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Maritime Forces in Global Security: Comparative Views of Maritime Strategy as We Approach the 21st Century

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author's research and analysis may be exhaustive yet unsatisfying.

Do not despair, but do note that this book is not for the general reader. It is for the China-watcher or defense and foreign policy professional who is both familiar with and absorbed in Chinese security policy-making. The insights are those of a deeply steeped observer, offering facts, analysis, and sometimes just conjecture. Not every question that arises is answered crisply. In the final chapter, entitled "Conclusions," very little is conclusive, but there is record-setting usage of words like *if*, *probably*, *could*, *might*, and *may*. But alas, this is a book about xenophobic and enigmatic China.

Swaine, however, hits his stride in the chapter on defense policy, reaffirming his reputation for excellence in this area. For many readers of the *Naval War College Review*, this fourth chapter may itself make the book worth reading—assuming an abiding interest in the fine grain of Chinese defense policy, organization, personalities, and their interplay. For example, in providing a straightforward, comprehensive description of the PLA's important General Staff Department (GSD), its policy orientation and proclivities, and how it plays in the defense arena, Swaine does the best possible job. Similarly, in a few sentences, he captures the essence of PLA Navy modernization and then succinctly reveals how the PLA Air Force stacks up.

Furthermore, such perceptive descriptions provide the reader with a bonus of insights into Beijing's way of thinking about defense policy implementation, and they more broadly reveal the Chinese way of thinking and

doing. As Swaine correctly implies, these insights may be of inestimable value to the United States in the complex task of forging a policy for dealing with China and the PLA—a policy that must succeed generally in serving U.S. interests in Asia and also specifically in managing relations with the biggest, fastest-growing country on earth, and with its modernizing military. If one cares profoundly about that, one should read Michael Swaine's book.

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Griffiths, Ann L., and Peter T. Haydon, eds. *Maritime Forces in Global Security: Comparative Views of Maritime Strategy as We Approach the 21st Century*. Halifax, Nova Scotia: The Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie Univ., 1995. 362pp. \$12

This book (fifth in a series of conferences and colloquia on maritime security hosted by Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies) contains the proceedings of an international colloquium held in June 1994. Its aim was to examine different views of the role of maritime forces, and especially medium maritime powers, in the closing days of the twentieth century. Participants represented primarily Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, but they also came from France, Australia, Argentina, and India.

This work addresses four main topics: new issues in maritime security, cooperative security, maritime strategies of medium maritime powers, and the future of Canadian naval forces.

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Although many of the contributors believe that navies no longer exist only to fight wars, one of the major themes addressed at the conference (and by the entire series) is that if warfare at sea cannot be prevented, there should be procedures by which we can cooperate to limit its consequences. The UN figures heavily in the essays.

Another major area of interest was the relationship between the one super-power navy and the world's medium-power navies. Rear Admiral Richard Hill (Royal Navy, retired) offers a refinement of the definition of a medium-power navy. Many of the authors point out the differences between the new regional approach to international relations, involving medium powers, and the former global approach that typified the Cold War. The former appears more complex than the latter, and regional issues may be more routinely a threat to peace. It is interesting to note that at least one author still believes that the United States is playing world policeman, despite both words and deeds to the contrary.

It would appear that many of the authors here assume that the United States will have to rely more on its allies and friends and that occasionally these nations may have to go it alone. Consideration of this question is typical of a conference held in a medium-power nation, but the issue is generally ignored in the U.S. armed forces. American naval officers especially generally assume that their allied and coalition partners produce seagoing officers that share both their own love of the sea and their political objectives. These officers should read Joel Sokolsky's (professor at the

Royal Military College of Canada) chapter, which reminds the reader that despite the camaraderie within the "fraternity of the blue uniform," navies remain instruments of policy of their respective governments. U.S. strategy and doctrine need to account for those potential differences.

One of the more thought-provoking chapters is by Paul Mitchell of Queens University, who points out the difficulty in measuring naval capability. Some of the other authors try to place specific medium-power navies in a ranking of various brackets. This topic raised itself again during the following year's conference and needs serious additional attention and funded research.

Jeff Sands's thoughtful contribution is drawn from his 1994 study on multinational naval cooperation and the UN, produced for the Center for Naval Analyses. This chapter is complemented by an excellent contribution by Michael Pugh derived from a recent book on maritime security and peacekeeping. The logic of the argument presented by Commander Darren Knight is that without expensive C3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence) improvements to fleets, they not only become less effective but their leaders are apt to make uninformed decisions. One assumes a connection to Canadian programatics. The chapters devoted to Canadian naval forces apparently led to discussion but no agreement about the amount of influence the fleet provides. It is hard to justify naval expenditures without the assumption of the ability to influence.

This book, like others in the series, is strongly recommended both for

content and process. The close working relationship between Canadian academics and their naval establishment is demonstrated by the names and affiliations of the various authors. This relationship results in a healthy interchange of ideas between the two communities, whereas in the United States many active duty naval officers eschew discussions with academe. Canadian naval officers have demonstrated a willingness to work with their academic colleagues and can benefit from their research. It is a lesson that is often ignored south of the border.

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Joes, Anthony James. *Guerrilla Conflict before the Cold War*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996. 209pp. \$55

Three questions loom large in the study of guerrilla warfare. The first is whether history offers any lessons that transcend the peculiarities of time and place. The second is whether American policy makers can usefully draw on any guerrilla experience other than Vietnam. The third is whether this, the most modern of nations in a new world order, can find useful instruction in the ways of guerrilla conflict in any pre-Cold War, or even any Cold War, history.

Most scholars have weighed in with decisive no's to all three questions: no, the lessons of the past are too murky to be of use even if they could be agreed upon; no, the failure of U.S. counterinsurgency in Vietnam is the quintessential case of a First World hegemon pitted against

misunderstood and determined revolutionaries; no, Cold War conflicts are *sui generis*, and pre-Cold War conflicts are too remote to offer any instruction in this multipolar, post-Westphalian, new-world age of computers, precision weapons, porous borders, and powerful nongovernmental organizations. But notwithstanding these scholars, who busy themselves drawing sharp distinctions between past and present, others are busy drawing lessons based on the continuity of past, present, and future.

Anthony Joes, author of five books on guerrilla warfare (including one on the Vietnam War) answers "yes" to all three questions: yes, there are specific principles of guerrilla conflict to be culled from an examination of cases; yes, the Americans have a rich experience of both successful insurgency and successful counterinsurgency on which to draw; and yes, pre-Cold War histories can usefully instruct military planners and statesmen in the ways and waves of the future.

Joes arrives at these answers by delving into four case studies well selected for their range of variables and balance of outcomes. Two of the four cases are American affairs, two are European. Two cases are civil wars, two are wars of resistance. In two cases the insurgents win, in two they lose. All four conflicts took place between 1776 and 1866, and all in an international structure that was not bipolar. The variety and remoteness of these histories might lead one to conclude, as many have, that each episode of guerrilla conflict must be unique. The author demonstrates otherwise.

Joes concludes that guerrilla warriors do not so much win as regular armies