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From Leadership to Partnership

A New American Security Strategy for Europe

Commander Benoît M. Silve, French Navy

[The Great Powers] are travelling on the stream of time, which they can neither create nor direct, but upon which they can steer with more or less skill and experience. . . . An awful lot [depends] upon the skill and experience with which they manage to sail on the stream of time.

Paul Kennedy¹

THE PRESENT UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY for Europe appears to be based on the assumption that “only the United States has the vision and strength to consolidate the gains of the last few years and to build an even better world.”² It is a fact that without the United States those gains would probably require much longer to consolidate. However, even the United States may fail if its policy remains too strongly defined by the heritage of the Cold War. Neglecting to clarify what is meant by the terms “partnership” and “leadership,” so frequently used in U.S. foreign policy, may ultimately foster confrontation with its partners and leave the United States weaker. But the American “vision” of an

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even better world may be shared; and the next few years offer an opportunity to create synergy that will strengthen American influence in the long term.

The following reflections highlight, from a European perspective, some features of the present European security environment and consider a new orientation for U.S. security strategy for this region.

The first topic to explore is the magnitude of the transformation of Western Europe, which is more controversial than was its economic recovery from the Second World War. Then we will consider the U.S. security strategy for Europe; although it is widely recognized that in the next century new economic poles will emerge, American security strategy is tailored to the existing unipolarity in world affairs. Today's expert on security issues, the United States intends to retain its Cold War leadership in Europe and to control the regional security architecture through Nato. As the final part of the article submits, however, the risks that this strategy entails suggest that a new orientation will be required today, if the United States is to harvest in the next century the benefit of its leadership in the present era.

The European Security Environment

The Soviet threat after 1945 fostered a deep "transformation within the Atlantic community . . . because the armed forces of [its] respective nations trained, studied and marched through their careers together."³ Such references to tensions internal to Europe suggest that only an outside threat has fostered in Europe the stability that followed the Second World War, and therefore that this balance is now undermined by the demise of the Soviet Union. The Third Reich is still present in everybody's mind. Common military training is credited for the transformation of the international security environment among Western European states. But political scientists also pay tribute to economics when they analyze the integration of Western Europe as a paragon of the "neo-functional" approach.

Western European Integration: From Economics to Politics. Started in 1952 with the European Coal and Steel Community, functional economic integration framed by governmental policies has gradually spread to political affairs.⁴ After 1984 it expanded to security, with the revitalization of the Western Europe Union (WEU).⁵ With the 1991 Maastricht Treaty and the emphasis on WEU as the defense arm of the European Union, or EU, the foundation was set for a future common European defense.

As a response to the Soviet threat, Nato and the common military culture it provided have clearly played a role in the integration process. However, to credit Nato with the major internal changes that have affected Western Europe would

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imply that its preservation is necessary for Western European internal security. This argument has found new strength since the reunification of Germany in 1990. Especially in the United States, where history plays a major part in security perspectives, the principle of balance of power is presumed, while renunciation of sovereignty is suspect. This perception of Western European internal security, though absent from U.S. official assessments, influences papers and reflections. People little aware of realities in today's Western Europe—that, for instance, German soldiers in armored cars were invited to drive down the Champs-Élysées in Paris on 14 July 1994—remain wary, especially in view of a reunited Germany. But the truth is that Nato may disappear tomorrow, and if it does, the European Union will internally function exactly as before. The time when “an enduring Euro-Atlantic security framework was needed for the assimilation of a recovering Germany into the European system” is long and definitely gone.⁶

Europe might soon be the only region where stability can be preserved in support of U.S. interests, with American partnership—but not leadership. The United States would have to commit itself not to belittle the credibility of Western European states as collectively a united partner on the basis of various divergences of national foreign policies among those states. The absence of such a commitment would extend the Cold War paradigm, whereas for future crises the United States could and should recognize Western Europe as an increasingly credible partner.

From the political viewpoint, the prospect of a common currency is a major indicator of the extent of Western Europe integration. With final implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, a unique sovereignty transfer will occur.⁷ The Common Foreign and Security Policy, revitalization of the WEU, and activation of the European corps (EUROCORPS, EUROMARFORCE, and the Air Staff) all indicate a trend that cannot fail to be recognized. Other indications are the “Force 2005” decision, which allows German forces to be engaged abroad;⁸ the professionalization of the French military, aiming at a deployable force of fifty to sixty thousand personnel; the rising consideration of a European nuclear deterrent force; the increasing number of WEU members; and national consolidations of armament industries and their involvement in multinational programs.

Such a transformation cannot be easy. Difficulties arise from conflicts between integration and state sovereignty, a context of scarce resources and general downsizing of the armed forces, divergence in national policies, and domestic economic concerns. As a result of these difficulties, Western Europe's potential is not always apparent. Nor, in the security arena, should this transformation be a purely European matter: the relative positions of Nato and such existing Western European security institutions as the WEU directly concern the United States.

This is not to say that all Western European countries now share one view on the integration of Western Europe. Great Britain, notably, has so far been reluctant to renounce the tenets of state sovereignty. Britain, however, cannot thrive in isolation from its European partners or reverse the policy chosen by the EU.

Toward a Common Defense. With the enlargement of the European Union, new members have joined with different conceptions of security. Some have a tradition of neutrality and consider the Union only a means to further economic prosperity; they are reluctant to extend integration to the security arena. The difference between the memberships of the EU and WEU best illustrates this distinction.⁹ At the same time, members strongly engaged in Nato, such as Britain, are concerned that the integration of European defense may not be fully compatible with the U.S. guarantee to, and involvement in, Europe.

Through the Maastricht Treaty the European Union has entrusted the development of its defense policy to the WEU rather than to individual nations' policies or to Nato. Since the efficiency of Nato is not contested, why did the EU choose the WEU instead of Nato? Because the WEU can provide something that Nato cannot: its European essence offers a capability to devise a *European* strategy, to act without external oversight. Thus the WEU represents for the Union a security instrument equivalent to that of a sovereign state, and its independent use must be recognized as a legitimate aspiration for the future. The WEU cannot be simply one component of Nato; however, neither can it duplicate the structures and resources found in Nato, some of them supplied by the Americans. From the European standpoint, a stable partnership between Nato and the WEU must preserve the transatlantic link but also offer the EU a capability to act as a sovereign entity, to use European assets in support of European strategy. Simultaneously, the Europeans cannot expect the United States to provide assets without consideration for American sovereignty concerns. Another challenge is to find a way not to duplicate the existing integrated military structure, not to allow the WEU to become a "clever way" to get unwilling nations "into the integrated military structure through the back door."¹⁰

The 1996 intergovernmental conference set a binding timetable for the three-stage realization of common European defense as defined by Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty. Though some disagreements made striking headlines, the conference linked more closely the EU and the WEU. The progress made by Western Europe in the formulation of coordinated responses to security affairs makes clear how misleading are the much-publicized disputes. The EU knows that its economic and political integration must extend to national defense policies and military capabilities, and that it must overcome differences among its members.

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One or Several Europe(s)? The path toward expansion of membership that the EU has chosen is all the more significant in that the integration proceeding in Europe is substantially different from such other approaches as the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). European integration is not only economic but political. It has a fundamental impact on the notion of state sovereignty. Furthermore, the financial transfers involved will, because of the differing wealth of the EU's members, have wide repercussions on national economies. In fact, support in Western Europe for a common currency is likely to find its limit if enlarging the EU brings in fragile states. Even among the core of founding nations, the adoption of a common currency will probably not immediately apply to all the partners.

The concerns raised by the EU's expansion in the security arena are even greater. Collective defense, by which a clear threat unites a fixed number of states, provides a stable foundation for common strategy and implementation; the success of Nato illustrates this point. Collective *security*, however, is another matter. As one analyst notes, "Contemporary Europe at first glance appears to stand out as one of the most promising systems of states to test a regional collective security organization in light of the continent's significant strides toward political and economic integration. . . . The forces of history, however, weigh heavily against the prospects for the establishment of a functioning collective security organization in Europe. . . . Interstate conflict stemming from ethnic nationalism would not lend itself to the rules governing a collective security organization and the identification of possible belligerents would prove difficult. The ambiguity of conflicts would strengthen the propensity for nation-states to favor their national interests over abstract commitments to an international organization committed to the preservation of the status quo."¹¹

From a Western European standpoint, the dilemma is how to avoid the dilution of purpose that would result from uncontrolled expansion of a collective security-type organization without also resurrecting the Cold War division. From the other side of the Atlantic, the preservation of recent achievements in Western Europe does not have the same significance, and the risks of destabilization entailed by expansion (of the EU or Nato) are less threatening.

Regarding potential new dividing lines, the main concern is Russia. Nato's expansion worries only Russia—and in truth, affirmation of goodwill from Nato's members cannot be sufficient to answer Russia's concern. Collective defense met the challenge of the Cold War; the threat has now changed in nature, but the possibility of a resurgent aggressive Russia cannot be disregarded.¹² Russia emphasizes the importance of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); yet it is widely recognized in the United States as well as in Western Europe, if with different rationales, that the OSCE "cannot form the foundation of a new European order."¹³

In the final analysis, the present European security landscape reflects three major and diverging trends: the “Russians” and the OSCE, the “Anglo-Saxons” and Nato, and the “Europeans,” who want to preserve Nato’s achievements while expanding their capabilities to act independently. For the Europeans, Nato does not hold all the answers. The future of one organization cannot be addressed independently from those of the others.

The United States and Security in Europe

The most important elements of U.S. security strategy for Europe are military strength and cooperation.¹⁴ The U.S. National Command Authority (comprising the president and the Secretary of Defense) contends that American leadership in the world has never been more important than since the Cold War, because “the values of a society where . . . governments preserve individual freedom, and ensure opportunity and human dignity, remain under attack today.”¹⁵ Indeed, those values do remain under attack. But will U.S. leadership remain the optimum strategy for defending freedom, opportunity, and human dignity? On the one hand, history shows the dangers of an isolationist United States and the benefits of American leadership: the failure of the post-World War I settlement, victories of the American-led alliance against the Axis powers in World War II, and the successful conclusion of the Cold War. This leadership can only be exerted if—as the authors of the U.S. National Security Strategy bluntly acknowledge—“the American people and the Congress are willing to bear the costs of that leadership—in dollars, political energy and, at times, American lives.”¹⁶

The alternative to “American leadership” does not have to be a new isolationism. Rather, U.S. security strategy for Europe should evolve toward more partnership with Western Europe. The direction would lessen the negative effects that a more isolationist policy might have—though a U.S. decision to abandon Europe would certainly accelerate the construction of a common European defense. Unlikely as it may appear, American disengagement represents a prospect that cannot be completely absent from European strategic planning. Should the isolationist trend in Congress extend to the executive branch, the damage to U.S. interests would be inversely proportional to the security capability that the Europeans had achieved by that time. Short-term affirmations of American leadership and lack of dialogue undermine European security prospects in the long term. U.S. interests will be far better served by having a regional partner on which the United States can rely, based on common values and shared purposes. “Leadership,” and its reactionary converse, isolationism, create long-term perils that a new policy of partnership with Europe can avoid.

Regarding Europe’s integration in the security arena, U.S. analysts are divided. Some dismiss the prospect of Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

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They present a rationale similar to that of the eighties with respect to political and economic integration: “Unfortunately, vague language translates into lack of resolve in world affairs as was reflected during the EU’s handling of the Yugoslav crisis.”¹⁷ The WEU’s potential as a European defense organization is downplayed in the same way: “The first test of Community resolve in an international crisis was Yugoslavia. . . . The conduct of the member states during the crisis can be seen as an indicator of the EU’s future role and influence in Europe’s new security architecture.”¹⁸ Headlines such as “Nato’s Bosnia Dithering: Waiting for the U.S. to Lead” have shaped American public opinion.¹⁹ Whether this outlook provides a sound foundation for the future, however, and whether U.S. policy is itself to blame for the dithering, are relevant questions.

The Bosnian crisis provides a specific framework to examine the future of European security architecture and of American strategy. The U.S. “National Security Strategy” and “Security Strategy for Europe and Nato” repeatedly refer to the dislocation of the former Yugoslavia to illustrate that “only the United States has the vision and strength” to deal with such challenges. The policy followed by the major European countries under the auspices of the United Nations was unable to solve the crisis. The Dayton Agreements highlight the failure of this policy, and they raise two specific questions: Is the apparent success of the Dayton Agreements essentially an American success? Will similar solutions be viable in the future?

Until November 1995, the United States acted in the Balkans in a way that was problematic both for the situation on the ground and its allies.²⁰ Washington resisted pressure to participate militarily in the UN framework unless extraction of forces under fire became necessary. In October 1994 the State Department declared that the United States would not participate in military action against the Bosnian-dominated government in Sarajevo. This statement undermined the credibility of the UN commander in Bosnia, who faced deliberate violations of the UN-negotiated agreements.²¹ The unilateral decision not to enforce the arms embargo also undermined European and UN policies (Resolution 713), and it had direct implications for the security of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR).²² The United States reportedly did not share with the UN or Nato its knowledge of the Serbs’ intention to attack the UN safe area of Srebrenica in July 1995.²³ Notwithstanding, the subsequent mission under the Dayton Agreements of the Implementation Force, or IFOR, only became possible, as the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations emphasized at the time, because of the achievements of the UNPROFOR.²⁴ Rigorous analysis can only conclude that the U.S. policy had an impact—sometimes good, but sometimes harmful—on the UN mission.²⁵

Among the goals of U.S. policy in Bosnia were humanitarian gains and affirmation of American leadership in Europe.²⁶ As a matter of collateral damage—or was it part of the affirmation of leadership?—this policy undermined

Western European credibility. The conviction that such collateral damage is not in the U.S. interest is at the core of our reflections here.

The reasons for the failure of the UN effort to solve the crisis must be sought in the respective security roles of global and regional organizations, an examination initiated by the United Nations Secretary-General.²⁷ Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali advocates a stronger role for regional organizations, but in the framework of UN security dispositions, and not outside.²⁸ A successful European and United Nations policy—with the participation, but not necessarily the leadership, of the United States—might have provided new inputs to thinking about Western European security. A path could have been explored by which, among Nato's resources, more than airpower would have supported the UNPROFOR. It might have been easier, for example, to have renegotiated the UN's rules of engagement to meet Nato's requirements than it was to start a substantially new process. The Bosnian crisis presented a rare opportunity. The choice did not have to be the UN or the United States: it might have been the Europeans *and* the UN *supported* by the United States. This opportunity was not recognized under the existing U.S. security strategy for Europe. As a result, the Dayton Agreements will slow, more than energize, the construction of the European common security and defense identity. Although this slackening may seem irrelevant to U.S. interests, and although the Agreements do answer immediate concerns, they will delay the time when humanitarian principles can be upheld without American involvement.

For such an operation in the future, the question to be considered should be: What strategy is apt to achieve the objective at less cost, less risk, and less "collateral damage"? U.S. leadership ought not to be an objective in itself of the management of crises. American leadership is tremendously important in areas of instability, where no regional organization can achieve objectives that are in accordance with U.S. interests; but Washington must deal with powerful domestic pressures that may delay the nation's involvement, undermine its will to remain engaged for long periods, and heighten its sensitivity to American casualties. Any delay in defusing crisis is costly in terms of later involvement. The dislocation of the former Yugoslavia is only one among many examples. The present situation in Europe, especially in Eastern and Central Europe, deserves U.S. attention; but *leadership*, when it becomes more an end in itself than a means, may backfire.

Two of the recurrent themes of U.S. security strategy for Europe are expanding "the zone of stability" and avoiding "the creation of new dividing lines that could exacerbate security threats."²⁹ It is not clear that manifest U.S. leadership is ideal for this policy. Regarding expansion, of course, the risk is of an excessive pace that might jeopardize achievements to date. It is interesting to compare the eagerness shown by the United States when the extension of the EU is discussed, with the debate that accompanied the ratification of NAFTA; the United States

has no more interest than does the EU in proceeding at a speed that would undermine the “zone of stability” itself.

A New Orientation for the United States in Europe

In the U.S. security strategy for Europe, the concept of “partnership under U.S. leadership” is reflected in the overwhelming attention given to Nato versus the WEU. President William J. Clinton titled one address “Sustaining American Leadership through NATO.”³⁰ Despite its support for Europe’s integration, the administration would apparently prefer to see the WEU address “soft” security concerns, such as arms control. Another presidential address, to European leaders, provided insight on the difficult equilibrium between the U.S. support for European integration and the restraint exerted by Nato over the WEU’s development: “The purpose of my trip to Europe is to help lead the movement to . . . integration and to ensure . . . that America will be a strong partner in it.” In this view, the two pillars of U.S. European security policy are “greater economic vitality,” in which the EU does have a role to play, and “military strength and cooperation,” regarding which Western European institutions are not mentioned; Nato is to provide the answer.³¹ When it comes to such “hard” security concerns as Bosnia, Nato is the means that the United States supports. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott summed up his view on the two institutions: “The two most important [organizations] are, and will continue to be, the EU and NATO. The EU is the foundation for future economic growth and prosperity across the continent, while NATO is the bulwark of transatlantic security and the linchpin of American engagement in Europe.”³²


The Regional and Global Risks of the Present Orientation. In the middle term however, the European Union will want to correct its weaknesses and demonstrate its credibility in the security arena. One way to assert its existence is to disagree on significant issues. Neglecting the EU’s aspiration to develop its security structure, in harmony with the transatlantic link, may therefore foster competition instead of synergy.

Competition was a possibility discussed in late 1995 by an EU study on the development of relations with the United States. The study raised concerns that “if certain trends continue—such as a more isolationist U.S. Congress concerned with domestic pressures—the two sides could drift apart” and “turn confrontational on a number of issues.”³³ The three scenarios envisioned by the report were: a drift toward a declining relationship; U.S. domination, wherein American concerns drove an unbalanced relationship; and partnership in a close and balanced relationship.

As stated by the president of the U.S. Institute for Defense Analysis, the American dilemma between isolationism and leadership has resulted in a lack of attention to its partners' concerns: "Frequently in this century, the successful conclusion of U.S. engagement abroad has led to attempts at U.S. withdrawal and at usually ill-fated attempts to place solely domestic priorities at the top of the national agenda. In the past the United States betrayed a propensity to look at the world in unilateral terms when rethinking its world role, without understanding that U.S. strategies and roles must exist in equilibrium with those of its partners overseas."³⁴

The U.S. security posture could, instead, gain much by adopting as often as possible a common position with its closest allies. This cannot always be compatible with a U.S. leadership stance. For example, as President Clinton has explained regarding his decision on the arms embargo in Bosnia, "If we [violate the embargo], it would kill the peace process; it would sour our relationship with our European allies in NATO and in the UN; it would undermine the partnership we are trying to build with Russia; . . . it would undermine our efforts to enforce UN embargoes that we like such as those against Saddam Hussein, Colonel Gadhafi and General Cedras in Haiti."³⁵ But was it sufficient not to violate the embargo? Many outside the United States consider that it might have been preferable to support the policy devised by the UN and supported by the European Union, which had soldiers in harm's way. Since the signing of the Dayton Agreements, a top-level U.S. official has acknowledged that though he shared the president's initial disapproval of the embargo, the arms embargo has been one of the reasons for the success to date of the peace process.³⁶ Generally speaking, the divisions between U.S. and EU policies do have an impact on global issues and make those policies individually more vulnerable to critics. By virtue of its leadership position, the United States is the more vulnerable partner of the two.

U.S. Agreement with the Majority, UN General Assembly



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The graph plots the percentage of decisions in the United Nations General Assembly, in successive four-year periods, in which the American vote concurred with that of the majority of members.³⁷ That its trend is dramatically downward over some forty-five years, to nearly zero near the end of the Cold War, may simply demonstrate the inadequacy of the General Assembly to address world affairs. On the other hand, it may reflect upon the choices made by the United States as it attempted during those years to steer a course in the “stream of time” evoked by Paul Kennedy. The latter possibility is not to be dismissed. In the global arena, a real partnership between the United States and the European Union may be more likely to support American interests than would U.S. “leadership.”

As we have seen in Bosnia, leadership, when it becomes an issue in itself, requires that superiority be continually reaffirmed. It strains relations with allies. Furthermore, to lead alone, the United States must be excessively engaged; it bears thereby a higher financial burden, and the foundation for domestic support grows more fragile, than need be the case otherwise. The Second World War created a situation where the United States assumed more than a proportional share of the defense of Europe and Asia. Although that commitment was not an “act of altruism,” the expectation in the American population was that it would foster gratitude, not irritation.³⁸ Today in Western Europe gratitude does indeed widely prevail, but this expectation might well be frustrated in the future. Security intervention abroad is something to which all countries are very sensitive. The past lack of agreement in the UN with the United States shows that weaker nations try to assert themselves one way or another. Also, the engagement of American soldiers when other countries (such as Japan or Germany) participate only financially is increasingly becoming an American domestic issue. In 1991 considerable controversy accompanied the vote on the federal budget over accusations that the Pentagon was trying to benefit financially from foreign contributions. Military leadership strongly influences the perception that other countries form of the United States, sometimes in a negative way when leadership supersedes partnership.³⁹

Perceived by foreign nations in the light of present American leadership, “forward presence” may appear to have an ambivalent nature and create mixed feelings. The recent trials of U.S. servicemen in Okinawa illustrates this point. The Nato agreements, linked with the financial principle of host-nation contributions, may raise similar concerns in the future. It will be increasingly difficult, in the face of a lesser threat, to retain at home and abroad the public support that forward presence requires. One way to retain such support is to make it clear as widely as possible, even globally, that public opinion is being considered. In the society of nations, various demographic trends and inequalities in wealth and resources increase the risk that relations will become confrontational. In the future, a partnership between communities that share values and interests is

needed on a permanent rather than a case-by-case basis. The United States and the European Union have the potential for such a partnership.

Partnership and Leadership. The notions of leadership and partnership both lie at the core of U.S. security strategy. However, official documents and addresses seldom clarify their relative weights. Nonetheless, a survey of recent formulations suggests that “partnership” is viewed as the process by which the United States invites nations to participate in joint endeavors to achieve common goals. It is associated with the view of the earth as a global village, the “spaceship Earth.” Partnership in this view refers to a wide range of concerns: environment, trade, labor, human rights, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and others. In the security arena, it is embodied in the Partnership for Peace. Partnership underlies many state addresses to foreign governments or institutions; recently, it was the subject of President Clinton’s address to the Japanese Diet, calling upon Japan to forge with the United States a “partnership for leadership.”⁴⁰ It is also the principle that is supposed to underpin U.S. relations with Europe.⁴¹

However, when American spokesmen address the same global issues in front of domestic audiences, partnership is replaced by leadership.⁴² Freedom, human rights, free trade, and the worth of the individual are considered concepts primarily American, values that can spread worldwide only under U.S. leadership.

Certainly, any return to the traditional isolationist position that characterized American foreign policy before the Second World War could later compel the United States to “re-enter Europe under hostile circumstances.”⁴³ Also, leadership does ensure that global affairs will be conducted according to American desires and that by the mere threat of nonparticipation Washington will be able to influence dramatically the course of events. It guarantees that U.S. forces will not be placed under foreign command. The nonenforcement of the arms embargo in Bosnia, the Nato air strikes, and the Dayton Agreements all illustrate the influence of American leadership in crisis management. But the issue goes further than crisis resolution; it is a question of whether the United States truly has “the opportunity and the obligation” that it believes it does “to play a key role—a leadership role—in building a new Europe.”⁴⁴

Domestic and foreign security statements complement each other, and they suggest that the actual relationship between leadership and partnership is more ambiguous than it may appear. The implied notion of “leadership in partnership” describes at least one aspect of U.S. security strategy. It is preferable to a return to isolationism but need not necessarily mean that variations in its interests should not be accepted by the United States in its definitions of “partnership” and “leadership.”

The Reform of Nato. “Nothing can make a treaty remain integrally valid when its object has been modified. Nothing can make an alliance remain unchanged when the conditions in which it was concluded have changed.”⁴⁵ Nato must adapt itself not only to the changes of the post-Cold War era but also in order to shape the next century. The future of Nato and the changes that affect it will be important in the construction of a new partnership between the United States and the EU. Nato’s expansion must preserve the traditional link between Western Europe and North America, and it must clarify the respective positions of Nato and the WEU. Far from being two isolated organizations, each facing its future in a period of transition, they have roles closely determined by each other’s. The WEU, not alone but as the European pillar of the Atlantic alliance, guarantees that an expanded Nato will retain the efficiency and credibility that took so long to build. Simultaneously, the expansion of Nato will provide the answers to some of the challenges that face Europe as a whole. In the context of a true partnership between the United States and the EU, Nato is the only viable mechanism for collective security in Europe. Inevitably, despite gradual and careful implementation, Nato’s expansion will dilute its soul and heritage. Military training with Eastern European nations, however, will not in the near future result in a Western Europe-type integration, nor create the kinds of links that exist between the United States and Western Europe. Integration is the ultimate goal, but the pace chosen must be attuned to the geopolitical realities. This is why Nato’s heritage must be preserved, but in a new way. “Forsake not an old friend; for the new is not comparable to him; a new friend is as a new wine; when it is old, thou shalt drink it with pleasure.”⁴⁶

With a strong European pillar, Washington will be able to preserve its interests in Europe without risk of rejection. The variable-geometry concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) will allow the United States to tailor its participation in future crises, avoiding the opposite pitfalls of massive involvement and isolationism. The nation will be able to adopt a lower profile in operations not involving its vital interests (the next Bosnia) and thus to be less vulnerable should the operation turn sour. It will be able to promote U.S. global security interests well into the next century by presenting a common position with the EU in peacekeeping, counterproliferation, and arms reduction. Further, the relative financial contributions to security of the United States and Western Europe, and their respective defense expenditures, must change from the present Cold War paradigm. The EU, as its economic strength becomes apparent, will have to assume a larger portion of the security burden. Partnership will lessen the cost to the United States of its security policy.

This partnership will have to address the sensitive issue of placing U.S. forces under foreign operational control.⁴⁷ The United States enforces UN Security Council resolutions—when it chooses—with forces under American leadership.

The Persian Gulf War and Nato's IFOR in Bosnia are recent examples. There is little middle ground between no U.S. participation and a massive one. Consequently, the United States finds itself in the front line when it would prefer not to be. Indeed, foreign operational control is very sensitive for all nations, a reality that is not necessarily perceived in the United States, where it is considered normal for Americans to control foreign forces. The U.S. force structure, with its unique assets and command capability, allows this conception to endure. But it would seem an ineluctable element of the "stream of time" that the cost of either excessive involvement or excessive isolation is higher than that of limited participation and shared responsibility. At least, if there is a fundamental divergence between UN and U.S. concepts of peacekeeping (and corresponding rules of engagement), Nato can provide a framework wherein the United States could act without overwhelming involvement but under foreign operational control.⁴⁸ Operational control is not command. The concept of the CJTF does not conflict with the rationale behind the principle of U.S. operational control. American soldiers would be engaged in the front line only if the United States so decides. However, supporting assets shared by Nato and the WEU are not front-line elements. Their commitment would represent a concession on the part of the United States, and thus a true partnership. European states cannot finance redundant programs in intelligence collection and analysis, space-based observation, sophisticated airborne surveillance and control of a "battlespace," communications, or strategic lift. However, they are building a balanced position from which to interact with their American partner, and they are moving toward a more autonomous capability—with, for example, the European reconnaissance satellite Hélios. It is in the interest of both partners to coordinate their security programs to optimize their joint capabilities.

Inventing the Future

Today's new realities allow the United States to continue to pursue a European strategy based more on leadership than on a balanced partnership with Western Europe. Indeed, the complexity of European politics and the many challenges that simultaneously face the United States—the integration of Western Europe, the end of the Cold War, uncertainties regarding Russia and Ukraine, and the future of Nato—confuse the issues. The potential of partnership may seem uncertain, and its cost higher than its benefits.

However, synergy can not be created in the framework of a continuously reasserted leadership. Synergy is required if stability is to expand in Europe as a whole and provide a solid foundation on which to address global issues in the community of nations. Further, the aspiration of Western European integration of foreign and security policies, and soon of defense, is embedded in "the stream

of time," as the United States may soon recognize. There is a prospect of a different relationship, a true partnership, between that nation and Western Europe, a partnership that will find a new legitimacy and credibility in the next century.

The next several years present a window of opportunity for building this partnership. The United States and Western Europe share values and interests to an extent that no other large communities in the world ever have in the past. Before 1996 partnership may have been impossible, because Western Europe was not mature enough as an integrated entity; on the other hand, once the integration of Western Europe is completely achieved, the two might have drifted too far apart.

The essential question is whether the world should await "the second American century," as the Secretary of State envisions, or look for a more balanced partnership between the American and the European polities.⁴⁹ It is my conviction that a partnership with democratic Europe will be more feasible, and more desirable, than a "Pax Americana."

Notes

1. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 540. The allusion is to Bismarck. Kennedy's quotation marks have been omitted.

2. Warren Christopher, "Leadership in the Next American Century," address, The John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.: 18 January 1996.

3. U.S. President, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* [hereafter *Engagement and Enlargement*] (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1994), p. 26.

4. A. LeRoy Bennett, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1995); A. H. Robertson, *European Institutions* (New York: Matthew Bender, 1973); and C. Archer, *International Organizations* (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 94-101.

5. Rome Declaration, 26 and 27 October 1984.

6. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Plan for Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1995, p. 27.

7. Though not all members of the EU may be able to adopt the common currency simultaneously, the Madrid summit of December 1995 confirmed 1999 for the fixing of exchange rates and 2002 for introduction of the actual currency (the Euro). The economic policies of major European states are determined by the criteria required, and they are demonstrating a commitment to succeed.

8. The German Constitutional Court ruled on 12 July 1994 that deployment of the Bundeswehr beyond Nato's borders is legitimate. Article 87 of the German Basic Law was modified accordingly.

9. Of the European Union's members, Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark have only Observer status in the WEU.

10. U.S. Defense Dept., background briefing for Secretary William Perry's attendance at the annual Munich conference on security policy, 1 February 1995 (Federal Information Systems Corp.).

11. Richard Russell, "The Chimera of Collective Security," *European Security*, Summer 1995, pp. 241-55.

12. Roy Laird, "The Soviet Legacy 1994: *Homo Sovieticus* Is Alive If Not Well," *European Security*, Summer 1995, pp. 256-72.

13. S. Anderson, "EU, NATO, and CSCE Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europe's New Security Architecture," *European Security*, Summer 1995, pp. 328-53.

14. *Engagement and Enlargement*, p. 25.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

16. *Ibid.*

17. Anderson, p. 337.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 340.

19. *International Herald Tribune*, 29-30 May 1991, p. 1.

20. Brzezinski, pp. 26-9.

21. The UNPROFOR commander was Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Rose.
22. UNPROFOR transferred its authority to the Nato Implementation Force (IFOR) on 20 December 1995. See United Nations, *A Global Agenda: Issues before the 50th General Assembly* (New York: 1995) for UNPROFOR's achievements (p. 380) and for U.S. policy and the enforcement of the embargo (pp. 11–23).
23. Associated Press, 3 November 1995, Dispatch 20:59 EST V0091.
24. Jeremy M. Boorda (Adm., USN), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.: 8 April 1996.
25. John E. Sray, "U.S. Policy and the Bosnian Civil War: A Time for Reevaluation," *European Security*, Summer 1995, pp. 382–27.
26. President Clinton's address, delivered from the Oval Office on 27 November 1995, exposed the rationale motivating U.S. intervention. It provides particular insight into U.S. concerns about leadership.
27. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992); and "Les ententes régionales et la construction de la paix," *Défense Nationale*, October 1992.
28. UN Charter.
29. U.S. Dept. of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO* (Washington, D.C.: Office of International Security Affairs, June 1995).
30. William J. Clinton, address, Harry Truman Library Institute: 25 October 1995 (reprinted in *Department of State Dispatch*, 6 November 1995).
31. William J. Clinton, address, Hôtel de Ville, Brussels: 9 January 1994.
32. Strobe Talbott, address, Bildenberg dinner, Washington, D.C.: 5 October 1995 (reprinted in *Department of State Dispatch*).
33. "EU Study Sees Various Scenarios for Development of Relations with U.S.," *BNA* [Bureau of National Affairs] *International Business and Finance Daily*, 29 November 1995; and J.E. Gurten, *A Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany, & the Struggle for Supremacy* (New York: Random House, 1992).
34. W.Y. Smith, "U.S. National Security after the Cold War," *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1992, p. 23.
35. William J. Clinton, address, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md.: 25 May 1994.
36. Restricted address.
37. From roll-call voting data, Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, in Robert E. Riggs and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics*, 2nd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1994).
38. Walter B. Slocombe, statement, U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, April 1995 (Federal Information Systems Corp., 5 April 1995).
39. A. Joxe, *L'Amérique mercenaire* (Payot, 1992), p. 374.
40. Associated Press, 18 April 1996.
41. *Engagement and Enlargement*.
42. See, among others, Christopher.
43. Robert Hunter (U.S. Ambassador to Nato), State Dept. briefing, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3 March 1995 (Federal Information Systems Corp.).
44. Strobe Talbott, "American Leadership and the New Europe," address, City Club, Cleveland, Ohio: 9 June 1995 (reprinted in *Department of State Dispatch*).
45. Charles de Gaulle, press conference, 20 February 1966.
46. Ecclesiasticus 9:10.
47. R.J. Parkinson, "Foreign Command of U.S. Forces," and R. Hartzman, "Legislation to Restrict U.S. Involvement in United Nations Peacekeeping Moving through Congress," *ASIL* [American Society of International Law], March-May 1995; and E.F. Bruner, "U.S. Forces and International Command," *Joint Electronic Library* (Joint Chiefs of Staff), May 1995.
48. Hunter.
49. Christopher.