FOURTH MEETING.

Mr. Viviani declared that the French delegation would be composed of Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, and Admiral de Bon.

The chairman said that the meeting of this committee would be subject to the call of the Chair.

The meeting then adjourned.

FOURTH MEETING, COLUMBUS ROOM, PAN AMERICAN UNION BUILDING, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1921, 11 A. M.

PRESENT.

United States.—Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark.

British Empire.—Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domville, Mr. Mousley.

France.—Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Ponsot.

Italy.—Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco.

Japan.—Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi, Commander Hori.

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson, Mr. Pierrepont, and Mr. Wilson; interpreters, Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon.

1. The fourth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American Union Building on Thursday, December 22, 1921, at 11 a.m.

2. There were present: For the United States, Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India); for France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Acton; for Japan, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda.

3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were present: For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domville, Mr. Mousley; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend-
hal, Mr. Ponsot; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco; for Japan, Mr. Ichihashi, Commander Hori. The secretary general, accompanied by Mr. Cresson, Mr. Pierrepont, and Mr. Wilson, was present. Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon were present as interpreters.

4. The chairman, Mr. Hughes, opened the meeting by saying that, as the members of the committee would recall, at the first meeting of this Committee on the Limitation of Armament a subcommittee, consisting of technical experts, had been appointed for the purpose of giving information and advice in connection with the proposal formulated by the American Government and any other matters that might be considered pertinent. That committee had proceeded with its deliberations. Conversations between the heads of the United States, British Empire, and Japanese delegations with respect to the definite proposals for the limitation of the capital ships of those three nations had followed. An agreement had been reached between the three powers concerning their capital ships, which, however, was a provisional one, so far as the number of capital ships to be scrapped and the number to be retained was concerned, depending for its final and definite adoption upon the future action of France and Italy.

The chairman stated that it had been found advisable to enlarge the subcommittee, which, it would be recalled, was originally composed exclusively of naval experts, in effect forming a new subcommittee in its place; this new subcommittee had been composed of one delegate for each of the five powers, together with one naval expert and one civilian (who might be a delegate or not), so that expert and political opinions might be more closely related.

The chairman was glad to say that at the first meeting of this new subcommittee (which had been called the subcommittee of fifteen on naval limitation), he had been able to announce that an agreement, provisional while awaiting the decision of France and Italy, had been reached between the delegations of the United States, the British Empire, and Japan. This agreement being familiar to all, he did not wish to take time to read it, but desired to have it incorporated in the records of this committee, as though it had been stated in full, as follows:

"The following are the points of agreement that have been reached in the course of the negotiations between the United States of America, Great Britain, and Japan with respect to their capital fighting ships.

"An agreement has been reached between the three powers—the United States of America, the British Empire, and Japan—on the subject of naval ratio. The proposal of the American Government that the ratio should be \(5:5:3\) is accepted. It is agreed that with respect to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific
RATIO OF SHIPS.

region, including Hongkong, the status quo shall be maintained—that is, that there shall be no increase in these fortifications and naval bases except that this restriction shall not apply to the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, New Zealand, and the islands composing Japan proper, or, of course, to the coasts of the United States and Canada, as to which the respective powers retain their entire freedom.

"The Japanese Government has found special difficulty with respect to the Mutsu, as that is their newest ship. In order to retain the Mutsu Japan has proposed to scrap the Settsu, one of her older ships, which, under the American proposal, was to have been retained. This would leave the number of Japan’s capital ships the same—that is, 10, as under the American proposal. The retention of the Mutsu by Japan in place of the Settsu makes a difference in net tonnage of 13,600 tons, making the total tonnage of Japan's capital ships 313,300 tons, as against 299,700 tons under the original American proposal.

"While the difference in tonnage is small, there would be considerable difference in efficiency, as the retention of the Mutsu would give Japan two post-Jutland ships of the latest design.

"In order to meet this situation and to preserve the relative strength on the basis of the agreed ratio, it is agreed that the United States shall complete two of the ships in course of construction—that is, the Colorado and the Washington—which are now about 90 per cent completed, and scrap two of the older ships—that is, the North Dakota and the Delaware—which, under the original proposal, were to be retained. This would leave the United States with the same number of capital ships—that is, 18, as under the original proposal—with a tonnage of 525,850 tons, as against 500,650 tons as originally proposed. Three of the ships would be post-Jutland ships of the Maryland type.

"As the British have no post-Jutland ships, except one Hood, the construction of which is only partly post-Jutland, it is agreed that in order to maintain proper relative strength the British Government may construct two new ships not to exceed 35,000 legend tons each; that is, calculating the tonnage according to British standards of measurement, or, according to American calculations, the equivalent of 37,000 tons each.

"It is agreed that the British Government shall, on the completion of these two new ships, scrap four of their ships of the King George V type—that is, the Erin, King George V, Centurion, and Ajax, which were to have been retained under the original American proposal. This would leave the British capital ships in number 20, as against 22 under the American proposal. Taking the tonnage of the two new ships according to American calculations, it would amount to 74,000, and the four ships scrapped, having a tonnage of 96,000 tons, there would be a reduction in
net tonnage of 22,400 tons, leaving the British tonnage of capital ships 582,050 instead of 604,450. This would give the British as against the United States an excess tonnage of 56,200 tons, which is deemed to be fair, in view of the age of the ships of the Royal Sovereign and the Queen Elizabeth types.

"The maximum limitation for the tonnage of ships to be constructed in replacement is to be fixed at 35,000 legend tons—that is, according to British standards of measurement, or, according to American calculations, the equivalent of 37,000 tons—in order to give accommodation to these changes. The maximum tonnage of capital ships is fixed, for the purpose of replacement, on the basis of American standards of calculation, as follows:

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"Comparing this arrangement with the original American proposal, it will be observed that the United States is to scrap 30 ships as proposed, save that there will be scrapped 13 of the 15 ships under construction and 17 instead of 15 of the older ships.

"The total tonnage of the American capital ships to be scrapped under the original proposal, including the tonnage of ships in construction if completed, was stated to be 845,740 tons. Under the present arrangement the tonnage of the 30 ships to be scrapped, taking that of the ships in construction if completed, would be 820,540 tons.

"The number of the Japanese ships to be retained remains the same as under the original proposal. The total tonnage of the ships to be scrapped by Japan under the original American proposal, taking the tonnage of new ships when completed, was stated to be 448,928 tons. The total tonnage of the ships to be scrapped under the present arrangement is 435,328 tons.

"Under the original proposal Great Britain was to scrap 19 capital ships (including certain predreadnaughts already scrapped), whereas under the present arrangement she will scrap 4 more, or a total of 23. The total tonnage of ships to be scrapped by Great Britain, including the tonnage of the four Hoods, to which the proposal referred as laid down, if completed, was stated to be 583,375 tons. The corresponding total of scrapped ships under the new arrangement will be 22,600 tons more, or 605,975 tons.

"Under the American proposal there were to be scrapped 66 capital fighting ships built and building, with a total tonnage (taking ships laid down as completed) of 1,878,043 tons. Under the present arrangement, on the same basis of calculation, there are to be scrapped 68 capital fighting ships, with a tonnage of 1,861,643 tons.
“The naval holiday of 10 years with respect to capital ships, as originally proposed by the American Government, is to be maintained except for the permission to construct ships as above stated.

“This arrangement between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan is, so far as the number of ships to be retained and scrapped is concerned, dependent upon a suitable agreement with France and Italy as to their capital ships, a matter which is now in course of negotiation.”

The chairman, continuing, reported that the subcommittee of fifteen on naval limitation had proceeded to consider the question of capital ship tonnage with regard to France and Italy. Admiral de Bon had very eloquently presented a proposal on behalf of the French Government which had been discussed. He would not attempt to describe the course of that discussion. It would be sufficient for him to say that there had been a discussion of the French desire to be free to build 10 capital ships of 35,000 tons each. The American delegation had stated its understanding that the present composition of France's first line navy was 7 capital ships, totaling 164,000 tons, and 3 predreadnaughts, giving an approximate total tonnage of 221,000 tons. He had pointed out that the other Governments had agreed to scrap their predreadnaughts without planning to replace them. Apart from this, the agreement to scrap capital ship tonnage represented for the three powers a cut of about 40 per cent in their capital ship tonnage exclusive of predreadnaughts. In the case of France, a similar reduction would have meant a reduction to about 102,000 tons. It had been considered fair not to ask so much of France, but that she should be free to keep all of her 10 ships, including the 3 predreadnaughts. In replacing her old ships, however, France was asked to keep her Navy down to 175,000 tons.

He had reported further that Italy had expressed the desire to maintain a naval parity with France. Italy was perfectly satisfied with the limit of 175,000 tons for capital ships so long as it applied equally to France and Italy. He had understood that the French Government was also content with parity with Italy. Admiral de Bon had, however, presented a complete statement of France's position, of her desire to be free to have 10 ships in the course of time to put her fleet on a footing she considered necessary and fitting, and to begin the replacement of her warships at an earlier date, due to the condition of her dockyards and to the fact that she had already refrained from building for some years.

In view of his responsibilities as chairman and considering that Mr. Briand had been present at the earlier sessions of the conference and shown such a strong wish to see it succeed, he, with the knowledge of the French representative, had sent a
message to Mr. Briand and received a reply. This correspondence being familiar to all, he would regard it as now submitted and ordered spread upon the records, as follows:

"DECEMBER 16, 1921.

"My Dear M. Briand: In view of your distinguished service at the Conference on Limitation of Armament and of my responsibilities as chairman of the conference, I venture to address to you this personal word. I am happy to say that the conversations between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan as to the proposal which I made on behalf of the American Government at the opening of the conference with respect to capital ships have resulted in a provisional agreement. Great Britain and Japan have accepted the naval ratio as proposed and the reduction of capital ships, with such modifications as do not seriously affect the principle involved. Japan keeps the Mutsu and scraps the Settsu. The United States finishes two ships, the Colorado and the Washington, now about 90 per cent completed, and scraps the North Dakota and Delaware. Great Britain will build two new ships and scrap four, to wit, the Erin, King George V, Centurion, and Ajax. The result is that the United States still scraps 30 ships—that is, 13 of the ships under construction and 17, instead of 15, of the older ships, leaving the number of ships the same as under the original proposal, with a tonnage of 525,000 tons, instead of 500,000 tons. Thus the United States scraps 322,000 tons of her ships (exclusive of predreadnaughts). Great Britain and Japan scrap to an equivalent extent. Japan retains the same number of ships as proposed and scraps 17 as proposed, her new tonnage being 313,300, instead of about 300,000.

"Great Britain scraps 22,600 tons more than originally proposed, leaving her tonnage 582,000 instead of 604,400, her excess being allowed in view of the age of her existing ships. The new limits are very little different from those proposed, being 525,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain, and 315,000 tons for Japan. The naval holiday as to capital ships is agreed upon except for the construction of the ships above mentioned. In short, under the original American proposal there were to be scrapped by the three powers 66 capital fighting ships, built and building, with a total tonnage (taking ships laid down as completed) of 1,878,000 tons. Under the present arrangement, on the same basis of calculation, there are to be scrapped 68 capital fighting ships, with a tonnage of 1,861,000 tons.

"You will thus observe that there has been simply a slight readjustment in the three navies with respect to the ships retained, but that the sacrifices proposed by the American Government have substantially been made and the principle as laid down is being carried out so far as these three powers are concerned.
"The agreement, however, as to the number of ships to be retained by them is dependent upon an appropriate agreement with France and Italy with respect to their capital ships. Italy is desirous to reduce her capital ships, because of the obvious requirements of her economic life, to the lowest possible basis and there will be not the slightest difficulty in making an agreement with Italy if we can reach a suitable understanding with France.

"You will observe the attitude of France will determine the success or failure of these efforts to reduce the heavy burden of naval armament.

"In dealing with Great Britain and Japan we have taken facts as they are. We have avoided an academic discussion of national needs and aspirations which in the nature of things could not be realized. It has been pointed out that the ratio of strength in capital ships is that which exists and that it is futile to desire a better one, for it can not be obtained if nations with abundant resources build against each other in competition. The predreadnaughts possessed by the three powers are to be scrapped without any suggestion of replacement, and there has been a reduction of over 40 per cent of the naval strength represented by dreadnaughts and superdreadnaughts. Now, France has seven dreadnaughts, with a tonnage of 164,500. Reducing in the same proportion as the United States has reduced, her tonnage of capital ships would be fixed at 102,000, or if the predreadnaughts of France were taken into calculation on her side although omitted on the side of the United States, the total tonnage of France's capital ships being taken at 221,000, a reduction on the same basis would reduce France to 136,000 tons.

"This would be the sacrifice of France if she made the same sacrifices that have been made by the other powers. We do not ask this. We are entirely willing that France should have the benefit of an increased tonnage which would preclude the necessity of her scrapping her dreadnaughts; that is to say, her present strength in dreadnaughts is about 164,000 tons, and there is not the slightest objection to allowing this and an increase over this, or a total of 175,000 tons, which would be more than 70,000 tons over what she would have on the basis of relative strength as it exists.

"If it be said that France desires a greater relative strength, the obvious answer is that this would be impossible of attainment. If such an agreement as we are now proposing were not made, the United States and Great Britain would very shortly have navies of over a million tons, more than 6 to 1 as compared with France, and France would not be in a position to better herself, much less by any possible endeavor to obtain such a relative strength as has been suggested. In short, the proposed agreement is tremendously
in favor of France by reducing the navies of powers who not only are able to build but whose ships are actually in course of construction to a basis far more favorable to France than would otherwise be attainable. The proposed agreement really doubles the relative strength of the French Navy.

"In these circumstances I feel that the suggestion that has been made that France should build 10 new capital ships in replacement, with a tonnage of 300,000 tons or more, suggests a program of such magnitude as to raise the greatest difficulties. In fact, I regret to say that after canvassing the matter thoroughly and taking the best information I can obtain, I am compelled to conclude that it would not be possible on this basis to carry through the agreement.

"I need not point out to you our great desire, which you yourself have so eloquently expressed, that the economic burden of armament should be lifted. It is not against the interests of France that we express the hope that her industry and resources will be devoted to economic recuperation and the enhancement of her prosperity rather than be expended in the building of fighting ships. The particular situation of France with respect to land armament you have vividly portrayed, but that points, as it seems to us, to the very great importance of reduction in naval armament. At this time, when we are anxious to aid France in full recovery of her economic life, it would be most disappointing to be advised that she was contemplating putting hundreds of millions into battleships.

"I have spoken to you thus frankly because of my deep appreciation of your friendship and of your solicitude for the success of the efforts we are making, and in the hope that the present matter, which represents perhaps the most critical position yet reached in the conference, may be adjusted on a satisfactory basis. I repeat that the provisional agreement reached with Great Britain and Japan hinges upon an appropriate agreement with France, and I can not too strongly urge the most careful consideration of all the matters to which I have taken the liberty to allude. Permit me to assure you of my highest respect and of the keen desire that we entertain in America that you should visit us again at an early date.

"CHARLES E. HUGHES."

"LONDON, December 18, 1921.

"MY DEAR MR. HUGHES: At the moment of my departure for London, Mr. Herrick handed me your friendly telegram in regard to the difficulties which have arisen in the Naval Disarmament Commission in reference to the tonnage of capital ships which have been asked for by the French delegation."
"You fear that the maintenance of this French request may have as its effect to hinder the agreement between the five powers. The will of the French Government is to do everything which is compatible with the care of the vital interests of France with a view to reconcile our points of view.

"In the question of naval armament, the preoccupation of France is not the offensive point of view but uniquely the defensive point of view.

"With regard to the tonnage of capital ships—that is to say, attacking ships, which are the most costly—I have given instructions to our delegates in the sense which you desire. I am certain that I shall be sustained by my Parliament in this view.

"But so far as the defensive ships are concerned (light cruisers, torpedo boats, and submarines) it would be impossible for the French Government, without putting itself in contradiction with the vote of the chambers, to accept reductions corresponding to those which we accept for capital ships under this formal reserve which you will certainly understand.

"The idea which dominates the Washington conference is to restrict naval armaments which are offensive and costly. But I do not believe that it is the program to deny to a nation like France, which has a large extent of coasts and a great number of distant colonies, the essential means of defending its communications and its security.

"I am certain, my dear Mr. Hughes, that you will appreciate the effort of conciliation which we are making in order to respond to your request.

"I beg you kindly to accept my cordial remembrances and the ardent wish which I form for the complete and striking success of the conference over which you preside with so much authority and brilliancy.

"Briand."

The chairman stated that he had understood the attitude of the French Government in substance to be that it was not so much preoccupied with the question of capital ships as it was concerned with auxiliary vessels such as light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. Capital ships were very costly and he had understood that in this regard the French Government was willing to accept a solution in the sense which he, as chairman, had desired, but that it could not accept a corresponding reduction with regard to auxiliary craft.

Then had followed a discussion of the desire voiced by Admiral de Bon that France should have six instead of five capital ships and that an arrangement should be reached with respect to auxiliary vessels before any decision was made concerning capital ships. Admiral de Bon had submitted very complete and important figures in connection with France's replacement problem, the
difficulties of constructing several ships at once in her dockyards, and the consequent desire of the French Government to begin building in 1927 and to lay down one ship annually until the French quota was filled.

There had been some question as to whether, in the correspondence passing between Mr. Briand and the chairman, Mr. Briand had conditioned his acceptance of the capital-ship tonnage proposed for France (175,000 tons) upon the making of a satisfactory adjustment with reference to auxiliary combatant surface craft and submarines or whether he had unconditionally accepted the proposed capital-ship tonnage for France (175,000) but at the same time had made a full reservation that such acceptance should in no way prejudice the position as to auxiliary combatant surface craft and submarines which the French might desire to take. He (the chairman) had understood it in the latter sense. He had not understood that it was in any way necessary to come to an understanding with regard to lighter craft before reaching an agreement concerning capital ships, but had understood that nothing that was decided in regard to the capital-ship ratio should be considered as involving a concession as to auxiliary vessels.

The chairman stated that he had had no desire to detract in any manner from the French reservation or to build anything upon a phrase, but he had not thought it necessary to wait for a decision regarding lesser craft before reaching a provisional agreement on capital ships. Upon this point the subcommittee had desired to know fully the views of the French delegation.

When this point in the deliberations of the subcommittee had been reached it was realized that it was not dealing with exclusively technical matters, and he had accordingly suggested that there were no reasons why these discussions should not proceed before the full committee, as many of the delegates not present on the subcommittee would like to hear them. It was not necessary to be a naval expert—which he himself made no pretense of being—in order to take part, and he felt a little reluctance at having the discussions proceed while the other delegates were absent. It had therefore been decided to continue the discussions in the full committee, inviting the technical naval experts to sit with the delegations. This meeting had then been called.

The chairman stated further that he could not possibly do justice to the elaborate statements made by Admiral de Bon, who had presented detailed arguments in support of every phase of the French Government's position. The chairman therefore had merely given an outline of the whole situation and would not attempt to go into details. He desired only to set forth the main points, so that the committee might have a basis upon which to proceed. To sum up, therefore, his understanding was that France
RESERVATION ON SOME CLASSES.

was ready to accept the limit of 175,000 tons for capital ships, but distinctly reserved her decision with regard to auxiliary vessels and submarines and was not willing to have her acceptance taken in any way as implying an agreement to a corresponding figure for auxiliary vessels.

The chairman then pointed out that the committee was uninformed with regard to what tonnage of lighter craft, destroyers, submarines, etc., the French Government desired. He felt that a statement from the French delegation on this point would now be useful. In saying his, however, he, of course, did not wish to foreclose discussion by others of the points he had already set forth.

The chairman added that he regretted to find he had omitted a point which should have been included in his review. It was quite apparent that it was impossible to foresee the future development of naval construction and of scientific researches, or what new political conditions might arise with relation to other powers not represented here. Consequently the opinion had been generally expressed that there should be another conference after 10 or after 7 years to reconsider questions that might result from new conditions produced through scientific or political developments or to deal with questions raised by or between powers not represented at the conference here. This did not mean that this present conference should not arrive at a decision fixing definite points of agreement. It meant that the present gathering might provide for a later conference to consider new phases and developments at a later date. He added that Mr. Balfour had suggested that the American Government should prepare and submit a draft statement regarding the calling of a new conference, and that this suggestion had been accepted.

In conclusion the chairman said that he thought he had now reviewed all that was necessary and that he would accordingly invite discussion.

Admiral de Bon said that he had nothing to add to the very clear presentation that had just been made by the chairman; he only asked permission to add a few words for the benefit of the delegates who had not been present at the meetings of the subcommittee in order to make entirely clear to them the spirit of the French demands.

When the French delegation had been called upon to formulate their views on the program for the reconstruction of the future force of France in capital ships, they had first pointed out that the coefficient which had served as a basis for the future naval forces of the British, Japanese, and American Navies could not be used for calculating the future naval force necessary for France.
The reason for this was obvious; this coefficient had been deduced from calculations based on the considerable increases in the three navies, whereas the French Navy was in a situation which demanded special consideration; it was far behind its normal program and even below its normal condition.

France had, in point of fact, already considerably reduced her fleet, while, during the same period, the American Navy had increased 48 per cent and the Japanese Navy 26 per cent. Before the war Great Britain had been obliged to build, in order to meet the threat of Germany; then the United States and Japan threw themselves into that armament race which had been one of the chief reasons for this conference. This coefficient could not, then, with justice and equity, be applied to France; she must suggest another method of calculation.

Her naval strength was at present composed of 10 vessels (including 3 predreadnaughts), the replacement of which was contemplated by France. As soon as she had been informed that predreadnaughts were not to be counted, she had agreed to limit herself to 7 ships.

France did not contemplate the immediate construction of a fleet of 10 battleships of 35,000 tons, but only the adoption of a program which would permit the replacement of the ships existing to-day from time to time as they should become obsolete, in accordance with the dates specified in the American scheme and based upon the normal life of vessels.

Such a program could not be completed before 1941. France could not allow herself to disappear from the number of the maritime powers, but she had never had the intention of constructing 10 vessels within a short time; her program had in view a gradual increase covering the period up to 1941, which indicated that her ambition was not inordinate.

At the last session the French delegation had finally agreed to consider a substantial reduction of their demands, leaving France with only 5 capital ships, with the reservation that they would ask a reconsideration of the point by the delegation, since 5 vessels did not constitute a tactical unit, the minimum of the weakest squadron that ever existed being 6 ships.

If France remained with only 5 ships, she would be practically disarmed from a naval point of view; with 6 ships she would be weak, but could still create a living organization.

The proposals which have been made by the French delegation, in conformity with instructions received, were based upon the above principles.

This enormous concession had been made for the sake of the success of the conference; it had left France in a serious situation, and it had as a consequence created the imperative need
that she should have a greater number of light craft and submarines. Under these circumstances the French delegation believed the future constitution of the French fleet would have to be considered as a whole and could not be divided into two parts—capital ships on the one hand and light craft and submarines on the other.

Such a method would be required not only for the French fleet but for all the navies. The chairman had pointed out that at this juncture it would be desirable for France to make known her requirements as to submarines and light craft; the French delegation were disposed to do so; correspondence was in progress with the French Government, and a telegram was expected which would make known the results of the decisions reached. The question was a very serious one, and before definite figures could be presented they should receive the sanction of the Government.

If concessions should be demanded in the matter of light craft and submarines, the great concession that had been made in regard to capital ships should be borne in mind and the security of France and the limitations of her normal naval existence should not be lost sight of.

In considering the problem as a whole, the French delegation were confronted by a question, raised by the British delegation, in regard to the necessity for abolishing or retaining the submarine. It appeared to the French delegation that in discussion this matter took precedence over the others, since it might embarrass their labors or nullify their results. It was desirable to make rapid progress, and the delegation believed that the first thing to do was to discuss the submarine question; this was the natural sequence of things, and this question should be taken into serious consideration and be made the subject of a very frank debate.

In conclusion, the French delegation desired to state its conviction that the discussion could not be pursued without taking into account the question of submarines.

The chairman stated that he wished to make a suggestion in order to avoid the possibility of any misapprehension. The proposal made by the American Government at no time contained any suggestion as to the exact number of ships any power might build in replacement. It had said how many ships the United States, Great Britain, and Japan should discard and how many they should retain. The calculations regarding replacement were based entirely on tonnage. What had been said regarding the number of capital ships had simply been inferred from calculations based on the tonnage figures. It had not been stated in the American proposal that the reduction to 175,000 tons for France and Italy would limit them to five ships. That conclusion was a deduction by the French and Italian delegations. Using 35,000
tons as the necessary size of a capital ship, it was evident that the result would be five ships. But no country was required to build vessels of that tonnage. The French Navy had at present seven capital ships totaling 164,000 tons. There was no objection to France having six or seven ships, or whatever number she desired. The chairman could understand the desire to have all ships built of the maximum size, but that was a matter of preference and was in no sense obligatory. He pointed out that there was therefore no question as to the number of ships; it was a question of tonnage only—a question of whether France should have 175,000 tons or should be allowed six ships of 35,000 tons, which would mean a total of 210,000 tons.

The chairman then referred to Admiral de Bon’s suggestion that there should be a preliminary discussion regarding the abolition of submarines. The committee greatly desired, he felt, to proceed with the discussion concerning auxiliary craft as soon as the French delegation were prepared to state what France desired in that regard. Without such a statement there was nothing upon which to proceed save the original American proposal. Italy desired equality with France, but the standard on which such equality must be based was not before the committee. The committee must therefore wait until the French delegation were ready to present their particular proposal. After that the discussion would continue.

Admiral de Bon said he desired to add but one word to what he had already said. He did not believe it possible, when the question of the French Navy was considered, that anybody could believe France so foolish as to construct small capital ships; that is to say, those inferior to 35,000 tons. If France should later find herself obliged to construct vessels of war—although she had not yet expressed her intention of doing so—she must certainly build vessels equal in strength to the capital ships of other navies. In other words, to impose upon her a maximum of 175,000 tons would be equivalent to limiting her to five boats. With respect to this there could be no hesitation, he said, in the minds of properly informed persons. The total amount of tonnage must change, whether they built five or whether they built the proper organic force of six. Concerning these questions a certain delay had arisen because Mr. Briand was at the moment somewhere between London and Paris and under such circumstances consultations were difficult or impossible. He now came, he said, to the question of submarines. Whether they were to be abolished or not, in view of the fact that nothing could be done without clearing up this point, he suggested that the matter should be taken up immediately; it would forward the work of the conference to do so.
Lord Lee said that he rose to clear up an important point with reference to the prospective conference to be held seven years hence, or it might be earlier. The justification for the conference arose from the inevitable development of technical aspects of the naval problem, which might render technical decisions now made either obsolete or inadequate. Among such technical questions he put that of numbers as opposed to tonnage as a basis of calculation for capital ships. Moreover, in seven years' time 35,000 tons "legend draft" might prove no longer a useful rule as to the limitation of individual capital ships. These questions of technical proportions he proposed should be left open for reconsideration at the future conference.

Senator Schanzer asked that he be allowed to make a few remarks on the subject of future meetings. Italy, of course, was in sympathy with the proposal for a meeting in seven years, and could understand that it might be necessary to discuss and review the work done at this conference. He suggested, however, but only in an informal way, that room be left in the agreement for a clause which would permit any one of the signatory powers to ask for a meeting at any time prior to the conclusion of the seven-year period. He pointed out that while scientific changes were sure to take place, political changes were also quite possible. He was not thinking, he added, of Germany, since Germany would be held in restraint by the terms of the treaty of Versailles, but of Russia. No one knew what Russia might do. He suggested, therefore, that there be an agreement for a meeting in seven years, but that the right be reserved to call one at an earlier date.

Mr. Balfour questioned whether the moment was suitable for a discussion on the question of the next conference. He understood that his own suggestion that the United States delegation should draw up a resolution on the subject for later consideration had been acceptable for the purpose of giving effect to the general policy of all the powers represented here. He was sure that the United States Government would consider the question of the date from the point of view not only of possible technical developments but also of those considerations of international polity which Senator Schanzer had very properly referred to. He himself would prefer an interval of eight rather than seven years, but perhaps it would be better to adjourn the discussion until the proposal of the United States Government was available.

The chairman observed that a point had been reached where the French delegation were not prepared to present a definite proposal with regard to lighter craft and desired a discussion of the question of submarines, which it was understood the British
Government desired to have abolished. The British delegation, however, not having expected this subject to arise so soon, were not yet ready to introduce it. If it would be convenient for the members of the committee to meet at 3 o'clock that afternoon, progress might be made with the submarine question. He wished neither to hasten his colleagues unduly nor to take the responsibility of delaying the proceedings when there was so much to be discussed.

Mr. Sarraut said that the French delegation would raise no difficulties with respect to holding a session of the committee during the afternoon, but in regard to the definite statements referred to by Mr. Hughes they could not undertake to have the matters in question ready. The reason was obvious. Mr. Briand was to arrive in Paris that afternoon. It had been impossible to keep him informed with respect to the negotiations here. Always faithful to France's aim of seeking to reconcile opposing views, an accord was looked for which would satisfy the United States and the other powers. He could say that the French program would be carefully revised, but with respect to the second part of the question—i. e., that concerning submarines and auxiliary ships—although their views had been transmitted to Paris they could not act without the approval of the French Government. They expected to receive an early answer, but in the natural course of things this could not be expected during the afternoon. This was because Mr. Briand was only then leaving London and would be obliged to consult on his arrival with the French minister of marine. With these reservations he accepted the proposal of a meeting that afternoon. Or, if the British delegation so desired and were ready to proceed, the French delegation were ready to continue immediately with the discussion of the submarine question.

The chairman remarked that as the information necessary would soon be available and as the conference now had its attention focused on the naval question, to break away from this and return to far-eastern questions would interrupt proceedings and cause an unfortunate delay. While not wishing in any way to hurry his colleagues and while, of course, there should be a full opportunity for consultation and consideration, it would seem that the committee should meet again promptly in order to make progress. He, therefore, merely wished to inquire whether it would be more convenient to meet that afternoon or the following morning.

That afternoon at 3 o'clock was the time agreed upon.

The chairman suggested that the communiqué should state that the progress already made in the subcommittee had been reported
to this committee, which had then discussed the matter and ad-
journed to continue the discussion that afternoon at 3 o'clock.

The meeting adjourned at 12.45 p. m. until December 22, 1921,
3 p. m.

FIFTH MEETING, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1921, 3 P. M.

PRESENT.

United States.—Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator
Underwood, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by
Mr. Wright and Mr. Clark.

British Empire.—Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes,
Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada),
Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New
Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice
Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Flint.

France.—Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon.
Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal,
Mr. Ponsot.

Italy.—Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Al­
bertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis
Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr.
Celesia di Vegliasco.

Japan.—Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato,
Capt. Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi and Commander
Horl.

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Paul and Mr. Osborne.
Interpreter, Mr. Camerlynck.

1. The fifth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Arma­
ment was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American
Union Building at 3 p. m. Thursday, December 22, 1921.

2. The following were present: For the United States, Mr.
Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Col.
Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour,
Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield,
Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Aus­
tralia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for
India); for France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de
Bon; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator
Albertini, Vice Admiral Acton; for Japan, Prince Toku­
gawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda.

3. Secretaries and advisers present included: For the United
States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the British Empire, Sir
Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domvile, Mr. Flint; for
France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Pon-