Mr. Sarraut said that before adjourning he wished to refer to one more matter—the delegates were well aware that all were subject to the solicitations of the press in the very natural desire of these gentlemen to be fully informed with respect to the news of the conference. The French delegation deemed it their duty to revise the somewhat copious report of the last sessions before publishing the same. He then asked whether the secretary general would not be the proper person to charge with transmitting the texts which the delegations might desire to have published.

The chairman said that an important distinction must be observed between what was stated outside to newspaper men and that which concerned the communiqué. The former lay in the discretion of the delegates; the latter was an official statement, an abstract of what had passed, subject to the discretion of the committee. In order that each delegation might be correctly represented, he assumed that the secretary general arranged for a revision of their remarks in order that the statements of their official communiqué might be deemed accurate. This seemed to be entirely in accord with Mr. Sarraut’s desire.

The other delegations formally agreed to the above.

The chairman added that it was not his intention to confine to the secretary general the statements to be given out. The delegations were free to give out what they wished privately, but the official statements issued by the secretary general must above all assure accuracy and completeness, with the aid of the secretaries of the various delegations. The chairman asked for comments upon the above, but no remarks were made.

The meeting then adjourned until Tuesday, December 27, 1921, at 11 a.m.

NINTH MEETING—WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1921, 11 A.M.

PRESENT.

United States.—Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Colonel Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark.

British Empire.—Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domville, Mr. Knowles.

France.—Mr. Sarraut, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend’hal, Mr. Ponsot.

Italy.—Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco.
Japan.—Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi.

The secretary general. Assisted by Mr. Pierrepont, Mr. Osborne, and Mr. Paul.

Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon, interpreters.

1. The ninth meeting of the Committee on the Limitation of Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American Union Building on Wednesday, December 28, 1921, at 11 a.m.

2. There were present: Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz (for the United States); Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield (for the British Empire); Sir Robert Borden (for Canada); Senator Pearce (for Australia); Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand); Mr. Sastri (for India); Mr. Sarraut, Vice Admiral de Bon (for France); Senator Schanzler, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton (for Italy); Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda (for Japan).

3. Secretaries and advisers present included: Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark (for the United States); Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domville, Mr. Knowles (for the British Empire); Mr. Kamerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Ponsot (for France); Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco (for Italy); Mr. Ichihashi (for Japan).

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Pierrepont, Mr. Osborne, and Mr. Paul, was present. Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon (interpreters) were also present.

4. The chairman (Mr. Hughes) announced that the committee was ready to continue the discussion with respect to submarines.

Mr. Sarraut, on behalf of the French delegation, read the following statement:

“At the last meeting of the committee, and as the outcome of the examination of the submarine question, a proposal was made to fix for each of the nations represented in the conference the submarine tonnage that they might possess. Instead of the 90,000 tons required by France, it was proposed that this tonnage should be limited so far as France is concerned to 31,500 tons.

Confronted by such a considerable reduction of the figures which had been given as the minimum of what France considered necessary for herself in the future, the French delegation was obliged to refer the matter to its Government.

At a meeting of the cabinet and of the supreme council of national defense the situation was examined and discussed with the most earnest desire to do whatever seemed possible to further the aim of the conference and assist in reaching results.
"This deliberate intention has been carried out in the resolution passed at the meeting as regards capital ships.

"As a token of the readiness of France, it has been resolved to accept the reduction to 175,000 tons of her tonnage of capital ships, although it seems practically impossible with such reduced tonnage to constitute a naval force composed of ships such as those which it is contemplated to build, and one normally organized, according to the tactical principles in force in every fleet.

"The conditions of application of the agreement as regards capital ships will be easy of settlement by taking into account such qualifications of it as may usefully be introduced in carrying out the naval holiday with regard to freedom of action in laying down, as from 1927, ships intended to replace, within the limits of the admitted tonnage, French ships as they reach their twentieth year of existence.

"It will be likewise easy to settle the question still outstanding of the duration of the agreement as to limitation of capital-ship tonnage.

"After examining, on the other hand, the composition of the forces needed by France in auxiliary craft and submarines which are specially intended for the protection of her territory and its communications the cabinet and the supreme council of national defense have reached the conclusion that it is impossible to accept a limitation below that of 330,000 tons for auxiliary craft and 90,000 tons for submarines without imperiling the vital interests of the country and of its colonies and the safety of their naval life.

"The French delegation has been instructed to consent to no concession in regard to the above figures.

"To sum up, France accepts, as regards capital ships, the sacrifice which she must face in order to meet the views of the conference and which represents an important reduction of her normal sea power. She limits her program for the future composition of her fleet to 330,000 tons for auxiliary craft and to 90,000 tons for submarines.

"While regretting that she can not possibly, under the present circumstances, entirely carry out the reductions and limitations contemplated in the American proposal, she at least feels quite certain that she is taking an important share in the work of the conference by reducing the French naval power in capital ships, a weapon specifically offensive and particularly costly, and by accepting a limitation for craft of other categories."

The chairman said that the committee had heard the statement on behalf of the French Government. It was a definitive statement, made after careful deliberation, and he assumed that it should be accepted as the final expression of the attitude of the French Government in regard to the limitation of naval arma-
ment. He was greatly gratified at the willingness of the French Government to limit the tonnage of their capital ships to 175,000 tons. He felt that the importance of this statement should not in any way be minimized. Capital ships were the chief weapon of offense. If the conference could succeed, as it was now evident that it would, in reducing in a fairly satisfactory manner armament as represented in capital ships, it would have done much to relieve the burden of taxation and would aid in establishing a better basis for a lasting peace. He wished to repeat that he was highly gratified and appreciated the manner in which the problem had been approached by the French Government. He understood that there were, however, certain reservations with respect to replacements and the duration of the agreement. These matters must receive further consideration and be the subject of continued negotiations.

He confessed that he was disappointed with the statement concerning submarines and auxiliary craft. If submarines were to be available for distinctly defensive purposes in connection with the movements of fleets, it would seem that they should bear some definite proportion to the fighting fleets. That is, if they were to be used in connection with the laying of mines, scouting, etc.—the necessities inherent in large defensive preparations—they should bear some relation to the operations of the fleet as a whole. The suggestion that France should have 90,000 tons of submarines would, on any basis of a practicable ratio, involve the assumption that Great Britain and the United States should greatly increase their submarine tonnage. This could hardly be called a limitation or reduction. Furthermore, if a large number of submarines were to be provided, then cruisers and destroyers, the natural enemies of submarines, would have to be provided in numbers adequate to deal with the situation created by a large submarine fleet. It was a serious question whether there was hope of accomplishing anything like limitation in regard to submarines and auxiliary craft. He understood that the attitude of the French Government was that, regardless of the requirements of other nations, 90,000 tons of submarines was deemed to be the minimum essential for France. If this were so, the suggestion of 330,000 tons of auxiliary vessels for France would have its bearings on what was considered necessary for the other nations and might make it difficult to arrive at an agreement limiting submarines and auxiliary craft. He did not desire at this time and in view of the existing situation to discuss details, but he wished to say that an agreement for the expansion of armament was not under consideration. The conference was called to consider the limitation of armament. He left it for the committee to decide in the light of the very definite statement of the French Government what was practicable to be done.
In conclusion he wished to say that in expressing his disappointment in regard to submarines he did not wish in any way to detract from the importance of the definite acceptance by France of the program for capital ships. This was a matter of the first importance, and he could assure his French colleagues that their attitude was cordially and sincerely appreciated.

Mr. Balfour admitted, as the chairman had justly pointed out, that there was a side to the statement just made by their French colleagues which profoundly disappointed him. The French position with regard to disarmament on land they already knew. What was their position with regard to disarmament on sea? They were prepared, and he rejoiced that they were prepared, to accept the ratio which gave them 175,000 tons of capital ships. He was glad that the French Government had accepted that all-important part of the American program, and he agreed that if nothing else was done by the conference in reference to naval disarmament, the scheme already in sight with regard to the limitation of capital ships did immensely relieve the burden of armament upon an overburdened world. He did not feel himself that the sacrifice on the part of France was in itself of an overwhelming character, even in regard to capital ships, for the thought that if the naval strength of a nation was to be estimated in relation to the naval strength of other nations, it would be found that the relative strength of France under the arrangement already accepted in regard to capital ships would be increased. He did not begrudge her that increase; he rejoiced in it.

But when he turned from the matter of capital ships to the matter of other craft he confessed that a very different picture met the eye. The French proposed to increase the number of submarines threefold. If they carried out that intention, it was evident that they would not only be equal to the other two greatest naval powers, America and Britain, in point of tonnage, but that they would have a very much larger proportion of submarines of a newer type than either of them. He understood the submarine was still in process of development; it was still adding to its powers of offense, and each new model was an improvement on the capacity of its predecessors for commerce destruction. Thus it was certain that when that program was carried out the French quota of submarines would exceed that of any other power in the world. It had further to be noted that their French colleagues accompanied their view of the necessity of submarines with the announcement that they intended greatly to increase the tonnage of their auxiliary craft. It must be acknowledged that this constituted a somewhat singular contribution to the labors of a conference called for the diminution of armament. Considered in connection with the refusal of the French delegation to discuss land armament, this position must
cause anxiety and disappointment to those who had come to the conference with high hopes regarding the limitation of naval armament. Furthermore, it had to be observed that the pleasure derived from the agreement with regard to the limitation of capital ships was subject to qualification. He understood that the French intended to begin replacing ships in 1927.

This seemed to be a serious interference with the proposal for a 10 years' naval holiday, but that was only a small part of the anxiety and disappointment which the French program had created in his mind. They had now come forward with a great building program of submarines and auxiliary craft. He was perfectly unable to conceive how that could be regarded as a defensive policy. If submarines were to be used as a strictly military weapon, in the manner contemplated by the American advisory committee, how came it that a fleet of capital ships limited to 175,000 tons required 90,000 tons of submarines to scout for it and protect it? And if 90,000 tons of submarines were really required for a fleet of 175,000 tons of capital ships, how many submarines would America and Britain require to build to assist their fleets of 500,000 tons? It was perfectly obvious that the proposed 90,000 tons of submarines were intended to destroy commerce. They could not be intended for any other purpose. It therefore appeared that, at a moment when the delegates were all assembled to discuss the limitation of armament, they were asked to agree to its increase, and that a country which did not desire to be among the first three naval powers in the world proposed, nevertheless, to build instruments of illegitimate warfare to an extent equal in numbers and superior in efficiency to those legitimately required by any other fleet in the world. We should, therefore, have the melancholy spectacle of a conference called for the limitation of armaments resulting in a vast increase in the very weapon which the most civilized elements in all civilized countries condemned. For the moment he need say no more. The whole of this controversy would again come up before the public conference. For that occasion he reserved himself.

He must, however, dwell shortly on the effect which the British declaration of naval policy must inevitably produce upon British opinion. It was perfectly clear that if at Britain's very gates a fleet of 90,000 tons of submarines (60,000 tons of which were to be of the newest type) was to be constructed, no limitation of any kind on auxiliary vessels capable of dealing with submarines could be admitted by the Government which he represented. Public notice had now been given in the most formal manner that this great fleet was to be built on the shores nearest to Britain, and it would necessarily be a very great menace to her. He had no doubt, if the occasion ever arose, that Britain would be equal
to it, but it was on condition that she reserved the full right to build any auxiliary craft which she considered necessary to deal with the situation.

Senator Schanzer said that the Italian delegation did not dispute the importance of an accord with respect to capital ships, but they could do no more than to express their deep regret that it was not possible to arrive at an arrangement concerning auxiliary boats and submarines.

In the absence of an agreement concerning the limitation of the latter, it was but natural that each nation should retain full liberty of action. At the same time it was impossible not to realize that the absence of such an agreement would give new impetus to the competition of naval armament respecting auxiliary craft and submarine which could only have a most unfortunate effect on the finances of the countries interested. It was not his intention to discuss what France considered necessary for her national security; but he would not attempt to conceal the fact that the naval program announced by France was one which gave him serious concern from the point of view of the economic sacrifices which might follow for Italy, as well as from the point of view of the political consequences which it might produce. This was all the more true because the solution of the land armament problem had been deferred.

The chairman said he gathered from what had been said that it was not deemed practicable to reach an agreement on the basis suggested by his French colleagues, and that it was apparent that other powers desired freedom of action with regard to the construction of auxiliary craft which would be built to deal with submarines.

He assumed that Mr. Balfour, in referring to the entire liberty of action of Great Britain in this respect, did not intend to include capital ships, nor did he understand that it was intended to build, under the guise of auxiliary ships, vessels which might possibly come within the category of capital ships.

He desired to present, for the consideration of the committee, the suggestion that, if it was not possible to reach a satisfactory agreement for the limitation of the total tonnage of auxiliary craft, some arrangement might perhaps be made defining the tonnage limit of individual ships. He therefore desired to propose the adoption of the following resolution:

"No ship of war other than the capital ship or aircraft carrier hereafter built shall exceed a total tonnage displacement of 10,000 tons, and no guns shall be carried by any such ship with a caliber in excess of 8 inches."

Mr. Hanihara said that he desired to be permitted to say a few words in order to avoid possible misunderstanding as to Japan's attitude with regard to the question of naval limitation. The
Japanese delegation believed that by the agreement which had been reached as to the ratio of capital ships a great step forward had been made toward the attainment of the high aim of the conference, thereby relieving the powers concerned of the heavy burden of costly armament. At the same time they thought it would be a misfortune if the conference failed to come to an agreement as regards the limitation of auxiliary combatant craft. The Japanese position was not to claim freedom to build auxiliary combatant craft, but, generally speaking, to maintain the tonnage allotment of auxiliary craft provided in the original American proposal of November 12 in order that an agreement might be reached as between the powers concerned on this basis and that full and final success of the conference might thus be assured.

Mr. Sarraut said that the decisions of the French Government, which he had had the honor of imparting to the conference, had just given rise to certain observations which he could not allow to go unanswered. If this reply had not been immediate, it was because he wished first to hear the remarks of each delegation regarding his statement.

To speak frankly, he was not there to make comment on the orders of his Government, which possessed an authority and a weight which sufficed in themselves; the decisions which he had just communicated to the committee had been carefully considered by the highest authorities representing national sovereignty in his country, from whose hands he had received them respectfully and had brought them, just as they stood, to the conference. It was his duty, however, and he performed this duty in the perfectly friendly spirit which had never ceased to animate the French delegation, to take up the allegations which had just been made, certain ones of which he found wholly unacceptable.

Certain delegations, while expressing their satisfaction at seeing France accept the reduced proportion of capital ships which had been allotted to her, had expressed real disappointment on learning that the French Government was unable to make similar sacrifices in regard to other classes of vessels.

Mr. Sarraut wished to say that this disappointment, if it existed, must already have had its counterpart in his own country when it was learned there how the amount of tonnage allotted to France had been authoritatively determined without taking any account of her manifest and ascertained needs and of the absolute necessities of her defense, the security and safeguarding of which no country was justified in intrusting to the care and good offices of its neighbors.

It was this idea, this conception of the true needs and interests of France and of her colonies, which had inspired the decisions of the French Government; it was this idea which both guided and limited their demand; and this idea was in no way influenced by
any comparison with what France's neighbors were doing or by any anxiety to measure her naval force against theirs.

Herein lay the profound difference between the French point of view and that of others. France had not determined upon her needs and her demands after examining the consequences to the French Navy of the increase of the naval power of certain neighboring countries with whom she maintained, under the happiest of conditions, relations of friendship, cooperation, and alliance. France was not guided by any fear of what their strength might be, precisely because they were friends. Great Britain, with her 525,000 tons of capital ships, would possess a fleet of great vessels stronger than the corresponding fleets of France and Italy put together. France, however, did not take offense at that. She was not in any way haunted by this prospect, any more than she was apprehensive of the fact that the fleets of the other friendly nations, the United States and Japan, would be considerably increased in comparison with her fleet.

Why, then, it had been asked, was a submarine fleet such as was demanded by France a necessity for her? Did France quibble over the needs of the others? Did she call into question their possible intentions? Did she suspect them? Assuredly not. It was not only the right but the duty of each country to assure its safety by its own means, and it was perfectly possible to consider this problem without being haunted by the idea of a possible aggression on the part of a neighbor. That others should apply to France such a method of reasoning while she did not think of applying it to them could not possibly be permitted. This would be still more painful to the French delegation and would appear to them more especially inadmissible at this table around which they and their colleagues were gathered in a spirit of the most cordial cooperation, and at the very moment when, in bringing the answer of France in regard to capital ships they were furnishing the most positive proof of the effective participation of their country in the success of the great ideals of peace aimed at by the conference.

If the answer of the French delegation in regard to other categories of vessels was not the same as for the capital ships, it was because of the tonnages which they had indicated corresponded to material needs of defense, to necessities of protection which must no longer be denied, since they would not cease to emphasize them. France had no desire to destroy merchant vessels, as Mr. Balfour had said; the contrary had formally been declared here, and this declaration had been echoed not later than yesterday in the debates which took place in the French Senate. But France had coast lines which she must defend; above all, she had a great colonial domain, second in importance only to that of Great Britain, which was distributed over all the seas,
and concerning which she might have, Mr. Surraut presumed, anxiety in regard to its defense, its police, and its supervision.

France had the duty of safeguarding the communications of these colonies with the mother country; and as he had already said, in case of war safety of transportation to France of her troops over-seas would be among the first of her obligations. This was not a mere theory. Had it not been seen how, in the last war, a belligerent had transformed merchant ships into auxiliary cruisers or into privateers to torpedo French transports; and had not this been done against all the allied navies? And should it cause surprise here to see the minister of colonies of France take account of colonial considerations and call to mind that France's colonial empire, though some would seem to be ignorant of the fact, really existed, and that its needs, as well as its interests, must be strongly affirmed, defended, protected, especially in regard to safety of communications with the mother country?

Mr. Sanaut said he must reiterate that the French delegation was bound by formal instructions from their Government: this was a fact of which he wished to remind the committee anew. They could not deviate from these instructions. He wished to repeat again that it was impossible for them to hear it said without protesting to the contrary that there was an inevitable and necessary correlation between what France was obliged to do and what her neighbors as a result would deem themselves obliged to do. Nor did he admit that there was an indispensable and logical connection between the proportion of a country's naval force in capital ships and the proportion of its auxiliary craft and submarines. That was an abstract rule which it had been felt should be laid down here. But the French delegates had shown why they could not recognize it. They were guided by the needs of France, duly stated, proved, and fully justified. This rule and no other thought had dominated their feelings on the question of submarines. They objected to having it believed or to having it said that the construction by France of a certain tonnage of submarines as a defensive weapon could be considered as a menace to any of her friends. If such a thought were to weigh all too heavily on the deliberations of the conference, if he found himself obliged to defend his country here against such a suspicion, the result would certainly be the elimination of the hopefulness and the enthusiasm with which he had so far collaborated in the work of relieving the burden of armaments, in accordance with the desire of France as clearly manifested by the sacrifice to which she had consented in the matter of capital ships. But, to tell the truth, he was not likely to be discouraged in this matter. The work was too beautiful and too generously humanitarian for the determination of the French
delegation ever to grow weary in their endeavors. They would remain faithful to the end to the noble aims of the conference.

Mr. Balfour assured Mr. Sarraut that he was the last man in the world whom he (Mr. Balfour) would suspect of hostile intentions toward his country, but the speech which Mr. Sarraut had just delivered was sufficient to show that he had not really understood the way in which Britain regarded the question now under consideration. Mr. Balfour begged him to consider one or two elementary facts without which he would not understand the position taken up by the British Empire delegation. While it was almost unthinkable that their respective countries could be on anything but the most cordial terms, one must not overlook the teachings of history. Britain had had many conflicts with France, though happily in the distant past. Britain had always been superior in naval armament and always inferior in land forces. Never in the history of France had she had to fear the power of Great Britain to strike a blow at her heart. In the nature of things that must be so. No inferior military power had ever yet been able to invade or seriously imperil a superior military power merely because she had more ships. Suppose the almost inconceivable happened and close allies became enemies, it was perfectly clear that in that case no British superiority of capital ships would imperil the life of France for an hour. To be fair he must admit that it might conceivably imperil some remote islands belonging to France; but France, with her land armament, would remain secure in the face of superior sea power.

He asked Mr. Sarraut to compare the position of France in the face of a superior British surface fleet with the position of Britain in the face of France with the largest submarine fleet in the world. She could use that fleet, if she chose, for commerce destruction, and it was difficult to believe that in time of stress she would not so use it. If Britain were unarmed against submarines it was evident that France, using that felonious weapon, could destroy her very existence. Therefore it was quite impossible for Britain to treat the submarine fleet with the serene and friendly philosophy shown by Mr. Sarraut in connection with the British fleet of capital ships. Mr. Sarraut talked of the absolute necessity for France of possessing a fleet of 90,000 tons of submarines. For what purpose? Not to cooperate with a fleet of 175,000 tons of capital ships. It was altogether out of proportion. What did he want the 90,000 tons of submarines for? According to Mr. Sarraut, it was not for commerce destruction, it was for the protection of France's lines of communication. There was no doubt that submarines were powerful for the destruction of lines of communication; but they were powerless to protect them. Mr. Sarraut would not obtain security for his lines of
communication by those means. For those purposes they were useless, or nearly useless. They were powerful weapons for one purpose, and for one purpose only, namely, the destruction of commerce; and it was not unreasonable that Great Britain, when threatened by the establishment within a few miles of her coasts of a vast fleet of submarines which were of no use except to destroy commerce, should say candidly that she could not look with indifference upon the situation which would be thus created.

He regretted that, he had been compelled to insist upon an aspect of the question which he would gladly have left undealt with. He did not yield to Mr. Sarraut in his conviction that the good feeling existing between his own country and their great ally across the Channel would remain unshaken through all the changes which time might bring.

With regard to the resolution which had been proposed by the chairman, he desired to intimate that Lord Lee would address the committee on that subject.

Lord Lee said he would pass to the resolution which the chairman had proposed a few minutes before, and which he hoped would be regarded by his colleagues as noncontroversial. It was, indeed, a necessary corollary of the agreement to limit capital ships, that there should also be a limitation on the size of other classes of ships. Otherwise it would be possible to build so-called light cruisers which would be capital ships in disguise and which would impose upon the world a fresh competition of armament which would be as costly as that which had preceded it. He understood there had been a certain amount of conversation between the naval experts of the countries represented at the conference, and he was led to suppose that there was an agreement that 10,000 legend tons—or whatever kind of tons were agreed upon—would be a reasonable maximum size for all ships other than capital ships or aircraft carriers. He thought also that there was a general agreement regarding the limitation of guns to 8 inches. So far as Britain was concerned, she had no gun in excess of 7½ inches. He understood France had a gun of an approximately similar size, namely, 7.6. That seemed a reasonable figure to fix, but if for any strong reason it was desired to fix 8 inches Britain would not oppose any serious objection to that size. He thought it was essential that the limitation of armament should apply also to the aircraft carrier; otherwise, while prohibiting capital ships, one might have what would be in effect a capital ship with the addition of flying appliances. He did not want to discuss, on this occasion, the matter of the limitation of tonnage of the aircraft carrier, but he thought the resolution should be amended to read as follows:

"No ship of war other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier hereafter built shall exceed a total tonnage displacement of
10,000 tons, and no gun shall be carried by any such ship, other than a capital ship, with a caliber in excess of 8 inches."

The chairman stated that the American Government had no objection to the amendment proposed by Lord Lee.

Mr. Hanihara said he would like to have further discussion postponed until the afternoon or the following morning.

The chairman asked what was the pleasure of the committee. He assumed that what had been said that morning could be given to the press, each delegate having the privilege of looking over and correcting his own remarks, as they were to appear in the statement to the press.

Senator Underwood said that the subcommittee on Chinese revenue was to hold a meeting in the afternoon; he would therefore have to absent himself from the afternoon meeting of the committee.

The meeting then adjourned until Wednesday, December 28, 1921, 3.30 p. m.

TENTH MEETING—WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1921, 3.30 P. M.

PRESENT.

United States.—Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark.

British Empire.—Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domville, Mr. Flint.

France.—Mr. Sarraut, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by Mr. Denaint, Capt. Oden’hal, Mr. Ponsot.

Italy.—Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco.

Japan.—Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi.

The Secretary General, assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Osborne.

Interpreter, Mr. Camerlynck.

1. The tenth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American Union Building, on Wednesday, December 28, 1921, at 3.30 p. m.

2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes,