The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.
de Bon had suggested in his speech it could only do so by resorting to extreme methods, for it was futile to suppose that submarines would make a practice of stopping merchant ships and placing prize crews on board to take them into port.

Senator Schanzer asked permission to inquire with respect to the Christmas holiday. He said he had been informed that there would be a recess until Tuesday after Christmas, and asked whether it was correct that a meeting would be held on Tuesday afternoon.

The chairman stated that as the servant of the conference he did not feel at liberty to recommend any Christmas recess unless this was the expressed desire of the delegates. He said that if in the judgment of the delegates the conference had arrived at a point where progress could be made, he would suggest that a meeting be held the following morning. If at that meeting a point should be reached where further immediate progress might be made, a meeting could be held the following Monday. This, he said, could be decided according to circumstances.

The chairman then referred to the question of the public statement for the press and asked whether it would be agreeable to the French and British Empire delegations to publish in full the arguments of Admiral de Bon and Mr. Balfour. This was agreed to by these delegations.

The meeting then adjourned until the following morning, December 24, 1921, at 11 o'clock.

SEVENTH MEETING—SATURDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1921, 11 A. M.

PRESENT.

United States.—Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. Wright and Mr. Clark.

British Empire.—Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domville, Mr. Mousley.

France.—Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Ponsot.

Italy.—Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco.
Japan.—Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi and Commander Hori.

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson, Mr. Osborne, and Mr. Paul.

Interpreters—Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon.

1. The seventh meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American Union Building, at 11 a. m., Saturday, December 24, 1921.

2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India); for France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton; for Japan, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda.

3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were present: For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Mousley; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Pensot; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco; for Japan, Mr. Ichihashi, Commander Hori. The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson, Mr. Osborne, and Mr. Paul, was present. Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon (interpreters) were also present.

4. The chairman, Mr. Hughes, announced that the meeting was ready to continue the discussion begun the day before.

Mr. Sarraut said that their eminent and venerated colleague, Mr. Balfour, replying the previous day to Admiral de Bon’s statement—a statement which in Mr. Sarraut’s opinion had been so substantial and convincing—had given the committee a new opportunity for respecting the eloquence and the emotion of the phrases which a mind like Mr. Balfour’s always so easily found to express the inspirations of his thought. He wished to thank Mr. Balfour personally for having given him that rare pleasure in which the regret felt at meeting opposition immediately gave way to admiration for one’s adversary. He regretted the use of such a word as adversary, which had a displeasing sound; for, as a matter of fact, his first impulse, as he rose to reply, was to think of the last words of Mr. Balfour’s speech and to approve with all his heart and all his reason the dignity and the serenity with which Mr. Balfour looked forward to the future destiny of his great country. On this point Mr. Balfour knew how completely he shared this faith and
COOPERATION DESIRED.

Conviction. His own country, more than any other—Mr. Balfour also knew this—desired for Great Britain the continuation of the power and security which France regarded as one of the essential guaranties of the peace of the world and of the future of civilization. France would be the last to forget how greatly the heroism and the tenacity of her mighty ally had contributed to bring about the final decision which had saved the liberty of mankind; and in the effort thus made by England it was also known what a part had been played by the splendid British Navy, which, in cooperation with the French Navy, had done so much to make victory certain.

He wished to bear these sentiments in mind in replying to Mr. Balfour, and particularly to the argument "ad hominem" which the latter had addressed to France as well as to Italy, with the object of demonstrating the danger that might be created by the position taken by France on the submarine question. If he had rightly understood, Mr. Balfour had said: Beware! You may be the first victims of your own attitude; you know what England has been enabled to do for you with the aid of her navy; this help ran great risk of being impaired by the action of the German submarines; let us suppose, he had said, that the situation at the time the last war should recur, as has been suggested by Mr. Briand; suppose the former allies of France again came to her assistance (as Mr. Balfour said he hoped they would do); the efficiency of their help might be impaired by the resumption of that submarine campaign which the attitude of France would have helped to render possible by its unwillingness to abolish the submarines.

Such, Mr. Sarraut believed, was Mr. Balfour's line of reasoning; he had not understated it and believed that he had exactly reproduced it. He might remark that, in reality, the danger contemplated by Mr. Briand was the same as that which Mr. Balfour himself had called "the very great insecurity from the land side." But he also agreed with Mr. Balfour that the peril might extend to the sea and, far from putting aside this supposition, he hastened to accept it, because it would still further strengthen the French contention.

At this point he would borrow from Mr. Balfour himself an argument in answer to the latter's own reasoning. In fact, Mr. Balfour, in pointing out to France the eventual danger of maintaining submarines, had maintained that countries having coast lines or with access to the sea might take advantage of this situation to gather together a force of submarines representing a considerable aggressive strength for use against their neighbors or against other countries. Herein lay the very danger—pointed out by Mr. Balfour himself—which France feared and wished to avoid. It had been suggested that France give up the idea of re-
aining submarines; but, he asked, were all the powers possessing fleets of submarines equally anxious to support such a decision? There were five powers represented on the committee; sometimes they were called "the Big Three," sometimes "the Big Five"; a decision could be reached as far as those present were concerned, but what would the other countries do? Who could give assurance that they would submit and follow the example set them? What would happen, moreover, if these other countries continued to build submarines, either for their own use, or for someone else? In what situation would those countries who were represented on the committee find themselves if, peradventure, war were to break out? They would have given up submarines only to be confronted with the great submarine forces which other nations had constructed, retained, or ceded to enemy powers.

This was the eventuality which must be faced. Would anyone tell him, Mr. Sarraut asked, that that was fantastic? The countries he had in mind were countries not represented here, and which would therefore preserve their freedom of action and their submarine forces; what way was there, he asked, of persuading them or of forcing them to follow the example of the countries represented on the committee?

Great Britain had tried persuasion without success. Those attempts had been made in the deliberations preliminary to the peace treaty, during which Great Britain had expressed the wish that the use of submarines be forbidden, as well as in discussions before the League of Nations in the course of which, if Mr. Sarraut was not mistaken, the matter had been brought up twice. The other countries concerned refused to accept the British proposals. There was nothing surprising in this; it went to prove that these suggestions were in opposition to a sentiment which was very natural and which was not peculiar to the French. There must be no misunderstanding on this point; the views upheld by the French delegation were not exclusively the views of France; they were shared by many other countries whose ideas France only reflected. No country worthy of the name could leave to others the care of its national defense; every country had the desire and the right to assure its own safety and to refuse to intrust to anyone else the defense of its independence or its integrity. Every country tried to do this through its own means and its own resources. Some countries were able to build mighty fleets and possess capital ships; but those which did not have the same resources to dispose of and the same financial facilities were building, or would build, submarines, which constituted the weapon of the weak and were less costly. Should this right be denied them? They had no choice when they saw other countries maintaining powerful fleets, without any warlike intention, to be sure, but with a view to protect-
ing their own safety against any eventuality. Persuasion was of no avail; constraint would not succeed any better. No one present could even dream of constraint, for the very simple reason that they all saw the danger of taking such an attitude.

Mr. Sarraut said he had called the attention of Great Britain in a friendly way to the construction which might be given to decisions of the conference by certain countries, a construction which would run counter to the common efforts of the conference to create a spirit of peace. An atmosphere of peace could only exist throughout the world if all peoples were given the assurance and guaranty that this peace was based on a feeling of equity and justice which took the interests of all into account. On the day on which the peoples began to think that there was likelihood of moral constraint being used to impose upon them the point of view of the powers here represented—and he ventured to emphasize this idea at a time when the susceptibilities of nations ought to be carefully considered—he feared that there might grow up, around the beneficial work that was being accomplished here, certain legends, and even calumnies, distorting the trend of the purposes of the powers represented on the committee, such as those from which the French had suffered, which had only recently been used in the press against France, representing her as imperialistic.

It must not be permitted, Mr. Sarraut continued, that such campaigns, misinterpreting true sentiments, should be initiated against any one of the powers present—France, Great Britain, Japan, or any other. If certain of these powers preserved more or less considerable naval forces and if, at the same time, other peoples, not represented here, were forbidden the right to procure for themselves the smaller but still efficacious weapons of defense which they believed they needed, might not the legends to which he had referred tempt them to think that other more powerful countries wished to keep them in subjection, to force them to place themselves under their protection, and to retain them in a sort of vassalage. That was an impression which must be avoided. Careful consideration, he wished to repeat, must be given to the mental attitude of the peoples not represented here, whose susceptibilities might lead them to misconstrue the exact meaning of the decisions which the members of the committee were collaborating.

The committee would perceive, Mr. Sarraut said, the conclusions to which he was leading. It was impossible to assume here certain obligations in the matter of submarines in the name of countries not taking part in the conference; these countries could neither be persuaded nor coerced; that was to say, there could be no guaranty that they would follow the example of those not constructing submarines.
Hence, in the absence of these guaranties, he considered that the committee could not come to a decision. An agreement had been reached on the reduction of offensive naval armaments, but the question of means of defense must be left to the consideration of the countries interested.

He readily understood that a general conference might be suggested in which all the countries interested in the question of submarines would be represented. In this conference the rules applying to a more humane use of submarines might be determined; the question of the principle of the retention or abolition of the use of submarines could be raised. Then all the nations interested in the question might express their opinion and really effective decisions might be reached. For the time being, he wished to repeat, he believed, that no decisions could be reached, even regarding the questions of what amount of submarine tonnage constituted a defensive navy or what amount constituted an offensive weapon. Let the tonnage of the great ships, of the attacking vessels, be limited as had been done; that was well, and each country might make its contribution along with its personal sacrifices in the matter; but, in regard to the defensive navy, it was those countries concerned which best knew their needs and the situation which they must face. It was essentially a question dependent upon the sovereignty of such countries and upon the perception they had of their responsibilities in regard to national safety.

Such, Mr. Sarraut added, were the considerations which he wished to lay before Mr. Balfour; he did not know whether he had succeeded in convincing him, but at least he had had the great honor of having entered into debate with him.

Mr. Balfour said that he did not mean to weary the committee with another long speech, but he had to say one or two sentences to make his position clear after the speech just delivered by Mr. Sarraut. Those observations, so far as he was concerned, were not only most courteous but they were flattering far beyond his deserts, and he gratefully acknowledged the spirit in which they were made and the language in which they were couched. But he felt bound, of course, to make quite clear—he would not say the whole case of the British Empire delegation—but certain points in that case which he thought it possible Mr. Sarraut's speech might have confused. The argument that he (Mr. Balfour) brought forward in its relation to France might be put in this way: The conference had been given to understand on the very highest authority, namely, the French prime minister's, that the danger to France in the future was a danger that came to her from the land side, and the conference had been told in terms of unforgettable eloquence that that danger was so great and pressed so much upon the consciences of public men and the
sentiments of the French public that it was quite impossible for France to permit any diminution of land armaments. The decision thus announced had had a most serious effect upon the development of the work of a conference called together to diminish armaments. This ideal had to be abandoned; and the conference found itself confined to naval disarmament alone. France, having thus put an end to all chance of even discussing disarmament by land, had proceeded to develop her sea policy, and her sea policy embraced the creation of a vast submarine fleet. Now, let those two positions taken together be considered.

If the danger to France was of the magnitude which had been indicated, and if France (which Heaven forbid) should again in the future have to call upon her friends and allies, or late allies, for assistance in men and in munitions, it would be, he supposed, because her great eastern neighbor had not merely revived her army but had also revived her navy. The one was not likely to take place without the other; both were contrary to the Treaty of Versailles. Very well. It must then be assumed that there were 60,000,000 or 70,000,000 Germans against whom France would have to be prepared, and it must be assumed that those 60,000,000 or 70,000,000 Germans would be supplied, if with nothing else, at least with the easiest and the cheapest of all ships that could be built—namely, submarines. How was France going to deal with that situation? Her fleet of submarines would be of no use at all. Let her make that fleet what she would, they would not protect or help to protect either her own merchant ships or the transports of her neighbors and friends. Submarines were weapons of offense not, as was so often said, weapons of defense; and in no sense would they be able to give one atom of assistance to the French nation if she was threatened with the dangers on which Mr. Briand had so eloquently dwelt. They would afford her no assistance in her hour of need. To whom, then, was she going to look? There was but one nation in Europe which was or could be made, so far as he could see, adequately safe against submarine attack, and that for social and economic reasons which could not well be copied.

Great Britain, and Great Britain alone in Europe, so far as he knew, had that large seafaring population which could be utilized for the manning of the small craft by which submarines could be controlled in those narrow waters—a population which, as shown conclusively by the experience of the late war, not only had the numbers but the individual skill, courage, and capacity to deal with that situation. So that he must assume, if it were true that France, in the crisis contemplated by Mr. Briand, was going to call upon her ancient allies for assistance, it was upon Great Britain's antisubmarine craft that she would be dependent for the possibility of that call being obeyed. How was such a policy
consistent with the building of this huge mass of submarines which anybody who looked at the matter from a strictly strategical and tactical point of view would certainly be driven to say was built mainly against Great Britain? He remembered, and of course he accepted, the eloquent protest made by Mr. Sarraut. He knew that Mr. Sarraut, in his expression of friendship for Great Britain, had said not one word in excess of the truth. He knew it represented what came from the heart. But no present expression of good will, however sincere, could control the future. Facts were facts. And when one tried to combine the military policy announced by Mr. Briand with the naval policy announced by Admiral de Bon, one could not fail to see that here was a naval and military scheme strangely incoherent and inconsistent. Men would inevitably ask themselves: What is the ultimate end underlying all that is being done? Against whom is this submarine fleet being built? What purpose is it to serve? What danger to France is it intended to guard against? He knew of no satisfactory answer to such questions.

He had so far confined himself strictly to the Anglo-French position, and he had tried to explain to those who he knew were Great Britain's friends why the position seemed to the British public so inconsistent and so difficult to justify. He asked to be allowed to say one word upon the more general aspect. He thought there was something to be said in favor of this part of the contention of Mr. Sarraut. Mr. Sarraut had asked the committee by what authority the five nations at the table could legislate for the world? They could not legislate for the world; they could not compel the world to take their opinion. When Mr. Sarraut had argued from that undeniable proposition he had merely repeated what Mr. Hughes himself had stated in a sentence which really covered the whole ground: "Even if they were ready to adopt the principle suggested by the British Empire delegation, they would still have to wait the adherence of other nations." That was a statement which he (Mr. Balfour) entirely accepted. But even if it were granted in its full extent, as it should be granted, did it follow that if a conference of the five great naval powers were really unanimous and really put forward upon broad moral grounds the statement that in their view submarines were not a weapon of war which was consistent with civilization, that such a declaration would have no effect. Would it not be the prelude to their ultimate abolition? Was mankind indeed deaf to such appeals? Would they fall vainly upon unheeding ears? He did not think so. He thought if it were possible for this conference of the United States of America, Japan, France, Italy, and Great Britain—the five great naval powers—to give expression in fitting language to that view, it would be the beginning of a great and beneficent reform. Mr. Sarraut apparently did
not think it would be a reform, or at all events he thought that whatever it might be, taken by itself, the very fact that it had been brought forward by Great Britain, advocated by Great Britain, and adopted by this conference on the appeal of Great Britain would give rise to endless calumnies and that Great Britain herself might suffer from the notion that in making this appeal she had been animated solely by selfish motives and a desire to dominate weaker neighbors by her superior sea power. But was such misrepresentation possible? If it were attempted, would it be believed?

It seemed to him incredible that anybody could think it was intended as a prelude to British domination over weaker neighbors. Without going into the depths of history, let him observe that for the whole of the nineteenth century, after the Peace of Paris in 1815, Great Britain possessed sea power which had no rival. Those who had had the wealth to build against her had not thought it worth while, and for all those years the British fleets had been by far the largest that traversed the ocean. Then Germany had begun to build, the United States and Japan had followed suit, and a new state of things arose. But was the history of Great Britain during those years one favorable or unfavorable to peace, favorable or unfavorable to liberty? It had been during those years that Greece became free, that Italy became united, that all the States of South America had declared themselves independent Republics. So far as he remembered, there had been only one European war in which Great Britain had been engaged, and in that war Great Britain had been the ally of France. He could not imagine anybody who read history supposing that, even if the sea power of Great Britain in the century which was to come was comparable to her relative sea power in the century which had passed, the liberties of the world would have anything to fear. He himself looked forward to the changed situation without fear and without any misgivings. The British Empire was strong enough to defend itself. It asked no more. Nor did he believe that any of the nations to whom reference had been made by Mr. Sarraut were going to run away with the idea that, for any purpose whatever, Great Britain meant to be a tyrant either on land or sea.

Mr. Sarraut seemed to think that the smaller powers who might have rejoiced in the power to build for themselves submarine fleets would resent an international arrangement by which the use of submarine fleets was forbidden. This, they would say, is an example of Great Britain's arrogance and pride. But if he knew anything of the smaller nations of Europe, that was the very last thing they were going to say. It was not from British avarice or British love of domination that they had ever suffered. If they
considered the power of Great Britain at all, they considered it as a power to which in time of difficulty they might look for protection. If they considered the influence of Great Britain at all, they knew that that influence had always been exercised on the side of freedom, and he was certainly not going to be prevented from doing his best to promote this great moral reform by the fear that the action of himself and his friends around him could, even by the bitterest and most unscrupulous calumny, be misrepresented in the way which Mr. Sarraut seemed to fear. That was all he had to say. He had not attempted, as his friends would see, to go over the ground traversed yesterday or to deal with all the fundamental verities of the situation; but as Mr. Sarraut had thought it desirable to bring up these international relations and to paint the future in these gloomy colors, he thought it would have hardly been respectful either to Mr. Sarraut or to the other friends who were present if he had remained perfectly silent under the observations made by the French delegation.

Mr. Sarraut said that he did not intend to monopolize the attention of the committee, but he considered it most essential to avoid any misunderstanding; it was indispensable to the clearness of this discussion that his thoughts should not be misconstrued. In this connection he felt he must clarify two points on which Mr. Balfour had dwelt: One concerned the definition of the general situation of France; the other dealt with the possible result of the decision which the conference might take in regard to submarines, upon the public opinion of the world, or at least upon the opinion of the powers not represented here.

In regard to the situation of France and the policy pursued by her in safeguarding her independence and her security, Mr. Balfour, in referring to the attitude on land armaments taken by Mr. Briand, and its relation to the French demands in naval matters, had appeared to experience a feeling of surprise in regard to this policy, which he had considered as a unit—a feeling of surprise, the causes of which, to tell the truth, Mr. Sarraut had had difficulty in understanding.

France, it was true, was compelled to make a double effort, military and naval. The reasons for this were simple and clear. In regard to land defense, Mr. Briand had made a statement of the perils against which France was obliged to guard—a statement which everyone considered final.

Mr. Briand had indicated, with a cogency to which he could add nothing, the necessity which confronted France of providing for her defense by retaining a burden of armaments which was for her a grievous servitude. It was not for pleasure that France assumed these sacrifices, and he did not believe that anyone would venture to contradict this.
LAND AND COAST LINES.

What was the object of France's efforts on the seas? Was she impelled by some proud aspiration toward an increase of maritime power? No; the committee well knew that she was not, since, in regard to capital ships, in which lay true offensive power (that power which alone could give support to an ambitious scheme), France had made the greatest sacrifice and was satisfied with the amount of tonnage which had been allotted to her. It was true that France asked for submarines—but to what end? To attack her neighbors? He would not deign to reply to such a suspicion. The truth was that France was confronted by a situation of fact of which Mr. Balfour must be aware. Besides her continental coast lines, the defense of which could not be neglected, she possessed a colonial domain whose ramifications were spread all over the world. France must have the weapons she needed to defend her possessions, just as she must have the weapons necessary to the safety of her transports and her lines of communication between the mother country and her colonies, both near and distant. In time of peace France scattered her military forces throughout her possessions; her forces, as the committee knew, were divided among the mother country, North Africa, and her various colonies.

There was, then, a logical connection between her indispensable military power and her naval force. She ought in any event to keep the means of assuring the safe transportation of her troops to the mother country, and for this purpose she must decidedly have at her command a certain force. This was why, after having consented to the sacrifice which had been asked of her in the matter of capital ships, she came there to set forth the situation; to state in all frankness and all simplicity the obligations and the reasons of her naval program, which was based on needs whose reality could not be doubted. And when the French delegation had laid before the committee the sincere, definite, and precise reasons for France's program, how could it be suspected of any secret designs against which the very frankness of its explanations protested?

As to the myths, the imputations to which he had referred as possibly penetrating beyond the circle of the powers there represented, he was astonished at the interpretation put upon them; he had said nothing—there was no need to insist on the fact—which was especially aimed against Great Britain. And if, on the contrary, he had outlined these fears very frankly to the committee, it had been because the reproach to which he had already alluded might some time be laid against their common work, against all the powers, without exception, which were deliberating there, and because he wished to avoid for all the powers there present, without exception, any suspicion of having attempted to
reduce to vassalage those powers, large and small, which had not participated in these counsels, by removing from them their weapon of defense, the submarine.

In fact, if Mr. Balfour harbored the slightest idea that he wished to impugn the motives of Great Britain, the words spoken by him (Mr. Sarraut) at the beginning of his speech would bear witness to the affectionate feelings which had continually inspired his thoughts. He had then stated clearly that the might and the safety of Great Britain constituted one of the essential safeguards of the peace of the world and of the progress of civilization. Who, moreover, would dream to-day of speaking of the possible hegemony of any country in the world? That dream of an earlier day, which was of a whole people, had forever vanished in the last war. And it was Mr. Balfour's own country which had largely contributed to the overthrow of that hegemony by a contribution toward the victory of right which would remain the honor and the supreme glory of Great Britain.

Nevertheless, the fact remained that, in the fulfillment of the task which the conference was engaged upon, the susceptibilities of certain peoples had to be taken into account. He had said that, if one wanted to settle such a question as that of the suppression or retention of the submarine, the small powers should be aligned by the side of the great, because the small ones had also the right to express their views and make their voices heard.

In conclusion, Mr. Sarraut said he could not express himself otherwise, even when speaking on behalf of a country whose liberal and peace-loving sentiments could not be mistaken, even when dealing with the problem of her safety on land and at sea. The creation of a will to peace in the world could be based only on confidence and a spirit of justice. This was the deep conviction which must be imparted to all nations; they should be persuaded of this fact, not by having it forced on them but by letting it penetrate gently into their minds. This, and nothing else, was what he had said.

The chairman said that he thought the committee had proceeded to a point where it must be concluded that it was not possible to reach an agreement on the matter just discussed. It had been the highest privilege to listen to the strong and persuasive arguments of Mr. Balfour. It would be superfluous to say that the arguments he addressed to the committee had been perfect in construction and comprehensiveness and admirable in their entire candor. All present must feel that they were his debtors for the intellectual pleasure he had given them. The chairman wished, however, to express a far deeper sense of obligation. The conference had been called for the limitation of armament; and the economic importance of limitation had been emphasized. But in that way, limited though it might be, the conference was striving
to lay a basis for an enduring peace. That was the real point of
their effort. What had impressed him most in Mr. Balfour's
statement was the spirit with which it was imbued and the mani-
fest desire to present and enforce, against apparently hopeless
odds, a proposition which was deemed important for the mainte-
nance of the peace of the world and for such an adjustment of
weapons of war as might favor the maintenance of conditions of
peace. He said that he wished to express his profound sympathy
with what Mr. Balfour and Lord Lee had said; their argument
had derived force not only from humanitarian sentiment, not only
from abhorrence of the atrocities of submarine warfare, but also
because it had been buttressed by facts drawn from the extended
experience of Great Britain—an experience which presented tests
of all the questions raised here. If the argument of Mr. Balfour
and Lord Lee could be answered, the chairman thought that that
answer had yet to come. He perceived from his more or less im-
partial position the great difficulties involved in presenting a tech-
nical answer. He distrusted his ability to judge of the technical
naval argument, but he believed that those taking upon themselves
the burden of that effort would have much to do.

He was quite aware that in the United States there was wide-
spread sentiment against the submarine, largely due to the feel-
ing that had been aroused by the abhorrent uses to which the sub-
marine had been put. There was a very strong sentiment against
the submarine, and that as an offensive weapon it should be outlawed, a feeling that would be powerfully reinforced by what had
been said here. While the chairman felt that there was no im-
mediate prospect of the adoption of the proposal, the words of
Mr. Balfour and Lord Lee would carry far beyond this conference
and powerfully influence the development of public opinion
throughout the world. He was not prepared to say that their
suggestions might not ultimately be successful in inducing the
nations to forego the use of a weapon which, as Mr. Balfour had
urged, was valuable only as an aggressive weapon, and then only
in a form of aggression, condemned by humanity and international
law.

There existed a very great difficulty because of the difference of
technical opinion on this point. Naval experts did not agree, and
it was impossible to ignore their views. So far as the United
States was concerned, the matter had been examined by the ad-
visory committees, which, although it had not had the advantage
of hearing these arguments, had nevertheless produced an able,
illuminating, and conservative report. As France, Italy, and
Japan had manifested an inability to agree, it would be impos-
sible at this time to expect a result favorable to the adoption here
of a resolution to abolish the submarine.
The chairman said that he had had the pleasure of conferring with the President in regard to this matter, and had found him deeply impressed with the strength of the arguments presented and the spirit animating them. If at any time it were found to be feasible to take the matter up, the United States Government would give it their most serious attention. The chairman hoped that what had been said here would prove provocative of thought throughout the entire world. When adherence could be expected to the principle of abolition the subject would be again considered. He hoped that it would be clearly understood that the submarine would not be countenanced as a weapon really suited only to offensive attack (if that be the fact) under the guise of a weapon which was only available for a very limited purpose of defense (if that, too, be the fact). He was not a naval expert; the position of the American Government was as well set forth as it could be in the statement of the advisory committee. The American Government welcomed the discussion as of the utmost importance and was greatly impressed by the strength of Mr. Balfour’s arguments in the light of the experience of the late war.

What could be done? It had been said that there were other powers which were not represented here. The powers participating in the Conference on the Limitation of Armament were bound not to use that conference to impinge upon the full liberty of discussion of those desiring to be heard in a matter relating to their defense. A moral offensive—if he might be permitted to use that term—should not be conducted against them. He felt in honor bound by what had been communicated to him by other powers not represented on the committee that nothing should be done which would compromise their position on a question which they believed related to their security, or which might prevent them from taking the measures they thought necessary for their defense. A discussion, however, which tended to bring out the truth would be as helpful to those who were not present as to those who were represented.

He hoped that the discussion would lead the five powers present to agree to a denunciation of the illegal methods of submarine warfare in terms clearly understandable and to bind themselves to assure the application of the principles of international law in connection with submarine warfare and to consider and debate what could be done to strengthen the laws governing the use of this weapon.

The chairman then said that unless further discussion of the principle of the abolition of the submarine was desired the committee should consider its restriction, numbers, tonnage, etc. He believed that those who considered that the submarine was essential should frankly tell the committee how far they were pre-
pared to go, what their minimum requirements were, and how far they were prepared to accept reduction or restriction. The point of limitation of armament as regards submarines had been reached. With respect to the point of proposing and considering the law in the case, that matter was one where the precise phraseology must be carefully considered. With the permission of the committee, precise proposals would later be brought forward by the American delegation, pending which the committee was ready to discuss the subject of the limitation of the tonnage of submarines and all that pertained thereto. He would therefore ask the delegates to express themselves on that point.

Mr. Balfour asked that he be allowed to express, on behalf not only of himself but of his colleagues on the British Empire delegation, their thanks for the speech which the chairman had just delivered. They thought that it was the happiest augury for the future. Looking at it from the point of view of peace, and in so far as peace could not be attained with humanitarian conduct of war, they regarded the chairman's utterance from those two points of view as a great step forward, and they did not doubt that it would find an echo in all parts of the civilized world and would greatly promote the cause they had so much at heart. The chairman had indicated that it would be for the general convenience that this stage of the discussion should now be brought to an end, and certainly he believed that to be right. He asked, however, to be permitted to have placed formally upon the committee's records the views, very briefly expressed, of the British Empire delegation, which would take the following form:

"The British Empire delegation desired formally to place on record its opinion that the use of submarines, whilst of small value for defensive purposes, leads inevitably to acts which are inconsistent with the laws of war and the dictates of humanity, and the delegation desires that united action should be taken by all nations to forbid their maintenance, construction, or employment."

The chairman assumed that there was entire agreement that the statement just read by Mr. Balfour should be placed on the record, and that as the views of all the delegates had been heard with regard to the abolition of submarines, the committee might proceed to the discussion of the limitation of submarine tonnage.

In the course of the discussion it had been remarked that as far as submarines were concerned the American proposal was hardly a limitation. The American delegation thought that, so far as American submarine tonnage was concerned, the remark in question had been based on a misapprehension, and that there had been a reduction—from 95,000 tons to 90,000 tons—slight, to be sure, but still a reduction.

He desired, however, to make this suggestion. It was impossible to hear all the arguments regarding submarines without
forming an impression of the views entertained by the delegations on this matter. The American delegation was entirely willing to accept instead of 90,000 tons, proposed as the maximum limit for the United States, 60,000 tons, thus scrapping 35,000 tons of the existing submarine tonnage, on the basis that Great Britain should also accept 60,000 tons as the maximum limit of submarines and scrap 22,464 tons, her present amount of submarine tonnage being 82,464 tons, according to the American figures. Then, in a desire to make whatever accommodation was possible to meet the views entertained by the other delegations, the chairman suggested that if the United States and Great Britain each reduced the maximum limit of their submarine tonnage to 60,000 tons, France, Japan, and Italy should retain the tonnage they have—in other words, maintain the status quo as regards submarine tonnage. He made the suggestion in order to show that so far as the American Government was concerned it was not in favor of anything that savored of expansion. This was a conference on limitation.

In reply to an inquiry by Lord Lee the chairman said that he understood that the present submarine tonnage of Japan was 31,452 tons; that of France, according to the figures given the other day, was 31,391 tons, and that of Italy somewhat less—about 21,000 tons.

The meeting then adjourned until 3.30 p. m., December 24, 1921.

EIGHTH MEETING, COLUMBUS ROOM, PAN AMERICAN UNION BUILDING, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1921, 3 P. M.

PRESENT.

United States, Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz.

British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield. (For Canada), Sir Robert Borden. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark. (For Australia), Senator Pearce. (For New Zealand), Sir John Salmond. (For India), Mr. Sastri, Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Captain Little, Captain Domville, Mr. Christie.

France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Captain Odend'hal, Mr. Ponsot.

Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Polandi Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco.