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Caging the Nuclear Genie: An American Challenge for Global Security

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States act as sheriff by encouraging, supporting, and enforcing new orderly relationships between international actors. The authority for doing so is not just hegemony but "acknowledged leadership." This linguistic distinction may or may not make sense to the rest of the world. Will this be perceived as cultural arrogance? Hegemony with a white hat? Raw power? Impotence? More importantly, will those perceptions and interpretations limit the possibility of forging coalitions?

The Fall 1997 edition of *Foreign Affairs* contains the thinking of a number of authors who see U.S. foreign policy as at a "breakpoint" in history. According to them, the United States during the Cold War produced a clear and reflective foreign policy, because it understood the "enemy" and its own interests and capability. The framework of analysis and concepts, and the resulting policy, were integrated. Haass is one of the clearest spokesmen for this model. As with many authors writing from experience gained during the Cold War and from "inside the Beltway," Haass takes as his reference point the past fifty years rather than the whole evolution of U.S. foreign policy.

The author, though often identified as a "realist," is remarkably idealistic, perhaps justifiably so. He appears to assume (or perhaps only hope) that the motivations for U.S. foreign policy will be consistently good and that the pursuit of U.S. national interests will seldom, if ever, be antagonistic to the support of justice, equality, law, or the freedom of others. Perhaps the last few pages, in which he calls for domestic support of foreign policy goals, reflects his faith that democratic principles and practices may

constrain foreign policy directions antagonistic to those ideals in the international arena. This book is an excellent illustration of idealistic objectives pursued in a realist manner.

This is one of many recent publications that have tapped the intellectual resources and carefully honed skills of a foreign policy guru to interpret contemporary foreign affairs, predict the future, and suggest appropriate U.S. foreign policy.

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Turner, Stansfield. *Caging the Nuclear Genie: An American Challenge for Global Security*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997. 163pp. \$21

One might not think that 163 pages would be enough to address adequately an issue as weighty as nuclear weapons. However, Admiral Stansfield Turner manages to pack quite a potent message in this relatively short book. Using layman's language, he systematically lays out the problems posed by nuclear weapons, then proposes a thoughtful and pragmatic plan to lessen them. He draws heavily from his extensive professional contacts—a virtual "who's who" of scholars, scientists, politicians, military leaders, and world-renowned nuclear experts—and combines their information with his own personal experience in order to tell his story from an "insider's" point of view. The result is a readable, well researched,

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personal, and thought-provoking book.

Turner begins by explaining the extensiveness of the nuclear problem, admitting his own naiveté about nuclear weapons when he was a task group commander. The reader shares Turner's incredulity when he discovers that nuclear weapons under his command are targeted against a railroad bridge in Bulgaria, a structure too small to be visible in intelligence photos. He then discovers the unmanageable vastness of the million-page Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), and he tries to sort out the arcane logic behind U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Turner methodically explains why the United States and Russia have far too many nuclear weapons. Succinctly said, military planners were not able to break away from the "more is better" logic of conventional warfare. Therefore, the arms race caused the United States and the Soviet Union to try to match each other weapon for weapon.

The author points to several reasons why this thinking is fallacious. (1) Numbers and types of weapons alone do not equate to lethality. Consideration must be given to the effectiveness of targeting and of launch vehicles and systems. (2) In an actual wartime situation one's weapons should be targeted against the enemy's center of gravity, not weapon against weapon. The numbers of weapons required to push an enemy effectively past the "point of nonrecovery" is far fewer than the total number of weapons in the opponent's arsenal. (3) No consideration is given to chaos and complexity theory, which says that as one factor goes wrong in a complex chain of related events, it distorts other factors. The end result is greater chaos than would appear warranted by the

original event. The lasting impact of multiple nuclear detonations upon an economy and a society would be far greater than the sum of the effects of individual blasts. (4) No consideration is given to the "point of self-deterrence," that is, whether or not the damage received by the offending country in retaliation would be acceptable. The author believes no foreign political objective exists today that would cause the United States to use nuclear weapons and accept the risk of receiving even one missile in retaliation.

Turner carefully makes a strong, careful case for drastically reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons held by both the United States and Russia. He calculates that the number of weapons required to push an opponent past the point of nonrecovery is approximately 250. Holding, maintaining, accounting, and paying for weapons in excess of that number, he argues, makes little sense.

In the second half of the book Turner explains why arms control negotiations are so painfully slow and ineffective. Even if we were successful in reducing the number of weapons to between 2,000–2,500 by the year 2010, as proposed by presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, that would still leave both sides with almost ten times the necessary number of weapons, and it would take more than a decade to accomplish the task. Turner states that the ultimate goal of the United States ought to be the total elimination of nuclear weapons, but he admits that no one knows how that can be accomplished. He does, however, present a reasonable and viable

alternative that in the meantime may drastically reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, through a three-part program.

Strategic Escrow. This involves removing a number of warheads from operational strategic launchers and placing them in designated storage areas some distance away. Observers from the Russian Federation would be invited to each storage location to monitor the inventory and warhead movement. Turner believes that the Russians would follow our lead and reciprocate with a similar program, just as President Gorbachev followed President Bush's lead in 1991 when he withdrew almost all of our tactical nuclear weapons from forward land bases and from all naval ships.

A Treaty for "No First-Use" of Nuclear Weapons. The United States would pledge not to conduct a first strike and would promise unilateral sanctions as well as possible military action in the event of nuclear aggression. Also, it would negotiate international adherence to a formal no-first-use treaty.

Development of Strategic Defense Systems. The nation would continue to invest in the development of defensive systems in the event of a preemptive attack, a terrorist attack, or an accidental launch.

Implementation of this three-part program would not only provide the immediate and obvious benefits inherent in reducing the number of available weapons but also allow the United States a much closer look at the safety and accountability procedures of the Russian Federation.

Turner points out that the United States currently is in a truly favorable position to make preemptive moves toward nuclear reductions and eventual disarmament. It can be done by embracing revolutionary, vice evolutionary,

thinking. Part of the U.S. difficulty in breaking away from conventional thinking is in its assumption of an inevitably adversarial relationship with Russia. Why is this so? History has proven that former enemies can become strong allies (e.g., Great Britain, Germany, and Japan). In addition to immediate implementation of his three-part plan, Turner also calls for more public involvement in nuclear weapons policies. He points out that citizens need to understand the risks of nuclear war, since it is impossible to use nuclear weapons for strictly military purposes—that is, without political implications.

Throughout this work, Turner does a good job of presenting his own ideas, but he plays devil's advocate when approaching possible obstacles, questions, and opposition to those same ideas. This is an important work that addresses what is arguably the largest global problem not only of our time but for the future. Turner has done a remarkable job of presenting the seriousness of the problem in terms that are understandable to everyone. He proposes a rational, well thought out, and pragmatic plan. Every concerned citizen should read this book.

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Johnson, Stuart E., and Martin C. Libicki, eds. *Dominant Battlespace Knowledge: The Winning Edge*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ., 1995. 149pp. (no price given)

This anthology provides a useful description of dominant battlespace knowledge