by the action of Austria-Hungary, a new element of life, which could only be effected by the conclusion of new agreements.

Conversations were reopened on a rather more definite basis in the month of December, 1914. The royal ambassador at
Vienna then received instructions to inform Count Berchtold that the Italian Government considered it necessary to proceed without any delay to an exchange of ideas, with a view to negotiating with the Government on concrete points in order to clear up the whole situation arising out of the conflict provoked by Austria-Hungary. Count Berchtold refused at first, on the ground that he did not think it was necessary, in the present circumstances, to enter into negotiations. But in consequence of our reply, with which the German Government associated themselves, Count Berchtold subsequently informed us that he was ready to enter into the exchange of ideas which we had proposed.

We accordingly immediately set out the fundamental broad lines of our point of view, that is to say, we declared that the compensation that we had in mind as affording the basis of a possible agreement must envisage territories now under the domination of Austria-Hungary.

The discussions continued from month to month from the beginning of December until March, and it was not until the end of March that Baron Burian made us an offer of a zone of territory extending slightly to the north of the town of Trent. In return for this cession Austria-Hungary demanded from us in her turn numerous reciprocal engagements, including full and complete freedom of action in the Balkans.

It should be noted that the Austro-Hungarian Government did not contemplate that the cession of territory in the Trentino should be effected immediately, as we had demanded, but only at the end of the present war. We replied that we could not possibly accept the offer, and we formulated the minimum concessions that would be in any way consistent both with our national aspirations and with the improvement of our strategical position on the Adriatic. Such requirements included a somewhat larger district of the Trentino, a new district on the Isonzo, the special treatment of Trieste, the cession of some islands of the Curzolari Archipelago, a declaration of Austria's disinterestedness in Albania, and the recognition of our possession of Valona and the Dodekanese.

All our requests met at first with a categorical refusal. It was only after another month of conversations that Austria-Hungary was induced to increase the zone of territory to be ceded in the Trentino, setting the limit at Mezzolombardo, but excluding Italian districts, as, for instance, the whole side of the Valley of Noce, the Val di Fassa, and the Val di Ampizzo, and leaving us a boundary which did not correspond in any way to strategical requirements. Moreover, the Austrian Government firmly adhered to their refusal to make any cession effective before the end of the war. The repeated refusals of Austria-Hungary were explicitly confirmed in a conversation between Baron Burian and
the royal ambassador at Vienna on April 29 last, the upshot of which was that the Austro-Hungarian Government, while admitting the possibility of recognizing to a certain extent our preponderant interest at Valona and the aforesaid cession of territory in the Trentino, persisted in giving a negative reply to almost all our other demands, and especially to those regarding the line of the Isonzo, Trieste, and the islands.

From the attitude adopted by Austria-Hungary from the beginning of December to the end of April it became quite clear that she was merely trying to temporize without achieving any definite results. In these circumstances Italy found herself face to face with the danger that all her aspirations, whether traditional or ethnical, and her desire for security on the Adriatic, would be lost forever, while on the other hand the European war menaced her highest interests in other seas.

Owing to this fact it became at once a duty and a necessity for Italy to recover the liberty of action which was her right, and to seek to preserve her interests by other means than those employed in the negotiations fruitlessly pursued for five months; and by other means than through the treaty of alliance, which by the action of Austria-Hungary had virtually been at an end since July, 1914.

It will not be inappropriate to observe that once the alliance had come to an end there was no longer any reason for the Italian people to maintain the attitude of acquiescence which had been dictated by their sincere desire for peace nor to repress any longer—as they had so long forced themselves to do—the indignation caused by the treatment to which the Italian population in Austria was subjected. It is true the treaty contained no formal provision for safeguarding the Italian language, traditions, or civilization in the regions inhabited by our compatriots in Austria-Hungary.

But since it was sought to give to the alliance an appearance of sincere peace and harmony, it is obvious that there was a moral obligation on the part of our ally to pay strict regard to and scrupulously to respect the vital interests involved for us in the racial distribution on the Adriatic coast.

As a matter of fact, the constant policy of the Austro-Hungarian Government aimed for many years at the destruction of Italian nationality and civilization along the coast of the Adriatic. It will only be necessary to give a few short instances of facts and tendencies already too well known to everyone; systematic substitution for officials of Italian nationality of officials of other nationalities; the importation of hundreds of families of different nationality; the creation at Trieste of cooperative societies of foreign workmen; the Hohenlohe decrees which aimed at excluding all Italian officials from the public life of Trieste; the denationaliza-
tion of the judicial administration; the question of the university, which formed the subject of diplomatic negotiations; the denationalization of the steamship companies; the action of the police and political trials tending to favor other nationalities at the expense of the Italians; the systematic expulsion of Italians, wholly unjustified and constantly increasing in number.

The unchanging policy of the Imperial and Royal Government toward the subject Italian population was not solely inspired by internal motives due to the existence of contending nationalities within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but appears, on the contrary, to have been caused in great part by a deep-rooted sentiment of hostility and aversion for Italy, which prevails in certain circles which are in close touch with the Austro-Hungarian Government, and which have a dominating influence on its decisions. From among many proofs of this which could be cited, it may suffice to mention that in 1911, while Italy was engaged in war with Turkey, the general staff at Vienna made preparations that grew more and more obvious for an attack upon us, and the military party made most active attempts to win over to its views the other factors responsible for the action of the monarchy.

At the same time the armed preparations on our frontier assumed an openly offensive character. The crisis came to a pacific solution, as far as can be judged, owing to the influence of external factors. But from that time onward we have remained under the impression that we might unexpectedly find ourselves exposed to armed menace whenever the party hostile to us might obtain predominance at Vienna. All this was known to Italy, but (as has been said before) a sincere desire for peace prevailed among the Italian people.

When new conditions came into existence Italy tried to see whether, even under such circumstances, it might be possible to find a more solid basis and a more durable guarantee for her treaty with Austria-Hungary. But her endeavors, conducted over a period of many months in constant accord with Germany, who agreed that negotiation was legitimate, were spent in vain. Hence Italy has found herself forced by the course of events to seek other solutions, and since the treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary had already virtually ceased to exist, and now only served to cloak the real situation—one of continual suspicions and daily differences—the royal ambassador at Vienna was instructed to declare to the Austro-Hungarian Government that the Italian Government considered itself freed from any binding power of the treaty of triple alliance as far as Austria-Hungary was concerned. This communication was made at Vienna on May 4.

After this declaration on our part, and after we had been forced to proceed to the legitimate protection of our own interests, the
Notification of War with Turkey.

Imperial and Royal Government made new offers of inadequate concessions, which in no sense corresponded to the minimum demands of our former proposals. These offers could in no wise be accepted by us. The Royal Government, considering all that has been set forth above, strengthened by the votes of Parliament and by the solemn manifestations of the nation, has resolved to make an end of delays, and on this day has declared to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at Rome, in the name of the King, that Italy considers herself in a state of war with Austria-Hungary from to-morrow, May 24. Instructions in the same sense were telegraphed yesterday to the royal ambassador at Vienna.

SONNINO.

Notification of war with Turkey, noon, August 21, 1915.¹

File No. 763.72/2052.

The Italian Ambassador to the Secretary of State of the United States.

[Translation.]

No. 2651.]

ITALIAN EMBASSY,

Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor by order of my Government to bring the following to your excellency's knowledge.

From the date of the signature of the treaty of peace of Lausanne, on October 18, 1912, the Ottoman Government has been violating that treaty and the violations have not ceased for an instant until now.

As a matter of fact the Imperial Government never adopted in earnest any measure to bring about the immediate cessation of hostilities in Lybia, as it was bound to do under its covenants solemnly entered into; and it did nothing toward the release of the Italian prisoners of war. The Ottoman soldiers remaining in Tripoli and Cyrenaica were kept there under command of their own officers, continuing to use the Ottoman flag, holding possession of their rifles and cannons. Enver Bey continued to direct in person the hostilities against the Italian Army until the end of November, 1912, and Aziz Bey did not leave those parts with 800 men of the regular forces until June, 1913. The way in which both these commanders were received on their return to Turkey is proof evident that their acts were fully assented to by the imperial authorities. After Aziz Bey's departure, on the other hand, officers of the Turkish Army continued to find their

way into Cyrenaica. On this very day there are more than a hundred there whose names are known to the Italian Government. In April last 35 young men from Benghazi whom Enver Bey had taken to Constantinople against the will of the Royal Government and who were there admitted into the military academy were sent back to Cyrenaica without our knowledge. Again the King's Government positively knows, any declaration to the contrary notwithstanding, that the holy war was also proclaimed against the Italians in Africa in 1914. And a mission of Turkish officers and soldiers bearing gifts to the Senussi chiefs in rebellion against the Italian authorities in Libya were recently captured by French warships.

The relations of peace and friendship which the Italian Government thought it could establish with the Ottoman Government after the treaty of Lausanne therefore never existed, through the latter's fault. And after every diplomatic representation against violations of the treaty had proved utterly useless there remained nothing for the Royal Government to do but to provide otherwise for the safeguard of the high interests of the State and the defense of its colonies against the persistent menace and the actual acts of hostility on the part of the Ottoman Government.

It became all the more necessary and urgent to reach a decision, as the Ottoman Government quite recently committed patent invasions of the rights, interests, and very freedom of Italian citizens in the Empire, the more energetic protests entered on this point by the King's ambassador at Constantinople being of no avail. In the presence of the tergiversations of the Ottoman Government on the specific point of letting Italian citizens freely depart from Asia Minor, these protests had, in these last few days, to assume the form of an ultimatum. On the 3d of the month the royal ambassador at Constantinople addressed by order of the Royal Government a note to the Grand Vizier setting forth the following four demands:

1. That the Italians be free to leave Beirut.
2. That the Italians in Smyrna, the port of Vourla being unavailable, be allowed to leave by way of Sigadjik.
3. That the Ottoman Government let Italians embark unmoled from Mersina, Alexandretta, Caifla, and Jaffa.
4. That the local authorities in the interior stop opposing the departure of royal subjects proceeding to the coast, and, on the contrary, endeavor to facilitate their journey.

On the 5th of August, before the expiration of the term of 48 hours set in the Royal Government's ultimatum, the Ottoman Government, in a note signed by the Grand Vizier, accepted every point in the Italian demands. On the strength of such solemn declarations the King's Government arranged to send two ships to Rhodes with instructions to await orders to proceed and take
on board the Italian citizens, who for some time had been staying in the above-named ports of Asia Minor, until they could return home. But now it appears from reports of the American consular officers whom the United States Government has graciously authorized to assume the protection of Italian interests at various posts that the Turkish military authority at Beirut canceled on the 9th instant the permit to leave granted but a short time before. It was likewise canceled at Mersina. It was further announced that the Ottoman military authorities had opposed the embarkation of other Italians residing in Syria.

In the presence of this patent breach of categorial promises made by the Ottoman Government in consequence of the Italian Government’s ultimatum the Royal Government has issued instructions to His Majesty’s ambassador at Constantinople to deliver a declaration of war on Turkey. And the declaration of war was delivered this day at Constantinople to the Ottoman Government by the King’s ambassador.

Accept, etc.,

V. MACCHI DI CELLERE.

Notification of a state of war with Bulgaria, October 19, 1915.

[Rev. Gén., Doc. 23: 150.]

Bulgaria having opened hostilities against Serbia in allying itself with the enemies of Italy and in combating the allies, the Italian Government has, by order of the King, declared that a state of war exists between Italy and Bulgaria, October 19, 1915.

Notification of war with Germany, August 28, 1916.

The Italian Ambassador to the Secretary of State of the United States.

[Translation.]

ROYAL ITALIAN EMBASSY,
Beverly Farms, August 28, 1916.

Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to address the following communication to your excellency in the name of the King’s Government:

Systematically hostile acts on the part of the German Government to the detriment of Italy have succeeded one another with increasing frequency, consisting in both an actual warlike participation and economic measures of every kind.

With regard to the former, it will suffice to mention the reiterated supplies of arms and of instruments of war, terrestrial

1 See also Journal Officiel, Aug. 31, 1916, p. 7831.
and maritime, furnished by Germany to Austria-Hungary, and the uninterrupted participation of German officers, soldiers, and seamen in the various operations of war directed against Italy. In fact, it is only thanks to the assistance afforded her by Germany in the most varied forms that Austria-Hungary has recently been able to concentrate her most extensive effort against Italy. It is also worth while to recall the transmission, by the German Government to Austria-Hungary, of the Italian prisoners who had escaped from the Austro-Hungarian concentration camps and taken refuge in German territory.

Among the measures of an economic character which were hostile to Italy it will be sufficient to cite the invitation which, at the instance of the imperial department of foreign affairs, was directed to German credit institutions and bankers to consider every Italian citizen as a hostile foreigner and to suspend payments due him; also the suspension of payment to Italian laborers of the pensions due them by virtue of the formal provisions of the German law.

The Government of His Majesty the King did not think that it could longer tolerate such a state of things, which aggravates, to the exclusive detriment of Italy, the sharp contrast between the de facto and the de jure situation already arising from the fact of the alliance of Italy and of Germany with two groups of nations at war among one another.

For these reasons the Royal Government has, in the name of his Majesty the King, notified the German Government through the Swiss Government that, as from to-day, August 28, Italy considers herself in a state of war with Germany.

Please accept, etc.,

MACCHI DI CELLERE.

BLOCKADES AND NAVIGATION RESTRICTIONS.

Notification of declaration of blockade of Austria-Hungary and Albania, May 26, 1915.2

[Journal Officiel, June 3, 1915, p. 3549.]

The Royal Italian Government, in view of the state of war existing between Italy and Austria-Hungary, considering that the

1 In an opinion of the German Reichsgericht at Leipsic, shortly before the war, appears the statement: "Formally there is not a state of war between Germany and Italy, but it must be admitted nevertheless that Germany participates in the Austro-Italian War in consequence of the treaties existing between Austria and Germany. According to these treaties, in case Austria is obliged to send troops to other theaters of the war, Germany should fill the vacancies thus caused by means of proper forces." (Journal du droit international privé. (Clunet), 43: 1701.)

2 A dispatch from Vienna says that Austria-Hungary sent on June 9, 1915, to foreign powers a note protesting against the blockade of Albania
Austro-Hungarian naval authorities make use of some ports of the Albanian coast for clandestinely supplying their navy, declare that, starting from May 26:

1. The Austro-Hungarian coast, extending from the Italian frontier at the north to the Montenegrin frontier at the south, with all its ports, isles, harbors, roadsteads, creeks;

2. The coast of Albania, extending from the Montenegrin frontier at the north to and including Cape Kiephali at the south will be held in a state of effective blockade by the Italian naval forces.

The geographical limits of the blockaded territory will be the following:

For the Austro-Hungarian coast: Northern limit, 45° 42' 50" north latitude and 13° 15' 10" east longitude (Greenwich); southern limit, 42° 6' 25" north latitude and 19° 5' 30" east longitude (Greenwich).

Vessels of friendly or neutral powers will have a time, which will be fixed by the commander in chief of the Italian naval forces, after the date of the declaration of blockade to freely leave the blockaded zone.

All vessels which, in violation of blockade, attempt to cross or have crossed the barred line, established between the Cape of Otrante and the Cape of Kiephali will be proceeded against according to the rules of international law and to treaties in force.


The Royal Government declares that the blockade of the coast of Albania which, by the declaration of May 26, was established from Montenegro at the north to Cape Kiephali at the south is by Italy and declaring that this blockade is contrary to the sovereign rights of a State whose neutrality Italy expressly recognized at the conference of ambassadors at London in 1913. The blockade is also contrary to the first article of the Declaration of London of Feb. 26, 1909, since the Austrian Army and Navy do not occupy a part of Albania, nor do they use the Albanian ports as bases of supply for the Austrian Navy. Finally, the blockade is not valid because it is contrary to the Declaration of London that the Austro-Hungarian local authorities have not received notification of the blockade."

(London, June 12, 1915, Chunct. 42 : 266.)

1 "The blockade of the coast of Albania by Italy, south to the Cape of Kiephali, has been considered, in the midst of Greek politics, as being the result of an error. In effect it would result that all the coast of Epirus, which was made part of the Epirus if the north, actually occupied by Greece with the assent of the powers, would be blockaded. The territory to the north of Epirus enjoyed, by the very fact of its occupation by Greek troops, the same neutrality as the Hellenic kingdom and can not consequently be submitted to any blockade." (Temps, May 30, 1915; Rev. Gén., Doc. 22:215.) See following text.
Reduced from the 30th May, from the same (northern limits) to Aspri Ruga.

Consequently the geographic limits of the blockade of Albanian territory are the following: Northern limit, 41° 52' north latitude and 19° 22' 40'' east longitude (Greenwich); southern limit, 40° 9' 36'' north latitude, 19° 35' 45'' east longitude (Greenwich). The new barred line, established between the Cape of Otrante and Aspri Ruga will form the line of blockade, with all the effects of the declaration of May 26, 1915.

The period conceded to vessels of friendly and neutral powers to leave the blockade zone has been fixed by the commander in-chief of the Italian naval forces at 10 days from the date of the declaration of blockade.

Notification relating to navigation of the Strait of Messina, May 30, 1915.

[Journal Officiel, June 1, 1915, p. 3518.]

Navigation in the Strait of Messina is forbidden three-quarters of an hour after sunset until a half hour before sunrise.

Navigation is permitted in the day in clear weather; under reservation of the prescriptions in force in reference to war vessels, torpedo boats, and submarines of the national or allied navies, it is ordered that all national, allied, and neutral merchant vessels await authorization before navigating the strait, vessels coming from the north to stop on the meridian of Forte-Apuria, at least 3 miles away, and to exchange signals with the semaphore; those coming from the south to stop on the meridian of Cape Dell Armi and to observe the same prescriptions.

Notification, blockade of the Adriatic, July 6, 1915.


The secretary of state for foreign affairs has received from His Majesty's ambassador at Rome the following translation of a Royal decree, dated July 4, and published in the Italian Official Gazette of the 8th:

**ARTICLE 1.** The blockade declared by the Royal Government on the 26th and 30th May, is extended to the whole zone of the Adriatic Sea to the north of the Otrante-Aspri-Ruga (Strade Bianchi) line.

Consequently, the navigation in the Adriatic Sea to the north of this line by merchant ships of any nationality is forbidden.

**Art. 2.** The minister of marine or authorities delegated by him may, nevertheless, grant after necessary inquiries, special safe conduct to merchant ships desirous of proceeding to ports belonging to or occupied by Italy or Montenegro.
Vessels desirous of entering the Adriatic must proceed to Gallipoli (Apulia), where the safe conducts of entry must be obtained.

For leaving the Adriatic, vessels after having received permission at the port of departure must proceed to Bari, where they will be furnished with the safe conducts of departure.

Vessels provided with safe conducts must cross the blockade line, Otrante-Aspri-Ruga (Strade Bianchi) during daytime only. They must stop on that line at a distance not greater than 5 miles from the Italian shore, to be visited by the men of war destined for that purpose.

Art. 3. The rules laid down in our decree of June 13, 1915, No. 899, as well as any special regulations which the naval authorities may think fit to enforce on vessels entering or leaving the Adriatic, must be observed by all merchant vessels of whatever nationality navigating in the Adriatic, in the circumstances provided for in Article 2.

Art. 4. Vessels contravening the rules laid down in the preceding articles will be considered guilty of violation of blockade and are liable to capture and confiscation, together with their cargo, according to the regulations in force.

Art. 5. The present decree will come into force on July 6, 1915.

JAPAN.

Ultimatum to Germany, August 15, 1914.

[Official Japanese Documents; See also Austro-Hungarian Red Book No. 66.]

No. 3.—Telegram dispatched by the Imperial Japanese Government to the chargé d'affaires ad interim at Berlin on August 15, 1914.

You are hereby instructed to address to Herr von Jagow immediately on receipt of this telegram a signed note to the following effect:

The undersigned, chargé d'affaires ad interim of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, has the honor in pursuance of instructions from his Government to communicate to his excellency, the minister for foreign affairs of His Majesty, the German Emperor to the following effect:

Considering it highly important and necessary in the present situation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to the peace of the Far East and to safeguard the general interests contemplated by the agreement of alliance between Japan and Great Britain in order to secure a firm and enduring peace in eastern Asia, which is the aim of the said agreement, the Imperial Japanese Government sincerely believe it their duty to give advice