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BOOK REVIEWS

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

“Who Should Decide?”

Leitner, Peter M. *Decontrolling Strategic Technology, 1990–1992: Creating the Military Threats of the 21st Century*. Lanham, Md.: Univ. Press of America, 1995. 242pp. \$47

PPETER LEITNER, A SENIOR STRATEGIC TRADE ADVISOR with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, explores the realm of national security policy making within the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom). His focus is on negotiations conducted between 1990 and 1992, which resulted in the decontrol of a wide variety of strategic technologies. He contends that those decisions will create serious military threats for the United States in the twenty-first century.

CoCom, an informal body largely composed of Nato countries plus Japan and Australia, began negotiations in June 1990 pursuant to President George Bush's January 1990 initiative to review U.S. export control policies. The review, reflective of improved East-West relations, identified fifty technologies in such fields as telecommunications, cryptography, navigation, electronics, and computers for complete or partial decontrol. This “core” list, as the author refers to it, formed the basis of CoCom's debates.

Leitner goes down two tracks in this book. The first illustrates how various technologies that were decontrolled can be turned into military applications. For instance, he refers to a May 1987 incident in which Mathias Rust evaded Soviet air defenses in a small Cessna aircraft, eventually landing in Red Square. This led the Soviets to acquire illegally U.S. computer technology through the Swedish firm DataSaab. By contracting with DataSaab for a civilian air traffic control system, the Soviets were able to obtain technology that was ultimately utilized to upgrade their air defense systems.

The second track is an analysis of CoCom's negotiations. The author uses Graham Allison's models, Irving Janis's "groupthink" theory, Paul K. Davis's and John Arquilla's "limited rationality" hypothesis, and concepts from Roger Fisher's and William Ury's problem-solving dynamics to explain the motivations of the U.S. negotiators that led to the sweeping decontrol decisions. In conclusion, he proposes an alternative model—cybernetics—as more suitable than "political haggling" for determining future technology transfer policies.

Leitner provides convincing evidence of how CoCom's decisions to decontrol various strategic technologies could result in a compromise of U.S. national security. However, his utilization of Allison's and other conceptual models to support his argument that the CoCom negotiations were "sub-optimized" is superficial and unconvincing. He has clumsily peppered his book with names and quotes from renowned group-dynamics theorists, moving with insufficient depth from one to the other in an attempt to justify his position. The result is an incomprehensible leap from analysis to conclusions. Notwithstanding this, Leitner raises some provocative questions. Should government representatives with limited expertise in science and engineering be determining public policy regarding increasingly complex technological matters? Can they fully understand the potential future ramifications of their decisions?

Leitner's book is timely reading for political scientists, students of national security policy, and government policy makers.

Carol J. Figerie
Naval War College

Ullman, Harlan K., and James P. Wade, with L. A. Edney et al. *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ., 1996. 199pp. (Available by request) Sponsored by the National Defense University's Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies directorate, a seven-member study group composed of distinguished scholars and retired general officers has sought to provide the national security community with a radically new military strategy for a rapidly changing world. The result of

their endeavor is *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance*, a futurist-oriented work that seeks "to explore alternative concepts for structuring mission capability packages . . . around which future U.S. military forces might be configured."

At the outset the authors sound a cautionary note. The military and political leadership of the United States, confronting an uncertain world and an era of rapid technological change, must abandon the current military-industrial structure born of World War II and the

Cold War. The authors seek to “replace or complement” the strategy of overwhelming force by exploiting the “revolutionary potential” of existing and emerging technologies for a new doctrine of “rapid dominance.” While, as the authors note, it is not a panacea, the objective of rapid dominance is to “impose [an] overwhelming level of Shock and Awe against an adversary on an immediate or sufficiently timely basis to paralyze its will to carry on.” Ideally, shock and awe would both paralyze and deter an opponent before the bullets fly. If deterrence fails, rapid dominance would “seize control of the environment and paralyze or so overload an adversary’s perceptions . . . that the enemy would be incapable of resistance at tactical and strategic levels.”

Unfortunately, it is the reader who is “shocked.” While the authors are all eminently qualified to expound on military affairs and strategy, the text is rambling, repetitious, and at times incoherent. The authors did not intend this to be a scholarly tome but expected their work to spark thought and debate. Yet a number of egregious errors call its credibility into question. The reader learns, for example, that “Operation Rolling Thunder III,” executed in November and December 1972, brought Hanoi back to the bargaining table, that terrorists bombed the “Kolbah barracks” in Riyadh in June 1996, and that the Israelis struck Syria’s nuclear reactors in 1982.

The evidence used to support the concept of shock and awe is uneven. The authors make a strong case for Germany’s blitzkrieg campaigns as an example of shock and awe, but sadly,

the book’s editors are obviously unfamiliar with that Wehrmacht strategy, consistently spelling the German word as “blitzkreig.” As in blitzkrieg, rapid dominance produces shock and awe through four elements, including “rapidity.” Yet the authors stretch their concept beyond credible limits, endowing the footslogging Roman legions with the ability to produce shock and awe. In an incomprehensible leap of logic, the Nazi Holocaust is classified a “state policy of Shock and Awe.” The authors also tell us that it would be hard to “overstate the importance of information dissemination within Rapid Dominance”; indeed, much of the book is devoted to the critical importance of this strategy of information-based technology. Yet in a warning against “overvisualizing” the concept, the reader is informed that rapid dominance “must still confront the fog of war.” While a prudent statement, it also casts doubt on the feasibility of the entire concept.

Shock and Awe offers a new strategy built from assertion and speculation, admittedly leavened with the authors’ practical experience. Indeed, at the end of the book retired generals Charles Horner and Frederick Franks and retired admiral L. A. “Bud” Edney provide the reader with insightful essays. Still, these brief appendices cannot salvage this work. Likewise, though the central proposition of *Shock and Awe* is valid, the principal authors have unfortunately cloaked some radical ideas in a poorly organized and edited treatise. Military professionals and national policy makers seeking new concepts for the nation’s defense will find them here—but

they will have to look past the text itself for the ideas it promulgates.

MARK J. CONVERSINO
 Major, U.S. Air Force

Fleck, Dieter, ed. *The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995. 589pp. \$135

In 1992 the German Bundeswehr issued its law of armed conflict manual, *Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts* (Joint Service Regulations 15/2). As an official statement of the legal norms that Germany (a key Nato member and pivotal player in the international arena) believes applicable in armed conflict, the manual necessarily helps refine, clarify, and reinforce the content of humanitarian law. *The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict* complements this process; it is an unofficial commentary on the manual's provisions by an impressive array of European scholars and practitioners. Under the editorial direction of Dieter Fleck, the German Ministry of Defence's noted international law expert, the group has produced a comprehensive analysis of the subject, one which is easily equal to anything else currently available.

Christopher Greenwood opens the book with a superb chapter discussing the historical development of humanitarian law. Focusing first on the *ius ad bellum* (the law governing the resort to force), Greenwood broadly interprets the UN Charter Article 2(4) limitations on the use of force by restricting them to situations involving enforcement actions under Chapter VII or self/collective-defense under Article

51. He extends the latter right to actions against terrorists when the underlying terrorism would allow a forceful response if committed by a state. Greenwood also contends that self-defense may be undertaken anticipatorily (when the threatening act is imminent but still prospective), reasonably asserting that the real issue is not *whether* it is permitted but rather *at what point in time*. With regard to the controversial issue of humanitarian intervention, he guardedly suggests that the interventions to protect Iraqi civilians may reflect the emergence of a new permissive norm in response to "extreme humanitarian necessity."

Turning to the *ius in bello* (law governing activities during armed conflict), Greenwood argues that differences among Nato allies in the applicability of various treaty regimes, particularly Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, have been exaggerated. Citing disputes over reprisals and restrictions on striking dams, dikes, and nuclear electrical-generating stations, he suggests that they are in the end "unlikely to present insuperable obstacles for NATO." He also advances the proposition that in the Charter era, the principle of necessity—long a *ius in bello* principle limiting the amount of force used to that necessary to subdue the enemy—has taken on *ius ad bellum* implications. By his interpretation, articles 2(4) and 51 were intended to survive the outbreak of hostilities. Therefore, only that force necessary to defend oneself with sufficient surety is permitted, absent authorization otherwise as part of a Chapter VII enforcement action. This may or

may not allow the complete defeat of one's enemy.

In the chapter on combatants and noncombatants, Knut Ipsen attempts to clarify the manual's somewhat muddled distinction (perhaps merely a result of translation from the original German) between the terms. He also provides an interesting discussion of the German application of the controversial Protocol I provision eliminating, under certain circumstances, the requirement that combatants wear uniforms or display distinctive emblems when engaging in hostilities. The United States opposes this provision, as well as another accepted by the Germans that severely limits the applicability of combatant status to mercenaries.

A highlight of the book is clearly Stefan Oeter's commentary on methods and means of warfare. He begins with an excellent introductory discourse detailing the development of modern limitations on them, and he offers as well a useful section on the relationship between treaty and customary law. Of particular note is his analysis of nuclear weapons. Although the German manual states that there is no "current contractual or customary" ban on the use of such weapons, Oeter correctly characterizes this position as, quantitatively, the minority view among states. That said, he goes on to question assertions of illegality, pointing out the argument's logical and legal flaws.

Chapters on protection of the civilian population and the wounded, sick, or shipwrecked, by Hans-Peter Gasser and Walter Rabus respectively, follow. Each, particularly the former, constitutes a comprehensive review of its subject.

Equally well done is a chapter by Horst Fischer on prisoners of war, though some may find a bit troubling his criticism of the treatment of Iraqi students (reservists) as POWs who were studying in England during the Gulf war, as well as his critique of the U.S. practice of binding prisoners. Nevertheless, Fischer's commentary is rich in detail and historical examples. So too is a chapter by the late Karl Josef Partsch on the protection of cultural property.

For readers of the *Naval War College Review*, the chapters on naval warfare by Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg and on neutrality by Michael Bothe are "must reading." In particular, von Heinegg draws attention to consequential differences between U.S. and German views of naval warfare. First, whereas the United States would permit an attack on an armed enemy merchant vessel even without warning, Germany would not consider armament alone, without some additional act, such as carrying military supplies, as sufficient reason to attack. Additionally, while Germany prohibits the laying of mines beyond one's own territorial sea during peacetime, the United States does allow the practice with controlled mines, so long as they do not interfere with lawful uses of the oceans by others. Finally, the German manual provides criteria for the formal establishment of maritime exclusion zones (the U.S. manual, NWP 1-14M, views them as mere warning zones, which may not unreasonably interfere with legitimate neutral commerce). Interestingly, von Heinegg's discussion of exclusion zones makes clear that the two sides are closer than might appear at first glance, for ultimately neither

country would permit the targeting of other than legitimate military objects in such zones. Instead, for von Heinegg the zones simply serve to lessen the impact of the principle of distinction on targeting.

In the chapter on neutrality, Michael Bothe urges the view that reports of the death of neutrality at the hands of the UN Charter's collective security regime are greatly exaggerated. He perceptively notes that collective security is a right, not an obligation requiring affirmative action. Moreover, Bothe distinguishes between enforcement actions under the direction of the Security Council and those in which the Council merely authorizes member states to act. In the latter case, nonparticipation is permissible, thereby allowing the neutrality law to retain its normative valence. Bothe also offers an insightful analysis of the timing of neutrality status, an important naval issue because during armed conflict neutrality may affect navigational prerogatives of belligerent navies. Finally, it is interesting that Bothe finds the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers during the Iran-Iraq conflict inconsistent with international law, arguing that Kuwait was engaged in "non-neutral services" to Iraq, a fact which might have justified Iranian reprisals (his term) against Kuwaiti vessels.

Rudiger Wolfrum concludes the commentary with a discerning analysis of humanitarian law's enforcement regime, emphasizing the punishment of war crimes. Three very useful appendices (on relevant agreements, distinctive humanitarian law emblems, and a listing of the world's military manuals) are included, as

well as an extensive bibliography centered on European sources.

As a cautionary note, *Handbook* readers should remain sensitive to the fact that it is not the official "annotated version" of the German manual but instead a compilation of commentary on it by noted experts in the field. So armed with an understanding of what the book is and is not, one is left with a work that no serious practitioner or scholar in the field should be without. It has rapidly become a standard, and deservedly so.

MICHAEL SCHMITT
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force

Ruggie, John Gerald. *Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era*. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1996. 237pp. \$27.95

John Gerald Ruggie is Burgess Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Columbia University, where he served from 1991 to 1996 as dean of the School of International and Public Affairs. He has written several other books on world order and international affairs. Ruggie has also served as consultant to several U.S. government agencies, as well as to the United Nations.

This work is the result of a study conducted by the Twentieth Century Fund to provide insights into what changes the United States might make in its post-Cold War foreign policy.

The author's first task, however, "is to clear up the rhetorical obfuscation that results in the use of such terms as 'internationalism,' 'isolationism' and

'idealism' in the current policy debate. None means quite what its protagonists claim." He points out that these terms were valid but today do not reflect such world order as the United States has implemented or would be likely to implement in the future. Ruggie defines "multilateralism" as a modified term for internationalism, "unilateralism" for isolationism, and "realism" for idealism. He then provides an excellent overview of the kind of world orders desired by the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, after World War I, and after World War II. He also examines the institutional legacy left at the end of the Cold War.

Unilateralism was practiced by the United States from the end of World War I up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The United States pursued a unilateralist approach to its security order and relied on bilateral treaties in economic agreements. The lesson drawn from this posture was the folly and high cost of leaving the most fundamental decisions concerning war and peace in the hands of others, often one's adversaries. Observing that the United States was being drawn into world war for a second time in one generation, President Franklin Roosevelt began almost at once to plan a postwar order in which the United States would be solidly anchored and the likelihood of future collapse would be greatly reduced. Early in 1943 Roosevelt proposed to the British foreign minister the idea of a United Nations, in which the major powers would play a special role in the world economy. This was the beginning of a multilateralist plan in international relations.

Realists such as Henry Kissinger believe that international political order inevitably will become multipolar during the first decade of the next century. The majority of realists feel that Germany and Japan will join the existing five major powers (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States) in the multipolar order. There will be a balance of power that will probably include nuclear capability for the new members. According to Ruggie, the realists believe in a much stronger military than the one in place during the Cold War, although they do not offer much practical guidance on how to pay for it.

The remainder of the book is devoted to an examination of the security order options open to the United States for "winning" the post-Cold War peace. Ruggie offers the following recommendations and assessments. (1) An overall foreign policy must put the United States in a position to defend and vindicate (on its own if need be) both its immediate interests and core values, while working with coalitions of the willing to pursue broader and longer milieu goals. (2) The domestic context is compatible with such a prudential yet progressive foreign policy orientation, since the public continues to support a relatively strong national defense. Maintaining the military capacity to meet the nation's needs should not prove inordinately difficult. (3) A core element is continued involvement and support of Nato; but Ruggie sees no compelling logic to extend Nato security commitments before greater consolidation of Nato's European pillar has taken place. (4) Active United States

involvement in East Asia is every bit as necessary as Nato involvement, from a strategic vantage point. (5) For areas other than Nato and East Asia, the United Nations should do the job. (6) A multilateral approach should be utilized for future international economic policy.

Each item has conditions that must be met, and implementation must be balanced. Reggie notes that it will not be easy.

JOHN T. COUGHLIN
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired
Seattle, Washington

Sokolski, Henry, ed. *Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1996. 377pp. \$23

This book, edited by Henry Sokolski of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, advances the antiproliferation literature focusing on new threats and proposing alternative approaches to thinking about proliferation. The message is clear: new dangers from proliferated technologies and capabilities pose real challenges that require comprehensive solutions and long-term perspectives.

This policy-relevant volume retains a healthy skepticism regarding proliferation. Kenneth Waltz, Martin van Creveld, and others suggest that nuclear weapons enforce a rationality without regard for national differences. *Fighting Proliferation*, however, is implicitly premised on the realization that proliferation is a long-term dynamic tied to global trends, while certain regimes with proliferated capabilities do

threaten the United States. Sokolski includes two balanced sections that analyze North Korea and Iran.

Proliferation threats have become diffuse, ranging from deliverable nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons to conventional weapons, and the enabling components and processes. Many analyses have focused on high-profile categories—particularly nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Sokolski, however, focuses on the strategic implications of satellite imagery and cruise missiles. But some observers argue that the effect of proliferation is not dangerous; Iraqi forces were dispatched with ease. Further, the performance of U.S. forces in the Gulf war apparently promises military-technological dominance against inferior opponents.

David Blair's chapter, however, demonstrates how U.S. power projection can be thwarted given the availability of technology and weapons, and the reduced number of overseas bases. This analysis challenges those who assume that the United States is so powerful and technologically advanced that its future position is assured. Instead, the technological, doctrinal, and organizational advancements of the last twenty-five years, and for the foreseeable future, are available to others as well.

Sokolski's suggestions for strategic responses are thoughtfully assessed. Diplomacy and arms control have been the primary tools used to stem proliferation. But given the accelerated rate of proliferation, the general porousness of control regimes, and the impact of the Gulf war and the 1993–1994 Korean crisis, capabilities to counter proliferation and protect U.S. troops are more

salient. Technology diffusion is a long-term issue, though, and solutions ought to be integrated and designed for the long term. David Andre's chapter on competitive strategies and Sokolski's on intelligence requirements exemplify sound analytic approaches to the proliferation conundrum.

The section on strategic responses, however, could have been improved by elaborating on various ideas. A preliminary attempt to devise a competitive strategy against North Korea and Iran would have been interesting, as would have an illustration of Sokolski's approach of constructing future scenarios and then deducing solutions. Furthermore, although this section was designed "to get beyond the negative goal of limiting possible damage," new analytical approaches are untested and will not eliminate the need for new capabilities. The most important capability to counter proliferation is theater-based and strategic-missile defense that enhances deterrence, power projection, and warfighting.

Most chapters are well researched and analyzed, particularly those by Blair, Steve Berner, Dennis Gormley, and K. Scott McMahon. But some, for example a debate concerning commercial satellite export-control policy and a chapter on South Korean concerns after the United States-North Korean nuclear agreement, are on important subjects but do not contribute effectively to the volume's message. The satellite export debate revolves around a 1994 presidential decision, of which the subject and implications are more clearly portrayed in Berner's chapter on the proliferation of satellite

imaging capabilities. As to Seoul's nuclear concerns, Victor Gilinsky's chapter raises questions without meaningful data, analysis, or assessment.

Other key proliferation concerns that could have been usefully included in a book on "new concerns for the nineties" are not covered. For instance, biological and chemical weapons employment may be more likely than nuclear. NBC terrorism and other asymmetric attacks are not broached, despite the March 1995 Sarin attack in Tokyo, continuing reports of smuggling, the abundance of plutonium, and lax control in Russia over NBC-related material. Space launch vehicles and their relation to ballistic missile delivery systems are not addressed. This is an important subject, given its bearing on satellite imagery and space technology proliferation. Ballistic missiles remain the proliferator's weapon of choice. Further, it is curious, having given so much attention to space-related issues, that Sokolski does not address maintaining military superiority in space and denying space as an operational medium.

Despite these few gaps, however, Sokolski's book will provide substantial value to the national security community. It deals convincingly with new proliferation threats that must be recognized and addressed. Additionally, Sokolski forwards important arguments and methods of thinking about proliferation as a long-term problem, one whose solutions will require of the United States a deft manipulation of foreign and defense policy tools.

PHILIP L. RITCHESON
Falls Church, Virginia

138 Naval War College Review

Alberts, David S. *Defensive Information Warfare*. Washington, D.C. National Defense Univ., 1996. 80pp. (Available on request)

If you are a senior policy maker or someone involved in crafting legislation or regulations regarding information technology, this book is for you. David Alberts, director of the Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies directorate at the National Defense University, presents a succinct overview of information warfare defense, enumerating the challenges posed by the increasing reliance of the United States on quick and open access to information, and developing a framework for finding solutions.

Alberts defines information attacks as “attacks on decision makers, the information and information-based processes they rely on, and their means of communicating,” but he focuses on attacks against information infrastructure. He compares information warfare defense to efforts to combat disease, requiring the same constant vigilance by public and private institutions, acting in concert. According to Alberts, direct economic damage from an information attack is a less significant threat than the potential that citizens will lose confidence in the government’s ability to protect them. For example, if a large number of U.S. citizens were to lose confidence in the security of the banking system, the economic consequences could be far more severe than any direct information attack.

Most discussions of information warfare acknowledge difficulties in determining the players and ascertaining their motives, since the threat is as likely to

arise from actors like economic competitors or criminal organizations as it is from states and terrorist organizations. Alberts does not resolve these difficulties but attempts to bound the problem by developing threat topology and characteristics. He allocates responsibilities for the everyday threat to the private sector, the strategic threat to the public sector, and the “potentially strategic threat” to a combination of both.

Alberts participated in a series of war games conducted by the RAND Corporation, and from them he draws the unsurprising conclusion that in order to respond to information warfare attacks effectively the United States requires more awareness and understanding of the nature of its own capabilities and vulnerabilities. Additionally, he recommends the development of defense in depth for information warfare, including a system of alerts (with required actions to be taken at each level) and a battle-damage assessment process.

This book is a short overview intended for high-level policy makers. It is refreshingly free of computer jargon, and Alberts defines each new term, which makes the topic more accessible to the average reader. Unfortunately, he does not include any examples or possible scenarios, which would have clarified his points.

Systems administrators may find this book somewhat frustrating, in that it emphasizes the need for action without providing much help in how to go about it. Nonetheless, those trying to understand what information warfare

defense is all about will find this book a worthwhile investment.

LILLIAN A. BURKE
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Haydon, Peter T., and Ann L. Griffiths, eds. *Multinational Naval Forces: From Theory to Practice*. Halifax: Dalhousie Univ. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1996. 261pp. \$19.95 (CDN)

Thomas, Robert H. *Multinational Naval Cooperation* (Maritime Security Paper no. 3). Halifax: Dalhousie Univ. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1996. 98pp. \$9.35 (CDN)

Multinational Naval Forces documents the proceedings of a three-day workshop held at the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies in July 1995. It brought together many international participants, including representatives from the U.S. Naval War College and the Center for Naval Analyses. As might be expected, however, the majority of those who attended were from the Canadian Maritime Command and the Centre itself. The purpose of this workshop was to "examine the interplay of political, military, and other factors that govern the ways by which ships of different navies can work together." Participants looked at three issues: interaction of political and military planning criteria and concepts, civil-military relations, and the impact of the media. These were examined under the rubrics of planning, organizational concepts, and lessons learned from recent Canadian experience. Individual chapters

(although not organized as such) document the individual presentations and cover such varied topics as "Media Relations and Multinational Naval Operations," "Is a Standing UN Naval Force Realistic?" and "Canadian Coordination of the Persian Gulf Combat Logistics Force."

The editors admit that when a workshop covers as many and as varied topics as this one did, it is sometimes difficult to draw conclusions. Still the papers carry one common thread: that multinational naval operations can work and achieve success, but the key is planning, and the biggest impediment is the disconnect between political expectations and military capabilities.

Multinational Naval Cooperation was published as Maritime Security Paper no. 3 by the Centre, an internationally recognized institute for the study of maritime security and oceans policy. It examines the evolution of multinational naval cooperation, noting that the precedent had been set at the Battle of Salamis (480 B.C.), when a naval alliance of Greek city-states successfully cooperated in the defeat of the Persians. However, specific details begin with World War I and trace the varying models for cooperation up through the intervention in Haiti in 1994.

Robert Thomas, the author of *Multinational Naval Cooperation*, is a retired captain in the Canadian navy with over thirty years of experience in both operational and staff assignments. Thomas holds both a B.A. and an M.A. from the Royal Military College. He is a graduate of the Canadian Land Forces and Canadian Forces Command and Staff colleges, and he directed National

Security Studies at the latter. His final tour of duty was as Director of National Security Studies at the National Defence College. Since retirement, he has published extensively on Canadian and international security issues.

His monograph brings home quite clearly the changing role of naval cooperation over the last eighty years. Thomas notes that the change has had significant impact on nations with small to medium navies. He uses history quite effectively to put the present in context and introduce how the future of naval cooperation will be affected. He observes with great clarity the challenges facing increased naval cooperation, categorizing them as strategic, political, operational, and professional.

By far, the work's most significant value lies in the final two chapters, wherein Thomas projects what the future might hold and then draws his conclusions. He notes that the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War make participation in multinational naval cooperative ventures less attractive for many nations whose national pride need no longer be swallowed up by American leadership. Conversely, the realities of U.S. naval downsizing may produce a more selective intervention policy by the United States, particularly in those areas where its interests are minimal.

For the naval professional, both *Multinational Naval Forces* and *Multinational Naval Cooperation* cover familiar ground, and in that regard one might be tempted to relegate both to the pile labeled "old news." Still, in the same fashion that the U.S. military is evolving more and more toward increased interoperability, there

is a need for the navies of the world to follow the same path. Both books do an excellent job of summarizing the key issues. For those who have never worn a naval uniform, or who have only passing knowledge of cooperative naval operations, or have never heard of the Nato Standing Naval Forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, these books will provide an excellent summary on the subject.

JAY R. AVELLA
Arlington, Virginia

Gray, Chris Hables. *Postmodern War*.
New York: The Guilford Press,
1997. 314pp. \$23.95

Any book that contains as its last two sentences the observation that "War is very strong. We must be stronger" would seem to have worked with great vigor toward a conclusion that is worthy only of reproduction as a bumper sticker. Fortunately, the journey Gray offers us is more interesting than his destination. This book is an exploration of the current state of the military and warfare, supported by a historical explanation of how both came to be as they are.

The title may be troublesome, sending some potential readers elsewhere at first glance. "Postmodern" suggests methods of examination rooted in literary and cultural criticism, not security affairs, and many believe that postmodernism is ill formed, silly, or so self-referential that it defies its own definition. There are certainly such elements in this work, many of them extremely frustrating, even infuriating, but there are also points at

which Gray precipitates issues concerning the nature of today's and tomorrow's military into statements and positions that ask us to examine our thoughts in using larger sets of rules.

"Postmodern" refers to the period in which the drivers of modernism (art, science, technology, progress, democracy, nationalism) have been called into question as their internal mechanisms are revealed, creating disillusionment. With regard to the military, as well as to the author's thesis, science and technology are the most relevant. We have now created, and appear to be ready to rely upon, a military built upon a scientific and technological base that has been assumed in the past to be "value free"—that is, objective efforts that offer the users only tools, without beliefs attached. In this realm, postmodernism's themes center around information as an organizing principle, the domination of knowledge by "the market, the battle and the scientific method," an increase in speed ("the Cartesian grid has become a Cartesian box"), and the proliferation of human-machine interaction as a cultural fact of life.

Gray summarizes in Part II, "The Past," that war is a "discourse," an interaction with rules, limits, and conversational components. These components have changed over time. The most important of them to modern war have been the application of rationality instead of tradition, the development of bureaucracies, and the "systematic application of science and technology." Postmodern war is the dilemma in which we find ourselves today—technology and rational thought have

brought us to the brink of a force-planning and wartime-execution environment which will enable us to conduct war with more force and power, and less risk and damage. Does this phenomenon, in a grim irony, produce two dangerous possibilities? First, will the populace no longer participate in wars to the degree they have in the past, leaving the military to fight at will with weapons that are essentially cyborgs? Second, will this new "manageable contest of intelligent machines in cyberspace," a less horrible prospect to all, therefore be an aid to a more horrifying future in which war is so easy that it may be undertaken with less thought?

Along the way, Gray applies the themes of his book to some issues that may seem peripheral at best: how the technological transformation of war affects notions of gender, and thus the roles of men and women in war; whether peace has become the justification for war; whether there is a continuing potential for asymmetries in future conflicts. Some of these may seem out of place to readers used to more traditional examinations of the military. They nonetheless add a dimension to the book that is worthwhile, even if they seem deliberately provocative.

There are some annoying methods that distract from the reading experience. Gray has a habit of citing the writings of reputable military theorists and historians in "as quoted in" fashion, using words that are closer to his own intellectual interests than the originals might be. We thus have the potential for an "out-of-context-context" phenomenon, which puts the reader

142 Naval War College Review

slightly ill at ease. The impression, accurate or not, is that Gray did not read the originals and may be using the observations in ways that the writers or speakers did not intend.

There is much to consider in this book. Even if its culmination leaves one cold or angry, a dramatically different point of view can be a tonic, even to those who have already made up their minds.

DAVID SMITH
Commander, U.S. Navy

Macgregor, Douglas A. *Breaking the Phalanx*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997. 283pp. \$24.95

With *Breaking the Phalanx*, Colonel Douglas Macgregor has accomplished what all military authors aspire to but few achieve. By calling for striking—some would say radical—change in how the United States Army structures and employs its combat forces, Macgregor has captured the attention of his service's leadership and inspired a genuine debate. The Army that emerges from this debate will likely incorporate some, though not all, of Macgregor's ideas. By fueling discussion and injecting fresh and provocative concepts and thinking, his contribution to the Army of the next century will be both lasting and significant.

An accomplished scholar and writer, as well as a distinguished combat soldier in his own right, Macgregor begins with a strong defense of the continuing relevance and utility of landpower. Refuting air advocates who claimed "decisive" roles for their service in the Gulf

war, he argues convincingly that "without landpower, airpower and seapower cannot be strategically decisive." Arguing that all conflicts are ultimately about control of populations and resources found on the land, Macgregor asserts that strategic landpower remains central to American preeminence in the next century. While service enthusiasts will no doubt continue to debate questions of service primacy, Macgregor is on firm ground in arguing that a strong, healthy capability on land, as well as at sea and in the air, is the essence of American military power—not a military establishment weighted toward any one.

Having made a plea for landpower's rightful place in our strategic calculus, Macgregor moves to his central theme: how to shape the Army for the next century. Here he boldly calls for the death of the division—heretofore the lowest all-arms formation capable of sustained combat—in favor of the "combat group," a combined arms formation of brigade size with organic maneuver, fire support, and logistics units. These groups would be organized and equipped by function and mission.

Thus "heavy" combat groups would conduct "decisive" maneuver operations. "Airborne/air assault" groups would conduct forced entry and economy-of-force operations. "Recon-strike" groups would conduct traditional cavalry missions to screen and secure the main force. Macgregor sees, in pushing the Army's organizational focus downward, major savings in end-strength by doing away with divisional staffs and headquarters troops.

How this force might fight a "future war" is described in a fictional scenario set in Southwest Asia. While incorporating next-generation technologies, the author points out the dangers of overreliance on "silver bullets": when the enemy manages to field passive systems able to detect stealth platforms, "dominant battlespace knowledge has turned out to be an illusion!" The message is clear. Precision guided systems and information warfare will matter greatly, but war will still be messy, plans will fail, and the clash of arms on the ground will remain at the heart of mankind's continuing fascination with war.

Many of Macgregor's proposals push the envelope hard. Still, upon reflection, much of his thesis intuitively compels. The arguments and counterarguments to come (and there will be many) will be based as much on the response of threatened communities within the Army as on implications for warfighting.

To be sure, Macgregor is vulnerable to criticism on the merits. A career cavalry officer, his dismissal of light infantry reflects a measure of branch bias at odds with the realities of combat in close terrain. His superficial treatment of logistics and sustainment is a weakness that is sure to draw close scrutiny. Eliminating the division as an echelon of command, absent a hard and objective look at the downside (the obvious disadvantage being an inherent span of control problem, with numerous groups reporting to a single joint task force), will not attract much support from senior leaders who are well aware of the division's proven flexibility and staying power.

Yet *Breaking the Phalanx* is an important book that may well endure. Though most military professionals realize that the United States stands at the dawn of a new era in warfare, few step "out of the box" with Macgregor's force, clarity, and relish. Highly readable, always interesting, his thrusting logic grapples resolutely with the possibilities. Douglas Macgregor has put a mark on the wall and challenged the system to do better. His book deserves careful reflection by all professionals concerned with the common defense.

R. D. HOOKER, JR.
Major, U.S. Army

Farer, Tom, ed. *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1996. 416pp. \$19.95

The United States is fortunate to be in a hemisphere relatively free of the recent troubling regional trends. One such trend is the deterioration of states, resulting in the unraveling of economies and the breakdown of civil society and its complementary form of democratic government. Perhaps, however, the withering away of the state is creating a positive effect in Latin America and the Caribbean. As *Beyond Sovereignty* reveals, state sovereignty is diminishing as a result of this hemisphere's growing dedication through "collective defense" to the full political institutionalization of democracy. *Beyond Sovereignty* explains this regional trend, which the United States must apprehend as one of the most positive

geopolitical dynamics within the current "Revolution in Security Affairs."

Beyond Sovereignty is a collection of studies by distinguished scholars on Latin America and the Caribbean. They focus on the institution of democracy and its "collective defense" in the region by a variety of state and nonstate actors. They are the result of an exploration by the Inter-American Dialogue of a call by the Organization of American States (OAS), in Resolution 1080, for "collective" responses to violations of the democratic process within the Americas. The studies examine the roles of governments and political movements within the various countries, the effects of U.S. policies, and the political forces within international and nongovernmental organizations that are subsuming state sovereignty in terms of the region's adherence to the strengthening of democracy. The book features case studies of a retrospective nature on Chile, El Salvador, Haiti, and Peru, and the struggles within those countries relative to the establishment of democratic political practices. The book also provides studies that look toward the futures of Mexico and Cuba and what they may hold with regard to the respective enlargement and the eventual establishment of democracy in those countries.

Beyond Sovereignty correlates the rise of democracy's strength, as a political institution in Latin America and the Caribbean, to the decrease of state sovereignty based on collective defense. In the region, the state and its sovereignty is giving way to political and suasive power from international organizations, principally the OAS, but

also the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as the World Bank. These external actors share a focus on building democracy as a political institution within the region—the OAS from its political "peer pressure," and the NGOs by aiding the positive social forces that support the growth of sound, expanding economies and the formation of civil society. The OAS and proliferating regional political forums are growing intolerant of any tendency by states to dismiss democracy as the preferred political system. These forums' ability to effect their political will in support of democracy is what defines collective defense.

The book also examines related political and governmental institutions necessary for the success of a democratic country: fully representative political parties that permit and encourage pluralistic expression, an effective independent judicial system, and a competent civil service. The strength of these related components is vital in a democracy. The new crumbling of state sovereignty in favor of regional interest in democratic politics is resulting in less internal dependence upon agrarian reform and labor movements, the clash of class interests, and guerrilla activity as the principal source of pressure on states in the region to democratize fully.

Despite the possibly distracting reference to "collective defense," this book does not focus on the military problem of defense but rather on the political problem of defending democratic political institutions. In this vein, its studies circumspectly characterize the military as a historically

counter-democratic force. Plentiful regional historical evidence demonstrates that the military has been ambiguously involved in some countries' internal "nation-building" activities. This contributed to the regional model for a military *junta* system of government that cynically manipulated social conditions to sustain itself and thereby formed the greatest threat to the political institution of democracy in the region.

Given this unfavorable conclusion about the military's role in the region's various countries, themes in this work should concern the military-minded readers of the *Naval War College Review*. Included are discussions of the troubled history of civil-military relations in the countries of the region. But with the establishment of democracy in the region has come the placement of the military in its proper role as an instrument of the government's political will, and not the other way around. Also, there is focus on the international approach toward preserving democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean. The "collective defense" alluded to is the intervention by fellow Latin American countries in support of democracy in a region where the most significant threats to that political institution generally have derived not from external state sources but disruptive internal politico-military actors. Consequently, *Beyond Sovereignty* exposes the region's growing political tendency to recognize the obsolescence of the military with regard to defending democracy in the context of the state's power. The ascendancy of regional adherence to (and political enforcement of) the ideal of democracy is supplanting the state and

its associated Clausewitzian military complement.

With plentiful history to draw upon, *Beyond Sovereignty* is not ambiguous about the worst effects of U.S. policy toward the region. It has applied its heavy hand in the region many times. Offering explicit support for various authoritarian regimes during the Cold War, the United States traded away democracy for the expediency of anti-communism. The book is forthright in asserting that this region is not likely to tolerate further applications of a unilateral, coercive U.S. approach. The studies emphatically demonstrate, through analysis of recent regional collective defense efforts, that the region's countries are determined to choose appropriate internal measures for application of democratic political principles, and not tolerate U.S. hegemonism.

This particular phenomenon implicitly exposes a significant problem with which the United States will have to struggle, since one of the top OAS priorities is to stop illegal drug trafficking in the region. A strong case can be made that internal U.S. social conditions are behind the hemisphere's illegal drug problem, which is now the most severe condition imperiling the institution of democracy. In this light, regional political dynamics are bound to increase insistence that the United States solve its internal problems, which threaten the region's ability to have responsible democratic government and the political conditions that sustain it. With an eye to the "collective defense" approach, the United States eventually will have to address its drug problem in

146 Naval War College Review

the context of the threat it poses to democracy in the hemisphere.

The importance of the ideas in this work is abundant. For years the United States has paid little more than lip service to the cause of democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean. History shows no room for doubt that U.S. intervention in the region has been problematic in the political realm, and often disruptive to social forces struggling to find expression for their interest in democracy within the countries that received U.S. "help." Yet *Beyond Sovereignty* demonstrates that in this hemisphere, effective regional cohesion around the idea of democracy has never been more powerful than it is now. In a world in which regional forces are shaping the future, the United States must devise policies to promote this positive force for democracy in its own geopolitical neighborhood.

CHARLES T. EPPRIGHT
Arlington, Virginia

Wiarda, Howard J. *Democracy and Its Discontents: Development, Interdependence, and U.S. Policy in Latin America*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. 367pp. \$27.95

Two major approaches dominate comparative politics research—a universalistic, scientific approach that emphasizes similarities and regularities among the world's political systems, and a more traditional "area studies" perspective that emphasizes distinctive features of different geographical areas. The first approach (deeply influenced by the so-called rational choice or public choice

theory) seeks to develop social-scientific theories and hypotheses that can be empirically tested and verified. Traditional area studies, by contrast, seek to explain the behavior of political actors and governmental institutions based on the history, religious values, cultural traditions, and the social and economic structures of a particular region. For area studies specialists, understanding the politics of developing nations, especially non-Western states, is impossible without first studying their language, culture, and history.

Howard Wiarda, a political science professor affiliated with the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, is a scholar of the traditional area studies school. Long regarded as a leading specialist on Latin America, Wiarda has written extensively and incisively on the politics and government of the Western Hemisphere, as well as on U.S.-Latin American relations. The book under review is a wide-ranging collection of previously published essays covering key issues in contemporary Latin American politics and relations with the United States. Some of the important themes discussed are legal and political traditions, the notion of the state, political reform, democratization, human rights, and U.S.-Caribbean relations.

As a traditional area-specialist, Wiarda writes that to understand Latin America's struggle for democracy "one has to go back to history." For him, this means understanding the region's distinctive traditions, social values, and cultural norms that have evolved since the Spanish conquest. Wiarda argues that Latin America's tradition of a strong

state is rooted in hierarchical, elitist, and corporatistic values derived from the sixteenth-century tradition of neoscholasticism. More specifically, he asserts that since the Latin American democratic traditions have been based on Thomistic and Rousseauian ideals, the region's constitutional practices have resulted in centralized, organic, and corporatistic structures designed to carry out "the great and glorious ends of government." By contrast, the North American constitutional norms have been based on Lockean, Madisonian, and Jeffersonian principles that have fostered radically different governmental structures based on consent, majority rule, separation of powers, and checks and balances. Wiarda observes that while the North American emphasis on process and constitutional procedures has resulted in pragmatic, prosaic decision making, the U.S. regime has been stable and durable. But the failure of Latin American regimes to give sufficient attention to constitutional decision-making procedures has led to more rigid and fragile regimes.

Wiarda argues that U.S. policy of trying to replicate in Latin America Westminster-style democratic practice has been misguided and ineffective, reflecting at best a limited understanding of the region's history and traditions, or at worst a profound hostility to it. While he correctly questions the wisdom of implementing policies that superimpose values and traditions on foreign countries, Wiarda's analysis would have been more credible had he outlined strategies that would advance the consolidation of Latin American democracy without neglecting the region's distinctive cultural

and historical traditions. If U.S. insistence on competitive elections is not the only road to democratic government, how should the United States attempt to encourage and sustain the consolidation of democratic systems? We can agree with Wiarda that U.S. policy makers need to be informed about the region's values, traditions, and cultural norms, and to pursue U.S. interests with sensitivity and nuance. But having recognized the need for an informed and sensitive policy, the challenge for U.S. officials is how to advance democratic ideals and practices even when such ideals may conflict with regional cultural sensitivities.

"Latin America," writes Wiarda, "has a system of politics that, in many ways, is uniquely its own." Persons wishing to become more familiar with some of the distinctive features of the region's politics will find many of the book's essays stimulating and worthwhile, providing penetrating assessments and critiques on important domestic and Western Hemispheric issues. While readers may differ with Wiarda's judgments and policy conclusions, they will find his analysis informed and his scholarship sound.

MARK R. AMSTUTZ
Wheaton College

Baldwin, Sherman. *Ironclaw*. New York: William Morrow, 1996. 265pp. \$24

Sherman Baldwin touches the elephant and describes it. But unlike the people in the famous fable, he is not blind. Nor is the item described as small or as

148 Naval War College Review

commonplace as an elephant. Those are two of the things that make this book worth reading. There are others.

"Tank" is the call sign the new naval aviator gets from his carrier-based EA-6B squadron mates. But call sign aside, this is no clumsy anachronism. In recounting his DESERT STORM memories, Tank demonstrates a sharp eye, keen insight, sensitivity, humor, and a sharp pencil. If he were not a good "stick" he would not have been assigned to a Prowler squadron embarked in USS *Midway* on its way to war. The author recounts events, procedures, and emotions that have slipped into a dim past for most of us: the transition from flight school to the fleet, the first encounter with new squadron mates, finding one's way around the carrier's labyrinth (he gets some of *Midway's* tortuous anatomy wrong), first combat mission, first true love. The detail of this work flooded this reviewer with memories and emotions. Yet those who are not naval aviators will also find it fascinating and entertaining.

Besides its treating the commanding officer of USS *Midway* favorably, the book also attracted me because it is a look into the quick mind of a very bright junior officer under great stress. Except for the familiar cockpit of the EA-6B, everything is different, especially the prospect of being the target of Iraqi missiles. Thankfully for Tank and his many fellow aviators over Iraq, there are few of those. Lieutenant (junior grade) Baldwin, like everyone else, does not know that Saddam Hussein is going to be a pushover. So the tension is real. Add to that the difficulty of in-flight refueling, a missed rendezvous

in marginal weather, and some terrifying night landings on *Midway's* small flight deck, and anyone's confidence would be rattled. Tank finds little support from his squadron commanding officer, whose leadership style is treated in unflattering terms. Right or wrong, the author calls it as he sees it. You cannot ask for more. In the end Sherman relies on his shipmates' good training, his inner strength, and the prospect of seeing his future wife waiting for him on the pier, to see him through these challenging times.

ARTHUR K. CEBROWSKI
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

McGibbon, Ian. *New Zealand and the Korean War: Volume II, Combat Operations*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996. 508pp. \$85

New Zealanders may indeed have a relatively short military history, but what the country lacks in extensive historical lineage it more than makes up for in valor and sacrifice. So too has New Zealand enjoyed an impressive record of official histories of its involvement in this century's major wars. Now, however, replacing the extensive multivolume sets that cover New Zealand's involvement in the first and second world wars, a more modest official history (like that in Australia edited by Professor Robert O'Neill) has been adopted to cover the Korean War. The work is also unique in that it is published by a university press vice a government printing office. The first volume of this history, *Politics and Diplomacy*, provided an excellent backdrop to the political

side of the conflict, both international and domestic. In the current volume, Ian McGibbon has examined in considerable detail the record and experiences of New Zealand's contribution to the United Nations effort to halt communist aggression.

New Zealand's contribution to the United Nations command was small in comparison to its efforts in both world wars, let alone in relation to the force sent to Korea by its other Commonwealth allies and the United States. The Royal New Zealand Navy was the first force in the theater, with two frigates, a force it maintained on station until September 1954. The ground force contribution followed, consisting of the 16 Field Regiment, Royal New Zealand Artillery, and signals, transport, engineer units. Named "Kayforce," the army contribution was initially approximately one thousand; by the armistice, it had increased to 1,500. Despite the modest size of these forces (well documented in the first volume), New Zealand's experience in Korea had many profound political and strategic implications for its foreign and security policy.

It would be a mistake to assume that this work is a dry recounting of a small contribution to a major conflict. McGibbon has woven a well written and compelling tale, employing not only essential hitherto unavailable documents but many personal accounts. Thus both scholars of the conflict and the general reader will find value in this volume. The experience of small forces in relation to the larger Commonwealth and U.S. commands would be particularly insightful to an American reader-ship in the current era, where we have

"rediscovered" the importance of coalition warfare. The litany of interoperability problems that New Zealand forces experienced with its allies hardly six years after the Second World War demonstrates how quickly such expertise can be lost.

Like volume 1, this is a richly illustrated work and contains many appendices with documentation of New Zealand's military involvement in the conflict, and it should be of considerable interest to the serious scholar of the Korean War. The New Zealand government and Ian McGibbon should be congratulated for continuing the tradition of serious scholarship in the documentation of the history of New Zealand's armed forces.

THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG
Strategic Studies Institute
Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

Stewart, Jean Cantlie. *The Sea Our Heritage: British Maritime Interests Past and Present*. Keith, Banffshire, Scotland: Rowan Books, 1995. 304pp. (No price given)

Part narrative, part analysis, and part obituary, this is an inquiry into the wealth and decline of Britain's maritime power. Covering four centuries and more, this work explores a number of interlocking themes about maritime preeminence. The goals of the book are, firstly, to explain Britain's rise to prominence via commerce, seaborne trade, and naval competence and strength, and secondly, to point out to present-day politicians of the United Kingdom that indeed history does have

150 Naval War College Review

lessons—and that British statesmen and political parties should clearly comprehend that the continued prosperity and security of the United Kingdom is dependent on the sea. Then as now, the author argues, the seas were and are realms of opportunity and the means to wealth and defence.

In many ways this book is a cry from the heart. Jean Cantlie Stewart, a biographer and lawyer, is aware of history's lessons and how England's wooden walls provided protection and influence in foreign policy. But she is less well attuned to the importance of colonial commodities and trades as ingredients in the larger story of success. Her discussion of how Britain adopted the policy of free trade is admirable. Britain's move to free trade had political costs because such a shift did not maintain its seaborne leadership. This completes the first third of the book. The remainder is devoted to commentary on twentieth-century politics of maritime primacy—in other words, to the means and methods of Britain's maritime greatness and decline. Here the tone becomes more strident and the message more certain. Flags of convenience carry British cargoes, and the British merchant marine is now a shadow of its former self. The value of British cargoes may be larger than heretofore, but the regret that the Red Ensign does not wave from the sterns of merchantmen like the windjammers and steamers of yesteryear drives the author to her conclusions.

This book says little about air power, intelligence warfare, alliance politics of our times, or other themes that would have obliged Stewart to look at her thesis in another light. Like many

another country concerned with its maritime strength, Britain knows that it is not by ships alone that the defence of the realm is achieved.

BARRY GOUGH

Wilfrid Laurier University
Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

Boyne, Walter J. *Clash of Titans: World War II at Sea*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. 381pp. \$27.50

Miller, Nathan. *War at Sea: A Naval History of World War II*. New York: Scribner's, 1995. 592pp. \$32.50

Both books, published at the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, are single-volume, comprehensive histories of the great naval battles of that war. Even though each discusses the overall political and military background of combined operations, their consistent focus is upon navies and naval operations. You must go elsewhere to find general histories of World War II land and air campaigns. Each book covers the major naval campaigns in the Atlantic and the Pacific of the British, American, German, and Japanese navies, plus the contributions of the French, Italian, and Soviet fleets. Both works describe the personalities of individual commanders and technological advancements, and each analyzes the naval tactics and strategy of the forces involved. They offer interesting insights into motivations of the battle force commanders and observations as to why things may have happened as they did. Each contains helpful maps and pictures of key ships and players. Written for the general public, both

books use narrative and personal anecdotes to explain and illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of each navy. Since each book covers essentially the same events, there is a similarity of content. However, each author has his own definite opinion as to the personalities and reasons for the success and failure of the navies involved.

As is necessary in single-volume histories, there is a relative lack of detailed, in-depth analysis of each battle. The need for brevity mandated that the authors touch only lightly on the many highly complex actions, mistakes, and successes of opposing commanders. Such attempts to cover enormously complex subjects sometimes frustrate knowledgeable readers; in this instance, however, brevity helps rather than hinders. Both books are informative and successful, and they are of interest to today's military professionals. Their conciseness allows one to stand back from the events and gain new perspectives, illumination, and instruction as to the sweep of the vast events of World War II.

For example, each book examines the differences in leadership and character of the admirals and commanders of each navy, how the officers' attitudes, outlook, and style were shaped both by their navies' history of glory or defeat, and by the strong personalities of political leaders, such as Churchill, Roosevelt, or Hitler. It is interesting for a naval officer to realize again what the corrosive fear of making a mistake, losing or damaging ships, can do to the effectiveness of a navy. In essence, it stops aggressiveness; it hands the initiative to the opponent. As has been suggested, this

factor became so important as the war progressed that it often crippled the decision making of on-scene German commanders.

Equally important, both authors outline the significant differences between the strategies used by the various naval forces in the Atlantic campaigns and those in the Pacific campaigns. These differences in offensive and defensive strategy, particularly submarine targeting, led to a German focus upon what was essentially a logistics war against supply lines in the Atlantic. But in the Pacific, the Japanese strategy consistently sought, in the Mahanian sense, a great meeting of vast fleets in a single decisive battle, like the Japanese victory against the Russians at Tsushima in 1904.

Flexible, aggressive, and dynamic leadership, plus the innate qualities of the men and women who constitute navies, are often not reflected in dry calculations of orders of battle. However, as both authors state, they are crucial to the moral force that binds a navy and often can make the difference between success and failure in battle. This quality one sees early on as distinguishing the British Royal Navy as it went through the battles of 1939 and 1940. One also sees the U.S. Navy making the transition from peacetime to wartime in 1942 and 1943, growing in stature and aggressive leadership after the mistakes in the Pacific of 1941 and early 1942.

Both books examine the use of technology: the British and American success in radar, the early U.S. failure in torpedoes, the advent in the United States of more capable naval aircraft, and

the use of carrier battle groups. These all contributed greatly to the success and eventual dominance of the allied navies. The books describe how each navy, to a greater or lesser extent, was or was not able to learn and to implement quickly in the fleet the technological changes that leveraged success. Of particular interest to an intelligence officer is the recognition by both authors of the major contributions toward eventual victory of U.S. and British signals intelligence groups and antisubmarine warfare operational intelligence centers.

Walter J. Boyne, author of *Clash of Titans*, is a retired U.S. Air Force colonel and formerly the director of the National Air and Space Museum. The author of twenty-six previous fiction and nonfiction books on aviation, including *Clash of Wings*, about the air campaigns of World War II, Boyne brings the perspective of an experienced military officer. As such, he points out time and again the importance of Allied leadership and command aggressiveness as major elements of success. Due to his aviation background and evident interest in things technological, Boyne is particularly insightful and authoritative in his descriptions of the evolution of naval aircraft and the constantly improving technology that became so much a part of Allied operations.

One finds sprinkled throughout his book interesting viewpoints and statistics. For example, during the battle of Midway, Army Air Force B-17s dropped 322 bombs upon Japanese ships, none of which hit the target. Boyne also observes that Japanese naval commanders did not learn the importance of antisubmarine warfare, and therefore failed to build necessary escort ships;

directly to this point, he cites the statistic that U.S. submarines sank 59.7 percent of the Japanese merchant marine. Still another example is his view of the vital importance of the U.S. fleet train and underway logistic support in the successful operations of the forward-deployed U.S. Seventh, Fifth, and Third fleets during the later Pacific campaigns.

I was especially struck by his discussion of the initial Axis invasions and Allied evacuations as early indicators of the abilities, and more importantly the psychological makeups, of the various naval forces. He points out that only two and one-half years separated the Japanese use of wooden boats in the invasion of Malaya from the myriad specialized amphibious craft and ships of D-Day. Lastly, and as very few authors of general histories do, he includes a brief review of Soviet World War II naval service, particularly in riverine warfare.

Nathan Miller, author of *War at Sea*, is a journalist, historian, and the author of twelve books of history and biography, including *The U.S. Navy: A History*, which is used as a textbook at the U.S. Naval Academy. Miller makes many of the same points as Boyne regarding leadership: the need for unified command, and the relationships between serving naval commanders and their political superiors. Interestingly enough, he flatly asserts that the underlying reason for the Allied victory "was superior leadership in adversity."

The author has definite opinions about personalities and effectiveness of political and naval leadership. For example, he likes Rear Admiral Frank

Jack Fletcher, USN, but he does not like Winston Churchill. I thought his discussion of the successes and failures of the various navies relating to the Battle of the Atlantic was especially instructive. His point about the crucial importance of logistic supply in a prolonged war, as represented by the British and American merchant fleets, is compelling. It certainly resonates today for those interested in maritime affairs, as one views the precipitous decline in tonnage, numbers, and market share of both nations' contemporary merchant fleets. I also liked Miller's use of footnotes, which added such touches of interest as the story of the Polish submarine *Orzel*.

I do have a point of disagreement, however, with one of Miller's conclusions. Over the last few years several contemporary historians have argued that dropping the atomic bombs was not needed, that the Japanese would have sought peace. Miller shares this view; however, the evidence on page 449 cited by him in support, is, in my opinion, very weak.

In summary, both are good reads, thoughtful, interesting, and concise. Of the two, I preferred Nathan Miller's *War at Sea*.

JAMES AYNESWORTH
Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve

Lorelli, John A. *To Foreign Shores: U.S. Amphibious Operations in World War II*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 362pp. \$38.95

For nearly a half century Jeter Iseley's and Philip Crowl's *The U.S. Marines and*

Amphibious War has been the landmark work on assaults from the sea during World War II. Since it did not address the many campaigns conducted mainly by the U.S. Army, students of amphibious operations have had to go to numerous other books to round out their knowledge of the subject. However, the Naval Institute Press has published *To Foreign Shores*, a one-volume history that addresses all the major American amphibious actions of that epic war.

The project was inspired and backed by Rolf L. Illsley, who served during World War II as a young naval officer training the crews of landing craft. Much of the research was done by Samuel Loring Morison, grandson of the eminent historian of the U.S. Navy in the Second World War. The author, John A. Lorelli, is a professor of history at a California community college and a former Navy officer with a tour on the gun-line off Vietnam. Given the background of this trio, it is no surprise (as the author freely admits) that "the book is written mainly from the naval viewpoint." The volume provides a superb account of operations from a "blue" perspective.

However, any reader interested in the landing-force side of the story will be sorely disappointed. Operations on and beyond the beach are not ignored, but they are glossed over in most instances. As an example, the combined assaults on 7 August 1942 on the islands of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and Florida are described in two paragraphs. The reader receives none of the detail needed to understand, much less analyze, Marine Corps tactics and capability at that point in the

154 Naval War College Review

war. Although a one-volume work on a topic this large cannot cover everything in depth, Lorelli could have replaced his lengthy discussions on Roosevelt, Churchill, and the development of strategy with more information on the ground side of operations.

The emphasis of Lorelli and Morison on the Navy also shows up in the scope of their research, which slights many of the rich primary sources available on the Army and Marine Corps for the years just prior to and during the war. In the entire first chapter, which covers the evolution of amphibious doctrine, all the footnotes refer to books (many of them memoirs) written long after the events in question. As a consequence, the account lacks much of the nuance so valuable to scholars and military personnel. The prewar squabbles of the Army and Marine Corps over doctrine are noted, but there is no mention that Marines themselves also were divided over how best to meet the challenges of landing across a defended beach. Similarly, the only Marine-related primary source cited for the momentous Tarawa assault is a 1948 interview with Lieutenant General Julian Smith. Given the wealth of material unearthed since Iseley's and Crowl's opus, Lorelli and Morison could have given the reader an updated analysis of each operation, instead of bare-bones summaries of well known information.

The book is at its best in developing the evolution of the "gator" navy. We learn a great deal about the acquisition and employment of landing craft and amphibious ships, and we see distinctly how naval officers applied to subsequent campaigns their hard-won experience

in each battle. Lorelli has woven in sufficient personal recollections to give the operations an important human dimension and to remind us that warfare is more about brains and courage than about doctrine and technology. His work is also commendable for its emphasis on the role of logistics, a topic too often slighted by others in favor of pure battlefield narrative. The prose and the story flow well, though there are far too few maps (only eight) to illustrate the large number of campaigns that spanned a globe.

To Foreign Shores falls short of its goal of being "a complete reference" to American amphibious operations, but it will undoubtedly become a classic in its own right. As a thorough, readable account of the naval aspects of those campaigns, it makes an excellent companion to Iseley and Crowl and should be on the shelf of anyone interested in this critical component of power projection.

JON T. HOFFMAN
Lieutenant Colonel,
U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

Wukovits, John F. *Devotion to Duty: A Biography of Admiral Clifton A. F. Sprague*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 273pp. \$35
The first full-length biography of Vice Admiral Clifton A. F. "Ziggy" Sprague (1896–1955) focuses on Sprague's role as the quick-thinking commander who overcame tremendous odds to beat the Japanese in the battle off Samar—one of several clashes that made up the largest naval battle in history, the Battle of

Leyte Gulf. When Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita found the San Bernardino Strait, between the Philippine islands of Luzon and Samar, unguarded on 25 October 1944, he had an excellent chance of crushing Sprague's U.S. task group of six escort carriers, three destroyers, and four destroyer escorts with his more powerful Japanese force of four battleships, eight cruisers, and eleven destroyers, and then to attack the main Japanese objective, the U.S. beachhead on Leyte Island. Sprague turned almost-certain defeat into a stunning victory, convincing the Japanese to retreat by attacking aggressively with his aircraft (some unarmed) and destroyers, laying one of the most effective smokescreens of the war, concealing part of his force in a nearby rain squall, and bluffing the enemy into thinking that U.S. fleet carriers were nearby and likely to attack the Japanese force.

As Wukovits points out, Sprague received relatively little personal praise for the glorious American victory, largely because the U.S. Navy wanted to avoid criticism of Admiral William F. Halsey, who had taken his fleet carriers north chasing a decoy carrier force under Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa. (The Japanese carriers were decoys because the "Great Marianas Turkeyshoot" in June 1944 had left them virtually denuded of planes and pilots.) This episode prompted the famous message from Admiral Chester W. Nimitz asking Halsey about the location of the task force that Halsey had supposedly assigned to guard San Bernardino Strait: "WHERE IS RPT WHERE IS TASK FORCE THIRTY-FOUR RR THE WORLD WONDERS." (Halsey did

not immediately realize that the second sentence was merely "padding" added to confuse Japanese code breakers.)

When Sprague discovered that Halsey had left the San Bernardino Strait unguarded, thereby giving the Japanese their best chance since Pearl Harbor to surprise a major part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, he shouted on the bridge of his flagship, "That son of a bitch Halsey has left us bare-assed!" Years later, writing in the margin of his copy of C. Vann Woodward's *The Battle for Leyte Gulf* (1947), Sprague commented that Halsey had lost a "golden opportunity" by failing to block Kurita's exit from the strait. Wukovits does a fine job of using Sprague's marginalia in Woodward's book to illustrate Sprague's thinking about key aspects of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. He also makes use of quotations concerning Sprague by the officers and enlisted men who served under his command.

Confusion among the public between Clifton Sprague and his fellow officer Rear Admiral Thomas L. Sprague (no relation, although both men were members of the U.S. Naval Academy class of 1917), who led the Leyte Gulf task force to which Ziggy Sprague's task group was attached, was another factor explaining why he was denied the acclaim that was rightfully his. Sprague's "modest and retiring" personality, as Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison described it, also contributed to a lack of public awareness about his crucial role in the battle. The result is that authoritative histories of World War II are still being written that do not mention Clifton Sprague or that give credit for the naval victory off Samar to

Thomas Sprague (see Gerhard L. Weinberg's massive 1994 *A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II*, for example). In stark contrast, Rear Admiral Morison dedicated to Clifton Sprague the Leyte Gulf volume (no. XII, published in 1958) of his masterful *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, in recognition of Sprague's superb performance at the battle off Samar.

The frequent neglect of Sprague is especially unfortunate because he contributed much more to his beloved Navy than just one victory. He trained the crew of his first afloat command, the seaplane tender *Tangier*, so well that it was one of the first ships (if not the very first) to return Japanese fire at Pearl Harbor. He also made his first aircraft carrier command, USS *Wasp*, into a model fighting machine that played a key role in the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944. Prior to the war, Sprague had been a pioneer naval aviator who foresaw the value of air power at sea and helped to develop the equipment and techniques of naval aviation.

The author, John Wukovits, is a history teacher with a master's degree from Michigan State University. He has written extensively about the Pacific War, including biographical essays on admirals Halsey and Raymond A. Spruance. He has published more than a hundred articles for twenty-five different publications, including the *Naval War College Review* and *Naval History*. Although his deep respect and warm admiration for Sprague are obvious throughout the book, Wukovits criticizes him when he believes it is warranted. For example, he notes that men died unnecessarily off

Samar because Sprague did not ensure that Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, the commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, had provided for search-and-rescue operations after the battle against Kurita's force.

If *Devotion to Duty* has a flaw, it is that Wukovits has written what might be termed a "military biography." We learn a great deal about Sprague the warrior but much less about Sprague the man, particularly Sprague the family man. Part of the lack of information may be due to Sprague's modesty and reticence, but one wonders if there is not more to know about the personal life of a man who was the brother-in-law of F. Scott Fitzgerald (having married the novelist's younger sister Annabel in 1925). Wukovits claims that Fitzgerald held Sprague in high regard, citing as evidence a 1940 letter in which the novelist speculated "whether Clifton Sprague has become a great power in the Navy."

Beyond that point there are only a few nits. Wukovits refers to Halsey as "Bull" without explaining that his nickname (like that of Major General Joseph Hooker in the Civil War, "Fighting Joe") had been bestowed on him by journalists and was not used by the man himself or his friends. The author's language is occasionally awkward: he refers at least twice to an electrically heated flying suit as being heated "electronically," and he sometimes splits an infinitive. The maps in this book, although useful, could be clearer and certainly more attractive. In contrast, the selection of photographs is excellent.

On the whole, Wukovits has produced a thoroughly researched, well

written book that will be of interest to the naval history expert, as well as to the general reader. One cannot finish *Devotion to Duty* without thinking that Clifton Sprague was indeed the sort of naval officer for whom his men, as one of them said to him, "would have gone to hell and back twice."

TIMOTHY J. LOCKHART
Commander, U.S. Navy

Galantin, I. J. *Submarine Admiral*. Chicago, Ill.: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1995. 376pp. \$26.95

Submarine Admiral, by Admiral I. J. Galantin, U.S. Navy (Retired), combines elements of memoir, submarine history, and international diplomacy to trace the author's distinguished career as a submariner, and the development of the U.S. submarine force.

Galantin's naval service put him in position to participate in some of the most important operations and initiatives in U.S. submarine history. A graduate of the Naval Academy class of 1933, Galantin completed submarine school in 1936 and seasoned himself for four years on the unwieldy submarine minelayer USS *Argonaut* (SS 166). During World War II he commanded USS *Halibut* (SS 232). *Take Her Deep!*, his previous book, was a vigorous, highly readable account of his successful war patrols, for which he earned the Navy Cross and three Silver Stars.

In the postwar era, Galantin advanced steadily through various submarine and surface commands. From 1955 to 1957 he served as the head of the submarine warfare branch when the bil-

let was the senior submarine-focused position in the Chief of Naval Operations staff (OpNav), responsible for all submarine operational matters and coordination of all submarine plans and programs. He later relieved Rear Admiral William F. "Red" Raborn, Jr., and directed the Special Projects Office from 1962 to 1965. Galantin retired in 1970 with four-star rank.

The author held the OpNav job at the beginning of the nuclear submarine era, when USS *Nautilus* was setting records and the Navy was building both diesel and nuclear boats, and debating the merits of each. He contributed significantly to decisions involving submarine size, speed, and depth capabilities, and his keen analysis of the trade-offs each type required reflects a high intellect and significant operational experience. Galantin argued early and logically for increased antisubmarine warfare capabilities in U.S. submarines, and for a nuclear-powered submarine capable of launching nuclear ballistic missiles.

As director of the Special Projects Office, Galantin presided over the frenetic buildup of the strategic deterrent force to forty-one SSBNs and the sharing of Polaris and SSBN technology with the United Kingdom. He accompanied President John Kennedy to Florida in November 1963, to witness the launch of a Polaris missile from USS *Andrew Jackson* (SSBN 619).

In both his OpNav billet and as head of Special Projects Galantin contended with the authoritarian control and political influence of Hyman G. Rickover. Galantin's trenchant but gentlemanly analysis, derived directly from personal

158 Naval War College Review

experience, of the costs and benefits of the Rickover style on the submarine force and the Navy is in itself enough to make his book valuable reading.

Galantin pursues two themes in *Submarine Admiral*. The first is the need for accountability, seared into his psyche by the failures of the exploder in the World War II Mark 14 torpedo. As a survivor of war patrols in the Pacific, Galantin writes with intensity and authority about the systemic and personal failures that permitted the exploder to be designed, tested, and approved by the same organization. He never forgot that lesson. His second theme is the importance of antisubmarine warfare as a continuing challenge to both the subsurface and surface Navy.

Galantin writes with a fluid and readable style, easily gathering together disparate concepts and facts into sentences and paragraphs that summarize with crispness and efficiency. He includes anecdotes of his meetings with many remarkable people, such as Lord Louis Mountbatten, Robert McNamara, and Arleigh Burke.

In his preface, he modestly describes the book as an "anecdotal account." Nevertheless, it shows extensive research, and rarely will the reader encounter a history that attains such great accuracy in even the small facts. Galantin works hard to set his story in context, to the point that it is sometimes difficult to separate what he observed firsthand from what he learned after the fact or from his own research. A greater use of footnotes and the inclusion of a bibliography (there is none) would have helped make these distinctions, and they would

have guided readers interested in learning more about particular topics.

Readers with little knowledge of the submarine force will find *Submarine Admiral* a useful introduction to the history of the undersea service. Readers with a submarine background will encounter much that is familiar, now illuminated by the observations of a submariner who was there when the decisions were made.

WILLIAM GALVANI
Director, Naval Undersea Museum

Loveland, Anne C. *American Evangelicals and the U.S. Military, 1942–1993*. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana

State Univ. Press, 1997. 356pp \$55

One of the significant demographic changes in the U.S. military since World War II has been the tremendous increase in the presence of Protestant evangelicals throughout the ranks. Loveland's volume provides a thorough history and analysis of the rise of evangelicals within the military and of the work of nondenominational organizations providing ministries to service members. The religious changes within the military have paralleled those of American culture at large. While in the past few decades there has been a steady decline in "mainline denominations," there has been enormous growth in denominations and groups that are more conservative theologically.

Since the Vietnam War the evangelistic efforts and desires of evangelicals for numerical and spiritual growth within the military were accompanied by a growing influence in national

security policy. Evangelicals have generally maintained a pro-defense and pro-military stance, which enabled them to move from the fringes of the chaplaincy and religious life within the services to a much more prominent and influential role. The careers of such senior officers as generals William K. Harrison, Harold K. Johnson, Ralph E. Haines, and John A. Wickham demonstrate the influence of personal religious convictions upon leadership, policies, and programs. Evangelical groups like the National Association of Evangelicals, the Navigators, and the Officers' Christian Fellowship have played a major role in assisting evangelical chaplains and others working within the military for a greater perspective and presence. As a result of these efforts "the success of the evangelicals' campaign within the armed forces matched their growing presence and political influence in American society as a whole."

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s evangelicals gained access to the federal government and public recognition, but their relationship with the military was filled with tension. The high percentage of military leaders coming from the mainline Protestant denominations like the Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Lutherans, and Congregationalists, as well as differing theological perspectives among evangelicals, created misperceptions and generated resentment, suspicion, and conflict. Much of it centered on chapel services, religious curricular resources, and constitutional concerns regarding religious freedom violations. In the late 1960s a concerted effort by evangelicals to improve their relationship with the military leadership, and the general

evangelical support of the war effort in Vietnam, opened a new era of military growth for them. Additionally, during the last three decades a shifting religious composition within the military has enhanced the evangelical presence, which has been felt throughout the ranks.

Evangelicals have participated in the debates regarding selective service, national security policy, nuclear arms, the Korean War, the Cold War, the Vietnam War, homosexuals in the military, religious pluralism, and constitutional issues relating to the chaplaincy. In each of these issues the evangelical voice was raised, and its influence increased.

Loveland's volume is thus more than simply a religious history relating to the military. It is a thorough analysis of one aspect of the religious and cultural changes that have occurred in the military in the last fifty years.

Anne Loveland teaches American history at Louisiana State University and has authored several works on American cultural and social history. Her volume is thoroughly documented and well researched. It should reach an audience far greater than the evangelicals in the military, since it affords readers an in-depth case study on the course and dynamics of the organizational influence of ideological groups. For the military leader, the volume offers a history and examination of the religious character of a significant and growing proportion of the armed forces. Over the last half century the evangelicals' mission to the military and their desire and ability to influence national policy have developed along parallel lines. This volume clearly demonstrates that religion in the military is a viable and potent

160 Naval War College Review

force to be understood off the battlefield as well as on it.

TIMOTHY J. DEMY
Commander, U.S. Navy, Chaplain Corps

Coye, Beth F. *My Navy Too*. Ashland, Ore.: Cedar Hollow Press, 1997. 415pp. \$16.95

When assessing how the U.S. Navy, or any other branch of the armed services, should respond to changes in society at large, it is important to keep in mind that the U.S. military exists not simply to defend a piece of geography—it also exists to defend a way of life. If defense of the homeland were its sole purpose, its leadership could argue plausibly that it should be composed of single, white, straight, Protestant males. Adding married people, blacks, gays, Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and women to the force certainly makes it more difficult and challenging to develop unit cohesion and maintain readiness, at least in the short run. Yet it cannot be otherwise, because American society, from its inception, has urged its citizens to “be all that they can be.”

In her excellent and timely autobiographical novel *My Navy Too*, Commander Beth Coye, U.S. Navy (Retired), describes how the leading character, Tucker Fairfield, the daughter of an admiral and a Wellesley graduate, deals with the Navy’s prejudices against women and homosexuals as she moves from Office Candidate School at Newport, Rhode Island, in 1960 to her retirement as a commander in 1980. But this novel is more than just a diatribe against “wrong-headed” regulations

and biased male-officer attitudes against women and homosexuals. It relives, through the eyes of Fairfield and her colleagues, the events of the 1960s and 1970s that shaped the contemporary American political system: for example, the assassinations of President John Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Robert Kennedy, as well as the tragedy of Vietnam. Moreover, it describes how the offspring of an admiral (even a woman) has access to people in the Navy hierarchy that can help smooth over the rough spots in career assignments. Finally, Coye deals realistically with the dilemmas faced by most career military officers as they move up in the ranks—such as the conflict between loyalty to one’s principles and loyalty to “Big Daddy Navy,” and the needs of the Navy versus one’s own personal needs.

Coye tells her story through journal entries, correspondence with her parents, her admiral mentor, her college roommate, her first (and only) male lover, and her female partner. The book was written with the assistance of Vice Admiral Duke Bayne, U.S. Navy (Retired); Navy submarine commander Captain Jim Bush (Retired); his wife, Dr. Patricia Bush; social worker Kitty Clark; and Lieutenant Commander Sandra Snodderly, U.S. Navy (Retired). These five individuals correspond roughly to Fairfield’s pen pals in the book.

This novel is must reading for anyone interested in understanding the struggle that women have had over the last thirty years in attaining some measure of equality in the Navy, as well as the difficulties that patriotic gay men

to serve their country. All of those “wrong-headed” military leaders, bureaucrats, and politicians, who are trying to roll back the gains that women have made and to prevent openly gay men and lesbians from serving their country, would also do well to walk in Tucker Fairfield’s shoes. Maybe then they would realize that for women and gays, as for Beth Coye, it is “my [tbeir] navy too.”

Reviewer’s note: I first met Beth Coye about twenty-five years ago at the Naval

War College. I considered her then, as I do today, one of the finest naval officers I have ever known.

LAWRENCE J. KORB
The Brookings Institution
Washington, D.C.

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