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bind themselves, as among themselves, not to use the submarine for the destruction of commerce. Quite apart from any attempt the committee might desire to make to change international law, such a proposition was entirely within the competency of the powers here represented. So far as the American delegates were concerned, there was no doubt as to the approval of the policy. It was really a practical application of existing rules, as it was only in exceptional cases that submarines could operate successfully against commerce and the existence of the exceptional cases constituted an invitation and temptation to violation of the law. On this point it was hoped agreement could be reached. The two propositions, while distinct, could be set forth in one declaration or in separate declarations. The chairman desired to know whether such discussion should take place then or should be postponed until the following day.

Mr. Balfour said that the chairman had pointed out that the discussion had brought two propositions before us: First, the change in international law proposed in Article II of Mr. Root's resolutions, and second, the addition which he himself had suggested in that resolution whereby the powers represented on this committee would bind themselves immediately to accept and act upon the new policy as between themselves. He thought it would assist the consideration of this question if he were to give the exact words in which his own proposal should be formulated. He would amend the last part of Article II so as to read as follows:

"They declare their assent to such prohibition and they agree to be bound forthwith thereby as between themselves, and they invite all other nations to adhere to the present agreement."

The subcommittee for drafting a resolution regarding submarines was made up as follows: United States, Mr. Root; British Empire, Sir Auckland Geddes; France, Vice Admiral de Bon, Mr. Kammerer; Italy, Signor Ricci; Japan, Mr. Hanihara.

The meeting then adjourned until 11 o'clock a.m., December 30, 1921.

THIRTEENTH MEETING—FRIDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1921, 11 A. M.

PRESENT.

United States.—Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark.

British Empire.—Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India).
Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Domville, Mr. Flint, Mr. Malkin, Mr. Mousley.

France.—Mr. Sarrut, Vice-Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend’hal, Mr. Ponsot.

Italy.—Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice-Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli.

Japan.—Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi.

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Paul and Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon, interpreters.

1. The thirteenth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American Union Building, on Friday, December 30, 1921, at 11 a. m.

2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, (for Australia) Senator Pearce, (for New Zealand) Sir John Salmond, (for India) Mr. Sastri; for France, Mr. Serraut, Vice Admiral de Bon; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton; for Japan, Admiral Baron Kato, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda.

3. Secretaries and technical advisers present included the following: For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Domville, Mr. Flint, Mr. Malkin, Mr. Mousley; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend’hal, Mr. Ponsot; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli; for Japan, Mr. Ichihashi. The Secretary General of the conference, assisted by Mr. Paul and Mr. Wilson, was present. Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon (interpreters) were also present.

4. The Chairman, Mr. Hughes, said that the committee had under consideration the second resolution which had been proposed and which had for its object the elimination of the submarine as a commerce destroyer. There were two phases of the resolution under the amendment proposed by Mr. Balfour: The one was the proposition to amend the existing rules of war so as to provide that submarines should not be permitted to act as commerce destroyers, and the other was that the five Governments here represented should not only recommend the adoption of the new rules to which he had referred, but should at once agree among themselves that they would observe such rules.

The Chairman asked whether the committee desired time to continue the discussion of this proposition.
Senator Schanzer said that he did not wish in any way to oppose the continuation of the discussion on the second resolution proposed by Mr. Root; but, as he had said the previous day, the Italian delegation had had to communicate with its Government. Its instructions had not yet been received. Of course, he wished to make it plain that the Italian delegation had no objection to the continuation of the debate if the other delegates so wished.

Mr. Sarraut said that he had no objection to the discussion proceeding, but he wished to remark that as yet he had been unable to receive instructions from his Government. It would be an unprofitable discussion, he thought, unless all the delegates were provided with instructions from their Governments and could speak with authority.

The Chairman remarked that it would certainly be desirable that the discussion be continued at a time when the French and Italian delegates were in a position to state with definiteness the attitude of their Governments in regard to the subjects presented for discussion and he was sure that the members of the committee had no desire in any way to proceed with the discussion at such time or in such manner as would seem to make it necessary to have questions presented and debated which their colleagues were not really in a position to discuss. But, of course, if there were any views which any of the delegates desired to present, there was opportunity to do so.

Lord Lee said that he quite appreciated the position in which the committee stood in the absence of complete instructions to two of the most important delegations here. He could not help feeling, that in the minds of the French delegation and Government, there existed some misunderstanding as to the attitude of the British Government in regard to submarines which it was desirable to clear up before the French Government committed itself in regard to the second resolution. He could not help feeling that here was a unique opportunity for the French delegation and Government to reassure the British Admiralty and public opinion in regard to this matter, of which he hoped they would avail themselves. British apprehension in regard to the use of submarines was deep founded and, as the events of the war had shown, well founded. He had no desire to take advantage of this occasion to reopen the question of the tonnage of submarines to be allotted to the different Powers. That would not be in order in discussing the present resolution. What the committee was considering was the uses to which submarines might be put. While the late war showed that rules of war were of little protective value when a nation was in desperate straits, at the same time these resolutions proposed by Mr. Root would, in the view of the British delegation, be of immense value as a deterrent. They would represent the most civilized opinion of the world,
and any country who broke them would be morally outlawing itself and running in an intensified form the risk which Germany ran in bringing down upon her head the active hostility of other civilized Powers. But he wanted to explain to his French friends, if he might, why it was that the British delegation had these special apprehensions which had been expressed so forcibly in connection with France.

Lord Lee went on to say that of course there was no one in the British delegation, or, indeed, among any of his fellow countrymen, who had not the highest esteem and admiration both for Mr. Sarraut and Admiral de Bon. Mr. Sarraut was obviously not only sincere in everything that he said, but the whole spirit of his remarks breathed statesmanship, moderation, and humanity. As to Admiral de Bon, if he would allow Lord Lee to say so in his presence, everyone regarded him—at any rate those at the Admiralty who knew his distinguished record—as the very embodiment of French chivalry and sea honor and, as Lord Lee believed had been said before, he did not think there was any officer in the British fleet who would not be proud to serve under his orders if the occasion arose. But the difficulty was (and this was a point that the British Admiralty and the British naval staff had to face): They were not clear as to the views of the French naval staff on the matter of the utilization of submarines in time of war. It was true that the views expressed by experts did not always by any means determine the action of governments; if they did, no doubt every country would some day be placed in the position which the late Lord Salisbury once described when he said, "If we listened to the experts we should have to put a garrison in the moon to protect it against an invasion from Mars." But the views of naval staffs, of the experts, were of importance unless and until they were disavowed by the governments which they served.

Mr. Briand quoted the other day in his memorable speech the atrocious sentiments expressed by Gen. Ludendorff and by Von Moltke, sentiments which still constituted in his view a menace to France and one which it was essential that France should guard herself against. It was, therefore, he hoped, not improper nor in any sense provocative if he had to call attention to the kind of statement, the kind of suggestion of policy, which was openly made in high and responsible quarters of the French naval general staff in connection with the use of submarines. If, as he believed, they did not represent the views of the French Government; if, as he hoped and believed, they would be at once repudiated, and in an effective manner, then possibly British apprehensions and the attitude which Britain was compelled to adopt with regard to the use of submarines in war might be very
largely modified. He felt bound to give chapter and verse to illustrate the anxiety that was felt in regard to this matter. There was published quite recently in the "Révue Maritime," a technical and official publication, published in January, 1920, under the direction of the French naval general staff, a series of articles now incorporated, he believed, in "Synthèse de la guerre sous-marine" by Captaine de Frégate Castex, who at that time was chief of one of the important bureaus of the French naval staff; who was now Chief of Staff of the Admiral of the second division in the Mediterranean, and who had just been designated as principal lecturer to the senior officers' course for the next year. Therefore, he was not quoting some retired naval officer writing from his club; all countries suffered from such gentlemen who propounded extraordinary theories. He was speaking now of a responsible officer of the French naval staff— in a high position, who wrote in particular an article on "Piracy," in which, after some preliminary observations destined to throw ridicule on those who criticized the German methods in the late war and to treat them with great contempt, he proceeded to say this:

"In the first place, before throwing stones at the Germans, we should have recalled that this war of the torpedo was, like so many other novelties of our planet, the application of an idea which in its origin was essentially French."

Then he quoted in support of his view the doctrine which had been laid down some years ago by Admiral Aube, who was a very distinguished and celebrated French minister of marine, who had used the following words when speaking of the use of the torpedo from a torpedo boat (Capt. Castex went on to point out that they were equally applicable to the submarine to-day):

"Will the torpedo boat tell the captain of the liner that it is there, that it is lying in wait for him, that it can sink him, and in consequence take him prisoner? In one word, will it seize its prize by platonic methods? On the contrary, at an appropriate distance, and unseen, the torpedo boat will follow the liner which it marks out for its victim. In the dead of night, quietly, silently, it will send to the abyss, the liner, cargo, passengers, and crew; then with a mind not only serene, but fully satisfied with the results achieved, the captain of the torpedo boat will continue his cruise."

Capt. Castex continued:

"The Germans, as is their wont, have only appropriated in this case the invention of others. The young French school no doubt only had in mind the torpedo boat as such, but, if the effect of the torpedo is independent of the tube which launches it, it will be agreed that the German submarine war had its germ in the observations quoted above. But approaching the question from a higher standpoint than that of mere inquiry as to who conceived
BRITISH COMMENT.

this new form of warfare, it must be recognized that the Germans were absolutely justified in resorting to it."

Capt. Castex said, indeed, that to "neglect to do so would have been to commit a great blunder." Further:

"It is thus that resolute belligerents have acted throughout the course of history when people have been engaged in desperate conflict."

Further:

"To sum up, one can see nothing in the attitude of the Germans which, militarily speaking, is not absolutely correct. The failure to give notice before torpedoing has raised a storm of protest, but it is not so inadmissible as at first sight appears."

There were many other passages, Lord Lee continued, of a similar description, and interspersed among them was the laying down of a doctrine with regard to the value of submarines, to which the British Delegation heartily subscribed and to which it had shown its adherence in the debates which had preceded this:

"The submarine is a mediocre torpedo boat; that is to say, it has only very limited chances of damaging by means of a torpedo a ship enjoying, like itself, full liberty of movement on the broad sea, as is proved by the relative immunity enjoyed by big warships even in the most dangerous zones and at times when submarines were swarming around. With regard to submarines, the English seem to have an opinion very similar to that which we entertain."

There was much more of the same kind, but Capt. Castex concluded the first section of his article by quoting these words.

"After many centuries of effort, thanks to the ingenuity of man, the instrument, the system, the martingale is at hand which will overthrow for good and all the naval power of England."

Lord Lee said he had drawn attention to these passages because, as he had said, they were the utterances of a responsible member of the French naval staff who at the time of writing was in a high position and was the actual head of a bureau. These things were known to the British naval staff, of course; indeed, they were published to the world under the authority of the French naval staff. Now this officer, who was appointed principal lecturer to the Senior Officers' Course, would, no doubt, unless a change of policy took place, be pouring what the British delegation regarded as this infamy and this poison into the ears of the serving officers of the French Navy. That was the justification for what he could only describe as the apprehensions and even bitterness that the British delegation must feel in the thought that under any conceivable circumstances their present allies, their late comrades in arms in the greatest war the world had ever known, should contemplate the possibility of warfare of that kind. It seemed to him, now that these apprehensions had been expressed, that the way was open for the French delegation and the French Government, as he
fervently trusted they would, to disavow and repudiate these things. He suggested respectfully that there was only one way in which that could effectively be done, and that was by, the adoption of these resolutions which had been moved by Mr. Root, and particularly No. 2, with the amendment suggested by Mr. Balfour, attached to it.

The French had told the committee here again and again that they only required submarines for purposes of defense, particularly for the defense of their colonial possessions, their home ports, and their lines of communication. There had been differences of opinion as to the utility of submarines for these purposes, but now, it seemed to Lord Lee, there was an opportunity of proving to the world that they meant what they said in regard to this, and that they were not prepared under any circumstances to consider the use of submarines in the manner in which the Germans used them in the war, which a member of their general staff had claimed as their own and as being in every way legitimate and desirable. If that repudiation took place, in the only form in which it could be effective, then the position, so far as the British people were concerned, would be very largely changed; the feeling they had of apprehension and even of bitterness would be removed, because he was sure his French friends would believe him when he said this, that they took no pleasure in any kind of recrimination, public or private; they regarded it as a offense and a reproach to the world that such a thing should ever take place between them. But here was a situation where the very existence of Britain, its life as a nation, might be at stake, and now was the chance of the conference, and perhaps the only chance, of making its appeal to the world to remove the horrors which were so vivid in the minds of everyone. If this resolution as amended by Mr. Balfour were accepted by every nation around this table, as applying to themselves and their conduct in any future wars as between themselves, then, he thought he might say, that France would have regained much of the ground which he believed had been lost between them, largely through a misunderstanding, a genuine misunderstanding in their hearts. If that were done all her friends, among whom he was proud to count himself one, would unfeignedly rejoice.

Admiral de Bon said, after thanking Lord Lee from the bottom of his heart for the flattering expressions used by him in regard to Admiral de Bon, he wished to declare that he considered it a great good happiness and a great honor in his life to have collaborated during several years, especially through the most trying hours of the war, with his friends of the British Admiralty, among whom he had made deep and lasting friendships which would endure as long as he lived.
EXPLANATION GIVEN.

He had been deeply gratified by Lord Lee's statement. Since the beginning of the discussion he had been unable to comprehend the misunderstanding which seemed to have arisen between them, because—he stated it openly and declared it most emphatically—there was nothing more foreign to the minds of the French than the idea of attacking a friend. It was not even conceivable to them. Their only regret was that this misunderstanding had lasted so long and that they had not known that it was based on article like that written by Capt. Castex.

He was, it was true, an officer who belonged to the general staff, but who was attached to a literary section. He was above all a man of letters. His article had been published in the Revue Maritime, which was, to a certain extent, an organ recognized by the French Navy, but on its title page it bore a statement to the effect that the French Admiralty and general staff declined to assume any responsibility whatever as regards the utterances contained in the articles, which responsibility rested wholly with the authors of the articles. Each writer was free to express his own opinions, but he did so at his own risk.

The charge should be laid at the door of the man who wrote that article, and to him only. The article in no way represented, thank heaven, the views of the French Navy.

Capt. Castex brought up an old argument regarding the torpedo boat. Admiral de Bon had told the committee only the other day, in regard to the submarine, that once more the same stages of discussion were being gone through which marked the appearance of the torpedo boat. There had been no instance in history when the appearance of a new weapon had not unleashed a sort of fanaticism in the ranks of the partisans; there were always extremists who wished to impose their ideas, and made fantastic statements to that end. But in the end common sense always stepped in and public opinion kept the ultimate judgment within reasonable limits.

At the time when frantic enthusiasts believed that torpedo boats were the noblest of inventions, abominable things appeared in print which had no affect on actual practice or on the doctrines adopted by the various Governments with regard to the use of torpedo boats. He could find no better way of condemning the article in question.

The author of that article had written what the French delegation considered to be a monstrosity. The French delegation had repeatedly stated that it unreservedly condemned the practices of the German submarines during the late war and that it desired that a declaration strongly condemning them should issue from the conference and be spread over the entire world.

He begged Lord Lee to believe that the French Navy had never harbored any idea of using methods of war practiced by the Ger-
man submarines (for which they felt only horror) against the
British Empire, nor against any other country whatever.

He maintained that the honor of the French general staff and
of the French Navy, which had a record of centuries of struggle
without a single stain on their escutcheon—could not be sullied by
the article in question. This article was the work of an officer
who was a man of letters rather than a sailor; and Admiral de
Bon formally repudiated it in the name of the French Navy.

Mr. Sarraut said that although he must await the instructions
of his Government with regard to certain points in the resolutions
proposed by Mr. Root, he had no need of any instructions to asso-
ciate his sentiments with those of Admiral de Bon, which he
solemnly confirmed as head of the French delegation, or to offer
the French Government’s formal repudiation of those methods of
warfare which had just been mentioned.

He hoped that these explanations—he thanked Lord Lee for
having given him the opportunity to make them—would be of
such a character as to dispel for all time the misunderstanding
which, to his profound regret; had arisen between them—a mis-
understanding of which he did not comprehend the reason or
the nature. He hoped and believed, moreover, that all the
delegates might draw a lesson of mutual confidence from this
incident which would permit them in future to avoid misunder-
standings of this sort by forming the habit of frank and fore-
handed explanations. The misunderstanding which had arisen
might easily have been avoided, even before it was thought of,
by a direct and friendly conversation in which the French delega-
tion would have been glad to take part had the opportunity been
offered them. In future, as far as they were concerned, they
would continue to have the same sincere desire to explain their
point of view before public opinion had been molded under such
circumstances as had been seen.

Lord Lee had uttered a word with which he (Mr. Sarraut)
would not reproach him, for he did not wish to use the word
“reproach” in speaking of friends. He had spoken of the
ground which had been lost by France since these deliberations
commenced. This phrase was well known to the French delega-
tion; they had heard it throughout the war; there were days
when France lost ground or positions which nevertheless she
contrived to regain immediately. He was well aware that every
day in the press the French delegation witnessed a campaign of
bitter criticism launched against their country, against the
motives of France, to the end that she might be made to appear
under an aggressive guise of imperialism and militarism. That
very morning there was an odious caricature representing France
trying on the spiked helmet of Prussia. The French delegation
had borne these attacks calmly and with serenity, not wishing
to embitter the discussion by replying to them. Strong in their right and in their loyalty, they had remained silent in spite of the violent prejudice which this campaign was arousing against them. There were times, Mr. Sarraut said, when one must suffer for one's friends; true friendship was measured by the extent of the sacrifices suffered in its name; but, just as the French delegation had never dreamed of holding their British friends responsible for these cruel attacks, so the British delegation should not dream of thinking that that organization which France had created for her national defense, in the name of the right of French sovereignty, and for the protection of vital interests with which the French were better acquainted than any one else, could possibly be directed against friends.

If each and every day the members of the French delegation had to continue to defend themselves against such suspicions; if, when they had come here for the purpose of working for the proposed peace by means of the reduction of armaments, they must constantly see the specter of war dangled before them and be made aware of an undercurrent of thought concerning mutual threats or of the idea that is attributed to them of plans of aggression against those who had mingled their blood with that of the French soldiers on all the battle fields of the greatest war the world has known; then indeed they would be impatient to see the end of a conference which had brought them the bitterness of such a disappointment. They were impatient to see a clearing of the atmosphere and the disappearance of all unwholesome insinuations. The French people had been given to understand (and in what terms!) that even before reconstituting their defensive forces, and before thinking of again fortifying their country against renewed devastation, they would do well to pay their debts. They felt no shame for those debts, nor did they forget them; they regarded them with pride as the wounded man his scars.

There were things more painful to the French people than these; the lack of confidence in their gratitude and affection toward their great ally. Mr. Sarraut said that he could attest its sincerity and with very deep emotion. He had had the honor to be a member of the cabinet at the moment when the war of 1914 was declared against them; and never without profound emotion did he recall the feeling of exaltation that he experienced when, in ministerial council, he learned that the English Army which the Emperor of Germany had called the "contemptible little army," and which was to become the great and powerful British Army, had just aligned itself resolutely at the side of France in the vast conflict which was looming up. He would never forget that hour; it was eternally graven on his heart;
and it had always dominated his thought. Truly there had been enough of these misunderstandings; they must be done away with! Mr. Sarraut, for his part, hoped for it with all his heart! Mutual confidence free of all reserve must again prevail among the nations represented at the conference. In this respect the French Government had given and was ready to give every guaranty; its word indeed should suffice. Mr. Sarraut concluded by saying that if he did not ask to pursue the discussion of the second resolution, and to formulate the conclusions which as all present must appreciate rose to his lips, it was in order that the expression of his feelings might have not only the authority of the head of the French delegation but might be clothed with all the moral force that belonged to the decisions of the French Government.

Mr. Hanihara said that so far as the Japanese delegation itself was concerned no objection was seen to the adoption of Article II of the proposed resolution as amended by Mr. Balfour. However, as a matter of formality and procedure, they were required to submit to their Government the precise text of it, and ask for instructions thereon before they could give formal assent to it. The chairman asked whether anyone desired to speak further upon this matter at that time. As the representatives of three of the Governments were not in a position at the moment to speak under definite instructions with respect to this article, it seemed desirable that the discussion should be postponed. The committee would then come to the third resolution; but anticipating what would probably be said with regard to it, the chairman suggested that the same course be adopted, and that both these resolutions (which had a relation to each other) should go over for further discussion until such time as the chairman was advised by the delegations that they had received instructions and were ready to proceed.

Senator Pearce said that there was one point involved in Article III which might possibly require amendment, and, if so, he thought it might be advisable to embody this amendment at once. He referred to the fact that the declaration included persons in service of any of the powers “adopting these rules.” If the resolution were adopted in its present form, it would mean that whilst the officers of the nations which adhered to these articles would be liable to the penalty under Article III, the officers of nations not adhering would not be so liable. He thought, however, that an amendment should be made so that the rules might become part of international law, with general application, in order to be effective.

Mr. Root said that the point to which Senator Pearce had referred was very important and very interesting. The draft limited its operations to those powers which had adopted the
rules; but the question whether it should be so limited or should extend to other powers was a question open to discussion, upon which different views might be taken. That question was in the proposition, and as it seemed to be understood that there was not to be a discussion upon the subject at the time, he would content himself with an acknowledgment to Senator Pearce of the importance and interest of the suggestion which he had raised.

The chairman said that it seemed quite clear that the committee should not proceed with the discussion of these resolutions in parts when several of the delegations were not in position to discuss them under appropriate instructions. As had been said, the point which had been raised by Senator Pearce was one which could not very well be discussed without bringing into the discussion the general bearing of the resolution, its import, the policy involved in it, and a number of questions which would have relation to the particular point raised. With the committee's permission he would assume that the discussion of both the second and the third resolutions should be postponed until the chair was advised that the delegations had heard from their Governments and were ready to proceed with the discussion; in the meantime, of course, any amendments which occurred to any of the delegates for the purpose of clarification or modification could be brought to the attention of Mr. Root or of the chair, so that they might be circulated, if desired, among the delegations and might be taken under advisement pending full explication and consideration at the time when the discussion was resumed.

With the committee's permission, therefore, the resolution which had been proposed the other day, and the discussion of which had been postponed with respect to the limitation of the tonnage of individual ships of war, other than capital ships or aircraft carriers, would be taken up. That resolution, as proposed and as amended, was now presented as follows:

"No ship of war other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier hereafter built shall exceed a total tonnage displacement of 10,000 tons, and no guns shall be carried by any such ship other than a capital ship with a caliber in excess of 8 inches."

The chairman said that the committee would recall that general agreement had been expressed with the provision of the resolution as to the limitation of armament in the case of ships of war other than capital ships or aircraft carriers, i. e., that no guns should be carried with a caliber in excess of 8 inches.

There were reservations, however, with respect to the limitation on total tonnage, i. e., the suggested limitation of a total tonnage displacement of 10,000 tons. The chairman asked if the committee would take up the discussion of this question.

Baron Kato said that on behalf of the Japanese delegation he accepted the proposal to limit the tonnage of light cruisers to
10,000 and the caliber of guns carried by such ships not to exceed 8 inches. He asked, however, that he be permitted to make a suggestion while he was on his feet. The question of large merchant ships with high speed should be considered according to the principle enunciated in paragraph 30 of the original American plan. Unless this question were settled, he feared that the limitation put upon light cruisers would remain meaningless.

The chairman said, with reference to the last suggestion of Baron Kato, that he ought to say that the question of merchant ships and appropriate regulations with regard to their use or to the armaments applied upon them, to the end that they should not be used to contravene or make futile the limitations upon which the committee might be able to agree, would be brought up later for discussion. That was a very important matter.

With respect to the range of application of the present resolution, he felt bound to call the attention of the committee to the fact that originally it had been proposed to refer to auxiliary cruisers, but that at the suggestion of Lord Lee that resolution had been amended to read as follows: "No ship of war other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier"; he assumed that the limitation therein expressed referred to every ship of war other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier, of every sort built hereafter.

There were three exceptions to the application with respect to tonnage displacement and armament, and those three exceptions were capital ships, aircraft carriers, and ships now existing. These were the three exceptions. This did not apply to any ship existing, but it did apply to every ship of war hereafter built which did not come within the category of capital ship or aircraft carrier. It was important that that be understood before it was acted upon.

If he had interpreted the amended resolution correctly, he was inclined to the view that its meaning would be clearer if there were some change in the arrangement of the words, and he suggested the following:

"No ship of war hereafter built, other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier, shall exceed a total tonnage displacement of 10,000 tons, and no gun shall be carried by any ship of war hereafter, other than a capital ship, with a caliber in excess of 8 inches."

The chairman then asked whether the committee should proceed to a discussion of this question.

Admiral Acton accepted for the Italian delegation the proposal just read by the chairman.

The chairman said that the situation was that all the powers present had accepted the resolution with the exception of the French delegation, which had not as yet received definite instruc-
tions upon the point. The matter would therefore be delayed until he was notified that such instructions had been received.

The meeting was then adjourned until 3 p. m. December 30, 1921.

FOURTEENTH MEETING—FRIDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1921, 3 P. M.

PRESENT.

United States.—Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark.

British Empire.—Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Knowles.

France.—Mr. Sarraut, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend’hal.

Italy.—Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano.

Japan.—Admiral Baron Kato, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi.

The Secretary General. Assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Pierrepont, Mr. Camerlynck, interpreter.

1. The Fourteenth Meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Armament was held in the Columbus Room, Pan American Union Building, on Friday afternoon, December 30, 1921, at 3 o'clock.

2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (of Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India); for France, Mr. Sarraut, Vice Admiral de Bon; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton; for Japan, Admiral Baron Kato, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda.

3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were present: For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Knowles; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend’hal; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano; for Japan, Mr. Ichihashi.

The secretary general of the conference, assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Pierrepont, was present. Mr. Camerlynck (interpreter) was also present.