The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. Government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.
to this committee, which had then discussed the matter and ad-
journed to continue the discussion that afternoon at 3 o’clock.
The meeting adjourned at 12.45 p.m. until December 22, 1921,
3 p.m.

FIFTH MEETING, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1921, 3 P.M.

PRESENT

United States.—Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by
Mr. Wright and Mr. Clark.

British Empire.—Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes,
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada),
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice
Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domville, Mr. Flint.

France.—Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon.
Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend’hal,
Mr. Ponsot.

Italy.—Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Alber-
tini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis
Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr.
Celesia di Vegliasco.

Japan.—Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato,
Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi and Commander
Horii.

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Paul and Mr. Osborne.
Interpreter, Mr. Camerlynck.

1. The fifth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Arma-
ment was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American
Union Building at 3 p.m. Thursday, December 22, 1921.

2. The following were present: For the United States, Mr.
Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col.
Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour,
Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield,
Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Aus-
tralia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for
India); for France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de
Bon; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci,
Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Acton; for Japan, Prince Toku-
gawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda.

3. Secretaries and advisers present included: For the United
States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the British Empire, Sir
Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domville, Mr. Flint; for
France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend’hal, Mr. Pon-
sot; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco; for Japan, Mr. Ichihashi, Commander Hori. The secretary general, accompanied by Mr. Paul and Mr. Osborne, was present. Mr. Camerlynck was present as interpreter.

4. The chairman, Mr. Hughes, announced that the committee was ready to continue the discussion begun at the morning’s session.

Lord Lee said that, as he understood it, the present position was one of agreement between the five powers in regard to the ratio of capital ships, but that all the powers were equally uncommitted on the subject of submarines, small craft, and auxiliaries. Hence he agreed with Admiral de Bon that it was justifiable to begin by clearing up the question of principle as to the future of submarines. To the British Empire the question of submarines was one of transcendent importance. He therefore regretted that any difference of opinion should have arisen on the subject and that submarines should have become the only question on which the British delegation was out of sympathy with the American proposals, and, perhaps, also with the views of France and other powers. He felt, therefore, that it was incumbent upon him to explain and justify British opinion. He wished to present as few figures as possible, but he felt it was necessary to mention the following as the basis of his statement. The figures as regards submarines were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Existing tonnage</th>
<th>The American proposals</th>
<th>Amount of new building permitted under the American proposals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The United States of America</td>
<td>87,500</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>90,500</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>9,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>32,200</td>
<td>54,000</td>
<td>21,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>28,360</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>18,250</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) In proportion.

He felt bound to say that it seemed to him very strange to put before a Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments proposals designed to foster and increase the type of war vessels which, according to the British view, was open to far more objection than surface capital ships. Moreover, it would be a certain consequence, if submarines were retained, that the powers which possessed large mercantile marines would be compelled to increase the numbers of their antisubmarine craft. This would give but little relief to the overburdened taxpayer and would provide
scant comfort to those who wished to abolish war and to make it less inhumane.

The view of the British Government and the British Empire delegation was that what was required was not merely restriction on submarines, but their total and final abolition. In explaining the position he wished to make it clear that the British Empire delegation had no unworthy or selfish motives. He would first like to reply in advance, since this might be his only opportunity of doing so, to the arguments of the friends of the submarine. He understood their first contention to be that the submarine was the legitimate weapon of the weaker powers and was an effective and economical means of defense for an extensive coast line and for maritime communications. Both these standpoints could be contested on technical grounds and, as he would show, were clearly disproved by recent history. If some weak country possessed an exposed coast line, it would, of course, desire to defend it against bombardment or the disembarkation of a military force.

It was necessary to ask, therefore, how such attacks were conducted in modern warfare. The reply was that they were conducted by powerfully armed, swift-moving vessels, fully equipped to resist submarine attack, and to escort and protect the convoys of military transports. There was no branch of naval research which had more closely engaged the attention of experts than the counter offensive against the submarine. He was giving away no secrets when he stated that the methods of detection, location, as well as of destruction of submarines had progressed so much further than the offensive power of the submarines themselves that the latter had now already a reduced value against modern surface warships. This, however, was bringing him into somewhat technical subjects. During the late war Germany had concentrated her naval effort on the production and use of U-boats and had built up the most formidable submarine fleet that the world had ever seen before or since. He believed that Germany had employed, in all, no less than 375 U-boats of 270,000 tons in the aggregate. Of these, no less than 203 had been sunk. What had these U-boats accomplished in legitimate naval warfare? It was almost insignificant. In the early part of the war a few obsolescent ships, which sometimes were not taking proper precautions, had been sunk, but the British Grand Fleet throughout the war had not been affected; not one single ship had been sunk or hit by the action of submarines, whether at sea or in harbor. Its surface squadrons had swept through all parts of the North Sea, and wherever the sea had been clear of mine fields had gone where they wished, undeterred by the submarine. Submarines had not prevented the passage of troops across the sea. No less than 15,000,000 British troops had crossed and recrossed the English Channel during the war, and not one man had been lost from the
action of submarines except on board hospital ships, which in the twentieth century it had been deemed would be immune from the attacks of submarines and therefore had not been escorted.

During the latter part of the war some 2,000,000 United States troops had been brought across the Atlantic, and the submarine had proved equally powerless to prevent them. In fact, the U-boat, whether considered as an offensive or defensive weapon, against any sort of organized naval force had proved almost contemptible.

It had been maintained that submarines were useful for the defense of coast lines and communications with colonies. He gathered from the press that this was one of the arguments used, and so it would have to be examined. If the argument was sound, and if submarines were essential for this purpose, there was no country which would need them so much as the British Empire, which possessed a coast line which, without wishing to boast, he believed was almost as large as that of all the four other powers present at this conference put together, and the length of which was four times the circumference of the globe, and which, in addition, had the longest trade routes of any country to protect. It was partly because experience had shown that they were not effective for this purpose that the British were ready to abandon submarines. The late war had made it abundantly clear that the greatest peril to maritime communications was the submarine, and that peril was specially great to a country which did not possess command of the sea on the surface. Hence, it was to the interest of any such power to get rid of this terrible menace. And in this connection it must be remembered that the submarine was of no value as a defense against submarines. It was against merchant ships alone that they achieved real success.

It would be as well to recall what the German submarine fleet had accomplished against mercantile marines. No less than 12,000,000 tons of shipping had been sunk, of a value of $1,100,000,000, apart from their cargoes. Over 20,000 noncombatants—men, women, and children—had been drowned. It was true that this action had been undertaken in violation of all laws, both human and divine. The German excuse for it had been its effectiveness. They had used the same argument in the case of poison gas, which had set a precedent for unscrupulous nations, which appeared likely to endure for all time now that nations had been driven to resort to it. The menace of the submarine could only be got rid of by its total banishment from the sea. That was the intention of the treaty of Versailles, which had forbidden Germany to construct submarines, whether for military or mercantile purposes. Was it to be assumed, Lord Lee continued, that Germany was always to be bad and the other powers were
always to be good? Was there to be one rule for Germany and another rule for the rest of the world? In saying this he was not casting any reflection on any nation, and least of all on the officers and men of the submarine fleets. These men were the pick of their service, gallant and high-minded men, but they were obliged to obey orders; and experience had shown that occasionally governments could go mad. The view of the British Empire delegation, therefore, was that the only proper course was the abolition of submarines. Their limitation was not sufficient. Another objection to limitation was that a submarine fleet could so very rapidly be expanded in time of war. Submarines could only be built if the industry were kept alive, and personnel could only be provided if a trained nucleus existed. Hence it was only by means of abolition that this menace to the mercantile marine of the world could be got rid of. He had said earlier in his remarks that the British delegation were animated by no selfish motives. At the same time it would be foolish not to recognize that Great Britain was the nation most exposed to the menace of the submarine. So long as submarine warfare continued it would be the greatest menace to the food supplies on which that country was dependent.

The British people lived in a crowded island whose soil only produced two-fifths of its supply of food. For the remaining three-fifths they relied upon sea communications. On an average only seven weeks’ stocks were maintained in the country. By far the greatest anxiety which the British Government had felt during the war was to prevent the reserves of food falling to zero. Was it surprising, therefore, if, with a danger in front of them as great as any to which Mr. Briand had so eloquently explained France was subject, the British people protested against a weapon which was the negation of humanity, chivalry, and civilization itself? There were some people who said it was this vulnerability of Great Britain which justified the retention of the submarine, since it was by these means alone that the British Empire could be stricken down. The late war had shown, however, that the British Empire was not easily stricken down, and, if war should ever come again, he imagined that means would be found for Great Britain to save itself from starvation. But, it might be claimed, if the U-boat had begun its operations earlier or had had better luck, the result might have been different. To this he would reply that the British Navy had constituted the keystone of the allied arch; but for the British Navy France would have been ruined, Belgium and Holland would have been overrun, and even the United States of America, self-contained, self-supporting, with all its vast resources, would have been impotent to intervene and might have had to abandon its Army and all that it had in France, or else to make a humiliating peace.
QUESTIONS ON SUBMARINES.

That would not have been a disaster to Great Britain alone. That was why he resented the idea, which had been published in a part of the press, that the British plea for the abolition of submarines was merely a selfish and unworthy design. It had been suggested that the conditions of the late war might never recur. Could France be so sure of this? Could France run the risk of a disaster to her near neighbor, and only certain ally, if the situation of 1914 were ever reproduced? It was necessary to take long views in this matter, and the British Empire delegation believed that they were fighting the battle, not only of the allied and associated powers, but of the whole civilized world in advocating the abolition of the submarine.

He felt sure that some one would ask, How can we feel sure that, if we abolish submarines, other powers who are not represented here will not proceed with the building of submarines? The same question might be asked as to the other classes of craft mentioned in the American scheme. He found it impossible to believe that other powers would set themselves against the opinion of the rest of the civilized world regarding this particular weapon. If, however, the great naval powers should at some future date find themselves exposed to piracy by the action of some smaller power, surely they would find the means of bringing Nemesis to the transgressor. World opinion was a very powerful weapon, and certainly some means would be found by which the great naval powers could protect themselves if necessary. It was said that submarines were a cheap method of warfare. Surely this conference did not desire to make war cheap? When war had been cheap it had been almost continuous. He hoped the submarine would not be defended because it would be a weapon within the reach of all. It might perhaps be cheap for the aggressor, but it was not so for the victim.

The average number of German submarines operating at any one time on the Atlantic approaches to France and Great Britain during the late war had not been more than nine or ten, but Great Britain had had to maintain an average of no less than 3,000 antisubmarine surface craft in order to deal with these. It could be seen, therefore, that it was a very expensive form of war for the defender. The British Empire delegation were anxious to contribute toward the ideals of the present conference. They desired not only a limitation of armaments but also a limitation of expenditures, which constituted so great a burden in time of peace. That was why Great Britain, which had the tradition of possessing the greatest navy, had welcomed the proposals for curbing capital ships. What would be gained, however, if this competition were merely transferred to submarines? Certainly not much, and meanwhile the submarine threatened Great Britain's very life and existence. But, if the submarine were
abolished, the British Empire delegation could accept, with modifications in detail, practically the whole of the American proposals in regard to the lightening of these burdens.

Lord Lee said he was not impressed with the argument that because it was found impossible to deal effectively with poison gas or air bombs, which were by-products of essential industries, it would be impossible to deal with the submarine. The submarine was not a by-product of any industry, but was essentially an offensive weapon. He, therefore, said that it could be, and ought to be, abolished. It was a weapon of murder and piracy, involving the drowning of noncombatants. It had been used to sink passenger ships, cargo ships, and even hospital ships. Technically the submarine was so constructed that it could not be utilized to rescue even women and children from sinking ships. That was why he hoped that the conference would not give it a new lease of life.

He had endeavored to prove that the submarine was only to a limited extent a weapon of defense, that for offense it was only really valuable when used against merchant ships, and that it constituted the greatest peril to which the mercantile marine of the world was exposed. For defense he did not say it was wholly useless, but merely inefficient, and that its disadvantages greatly exceeded its advantages except for war on the mercantile marine. The submarine was the only class of vessel for which the conference was asked to give—he would not say a license, but permission to thrive and multiply. It would be a great disappointment if the British Empire delegation failed to persuade the conference to get rid of this weapon, which involved so much evil to peoples who live on or by the sea.

To show the earnestness of the British Government in this matter, Lord Lee pointed out that Great Britain possessed the largest and probably the most efficient submarine navy in the world, composed of 100 vessels of 80,000 tons. She was prepared to scrap the whole of this great fleet, to disband the personnel, provided the other powers would do the same. That was the British offer to the world, and he believed it was a greater contribution to the cause of humanity than even the limitation of capital ships.

However, it was useless to be blind to the facts of the position, and he hardly hoped to carry with him all the powers present at that table, though he believed that in the end all civilized powers would come round to the British point of view. In any event, the British Empire delegation did not intend that the settlement in regard to capital ships should be affected if they failed to carry their point in regard to the abolition of submarines. Should he fail to convince his colleagues he would nevertheless welcome any suggestions for the reduction and restriction of submarines which they might like to make, and, in particular, he would await with
the greatest interest the proposals of his French colleagues, which had been promised earlier in the day.

The chairman said that he did not intend then to comment upon the very able and powerful argument of Lord Lee, to which the members of the committee had had the privilege of listening, but he merely wished to interpolate a statement giving the figures supplied by the American naval experts and upon which the American proposal was based, concerning the submarine tonnage built and building, since these figures did not appear to coincide with those referred to by Lord Lee. According to the American figures, this tonnage was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Tons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>82,464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>42,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>20,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>31,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The United States had, therefore, 95,000 tons, which it was prepared to reduce. The reduction was slight. But it was a reduction. It was, of course, not the intention to increase but to reduce.

Lord Lee said that he regretted if any of the figures he had given had been inaccurate.

Mr. Sarraut said the British Government had shown clearly its views regarding submarines; he then read the following declaration of the views of the French Government:

"The French Government has already set forth its views with regard to the question of submarines, first, during the discussions preliminary to the treaty of Versailles and also before the League of Nations, when the representative of the British Government opposed the granting of submarines to the small Baltic powers. In both of these instances the point of view favoring the inclusion of submarines in the naval forces of States met with the almost unanimous approval of the various Governments represented.

"France believes that the submarine is the only weapon which at present permits a nation scantily supplied with capital ships to defend itself at sea. For France, therefore, the submarine is an essential means of preserving her independence which she can not give up, especially in view of the sacrifices to which she has been asked to consent in the matter of capital ships. Moreover, in the present state of the development of naval science the submarine can not suffice to assure the control of the seas to a belligerent, even if that belligerent possesses a great superiority in submarines. It is not, therefore, a weapon making for supremacy.

"The French Government believes that every method of warfare may or may not be employed in conformity with the laws
of war and that the inhuman and barbarous use made of the submarine by a belligerent in the late war is a reason for condemning that belligerent but not for condemning the submarine.

"As submarines are particularly subject to withdrawal from service in war time, the restriction within a certain limit of the total tonnage of these vessels which a maritime nation may build would have to a lesser degree the same effect as their total abolition, and should be declined for the same reasons.

"The French Government has already stated that it can not accept an agreement based on the principle that the total tonnage of submarines which a nation may build should be in direct proportion to the capital ship tonnage of that nation. In its opinion, the contrary point of view is the rational one, since a nation would be deprived of the protection which would be afforded her by capital ships.

"The French Government believes that it is possible to reconcile the use of submarines with the laws of humanity. From this point of view large submarines have the advantage of being able to rescue the crews of torpedoed vessels or to furnish prize crews to captured vessels.

"The French Government is obliged to assume eventually the defense of its numerous colonies, some of which are far distant from the mother country. In view of this fact and also in order to safeguard its lines of communication with the colonies it must possess submarines with a very large cruising radius and consequently with appropriate dimensions.

"For these reasons the French Government can not consent to accept either the abolition of submarines or a reduction of the total tonnage of submarines which it considers to be the irreducible minimum necessary to assure the safety of the territories for which it is responsible, or a limitation of the individual tonnage of submarines."

Senator Schanzer said he had listened with the greatest attention and sympathy to Lord Lee's important speech.

In the name of the Italian delegation he wished to declare his great sympathy with anything that could make war less inhuman.

The Italian delegate in the subcommittee for poison gas, in this same conference, had proposed the abolition of the use of poison gas in warfare. The submarine question was mainly one of a technical nature. Lord Lee had asserted that submarines were not an efficient means of defense. The Italian naval experts did not share this opinion. They thought that the submarine was still an indispensable weapon for the defense of the Italian coasts, which had a very great extent and along which some of the largest cities, the principal railways, and a number of the most important industrial establishments were situated.
The Italian naval experts were furthermore of the opinion that submarines were necessary to protect the lines of communication of their country, which for the greater part depended upon the sea for its supplies. The Italian delegation was not ready at that time to resolve these questions of a technical character.

Senator Schanzé ventured to observe, moreover, that the Italian delegation did not think this conference, in which only five powers were represented, could settle the question of submarines which concerned many other powers not represented here. For these reasons, and in spite of its appreciation of the humanitarian arguments brought forward by Lord Lee, the Italian delegation were not in a position at the present time to associate themselves with the proposal for the abolition of submarines and were not authorized to do so.

Mr. Hanihara said that he had listened with great interest to the able and highly instructive and impressive argument of Lord Lee for the abolition of submarines: The Japanese delegation yielded to none in condemning such atrocious and lawless use of submarines as was resorted to by Germany in the late war. They believed that the sinking of merchant vessels without proper warning had no justification whatever, and they felt called upon to insist on such international rules as would effectively prevent the future recurrence of similar barbarous acts from submarines. Such was the conviction of the Japanese delegation.

However, as legitimate defensive weapons, submarines did not, in the opinion of the Japanese delegation, materially differ from destroyers. The popular idea was that submarines menaced and sank peaceful merchant marines without warning; their legitimate uses were apparently lost sight of. Submarines in their legitimate employment were no more atrocious than poison gas or air bombs. Moreover, when employed as a means of coast defense, submarines were like movable mines and thus constituted an effective defensive weapon. Of course, the unrestricted use of mines against merchant ships in the open sea would be as dangerous as the sinking of ships without warning by submarines.

Mr. Hanihara said he thought it was clear from these observations that submarines could not be considered as an illegitimate weapon. Any weapon might become illegitimate if used without restriction. For the protection of an insular nation like Japan submarines were relatively inexpensive and yet effective; but the Japanese delegation would insist, at the same time, upon more vigorous international rules governing their proper uses. The recurrence of cruelties committed by submarines during the recent war should by all means be avoided.
DIFFERENCES OF OPINION.

The chairman observed that, as had been indicated by the remarks of the delegates, he thought that all could not fail to be deeply impressed by the statement of Lord Lee, supported as it was by the very definite statement of facts as to the use of submarines. He thought that one clear and definite point of view emerged on which all were agreed, namely, that there was no disposition to tolerate on any plea of necessity the illegal use of the submarine as practiced in the late war and that there should be no difficulty in preparing and announcing to the world a statement of the intention of the nations represented at the conference that submarines must observe the well-established principles of international law regarding visit and search in attacks on merchant ships. Much could be done in clarifying this position and in defining what uses of submarines were considered contrary to humanity and to the well-defined principles of international law. The recommendation might go further, not only regarding what were conceived to be the rules regarding use of submarines but also what the limitations upon their use should be.

The chairman understood that the crux of the controversy was as to the use of the submarine as a weapon of defense. Lord Lee had said that it was of little value as such, and hence that its continued use should not be tolerated. Lord Lee had pointed out that there were only five nations present. The chairman could not agree, however, that these were in the same position regarding submarines as they were regarding capital ships, since in the matter of capital ships they represented the potency of competition, whereas when dealing with submarines—a more cheaply made weapon—they were dealing with what other nations could produce, if they chose. Even if they were ready to adopt the principle suggested by the British delegation, they would still have to await the adherence of other nations.

Upon the question whether the submarine was of value for defense, each nation must take the opinion of its naval experts. Indications of differences of opinion had already been manifested. He would not at this time make any announcement of the position of the United States, except to add to the expressions of detestation of the abuse of the submarine and of the methods—the illegal methods, as they have been continually called—of their employment during the war.

He wished, however, to read a report. The President had appointed an Advisory Committee to aid the American delegation. The members of that committee were gathered together, men and women, from all fields of activity, from all parts of the country, and represented every shade of public opinion. That committee had considered this subject, and the subcommittee to which it was
referred was headed by a distinguished admiral of the American Navy. The report was debated in full committee and was unanimously adopted—even by those who were prepossessed against the submarine. He read this report, not as an opinion of the American Government, but as a report of the Advisory Committee, which was created in order that the American delegates might be advised as to public opinion.

The chairman then read the following report on submarines adopted by the Advisory Committee of the American delegation on December 1, 1921:

"In the recent World War the submarine was used in four general ways:

"(a) Unlimited use against both enemy and neutral noncombatant merchant vessels.

"(b) Use against enemy combatant vessels.

"(c) Use as mine planters.

"(d) Use as scouts.

"Whatever is said about unlimited warfare by submarines is also true of unlimited warfare by surface craft, provided the combatant wishes to violate the rules of war. The confederate cruisers destroyed all property, but not lives. The English expected the Germans in the latter part of the World War to use surface craft for unlimited warfare, and had provided means to offset this. However, the Germans, with one exception, were unable to get out of the North Sea. The Moewe, a surface ship, sank almost all merchantmen that she came into contact with, saving the lives of the crews. So that unlimited warfare is not necessarily an attribute of the submarine alone.

"Submarines against commerce.—The unlimited use of submarines by Germany against commerce brought down upon her the wrath of the world, solidified it against the common enemy, and was undoubtedly the popular cause of the United States entering the World War.

"The rules of maritime warfare require a naval vessel desiring to investigate a merchant ship first to warn her by firing a shot across her bow, or in other ways, and then proceed with the examination of her character, make the decision in regard to her seizure, place a prize crew on her, and, except under certain exceptionable circumstances, bring her to port, where she may be condemned by a prize court.

"The rules of procedure (1917) as laid down for United States naval vessels when exercising the right of visit and search make no exception in favor of the submarine. In the early part of the World War the German submarines exercised this right of visit and search in the same manner as surface vessels. When sunk, the papers and crew of merchant ships so visited were saved. Later, when the cases came up in a German prize court sitting
on appeal at Berlin, the responsibility of the German Government was often acknowledged and indemnities paid. When unlimited submarine warfare commenced, in some cases where necessary evidence was produced by the owners making claim in the prize court, the court decided that the matter was outside the pale of the prize regulations, though it did not deny the justice of the claim.

"Assuming that a merchant ship may be halted by a submarine in a legitimate fashion, it becomes difficult because of limited personnel for the submarine to complete the inspection, place a prize crew on board, and bring her into port. It is also difficult for her to take the passengers and crew of a large prize on board should circumstances warrant sinking the vessel. However, these remarks are applicable to small surface crafts as well.

"During the World War, on account of the vulnerability of the submarine and on account of the probability of its sinking the vessels it captured, the tendency was for all merchant ships (including neutrals) to arm themselves against the submarine. Such action greatly hampers the activity of the submarines and tends toward illegal acts both by the merchant vessels and by the submarines. In other words, the general tendency of submarine warfare against commerce, even though starting according to accepted rules, was sharply toward warfare unlimited by international law or any humanitarian rules. This was because the vulnerability of the submarine led the Germans to assume and declare she was entitled to special exemptions from the accepted rules of warfare governing surface craft. The merchant ship sank the submarine if it came near enough; the submarine sought and destroyed the merchant ship without even a knowledge of nationality or guilt.

"Submarines were largely responsible for the extensive arming of merchant vessels, neutral and belligerent, during the World War. The average merchant vessel could not hope to arm effectively against enemy surface combatant vessels and as a rule submits to visit and search without resistance. Prospects of saving the ship and certainty of safety to personnel have caused them to accept as the lesser risk the visit of belligerent surface vessels. When, however, as in the World War, they met a belligerent submarine, with a strong probability of being sunk by that submarine, the law of self-preservation operated, and the merchant ship resisted by every means in its power. Defensive armament was almost sure to be used offensively in an attempt to strike a first blow. The next step was for each to endeavor to sink the other on sight.

"War on commerce by surface combatant craft causes change of ownership of merchant vessels only, provided the surface craft does not sink these ships, but these merchant vessels for the most
part remain in service; they are not destroyed. The world does not lose them. The object of war on commerce is not to destroy shipping but to deprive the enemy of its use. Submarine warfare on commerce, if unlimited in character, injures the enemy and greatly injures the world as well. The world is so highly organized and so dependent on ocean transportation that shipping is essential to livelihood; without it vast populations would starve.

"At present when war breaks out belligerent vessels tend to transfer to neutral flags and also to fly false flags. This hampers lawful warfare by submarines, as owing to their great difficulty in making the proper visit and search, it is thus impossible for them to prevent belligerent commerce from going forward.

"The net results of unlimited submarine warfare in the World War were (a) flagrant violations of international law, (b) destruction of an enormous amount of wealth, (c) unnecessary loss of many innocent lives, and (d) to draw into the war many neutrals.

"Unlimited submarine warfare should be outlawed. Laws should be drawn up prescribing the methods of procedure of submarines against merchant vessels both neutral and belligerent. These rules should accord with the rules observed by surface craft. Laws should also be made which prohibit the use of false flags and offensive arming of merchant vessels. The use of false flags has already ceased in land warfare. No one can prevent an enemy from running 'amuck,' but immediately he does he outlaws himself and invites sure defeat by bringing down the wrath of the world upon his head. If the submarine is required to operate under the same rule as combatant surface vessels, no objection can be raised as to its use against merchant vessels. The individual captains of submarines are no more likely to violate instructions from their Government upon this point than are captains of any other type of ship acting independently.

"Submarines against combatant ships.—Against enemy men-of-war the submarine may be likened to the advance guard on land, which hides in a tree or uses underbrush to conceal itself. If the infantry in its advance encounters an ambuscade, it suffers greatly, even if it is not totally annihilated. However, an ambuscade is entirely legitimate. In the same fashion a submarine strikes the advancing enemy from concealment, and no nation cries out against this form of attack as illegal. Its navy simply becomes more vigilant, moves faster, and uses its surface scouts to protect itself.

"The submarine carries the same weapons as surface vessels; i. e., torpedoes, mines, and guns. There is no prohibition of their use on surface craft and there can be none on submarines. Submarines are particularly well adapted to use mines and torpedoes. They can approach to the desired spot without being seen,
lay their mines or discharge their torpedoes, and make their escape.

"The best defense against them is eternal vigilance and high speed. This causes added fatigue to the personnel and greater wear to the machinery. The continual menace of submarines in the vicinity may so wear down a fleet that when it meets the enemy it will be so exhausted as to make its defeat a simple matter.

"The submarine as a man-of-war has a very vital part to play. It has come to stay. It may strike without warning against combatant vessels, as surface ships may do also, but it must be required to observe the prescribed rules of surface craft when opposing merchantmen as at other times.

"*The submarine as a scout.*—As a scout the submarine has great possibilities. It is the one type of vessel able to proceed unsupported into distant enemy waters and maintain itself to observe and report enemy movements. At present its principal handicaps are poor habitability and lack of radio power to transmit its information. However, these may be overcome in some degree in the future. Here, again, the submarine has come to stay—it has great value, a legitimate use, and no nation can decry its employment in this fashion."

Then followed a statement of the proposal of the United States for limitation of naval armament so far as submarines are concerned, as made at the opening session of the conference.

The report then continued:

"A nation possessing a great merchant marine, protected by a strong surface navy, naturally does not desire the added threat of submarine warfare brought against it. This is particularly the case if that nation gains its livelihood through overseas commerce. If the surface navy of such a nation were required to leave its home waters it would be greatly to its advantage if the submarine threat were removed. This could be accomplished by limiting the size of the submarine so that it would be restricted to defensive operation in its own waters. On the other hand, if a nation has not a large merchant marine, but is dependent upon sea-borne commerce from territory close abroad, it would be necessary to carry war to her. It would be very natural for that nation to desire a large submarine force to protect the approaches on the sea and to attack troop transports, supply ships, etc., of the enemy. Control of the surface of the sea only by the attacking power would not eliminate it from constant exposure and loss by submarine attacks.

"The United States would never desire its Navy to undertake unlimited submarine warfare. In fact, the spirit of fair play of the people would bring about the downfall of the administration which attempted to sanction its use. However, submarines act-
ing legitimately from bases in our distant possessions would harass and greatly disturb an enemy attempting operations against them. They might even delay the fall of these possessions until our fleet could assemble and commence major operations.

"It will be impossible for our fleet to protect our two long coast lines properly at all times. Submarines located at bases along both coasts will be useful as scouts and to attack any enemy who should desire to make raids on exposed positions.

"The submarine is particularly an instrument of weak naval powers. The business of the world is carried on upon the surface of the sea. Any navy which is dominant on the surface prefers to rely on that superiority, while navies comparatively weak may but threaten that dominance by developing a new form of attack to attain success through surprise. Hence submarines have offered and secured advantages until the method of successful counterattack has been developed.

"The United States Navy lacks a proper number of cruisers. The few we have would be unable to cover the necessary area to obtain information. Submarines could greatly assist them, as they can not be driven in by enemy scouts.

"The cost per annum of maintaining 100,000 tons of submarines fully manned and ready is about $30,000,000. For the work which will be required of them in an emergency this cost is small when taken in connection with the entire Navy. The retention of a large submarine force may at some future time result in the United States holding its outlying possessions. If these colonies once fall, the expenditure of men necessary to recapture them will be tremendous, and may result in a drawn war, which would really be a United States defeat. The United States needs a large submarine force to protect its interests.

"The committee is therefore of the opinion that unlimited warfare by submarines on commerce should be outlawed. The right of visit and search must be exercised by submarines under the same rules as for surface vessels. It does not approve limitation in size of submarines."

The chairman stated that he had deemed it his duty to read the foregoing report, which, as he had already said, represented the views of the Advisory Committee that had been created by the President for the very purpose of giving to the American delegation such aid. The American delegation would most carefully consider the able address of Lord Lee and would consult the American naval experts.

Mr. Sarraut said that he thought that the very interesting discussion to which the committee had been listening might well be postponed until the next day. Lord Lee had set forth the British views on the submarine question; he (M. Sarraut) had replied
by outlining the divergent French views, and the chairman had presented the American thesis in an interesting and voluminous document. He could testify to the profound interest aroused among the French delegation by Lord Lee's speech and to the force of his arguments, which if not convincing were highly impressive. He (Mr. Sarraut) and his colleagues felt that the best tribute which they could pay to Lord Lee's able address would be to reply to it in detail. He requested, therefore, that time might be given to prepare this reply and also secure a translation of the document presented by the chairman, and that the meeting be adjourned until Friday afternoon.

The chairman asked what was the pleasure of the committee in this matter.

Mr. Balfour said that he placed himself in the chairman's hands. After some discussion it was agreed to meet Friday afternoon, December 23, 1921, at 3 p.m., and that the statement to the press should embody such portions of the remarks made at the present sessions as the respective delegates should communicate to the secretary general.

The meeting then adjourned until December 23, 1921, 3 p.m.

SIXTH MEETING—FRIDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1921, 3 P. M.

PRESENT.

United States.—Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark.

British Empire.—Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt Domville, Mr. Mousley.

France.—Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Ponsot.

Italy.—Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco.

Japan.—Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi.

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson, Mr. Pierrepont, and Mr. Wilson.

Interpreters, Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon.