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The Helsinki Process: Negotiating Security and Cooperation in Europe

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Manifesting its distrust for official reports, the press focused on the treaty's relatively small number of opponents, developing the appearance of national pressure for an agreement at almost any cost. The reality was that only 28 percent of the American public professed any knowledge of INF (even after it was signed), and those actually opposed to Reagan's cautious approach numbered in single digits. An administration official admits, however, that policies were designed to placate press concerns: "The reality in Washington every morning is the *Washington Post*. It arrives at your door and defines your reality." The result, according to the chief negotiator of the treaty, made the situation "very difficult. . . . The press editorials would call for rapid results, so it would put pressure on us to move faster, make more concessions." Genes's interviews of the journalists involved produced denials of special agendas but evidenced a certain degree of pride in stimulating, or as one authority put it, "fast forwarding," the results.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union has turned the era of superpower arms control negotiations into history, arguing press proclivities may seem moot. But the book's primary lesson for politico-military decision makers is that they should anticipate and beware of the unrelenting pressure of a media that will show little respect for the particulars of patient policy making. In such an environment, personalities and conjecture drive out plain facts, and "fair play" should not be expected. James Timbie, technical advisor for the INF negotiation team, describes what the press attention was like during negotiations: "Fair is not the first word that comes to mind. . . . Reporters were trying to uncover the 'political

dimension' of INF—Republican versus Democrat, White House versus the Congress, or State Department versus Defense Department. The press emphasized personality and the political dimension over factual accounts of the negotiations."

While such may be growing folk-knowledge in Washington, this book does a sound scholarly service in demonstrating that the political power of the media, even in the absence of public opinion, is very real and can be measured.

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Fry, John. *The Helsinki Process: Negotiating Security and Cooperation in Europe*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press, 1993. 411pp. (No price given)

"Long before the Paris meeting, the Helsinki Process had begun to unravel Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe," writes John Fry. The Helsinki process also figures prominently in European accounts of the end of the Cold War, whereas U.S. commentators tend to focus more on how the Reagan arms buildup bankrupted and intimidated the Soviet Union. Whichever version triumphs, the story of how the "two Europes" commenced a dialogue that contributed to peace is a fascinating one. Countries whose foreign officials initially could not agree to hold a meeting eventually succeeded in agreeing to full human rights protections in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Citizens in Eastern Europe then appealed to their own

governments to honor the obligations they had consented to at Helsinki. In refusing to do so, the governments chose instead to discredit themselves. Thus, the mounting crises over the legitimacy of Eastern and Central European regimes ultimately spelled their end and revealed, in the author's words, "the increasing power of public diplomacy."

Fry studiously details the conference diplomacy which took place under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (a new and upgraded title) is presently a fifty-three-member body including all of Europe, Canada, and the United States. Fry covers the period from its inception in the early 1970s through 1992.

Throughout, the author bases his work on careful scholarship and astute observations from the vantage point of an insider. His former position as a senior U.S. Foreign Service official with responsibilities bearing directly on CSCE negotiations provide him with valuable information, not the least of which is found in select interviews and unpublished materials used in this book. In lengthy appendices, Fry includes the most important texts which resulted from the Helsinki process, increasing the book's reference value. His commentary covers the major points of disagreement among the conference participants, their strategies, national perspectives, and the machinations of their negotiators. He pays particular attention to the substance of their agreements, which ranges widely beyond the human rights emphasis for which the Helsinki process usually is acclaimed.

Members of the national security community will be interested in how the negotiations moved into more traditional security areas, and how evidence from the Helsinki process was used to draw conclusions about the usefulness of conference diplomacy for military issues. Fry is attuned to procedures that facilitate progress in negotiations. For example, one lesson (also known to the European Union) is to agree on future dates for meetings, often for the purpose of reviewing an agreement or its implementation, while the group is in a conference mode; the goal is to make sure the process continues. As Fry demonstrates, the ongoing nature of the Helsinki process allowed for a dynamic of fits and starts (including walkouts and impasses), as well as breakthroughs and systematization.

Fry's analysis holds political-historical interest for students and specialists of European and East-West relations during an epochal period, and, for that matter, observers interested in the different perspectives that emerged at the time between the European Community and the United States. Indeed, this book might provide a starting point for understanding the current enthusiasm that Western Europeans hold for multilateralism, as tied in some way to their having been well served by the Helsinki process. In contrast, the United States seems uncomfortably entangled by multilateral arrangements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement and UN peacekeeping.

Although Fry tends to restrict himself to the specific analytical task of dissecting a process, occasionally he allows himself the license of interpretation. For instance, in describing the "genius of the

Final Act,” Fry reflects that it “recognizes that true security depends on balanced progress in security, human rights and economic cooperation.” Although not its main focus, this work does make a contribution to rethinking security. In addition to pointing out the broad concept of security the Helsinki process elaborated, the book identifies unexpected players in the national security game: Helsinki monitoring groups and citizens holding their governments accountable. Ideally, in the future the world’s citizens will continue to be mobilized by similarly noble causes, not the nationalist and zero-sum motives we fear so much at present.

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Kagan, Robert. *A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977–1990*. New York: Basic Books, 1996. 903pp. \$37.50

During the 1980s Nicaragua became a major ideological battleground in the East-West conflict. In 1979, Sandinista revolutionaries toppled the government of Anastasio Somoza and immediately embarked on a radical transformation of the country’s social, political, and economic structures, dramatically extending government controls and threatening those who challenged their consolidation of power. Most significantly, from an American strategic perspective, the Sandinista regime became a vehicle for supporting insurgency in El Salvador.

In this important historical study of U.S.-Nicaraguan relations, Robert Kagan

tells of the political forces and institutional dynamics that influenced the development and execution of American foreign policy toward this small land. Kagan’s massive treatise can be viewed as three distinct stories. The first is that of the domestic politics of U.S. foreign policy toward Nicaragua. By explaining the ongoing political conflicts between President Ronald Reagan and Congress, and between congressional Republicans and Democrats, the author shows how difficult foreign policy making can be in a democratic society, especially when the conflicts involve core interests and fundamental moral values. Indeed, Kagan argues that the intensity of the policy debates had less to do with Nicaragua than with how “to define America at home and abroad.”

The second story is that of the domestic politics of Nicaragua, illuminating the institutional forces that contributed to the fall of Somoza and the rise, evolution, and eventual demise of the Sandinistas. Kagan challenges conventional wisdom which assumes that the United States was partly responsible for the Sandinistas’ radicalization. He shows that it was “the Sandinistas [who] earnestly sought alliance with the Soviet Union” as a way of extending their own national and regional influence.

Third, Kagan provides a historical account of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Nicaragua. While the study begins with the American occupation of Nicaragua in the early part of this century, Kagan’s major focus is on the years of intense regional conflict from the late 1970s, when Somoza was forced to resign, to the unanticipated 1990 election of Violeta Chamorro, which ended the Sandinista