

1997

## Book Reviews

The U.S. Naval War College

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

---

### Recommended Citation

War College, The U.S. Naval (1997) "Book Reviews," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 50 : No. 1 , Article 10.  
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol50/iss1/10>

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu](mailto:repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu).

# BOOK REVIEWS

*A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.*

*Admiral H.G. Rickover*

## “Navies of the Past, Present, and Future”

Till, Geoffrey, ed. *Seapower: Theory and Practice*. Portland, Oregon: International Specialized Book Services, 1994. 206pp. \$35

**T**HIS IS A USEFUL OVERVIEW of the complex field of international seapower and the interrelationship of theory and practice. Skillfully edited by the well known strategist Geoffrey Till of the Royal Naval College in Greenwich, England, this collection of illuminating essays focuses on two salient issues: the appropriate relationship of seapower and landpower, and the connection between naval theory and practice.

Both issues have largely dominated the discussion of naval power in the modern era, beginning with Alfred Thayer Mahan’s influential theories on the importance of seapower around the turn of the century, and extending through the current debate over littoral warfare as a key operational determinant of and fundamental justification for continued seapower.

The first, and most academic, essay in the collection is Colin Gray’s study of history and strategic theory, which he contends “cooperate to mutual advantage.” Gray, a brilliant strategic thinker, sharply connects the intellectual requirement for both continued examination of maritime studies and the dramatic real-world requirement for continued power at sea. In his well written essay “History for Strategists” Gray extols the virtues of the British strategic maritime experience as a valuable example for current thinkers.

Jan Breemer contributes an interesting essay, “The Burden of Trafalgar” (previously published as Newport Paper Number 6 by the Naval War College Press), which uses the influence of the Battle of Trafalgar as an example of how history (and the ancillary strategic analysis that inevitably accompanies it) becomes the driving

force in decisions. This may not always be helpful, as his title implies, and his analysis supports this conclusion. Breemer says that both the “British and German navies went to war in 1914 burdened by the legacy of Trafalgar,” the British endlessly searching for the great decisive battle and the Germans seeking “prestige”—something unattainable without a far longer maritime history.

Three of the essays in the collection are focused at the level of operational art and will be of greatest interest to currently serving naval officers. Notable among them is Andrew Gordon’s description of the concern British planners had in the early twentieth century concerning the Japanese threat. It breaks step with the more traditional analysis that places the German threat at the head of the British planning queue. Gordon states that “strategically speaking, the British Empire was a throw-back from the uncrowded age of Pax Britannica. From the turn of the century, if Britain was to be secure at home, a formal naval alliance was required.”

A second operationally informed discussion is Andrew Lambert’s “Seapower 1939–1940,” which keys on strategic decisions taken in the opening months of the Second World War. Imbued with his experiences in World War I, Churchill overstated the impact that seapower could have in the initial stages of the new conflict. This interesting contribution demonstrates how difficult it can be to apply lessons directly from one scenario to the next.

Finally, Jock Gardner’s “The Battle of the Atlantic, 1941: The First Turning Point?” lays out a coherent argument that when war actually begins, the hard data of combat (sinking rates, locations, convoy timing issues) overtakes theoretical strategic planning. No surprise here, but one can think of such examples as Vietnam where the process of the practical overtaking the theoretical was a long one indeed.

The final essays cover the post–World War II era, and John Pay’s piece on carrier operations illustrates how a navy’s self-conceived notion of its operational approach will drive its procurement and design decisions. This is perhaps the most concrete example of how steel is cut on the basis of strategic theory. Turning to the post–Cold War era, Norwegian Commodore Jacob Borresen captures the current trend in strategic thinking that focuses on battle to influence events ashore and the concurrent requirement to dominate the littorals “from the sea.”

Editor Geoffrey Till returns to conclude the collection with an essay on “Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-First Century.” He postulates that naval planners must return to basics in the wake of the enormous global changes since the end of the Cold War. The first step is to identify the tasks required of navies, which range from outright warfighting to humanitarian operations, resource protection, and presence missions. This range of operational requirements, while broadly traditional in character, will present enormous challenges to navies, which are universally dwindling in size.

## 136 Naval War College Review

This is a fine work, full of serious thought, and it deserves a place in any library of strategic and maritime writings.

James Stavridis  
Commander, U.S. Navy  
The Joint Staff, Washington, D. C.

---

Rodger, N.A.M., ed. *Naval Power in the Twentieth Century*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 273pp. \$45

This work is a compilation of nineteen papers presented in July 1994 at the Exeter Conference, which addressed various aspects of seapower during this century. This anthology boasts a collection of international experts in naval power, including George W. Baer, Eric Grove, Geoffrey Till, Herve Coutaubegari, Michael Epkenhans, and others.

In the introduction, editor N.A.M. Rodger discusses the evolution of doctrinal and strategic thinking from Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's *The Influence of Sea Power upon History* to Paul M. Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*. Rodger contends that despite the inadequacies of Mahanian concepts, no "general explanation of how naval power works and why it is important . . . can credibly be applied to many different nations and navies . . . in the circumstances of the past and present." He suggests that this volume attempts to form a cogent general theory of naval power.

There is no coherent thematic chapter arrangement, but the papers fall into

two main categories. The most compelling section provides an analysis of the policies, planning, and strategies of the world's navies (with the exception of China) from 1900 to the early 1990s. The subsequent category examines such specific operations and campaigns as the Arctic convoys to Russia during the Second World War.

In the chapters on policies, planning, and strategies, the authors posit that Mahanian concepts and doctrine emerge as primary catalysts for constructing and maintaining powerful fleet-based navies. Yet these contributors accurately note that while Mahan's influence proved applicable to some nations, Mahanian strategic thought was not a panacea for all.

Throughout the twentieth century all navies have had to redefine their roles. Although prewar navies continually evaluated new missions, such as amphibious operations, their top priority remained the large surface fleet centered on the battleship. Exceptions included Canada, which maintained only an antisubmarine warfare force. World naval leaders also carefully observed the evolution of naval warfare and contemplated the prospective uses of carrier-based air power.

In the postwar world, planners of small and midsize navies reevaluated their fleets'

roles in a polarized global environment with two superpowers. Concurrently, the Western allies and Soviet-bloc navies had to determine which technologically advanced weapons systems to adopt and whether to rely on submarine launched ballistic missiles or carrier-based aircraft for nuclear deterrence. For both superpowers, strategic planning pivoted on three concepts: an all-out nuclear exchange, a protracted conventional conflict, and a combination of both.

In subsequent chapters attention is given to isolated events. In these case studies, the authors examine joint air and sea operations in addition to the convoy and blockade. For example, World War II Arctic convoys successfully "demonstrated the ultimate futility of a submarine-based *guerre de course*," in that, as the author states, "the U-boat was a weapon of denial; unaided it was incapable of obtaining or exercising control."

These proceedings provide an excellent resource for comprehending the unique challenges faced by the world's navies in the twentieth century. Yet despite interesting and broad topics, this work contains two pervasive flaws. First, several of the chapters furnish only brief narratives instead of historical analysis. But the major drawback is the absence of a closing chapter to provide overall conclusions and present a working definition or theoretical premise of naval power derived from the historical studies. If discerningly read, however, this volume should be of interest to those who desire to understand the future potential applications of naval power by studying the successes and pitfalls of the past.

R. BLAKE DUNNAVENT  
Lubbock, Texas

---

Pugh, Michael, ed. *Maritime Security and Peacekeeping: A Framework for United Nations Operations*. New York: Manchester Univ. Press, 1995. 302pp. \$24.95

Life after the Cold War continues to provide fertile ground for analysts engaged in building "what if" scenarios. A fundamental realignment in thinking still predominates, and there are important security issues yet to face. Intelligent dialogue is required to prepare for this changing security environment, and Michael Pugh directly contributes to this effort. Pugh, in editing this analytical study of maritime security operations, has brought together a team of British professors and researchers (Jeremy Ginifer, Eric Grove, Frank Gregory, and Françoise J. Hampson) to develop a framework for integrating appropriate maritime security systems. In addition to editing the book, Pugh wrote four of the twelve chapters and coauthored four others.

The book focuses on key concepts and policy issues that will help assess the potential for using naval and maritime forces as instruments to promote international order. By broadening the focus from naval to maritime forces, the functions of police, coast guard, and customs are added to potential security regimes. The military roles of peacekeeping, naval diplomacy, peace building, deterrence, embargoes, and enforcement are all considered, along with such nonmilitary constabulary roles as drug interdiction and the prevention of terrorism and piracy.

## 138 Naval War College Review

This book provides a balanced view of the benefits and drawbacks of coalition security arrangements. Pugh correctly points out the costs of and impediments to building multinational security; still, the pressure to pursue it is mounting. President Clinton has charged the government, and peripherally the military community, to enhance U.S. security by promoting cooperative security measures, working to open foreign markets and spur global economic growth. Thus, the government's position largely lends support to the basic premise of the book.

Indeed, the U.S. Navy has been actively involved in building maritime security under the multinational rubric. Since 1990, multinational maritime interception forces, including warships and aircraft, have queried more than twenty-two thousand vessels and boarded more than ten thousand. A total of 573 ships have been diverted on suspicion of carrying prohibited cargoes; of these, seventy-six vessels have been turned over to UN member countries.

Building stronger multinational security is receiving more attention today as national military organizations downsize, and Pugh presents valid options for facing these challenges. Advocating neither the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Western European Union, nor the United Nations structure as "the" framework to follow, the authors use germane historical examples to illustrate how these organizations have built maritime security. They also stress that there may not be a single definitive maritime security system, because various geographic regions have different maritime security requirements.

Those who feel that the United States already pays a disproportionate share of

the UN budget will find comfort in the book's suggestions on limiting costs. Confidence-building measures and sharing with coalition members select portions of well established U.S. command and information systems are two ways Pugh has outlined.

A complete historical record of instances (found in the appendix) where maritime assets have been involved in peacekeeping efforts is a particular strength of the book, and the select bibliography is also a valuable research tool. Additionally, if such acronyms as UNIMOG, NUPI, ONUCA, or SOLAS are not a regular part of the reader's vocabulary, there is a handy list of acronyms at the beginning of the book.

This book, however, is not without its flaws. Some of the "bean counting" is either outdated or incorrect. For example, to say that these are eight prepositioning ships in the United States inventory is clearly off the mark (thirteen Maritime Prepositioning Ships were leased to the U.S. Navy alone, an enhancement ship has been contracted, and numerous Army War Reserve ships are in the inventory). Also, the book's tone is sometimes stilted. Such sentences as "significant evidence of the amelioration of international anarchy by the regulation of state behavior through international institutions, international law and functional interdependence," and, "At regional levels, too, the normative understandings between naval powers may be organic and more durable," force the reader to be patient. Still the fresh ideas provided here make the book an important addition to the growing body of literature on the maritime dimension of peace operations.

DAVID RODGERS

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

Hartmann, Frederick H., and Robert L. Wendzel. *America's Foreign Policy in a Changing World*. New York: Harper-Collins, 1994. 503pp. (No price given)

The developmental process and implementation of American foreign policy continue to be the subjects of innumerable texts trying to make sense of a complex and confusing topic.

This book seeks to provide readers a solid foundation for understanding the conduct of U.S. policy from independence to the present. Hartmann and Wendzel provide insights into the formulation and implementation of foreign policy; a brief description of how foreign policy issues are decided upon; analysis of U.S. policy during the Cold War, from 1945 to 1991; and a discussion of present and future foreign policy problems facing the United States. Most importantly, the authors offer a framework for organizing one's thought processes when considering the direction and implications of future foreign policy formulations.

The authors carry impressive credentials. Frederick H. Hartmann, Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor Emeritus at the Naval War College, is a specialist in international relations and the author of numerous books, including *The Conservation of Enemies*, *World in Crisis*, *The Relations of Nations*, and *Defending America's Security* (coauthored with Wendzel). Robert L. Wendzel is the educational advisor at the U.S. Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, and a frequent lecturer on national security matters and foreign policy. He, too, has written extensively on the subject of international relations. His textbooks include *Defending America's Security* and *To Preserve the Republic: United States Foreign Policy* (both coauthored with

Hartmann), *A Policymaker Focus*, and *International Politics: Policymakers and Policy-making*.

This strong academic background is evident throughout the present work. Its focus is tight, the examples chosen support the authors' arguments, and the research and references are both impressive and current. The authors demonstrate a superb knack for introducing and explaining, in simple terms, basic definitions and concepts essential to the study of international relations. Particularly enlightening are the discussions of the historical context that helped shape American foreign policy and still continues to give it its unique flavor; the evolution of the constitutional and legal relationships between the executive and legislative branches; the role of the president and his advisors in the development of foreign policy; the impact of the media, interest groups, and public opinion on the decision-making process; and the complex interrelationship of economics and foreign policy.

Hartmann and Wendzel recognize the myriad of factors that have an impact on foreign policy, and then attempt to provide the reader with a framework for dealing with these considerations. Drawing on past work, they suggest four cardinal principles: past-future linkages, counterbalancing national interests, third-party influences, and "conservation of enemies." These principles, say the authors, form the basis for examining and explaining successes and failures in past American foreign policy decisions.

While these principles prove useful in helping explain selected foreign policy decisions, they undoubtedly oversimplify a process that the authors would admit is extremely complex. Applying a framework to historical events (where hindsight is always 20-20) to explain success and failure is one

## 140 Naval War College Review

thing; using these principles as the basis for formulating future policy is quite another. In a perfect world these considerations could be applied to every situation and a reasoned approach adopted. But the world is not perfect, and frequently foreign policy decisions are made with less than perfect knowledge. Time lines are compressed, and decisions must be made without input from every key actor. This will lead to mistakes. Further, policy alternatives seem to be much more numerous (each with its attendant "pros" and "cons") than the authors would have one believe and it may be argued that the choice rarely boils down to an "either-or" decision.

Despite these drawbacks, Hartmann and Wendzel provide invaluable advice to those interested in American foreign policy. *American Foreign Policy in a Changing World* should be on the shelf of every serious student of international relations.

JOHN J. LANGER  
Captain, U.S. Navy

---

Harrison, Selig S., and Masashi Nishihara, eds. *UN Peacekeeping: Japanese and American Perspectives*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1995. 175pp. (No price given)

While books, monographs, and articles about United Nations peacekeeping proliferate at a rate that suggests faddishness, this book is less about UN peacekeeping than about Japan's possible role in the maintenance of global security. In this collection of brief essays, four American and four Japanese scholars address four distinct topics: what the role of the

UN in peacekeeping is and should be; what the tea leaves say about public opinion in Japan and the United States; what steps in preventive diplomacy the United States and Japan can take for Asia-Pacific security; and in what ways Japan can contribute more to global security. Although the introduction suggests that American and Japanese scholars must necessarily disagree, they in fact do agree on most points, and this is what makes the book both coherent and instructive.

Steven Ratner, who served as a legal advisor at the Paris Conference on Cambodia, begins with a review of crucial, but often confused, distinctions among peace-making, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. The confusion surrounding such terms is not limited to the marginally attentive public but includes the multitude of public officials who influence UN policy and have a great deal to do with reinforcing both public and official perceptions of the usefulness and neutrality of the United Nations.

Masahiko Asada makes Ratner's points clearer. Asada, who was from 1991 to 1993 a legal advisor at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, points out that the UN intervention in Somalia became an alarming departure from precedent when the UN Secretary-General ordered that Somali warlords be disarmed. Asada suggests that the consequences of UN (and U.S.) policy in Somalia reached far beyond the death of eighteen American soldiers and the ignominious withdrawal of U.S. troops: Japan and other nations learned from the episode that a UN mission they have agreed to support can change in mid-course, thereby also changing the risk involved, making it more difficult for them to support missions in the first place.



This brings the reader to the most central and yet elusive topic: How much and what kind of support for UN operations can be expected from the public in the United States and Japan? John Isaacs, formerly a legislative assistant to Stephen Solarz, Democratic representative from New York, claims there is much broader American public support for UN missions than the congressional critics would have us believe. Citing a series of opinion polls, Isaacs points out that the perception of UN success or failure bears directly upon public and government support for future missions. The definition of success, and therefore the public perception of success, requires determined leadership—something that, Isaacs concludes, the Clinton administration has not provided.

Akihiko Tanaka demonstrates that despite the deep-rooted resistance in Japan to greater military roles abroad, a series of qualified successes have increased public support for the peacekeeping legislation that allows the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to be sent abroad. The SDF has now completed small, well defined missions in Cambodia, Zaire, Rwanda, and Mozambique—all in the midst of a vast electoral realignment, including the ascendance of a Socialist prime minister whose party had once opposed not only peacekeeping roles but the SDF itself.

Edward Luck and Takako Ueta evaluate the possibilities of preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region, where so many problems of economic transition, dislocation, and boom-and-bust are brewing just beneath the surface. Yet for all their efforts to suggest new peacebuilding measures, one is left with the impression that the most workable and

tangible kind of preventive diplomacy is the maintenance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Thus, in two final essays we come neatly around to the question of how to achieve greater security cooperation between the United States and Japan. Both William Durch, a senior associate of the Stimson Center, and Masashi Nishihara, a senior professor at Japan's National Defense Academy, conclude that Japan can and ought to improve its air and sea lift capabilities.

In addition, they recommend increasing complementary activities by U.S. and Japanese armed forces. Both authors also offer some sensible cautions.

Durch warns that selected interventions must take into account a wide range of variables, most of which are beyond the control of any policy or country: the size of the target country, its access from the sea, the acuteness of the event, and "the fit with traditional interests." Nishihara warns that U.S.-Japan cooperation necessarily has limits. The SDF can do no more than perform traditional peacekeeping; it cannot be required to coordinate with U.S. troops if those troops are actively enforcing peace, and Japan will not approve of proposals that allow the United States or the UN to change the nature of the mission, as was done in Somalia and Bosnia.

The authors agree with, and even complement, one another far more than most casual observers of U.S.-Japan relations might expect. Indeed, their complementary opinions reflect the similarity of circumstances between the two countries: both are global economic powers; both have the most modern and well equipped armed forces; both have a deep interest in the maintenance of global order; and both have publics that are simultaneously willing to support the UN but skeptical of

open-ended commitments, runaway costs, and embarrassing entanglements. The arguments in this volume are likely to be dated within a few years. But the questions will not be.

PETER J. WOOLLEY  
Becton College  
Fairleigh Dickinson University

---

Magyar, Karl P., and Constantine P. Danopoulos, eds. *Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge*. Maxwell, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1994. 463pp. (No price given)

This book is an excellent historical-political analysis of prolonged wars during the Cold War era, when the superpowers had a measure of influence on nation-state behavior in the developing world. As the subtitle suggests, the post-Cold War challenge is to understand these conflicts in a post-nuclear environment. This book has special value for the international security community, because it gives an excellent analysis of the factors that influence the duration of conflicts. The editors argue that it is "analytically misleading to make no distinction between wars that are planned from the onset around a protracted war strategy and wars in which the warring parties expected a quick victory, but various factors prolonged the conflicts." Thus, prolonged wars and the factors influencing their length are the focus of this study. The editors' stated objective is to "establish the distinction between protracted and prolonged wars, to present a number of case studies of prolonged wars drawn from mostly contemporary examples, and to offer the rudimentary outline of a proto theory of prolonged wars."

Magyar and Danopoulos suggest that factors prolonging wars "may be divided into separate but often interrelated categories: general societal, international/regional, and strategic/military." Using this framework of analysis, one can begin to understand the complex nature of prolonged wars. The contributors offer excellent case studies, each providing valuable insight into the origin of the conflicts and the factors that tend to prolong them. While some of the studies are dated (e.g., Earl H. Tilford's analysis of the Vietnam War and Benjamin Kline's "Northern Ireland Conflict") their value is of a historical nature, suggesting how societal, national, and regional factors may lead to prolonged conflict in the post-containment era.

The international security community should find of special interest the case studies of Ann Mosely Lesch's "Prolonged Conflict in the Sudan," Frederick Belle Torimiro's "Chad: The Apparent Permanence of Ethno-Regional Conflict," Karl Magyar's "Liberia's Conflict: Prolongation through Regional Intervention" and "The War over Angola and Namibia: Factors of Prolongation," Christopher Gregory's "Civil War in a Fragile State: Mozambique," and J. Richard Walsh's "Cambodia: Prolonged War, Prolonged Peace?" Given the nature of current post-Cold War conflicts, these studies are useful examinations of the conflicts dominating the international environment today, and they point to a number of different approaches to limiting conflicts in the future.

The editors make no attempt "to develop a general or comprehensive theory of prolonged war." The value of this text is in its excellent case studies and its reflections on how the international community should deal with the dominant conflicts of the latter part of the twentieth century.

WILLIE CURTIS  
U.S. Naval Academy

---

Scharfen, John C. *The Dismal Battlefield: Mobilizing for Economic Conflict*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 239pp. \$29.95

John Scharfen is a retired Marine Corps colonel. Having held a number of senior planning positions while on active duty, he later worked as a civilian national security analyst. Now a resident of Alexandria, Virginia, Scharfen has written and lectured extensively on national security affairs.

Scharfen seeks to "analyze the dynamics of economic conflict" within the context of total national forces (e.g., military, political, and economic), but he falls short of his objective. This book is, principally, a collection of observations, opinions, and incidents on a complex subject, leading to an uncertain conclusion.

The concerted application of a nation's economic strengths as instruments of national power can be viewed as conflict by other means.

Political actions may be measured and assessed. Military actions may be measured and assessed. The author's implied thesis is that a nation's economic strengths and capabilities can also be measured and assessed, then catalogued and positioned for "economic conflict," just as a logistician catalogues and positions ammunition and rations for military conflict. By stating that "there is no department, agency, or staff within the federal bureaucracy that has responsibility or is organized for the overall management of the economic instrument,"

the author minimizes the extensive involvement of the departments of State and Commerce, and most assuredly the National Security Council, in such policy matters.

One concedes the importance of military instruments of power being under the operational direction of a professional military officer corps, as one does that of the diplomatic affairs of states being under the operational direction of a professional diplomatic corps. However, whether or not the instruments of a nation's economic power, as distinct from the nation's military and diplomatic powers, can be collectively assembled under the operational direction of a vaguely defined bureaucracy is, at best, problematic. The author suggests tasking the Department of State to create policy, doctrine, and strategy for economic conflict. He then calls upon the academic and private sectors to produce plans and "provide augmentation teams to assist and advise during [economic offensive?] operations," just as, in the opinion of the reviewer, an engaged military force might "call up the reserves." What the author is ultimately proposing, then, is the centralized command and control of the nation's economy under the operational direction of a public bureaucracy, perhaps an empowered U.S. version of Japan's often-misunderstood MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry).

But surely, U.S. industry cannot arbitrarily concede management controls, oversight, or strategic planning to a government bureaucracy, absent an overriding threat to the nation. The Axis powers effectively brought U.S. industry into full partnership with other elements of a World War II grand national strategy, mandating extraordinary government controls as befitting the threat. Centralized production

## 144 Naval War College Review

planning, allocation of resources, price controls, and so on, did not continue after the war's end. In time of peace, those wartime controls would be unconstitutional infringements upon public freedoms, especially upon the conduct of private enterprise.

*The Dismal Battlefield: Mobilizing for Economic Conflict* is not, therefore, recommended for the student of international affairs. A notable body of literature already exists on the subject of economic conflict, economic sanctions, economic warfare, and other related topics. See, for example: *Economic Warfare or Detente: An Assessment of East-West Economic Relations in the 1980s*, edited by Reinhard Rode and Hanns D. Jacobsen (Westview, 1985); Jagdish Bhagwati, *Protectionism* (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988); Ravi Batra, *The Myth of Free Trade: A Plan for America's Economic Revival* (Scribners, 1990); William J. Gill, *Trade Wars against America: A History of United States Trade and Monetary Policy* (Praeger, 1990); George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, *The Coming War with Japan* (St. Martin's, 1991); John G. Clark, *The Political Economy of World Energy: A Twentieth Century Perspective* (The University of North Carolina Press, 1990); and Michael Silva and Bertil Sjogren, *Europe 1992 and the New World Power Game* (Wiley and Sons, 1990).

SAVERIO DE RUGGIERO  
Naval War College

---

Yetiv, Steve A. *America and the Persian Gulf: The Third Party Dimension in World Politics*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995. 192pp. \$49.95

In the study of the Middle East, perhaps more than any other area of the world, the gaps between policy makers, international relations theorists, and area specialists tend to be very large. This book is, in part, an attempt to bridge these gaps, and happily, the attempt is successful; hence this book will be of interest to anyone in these various fields. Steve Yetiv, a political scientist at Old Dominion University (and a contributor to the *Naval War College Review*), brings both his detailed knowledge of the Middle East and his deep understanding of international relations theory to bear on the role of the United States in the Persian Gulf.

One of the distinctive features of Yetiv's approach is his emphasis on the role of "third parties" in international politics. What is especially remarkable about his use of this concept is his reversal of the way in which third parties are often viewed. Much of the literature, for example, focuses on their roles as mediators or otherwise decisive forces affecting international conflicts. Yetiv makes the interesting twist of arguing that it is not only that the United States has had great effects on Persian Gulf politics but that the reverse is also true, and to a profound degree. The author uses a case study approach, examining a series of major events in the Gulf (the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and the 1991 Gulf war) to show how each affected and changed the strategic position of even so powerful a third party as the United States. Among other things, he also makes the provocative argument that these events actually enhanced the strategic position of the United States while lessening that of the Soviet Union.

One of the reasons this book has special appeal is that it combines major theoretical

perspectives with a full empirical study of the Persian Gulf. The first chapter outlines the concepts guiding the analysis—essentially the ideas of realism and the balance of power. But those less interested in theory and more in actual strategic behavior and its resultant security implications will find this a highly user-friendly book. The theoretical discussion at the outset is brief, allowing some readers to charge on to the case studies. (For those more interested in the theoretical or methodological implications of this excellent study, the author has provided a detailed discussion in an appendix.) In the studies themselves, Yativ does a good job of clearly tying the events together, noting how each affected those that followed and stressing the implications for U.S. national security policy. The author's research is well documented and includes extensive use of official government documents, as well as secondary source material.

Among his major conclusions, the author argues that the detached and distanced relationship of a third party to regional politics has actually reinforced the U.S. security position and that therefore it is imperative that the United States not relinquish this role. Furthermore, Yativ argues, the current American policy of "dual containment" of Iran and Iraq, with an overt commitment to topple both regimes, carries with it the great dangers of a far too direct, engaged, and confrontational policy. Standing by the ideas of balance-of-power theory, Yativ calls instead for a more nuanced approach in which the United States would remain vigorous against both Iran and Iraq in thwarting the development of weapons of mass destruction but would take a step back in conventional

terms, allowing Baghdad and Tehran themselves to bear the high costs of balancing against one another. In short, he suggests that both political history and theory demonstrate the value of third-party status and that the United States would be well advised to recall these lessons. Readers will find this book a valuable contribution to the literatures on U.S. foreign policy, strategic interaction in the Persian Gulf, and international relations theory.

CURTIS R. RYAN  
Mary Washington College

---

Kemp, Geoffrey, and Janice Gross Stein, eds. *Powder Keg in the Middle East: The Struggle for Gulf Security*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995. 306pp. \$42.50

If you are a little fuzzy on what U.S. interests are in the Persian Gulf and why it has forces committed to the area, then this book is for you. Geoffrey Kemp and Janice Gross Stein have assembled a series of essays from three workshops sponsored by the Program on Science and International Security of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, essays that address ethnic conflict and state-building in the Arab world; weapons of mass destruction in the region; the future of Iraq and regional security; alternative futures for Iran; security concerns of the Gulf Cooperation Council states, Turkey, and the Middle East; the Kurdish issue; the water factor; and U.S. policy in the Gulf.

We are treated to well reasoned analytic insights from such U.S. foreign policy experts as William B. Quandt, Shaul Bakhash, Richard K. Herrmann, and Thomas L. McNaugher, as well as Geoffrey Kemp

## 146 Naval War College Review

himself. A senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the director of the Middle East Arms Control Project, Kemp served in the Reagan White House as special assistant for national security affairs, and also on the National Security Council. A real plus is the addition of several essays from some of the region's own experts.

The primary reason for the U.S. focus on the Gulf is that, as the editors point out in their introductory essay, "for the foreseeable future the industrial powers will remain dependent upon access to Persian Gulf energy and will therefore remain deeply involved in the efforts to assure its security. While the major oil producers of the Gulf already control a large share of the oil market, the distribution of existing oil reserves suggests that they will play an even larger role in the years to come." This is reason enough for U.S. policy makers to pay attention to what these experts have to say about the problems facing the Persian Gulf and the impact of these issues on present and future U.S. policies. The editors' introduction lays out those problems, examining and analyzing not only the traditional military and political issues but also demographic trends and what they portend; potential social problems brought on by the unequal distribution of oil wealth; poor educational systems and standards; and the shortage of fresh water. Kemp and Stein do a very good job of illustrating how these factors are interrelated and how important it is to pay attention to them all. Neglecting any one factor could ignite the region. In this respect the book's title is well chosen: the Persian Gulf is indeed a powder keg, and any issue explored in this book could be the "match" that explodes it.

One of the more thought-provoking essays, by Professor Thomas Naff of the University of Pennsylvania, explores the multiplicity of problems caused by the lack and misuse of fresh water supplies. The difficulty is highlighted by the fact that non-Arabs (i.e., Turks, Iranians, and Israelis) control more than half the fresh water resources used by the region's Arab population. Naff does an excellent job of outlining the situation and offers several viable solutions. However, they require a multinational approach, and Naff acknowledges that the Gulf's many historical and ethnic enmities probably inhibit a workable, long-term solution. After reading this essay, one can understand why the region's next conflict may well be fought over access to water and not oil.

Kemp, Stein, and the contributing authors have done a fine job, offering a balanced look at the Persian Gulf from differing perspectives. This book ought to raise red flags for everyone interested in the Middle East, especially those involved with developing or implementing U.S. policies there.

RONALD A. PERRON  
National Cryptologic School

---

Miller, Judith. *God Has Ninety-Nine Names: Reporting From a Militant Middle East*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. 574pp. \$30

Judith Miller, a *New York Times* reporter on Middle East affairs for two decades, brings her experience to a book that chronicles the development of Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Miller takes the reader on a journey to ten Middle Eastern nations that are either battling religious militancy

or have succumbed politically to the surge of Islamic radicalism. Miller begins her journey with Egypt, the birthplace of the Muslim Brotherhood (Al Ikhwan), which was the first Islamic political party, founded in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna. She reports how Zionism, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Egypt's current economic crisis have given rise to more violent splinter groups, such as the Gamaa' Al-Islamiyah.

The author delves into the people who have changed the political and religious face of the modern Middle East. Her most insightful analysis deals with the effects of the Afghan war on Middle East terrorism. Thousands of frustrated and unemployed young men volunteered to fight a *jihad* (holy war) against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Many returned to the Arab world unappreciated and unemployed, knowing only the skills acquired in the war. These veterans have sought to overthrow their ruling governments and have formed the most radical Islamic political groups in the Middle East.

Miller reports how in Egypt Islamic fundamentalists have competed with the government in providing social services to the poorest members of society. She masterfully explains how Arab leaders, from President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to King Hussein of Jordan, have required the endorsement of religious groups to legitimize their hold on power. In Saudi Arabia, where Islam was founded fourteen centuries ago, many legitimate and illegitimate Islamic groups have asked for financial support. Miller explores the political relationship between the ruling Al-Saud family and the *ulama* (Islamic scholars), led by Sheikh Bin Baz and the Ala Al Shaikh family, whose ties with the royal

family go back to the founding of Saudi Arabia itself.

The next two chapters focus on Sudan and Algeria. The author reports on the brutal civil war in Sudan, between the Christian minority in the south and the Muslim majority in Khartoum. It was further agitated by President Gafar Al-Numeiri's decision to impose his sadistic brand of *shariah* (Islamic law). Many political opponents have been declared heretics and sent to the gallows at Koba prison in Khartoum, both under Numeiri's regime and the current dictatorship of Hassan Al-Turabi. Also discussed is the relationship of Sudan's current regime to groups like Hamas and Hezbollah.

Algeria's current quandary is examined from historical, political, and economic perspectives. Miller skillfully brings to light the struggle between Arab nationalism, Islamic influence, and the effects of French colonialism on the Algerian psyche. This conflict has exploded into a civil war that will be decided in the streets of Algiers but that has reverberated in the streets of Paris. This chapter offers an excellent account of current events in troubled Algeria, with respect to both the Islamists and those with a desire for a secular government.

In Libya, Miller enters the megalomaniac world of President Muammar Qadhafi. Qadhafi's insecurities, his rise to power, and his desire to emulate Nasser are discussed. The focus of this chapter is how Qadhafi manages to control Islamists at home while exporting terrorism to his neighbors. After Libya, we take up Lebanon and the effects of Hezbollah and Islamic militancy during the civil war and to the present; then it is on to Damascus and the repressive world of President Hafiz al-Assad of Syria. The author reveals how

President Assad has been able to control Islamic fundamentalism and any opposition in Syria by imposing a rigid police state. She also discusses how Damascus has utilized Islamic fervor to profit strategically and economically in Lebanon.

The last chapters are devoted to Jordan, Israel, and Iran. Miller shows great respect and admiration for King Hussein of Jordan, who has been able to hammer out a gentlemen's agreement with Islamic groups in his kingdom. Miller also sheds light on King Hussein's reasons for taking Iraq's side during the Persian Gulf War. The author reports on the oppressiveness of Israeli forces that led to the development of the Intifadah and radical groups like Hamas. As for Israel, there is a superb account of how non-Jewish Israeli citizens participate in the Knesset (parliament). The author also forecasts the future of Israeli society as we approach the twenty-first century. Finally, the Iranian revolution is considered as a turning point for Islamic radicals, sparking the fuse that ignited the radical Muslim challenge throughout the Middle East against ruling governments. Iran has also been active in supporting these groups in order to export its brand of religious fundamentalism. The author addresses the open debate among the mullahs over the success of Khomeini's vision of the Islamic Republic.

Although this book is primarily a description of events and offers little real analysis on how to counter threats from such militant groups, *God Has Ninety-Ninety Names* does explore the successes and failures of secular regimes and U.S. allies in combatting religious fanaticism in the Middle East. Miller offers a fine account of the people, history, economics,

and politics that have molded and shaped Islamic militancy. For those with an interest in Middle East affairs, counterterrorism in particular, this work is a must-read.

YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN  
Lieutenant, MSC, U.S. Navy

---

Regan, Geoffrey. *Blue on Blue: A History of Friendly Fire*. New York: Avon, 1995. 258pp. \$12.95

"Mistakes will be reduced when men have less to fear. But then that would not be war, and they would not be men." While this statement is the concluding sentence in Geoffrey Regan's book, it is far from the theme of this literary undertaking. Rather, the author's accounts of events endeavor to support the statement emblazoned on the cover: "We have no one to fear but ourselves." However, although *Blue on Blue* does provide an interesting collection of anecdotes, the author has granted himself too much latitude in defining friendly fire and has succumbed to the temptation to psychologize as to its causes.

Regan's compilation of "blue on blue" incidents includes nonbattle injuries, self-inflicted wounds, malfunctioning firearms, training accidents, suicides, an army shooting its own men on the battlefield to discourage desertion, "fragging," the release of glider pilots too far out at sea, the poor design of the K-class submarine, a rogue admiral who chose not to follow the course of action prescribed by the British Secretary of State, and the American sinking of a Japanese ship that happened to be transporting Allied prisoners. To combine all these types of incidents under the heading of *A History of Friendly Fire* tends to distort a very real issue that needs a greater



understanding by the public and the military alike.

This book is at its best in shedding light on things that can and have gone wrong throughout the history of warfare, but it is at its worst in implying causation and attributing motive. Regan writes of troops "firing in the air and then at each other in frustration," tank crews who "succumbed to the primitive urge to kill in which conscious thought played no part," and of Americans who "ignored the signals and plastered the British position;" he asserts that "a 45 percent casualty rate was not enough for the American High Command." The author, somehow, is able to take the scant information that exists on most "frasualty" incidents and perform psychological postmortems on the motivations of the personnel involved.

Also, in some cases *Blue on Blue* fails to provide substantiating data, while in others it cites potentially misleading statistics. On the very first page it states that "during the Gulf War, coalition troops killed far more of one another than the enemy did." A statement like this certainly deserves further amplification or documentation. Regan also writes of "77 percent of U.S. combat vehicle losses resulting from friendly fire." Seventy-seven percent is a tremendously high number. But is it 770 out of a thousand vehicle losses, or seventeen out of twenty-two? Also, when he mentions that 23 percent of American casualties were self-inflicted, does the author deem the actual number of casualties of such trivial importance that the reader need not be apprised of it? Is it 23 percent of ten thousand or of 146?

Moreover, Regan does a disservice to Charles Shrader, who wrote the report

*Amicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War* in 1982, long before the Gulf war kindled interest in this subject. The author, while using Shrader's superior work as a guide to various "frasualty" incidents, ignores his analytic approach and re-reports these accounts with emotionally charged descriptions intended to appeal to those who have little familiarity with combat operations. Further, the fact that artillery and close air support reduce the casualties inflicted by enemy forces by numbers generally far outweighing the friendly casualties sustained in the process is a point that Regan fails to underscore.

Blue on blue, friendly fire, amicide, fratricide, frasualties, or whatever people decide to call them, are unfortunately as much a part of warfare as the casualties inflicted by the enemy. Given the awesome power of today's arms technology, it should be no surprise that heightened stress, reduced visibility, inadequate training, faulty intelligence, poor coordination, and mathematical miscalculations can all lead tragically to unintended deaths in times of both war and peace. While many of the anecdotes related in Regan's book are entertaining and some are revealing, most lack any substantial documentation. As a vehicle for objectively informing a curious public or eliciting possible remedies from battlefield commanders, *Blue on Blue* falls woefully short.

CHRISTOPHER G. BLOOD  
Naval Health Research Center  
San Diego, California

---

Guilmartin, John F., Jr. *A Very Short War: The Mayaguez and the Battle of Koh Tang*. College Station: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 1995. 264pp. \$39.50

## 150 Naval War College Review

This remarkable "small war," involving U.S. forces in the recovery of the SS *Mayaguez* and its crew, coupled with a short and savage battle on the island of Koh Tang, all occurred a scant twelve days after the U.S. evacuation of Saigon in 1975. The story is deftly told by an associate professor at Ohio State having an extensive prior background as a helicopter pilot in combat over Southeast Asia.

John Guilmartin introduces his story with a brief narrative of the U.S. evacuations of personnel from Phnom Penh and Saigon in April 1975. He then traces the impact of long-range electronic communications (with their ability to link in real time the national leadership with intermediate commands and warriors under fire) on these evacuations as well as on the battle of Koh Tang. The author maintains that "information gathering and transmission technology will create as many problems as it solves until we have fully come to grips with its operational and tactical implications." His estimate of potential problems proved accurate.

President Gerald Ford was suddenly and unexpectedly confronted on 12 May 1975 with the seizure of the U.S.-flag vessel *Mayaguez* and its crew by Khmer Rouge naval forces off the Cambodian coast in the Gulf of Siam. In response the president quickly brought together Marines, Air Force helicopters, and Navy air and surface units from throughout Southeast Asia to carry out an extremely difficult rescue mission. There was little time to plan, and each participating service was forced to improvise. Intelligence on the enemy was sparse and conflicting, and at a critical juncture it was not disseminated to the Koh Tang Island assault forces. At the national

level, the rescue mission's urgency was driven by the provisions of the War Powers Act of 1973, which required the president to consult with Congress before U.S. forces could be committed to combat and to justify that commitment within forty-eight hours. Further, President Ford was faced with the possibility of another *Pueblo* incident and the clear necessity of not again permitting a hostile government to seize an American-flag vessel and hold its crew captive. The author ably details the complexity and difficulty of welding reactive forces together in an overlapping and cumbersome command structure. He depicts the impact that each service's procedures and communications systems had on the tactical parameters of the battle. In the event, worldwide systems that allowed higher echelons of command to communicate among themselves and with the forces in the field rapidly overloaded communications at all levels of command during the twin assaults.

Guilmartin traces the development of a plan whereby Air Force helicopters carrying Marines would simultaneously assault Koh Tang Island and recapture the SS *Mayaguez*, while naval carrier forces conducted retaliatory strikes against the Cambodian mainland. The assault on Koh Tang by a small force of Marines, flown into an unexpectedly furious battle by Air Force helicopters, is superbly narrated. Air Force and Marine personnel quickly fell back on improvisation and raw courage to salvage a situation that came perilously close to disaster. In closing, Guilmartin asks his readers "what lessons were learned and whether they have been assimilated by the U.S. military services and national command staff." He then briefly reviews similar subsequent events, from the April 1980 Ira-

nian hostage rescue attempt to the evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1961, and implicitly answers his own question: "A verdict remains to be seen."

The clear worth of this short and readable book to career military officers of all levels lies in the hope that they will heed its lessons and learn from the mistakes it records when responding to the similar challenges they will clearly face in coming years.

ROBERT G. SULLIVAN  
Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve, Retired  
La Jolla, California

---

Lee, Alex. *Force Recon Command: A Special Marine Unit in Vietnam, 1969–1970*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 296pp. \$29.95

Throughout its history, the Marine Corps has prided itself on being an elite fighting organization within the American armed forces. The concept of having small, specialized units within the Corps (an "elite within the elite") has always been the subject of some debate. The prevailing attitudes on this subject within its senior leadership led to the formation and eventual disbandment of the Raider and Parachute battalions during World War II. Marine reconnaissance units today, though not direct descendants of these formations, are in a similar position. Funding, manpower constraints, and the view of "the men at the top" have a great deal of impact on these units, as reflected by the recent reduction of amphibious reconnaissance assets within Marine divisions.

Lieutenant Colonel Lee's book is an insightful, hard-hitting memoir of his

experiences as the commanding officer of the Third Force Reconnaissance Company during its combat operations in the northern I Corps area of Vietnam from 1969 to 1970. In many ways, this book goes well beyond a personal account. As the dust jacket states, "This frank and absorbing chronicle traces the evolution of Marine small unit reconnaissance from its origins in World War II, analyzes its use and abuse in Vietnam, and offers . . . lessons learned from a career dedicated to an elite within the elite." Lee not only describes the daily operations of the Third Force Reconnaissance Company but writes in great detail about reconnaissance doctrine within the Corps, the various types of missions that his unit conducted, and his efforts to create a cohesive and technically proficient combat unit. His position as the commanding officer gave Lee an acute insight into how the war in Vietnam was conducted at the most senior levels. He is quite candid about his battles with the bureaucracy of higher headquarters, which often did more to inhibit Third Force Reconnaissance Company from performing its missions than did the North Vietnamese army.

Lee is eminently qualified to comment not only on the reconnaissance community but on the Marine Corps in general. He served in the Corps for twenty-seven years as an infantryman and held command billets from the platoon to battalion level. In addition to the Third Force Reconnaissance Company, he led two rifle companies in combat operations in Vietnam. Much of his knowledge and experience in the field of reconnaissance doctrine, operations, and techniques was the result of his tour as the reconnaissance equipment research and development officer at Quantico, Virginia, prior to his assumption of command of Third Force.

The reputation of the Marine Corps reconnaissance community was shaped by the men and exploits of the Vietnam War. In this regard, I believe Lee's book has something for all military professionals. For the small unit leader, from team leader to company commander, it offers insight into building a tough, cohesive unit in a fluid combat environment. For those serving in reconnaissance units today, Lee gives firsthand knowledge of the training, mission planning, and employment of reconnaissance teams. Also, he shows how little the Marine Corps changes: the same battles fought then in regard to manpower, modern equipment, and correct employment of forces are still being fought today. For senior commanders and staff members, there are valuable details concerning the support requirement of and planning considerations for intelligence collection assets; for the national security community, there are particularly insightful comments dealing with the employment of ground reconnaissance units on the operational and strategic level, during a period when the United States commitment in Vietnam was on the decline. Finally, for the historian, Vietnam enthusiast, and former recon Marine, there is Lieutenant Colonel Lee's story itself, which intertwines well written history, humor, and a bit of the "old Corps" to produce an account that is brutally honest, entertaining, and a significant contribution to the field of military history.

Some readers might find Lee glib in his praise of his unit. However, unlike such authors as the "rogue warrior," Richard Marcinko, Lee also freely criticizes his own merits and failings as a leader. Above all, in both the introduction and conclusion he explicitly states

his purpose for writing this book. "The people of the United States of America . . . failed those gallant men . . . by permitting them to be vilified upon their return home. Those who served in Vietnam were characterized as personifications of evil, and the nation ignored the honor . . . and the bravery that they exhibited in a war that was not to be won. The men of Third Force Reconnaissance Company . . . have now passed on into history, unremarked and unremembered by a nation that should not be allowed to forget that some men willingly go forth to risk both their lives and their honor when the bugles call."

STUART R. LOCKHART  
Captain, U.S. Marine Corps

---

Donahue, James C. *Mobile Guerrilla Force: With the Special Forces in War Zone D*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996. 228pp. \$28.95

James Donahue served with the Green Berets in Vietnam. *Mobile Guerrilla Force*, his second book based on his experiences there, focuses on operation BLACKJACK 31, a legendary Special Forces (SF) mission conducted in early 1967. The Mobile Guerrilla Force (MGF) was a special operations strike unit created by the U.S. Army's 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), manned predominantly by indigenous troops and led by American Green Berets. This distinguished the MGF from the common SF experience in Vietnam. Generally, as with the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program, indigenous units were led by South Vietnamese Special Forces personnel; U.S. Special Forces troopers served as advisors. Sergeant James Donahue was an assistant

platoon leader and medic with the MGF during **BLACKJACK 31**.

The operation was a month-long incursion by an MGF company into War Zone D, a communist sanctuary north of Saigon that allied conventional forces had never entered. The mission was led by Captain James Gritz (recently in the news as a negotiator during the Freeman standoff in Montana). Between 9 January and 7 February 1967, Gritz's men, consisting of fourteen Americans and 108 Cambodians, fought fifty-one engagements, called in air strikes on twenty-seven targets, and raided fifteen enemy base camps.

Donahue's story is enhanced by rich detail (although one sometimes wonders at the recall of surroundings and conversations that took place nearly thirty years ago). The book is fast-paced and never gets bogged down. The author describes the formation and training of the MGF, then quickly moves to the action. Special Forces procedures are interestingly described, including an innovative use of A-1 Skyraider attack planes: in an effort to deliver supplies deep in enemy territory while masking both the patrol's location and the true nature of the air drops, A-1s were used instead of cargo planes or helicopters, and the supplies were packaged inside napalm-bomb canisters. Donahue never lets the reader forget that the jungle itself was a foe and that anyone entering it, in whatever uniform, was an interloper. War Zone D's rightful tenants included elephants, tigers, snakes, monkeys, and a river that was one of the more serious and dangerous obstacles to the completion of the mission. The author's vivid descriptions of the environment and the action hold the reader's attention.

This book also reminds us that America's Vietnam war came after many years of fighting and that a broad mix of cultures and peoples were involved (not unlike the situation in the Balkans today). One reason the Special Forces were so successful at unconventional warfare was their respect for the various groups, including the Montagnards and the Cambodians, with whom they served—a counterpoint to the disdainful attitude toward minorities widespread among South Vietnamese leaders and officers. Donahue documents the efforts made by the Green Berets to maintain the trust of their Cambodian troops before and throughout the mission. It was not always easy, but it was vital, and the results were obviously beneficial. Near the end of the mission, a Cambodian soldier says, "When I was Viet Minh, we do not fear Saigon soldier because they are like elephant. Mobile Guerrilla Force is like tiger."

**BLACKJACK 31** was an unblemished triumph, based on, to a large extent, American air power and communications technology. But fundamentally it was a triumph of leadership, fortitude, endurance, and of sound, sometimes daring, small unit infantry tactics. As the author says, for a month the Green Berets fought the war their way. Donahue's account reminds one of the epic Guadalcanal patrol by Carlson's Raiders, and of the patrols by "Chesty" Puller, "Red Mike" Edson, and "Haiti" Hanneken (often leading indigenous troops) in small wars around the globe. This type of warfare is not going to go away, even in an age of precision guided missiles and "command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence." In fact, in many trouble spots, conventional warfare may prove more relevant than any high-tech weaponry. The United States needs to keep an

## 154 Naval War College Review

institutional memory of unconventional warfare successes such as these. James Donahue's *Mobile Guerrilla Force* is a welcome addition to that lode.

F.A. FOX  
East Greenwich, Rhode Island

---

Wooldridge, E.T., ed. *Into the Jet Age: Conflict and Change in Naval Aviation, 1945–1975*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 321 pp. \$32.50

With this volume, noted naval aviator and aviation historian E.T. Wooldridge has compiled an impressive collection of oral histories on the thirty-year period between the end of World War II and the end of Vietnam. The dedication, "To those who fought to preserve our naval aviation heritage," sets the tone. What follows are nineteen vignettes by leaders who fought the battles both within the Beltway and in hostile skies to keep U.S. naval aviation viable and effective. The majority of those discussed achieved legendary status through their actions and leadership; several paid a professional price for their beliefs.

The interviews are arranged in the categories of "Images of Flight," "The Washington Scene," and "Crises, Conflict, and Limited War." Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller talks about the post-World War II Navy and of the excitement of deploying with new aircraft on new carriers that was balanced by defense cutbacks, lack of training, and a horrendous accident rate. Miller's second chapter covers his experiences in the "come as you are" Korean War as a carrier division Flag Secretary. Captain Gerald G.

O'Rourke contributes his memories of early night-fighter operations in Korea, with both F4U Corsairs and F3D Skyknights; in a subsequent chapter he expands on the subject, recalling problems with integrating a new weapon system (the Skyknight) into the air wing, and also his happy discovery that the Marine night fighters wanted him and his men.

Vice Admiral Kent Lee's and Admiral George W. Anderson's interviews constitute four additional chapters. Admiral Lee served as one of the early commanding officers of the USS *Enterprise*, relieving future Chief of Naval Operations Captain James L. Holloway. He discusses the ship's two eventful combat tours under his command, which included the *Pueblo* incident and a flight deck conflagration. He also evokes with great clarity the view from the bridge as air wing personnel were sent off daily to fight an unpopular war. In another chapter, Lee, who was later Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, comments about the development and gestation of the F/A-18 Hornet "strike fighter," the current and future mainstay of naval aviation.

Particularly fascinating and enlightening for this reviewer are Admiral Anderson's two chapters on his tour as Chief of Naval Operations. His comments on his service in the Kennedy administration under Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara cover the Cuban Missile Crisis, the development of the TFX (eventually to be known as the F-111), interservice rivalries, and the clashes between the military and its civilian leadership. Additional chapters provide similar Washington, D.C. experiences of Vice Admiral Gerald F. Bogan, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and Admiral Charles D. Griffin, who served under Admiral Louis Denfeld from 1945 to 1950,

including the “revolt of the admirals” incident.

Here are the operational, training, command, and leadership experiences of men like Rear Admiral Francis D. Foley, commanding officer of Helicopter Utility Squadron Two, one of the first two rotary-wing squadrons in the Navy; Captain Arthur Hawkins, World War II SC-1 pilot and later commanding officer of the Blue Angels; Admiral James Russell, involved with the development of the angled deck, mirror landing system, and other programs while on the CNO's staff (OP-05) and as Chief, Bureau of Aeronautics; and Vice Admiral Robert Pirie, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when naval aviation was testing and acquiring the jet aircraft that would take it through the coming Vietnam War. The last chapter presents an interview with Vice Admiral William Lawrence, who was commanding officer of Fighter Squadron 143 when he was shot down over Vietnam in June 1967. Admiral Lawrence came home in March 1973.

Though it looks back between twenty and fifty years, *Into the Jet Age* is still timely; its value is all the greater in view of the passing of many of these warriors over the last two decades. Captain Wooldridge's editing and presentation are excellent. For his part, Wooldridge lived the period, flew the aircraft, and made the fleet and staff tours. A proven naval aviator, historian, and author, Wooldridge's experiences have served him well. This is an excellent book.

MARK MORGAN  
Tunkhannock, Penna.

Barlow, Jeffrey G. *Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950*. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1994. 420pp. \$30

Jeffrey Barlow has been a historian with the Contemporary History Branch of the Naval Historical Center since 1987. His publications include chapters in Gray and Barnett's *Seapower and Strategy* and Howarth's *Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II*, as well as articles in various national security periodicals. His latest work, *Revolt of the Admirals*, is a compelling, thoroughly documented account of the bitter fight for key military roles and missions between the newly independent U.S. Air Force and the Navy during the latter half of the 1940s. This complex struggle was as vicious, and at times unseemly, as any in U.S. history, which helps to explain the high drama in which it culminated and from whence the title derives.

Barlow starts by tracing the interplay of various factors that led to the so-called revolt. These included the politics of military unification under a single defense department, the establishment of an independent air force, the U.S. Navy's struggle to establish its relevance in the absence of a significant naval competitor, disparate Navy and Air Force views on the role (and control) of atomic weapons and their implications for conventional forces, and the key programs each service pushed in pursuit of its vision. The struggle raged amidst a constant backdrop of decreasing budgets, fierce public-relations battles, and unremitting political infighting. Large figures, among them Arthur Radford, Omar Bradley, and Arleigh Burke, plus a big cast of lesser characters, played important roles in the unfolding drama.

By 1949, under that year's extraordinarily stringent budget constraints, it was

clear that the country could not (or would not) afford both the U.S. Air Force's B-36 strategic bomber and the Navy's proposed *United States* class of big, jet-capable carriers. That April, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, newly appointed by President Harry Truman after playing a crucial role in his surprising 1948 reelection, peremptorily cancelled the *United States* without meaningful consultation with Navy leaders. To many naval officers, the very future of the service was at stake. Moreover, Johnson's decision seemed to commit the nation to the highly questionable doctrine of massive strategic nuclear bombardment. The Navy faced the difficult question of how to raise crucial national security issues in the face of a civilian leadership that appeared unwilling even to listen.

Almost immediately, an "anonymous document" was received by various members of Congress charging that the Air Force's troubled B-36 program was "a billion dollar blunder . . . which remained uncorrected because the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force had a personal financial interest in its continued production." It prompted hearings, which were expanded to examine not only the immediate venality charge and the B-36 program but also service roles and mission issues (including the soundness of the *United States* cancellation) and the proper role of strategic bombing in U.S. national military strategy. An open debate on fundamental issues seemed in store.

But by late August 1949, the corruption charges had been shown to be totally unfounded. Worse, the scurrilous "anonymous document" was found to have been coauthored by a naval officer. When the hearings recessed for six weeks, it was

uncertain whether they would be resumed at all, thus putting at risk the thorough examination of deeper issues the Navy wanted. The Truman administration and the Air Force argued that since the secretaries of Defense and the Air Force had been vindicated and the Air Force had successfully made its case for the B-36, there was no need for further hearings.

Navy Secretary Francis Matthews, who was appointed following his predecessor's resignation in protest of the carrier cancellation, vigorously pushed efforts to end the hearings, in support of Secretary Johnson. Later, when they nonetheless resumed, he tried to limit severely Navy testimony, even unsuccessfully pressuring Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Louis Denfeld: "Admiral, I believe we should select a time at which you and I can get together and prepare your statement."

When the hearings resumed, Matthews's opening testimony was soundly rejected by the naval witnesses, who went on to present their professional views on the wider issues of roles and missions and the role of strategic bombing. Denfeld, the final Navy witness, sealed his own professional fate with the remark that "as the senior military spokesman for the Navy, I want to state forthwith that I fully support the broad conclusions presented to this committee by the naval and Marine officers who had [*sic*] preceded me." The Secretary of Defense, outraged by the CNO's testimony, believed it "an attack against the President and civilian control and economy." Secretary Matthews fired Admiral Denfeld less than two weeks later. The press judged at the time that the "Revolt of the Admirals" (a *Time* magazine headline) had failed.

Yet the opposite turned out to be the case. Barlow concludes that the Navy's tes-



timony “challenged much of the accepted strategic wisdom regarding the role of the strategic air offensive in warfare, the proper use of atomic weapons, the capabilities of the B-36 as an intercontinental bomber, and the usefulness of carrier aviation. Clearly, the nature of the Navy’s ‘revolt’ served to establish doubt in the minds of some members of the [congressional] committee about the efficacy of the policies that . . . Johnson was pursuing in the name of economy and unification.” The committee’s report was released in March 1950, and “among the most important conclusions was the view that intercontinental strategic bombing was not synonymous with air power—that U.S. air power consisted of Air Force, Navy, and Marine air power, and, of these, strategic bombing constituted but one aspect.” By late 1950, Johnson had been sacked and carriers had played a crucial role in stemming the initial North Korean invasion. The first of the big *Forrestal* carriers was authorized in March 1951.

The period addressed by this book offers some fascinating parallels with the present. The same potent brew exists today. The role of airpower (manned and unmanned) is once again a central focus during a time of decreasing budgets and potentially bitter roles-and-missions debates. Once again unproven technologies suggest new ways of doing business that could radically alter how the military is organized and how future combat operations are conducted. And once again there are those who claim that the military threatens to go beyond its proper bounds into areas rightfully the domain of civilian leaders. Recently, academics have suggested that current civilian-military relations are increasingly poor,

with more than a hint that the military no longer knows its place. This case study offers some timely thoughts on the inherent tensions between “revolt” and providing sound professional military advice to the civilian leadership on matters of profound national concern.

JAN VAN TOL  
Commander, U.S. Navy

---

Blackwill, Robert D., and Sergei A. Karaganov, eds. *Damage Limitation or Crisis? Russia and the Outside World* (CSIA Studies in International Security #5) Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s (US), 1994. 330pp. \$18.50

This volume constitutes another addition to the scholarly debate over the future direction of Russia’s foreign policy and what, if anything, the United States and its allies can do to influence it in directions congenial to their interests.

Prominent academicians from Russia and several other countries, including the United States, China, Germany, and Japan, analyze these issues thematically, assessing the prospects for democracy in Russia and delineating Russia’s national interests; and regionally, by examining Russia’s policy toward the “near abroad” (i.e., the other successor states of the Soviet Union) and respectively Eastern Europe, Western Europe, China and Japan, and the United States. Given Russia’s current diminished role in world affairs, one might justify the omission of Russian foreign policy toward Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. Less explicably, however, given the subject of its inquiry, the volume devotes no chapter to the overall status of Russia’s armed forces or

## 158 Naval War College Review

the military doctrine under which they operate. Also diminishing its utility is the lack of an index and bibliography; however, the essays by Robert D. Blackwill and Steven E. Miller, in particular, do include many useful bibliographical entries in their footnotes, for the interested reader.

This work offers little solace to those inside and outside Russia who hoped that a post-communist Russia would construct a "strategic partnership" with the United States to promote international peace and stability. Summarizing the conclusions of his colleagues, Blackwill states categorically that partnership between Russia and the United States is an "empty slogan" and that it "will not be easy" for these two countries even to follow his prescription to pursue policies of "damage limitation designed for narrow cooperation when possible, and seek to forestall crisis in Russia's relations with the outside world." Even more depressing, his coeditor Sergei Karaganov, Deputy Director of the Institute of Europe at the Russian Academy of Sciences, reports that Blackwill's "largely realistic and gloomy conclusions" are actually "less pessimistic" than those held by his Russian colleagues.

The essayists identify four "powerful and negative domestic trends in Russia" that largely account for their bleak prognostications: a deteriorating economic situation with limited prospects for market-based economic reform; a "discouraging" political situation in which the "period of democratic breakthroughs," which continued until early 1993, is over; rampant crime and corruption; and "strong" anti-Western feeling among both elites and masses. Together, these trends "will feed nationalist and

chauvinistic forces already gaining ground in the country," who will pursue policies that the West "will often not like."

Paradoxically, from this volume a good case can be made that a generally pro-Western foreign policy—if not an actual "strategic partnership"—is in the national interest of Russia. First, as Sergei Karaganov argues, the strategic interests of Russia and the West "converge much more than they conflict" on many issues, including arms control and nuclear proliferation, effectuating a balance of power to contain the "emerging Chinese leviathan," and the long-term integration of the Russian economy into the world capitalist system. Second, as several of the essayists point out, the West itself poses no direct threat to the security of Russia; any threat comes principally from the economic and political chaos found within itself and the "near abroad"—chaos that Western financial aid and private investment could mitigate. Third, Steven E. Miller identifies the close links among economic, military, and overall world power and cogently concludes that "clearly Russia should pursue those external policies that are most likely to facilitate economic progress and success and avoid policies that may impede economic development"—a prescription for a generally benevolent Russian foreign policy toward the West.

Whither Russia? Will the gloomy prognostications of this volume be realized, or will Russian elites apprehend and act upon the substantive coalescence of interests that on many issues they share with the West? Students of this subject will await with keenest interest history's answer to this query.

JOHN M. KRAMER  
Mary Washington College

Cochran, Thomas B., Robert S. Norris, and Oleg A. Bukharin. *Making the Russian Bomb: From Stalin to Yeltsin*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995. 318pp. \$55

"Making the Russian Bomb, Trashing the Empire" might be a more appropriate title for this book. Global security requires concern not only about diminishing the warhead count but also about dealing with the environmental contamination legacy that resulted from nearly half a century of building the Russian nuclear arsenal. In addition to the production of a weapons stockpile that reached a peak of forty-five thousand warheads sometime around 1986, nuclear fuel-cycle activities and radioactive contamination from nuclear-powered vessels have created a vast waste area on land and seas throughout and around the former Soviet Union.

For example, the Russian navy dumped liquid and solid reactor waste in ten officially sanctioned areas in the Far Eastern seas, including six in the Sea of Japan south of Vladivostok, one in the Sea of Okhotsk, and three in the North Pacific Ocean southeast of the Kamchatka Peninsula. The radio-chemical plant at Tomsk-7 on the Tom River near the geographical center of Russia has a long history of accidents, from a condenser explosion in 1961 to an explosion with discharge of radioactive aerosols outside the plant in 1993. In 1957, the "Kyshtym disaster" resulted from a chemical explosion in a waste storage tank; some twenty mega-Curies (MC) of radioactivity was ejected. (By comparison, an estimated 50 to 150 MC of fission products were released from the Chernobyl accident.) The authors, who are members of the Natural Resources De-

fense Council, present a comprehensive account of the activities that have resulted from the Russian radioactive contamination problem. This book is an essential reference for those concerned with what needs to be done now.

However, the title is misleading. The history of the Russian Bomb is treated in a single, short chapter. The student interested in the historical development of the Russian nuclear weapon is referred to *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1994). For its part, *Making the Russian Bomb* is an encyclopedic compendium of sources of radioactive waste and must be treated as such to be appreciated. The chapters do not have a common theme but rather are independent discussions of such topics as "An Overview of the Stockpile and Complex" and "Chelyabinsk-65/Mayak Chemical Combine."

The writing style may be difficult for readers unfamiliar with Russian geography. More extensive maps would have been useful. Also, the style and terminology are difficult. The addition of a glossary of acronyms and abbreviations would have been helpful. For example, it took considerable effort for me to realize that "Hm/y" meant "tons heavy metal per year" and that "Pbq" meant "penta-Becquerel," which is  $10^{15}$  disintegrations per second.

I found the chapter "Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26" interesting, because I had attended a physics conference at Tomsk in September 1993, shortly after a chemical accident; reading this book explained why I was able to find a personal microdosimeter for sale in a department store. Of particular interest to the Navy community is the final chapter, "Radioactive Contamination from Nuclear-Powered Vessels,"

## 160 Naval War College Review

which describes the persistent dumping of radioactive waste in the Arctic region. To the authors' credit, this material comes from the comprehensive Russian report by Alexei V. Yablokov et al., "Facts and Problems Connected with the Disposal of Radioactive Waste in the Seas Adjacent to Our Territory," published in February 1993.

Although it is an important addition to our knowledge of activities in the former Soviet Union and the six appendices and extensive footnotes are invaluable, *Making the Russian Bomb* is a specialist's book. It is recommended for libraries and as a reference for scholars of nuclear weapons, nuclear waste, and the environment.

XAVIER K. MARUYAMA  
Naval Postgraduate School

---

McCauley, Martin. *Stalin and Stalinism*. London: Longman, 1995. 142pp. (No price given)

McCauley, Martin. *The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1949*. London: Longman, 1995. 152pp. (No price given)

The serious reader will read perhaps three thousand books in a lifetime. This is not a great number, so every single volume matters. Especially on important issues, each book should enhance understanding rather than confuse. It follows, then, that there will be books to skip over. These, I submit, are two.

It is truly surprising that in the wake of the Soviet Union's demise—when even the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* now feel it safe to acknowledge that the USSR was a "totalitarian" state—there continue to be published histories that downplay what few now

dispute: the monstrous nature of the Soviet regime. If you wish to avoid such works, a few general rules of the road might help. You might, for example, simply stay away from authors who refer (unless with irony) to "legitimate Soviet security needs." You can safely steer clear of historians who describe the Soviet Union as an "extraordinary experiment." You would also do well to avoid works that purport to be "objective"—meaning that they will not stoop to "moral judgment." On all these counts, McCauley's books are guilty.

One hesitates to criticize the work of a historian who has worked as hard as Martin McCauley to synthesize an impressive amount of scholarship into two slim volumes. But I will overcome my reticence, as the flaws in these histories of Stalin's Russia and the beginnings of the Cold War greatly outweigh their virtues.

McCauley, who teaches at the University of London, is a frequent and cogent commentator on the current economic and social problems of the countries that emerged from the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. However, his historical treatments are quirky, and the quirkiness seems to be all in one direction—one that tends to muddle rather than illuminate the reader's understanding of the essence of Stalinism or of how the Cold War came about.

Both volumes are part of an ambitious series being published by Longman that covers British and world history from medieval times to the present. Both books have their good points. In *Stalin and Stalinism*, McCauley weaves together in a very small space much of the political, economic, and cultural histories of the Soviet Union under Stalin. In *The Origins of the Cold War* he attempts, with general success, to synthesize most of the historical inter-

pretations of that lengthy ideological conflict. Both volumes have, by way of appendices, useful and eclectic lists of pertinent documents. But for an understanding of the events encompassed in these works, one would be better off reading the appendices and jettisoning the text.

In both books, McCauley takes an ostensibly (and ostentatiously) "neutral" stance that professes to reveal "complexities" rather than, heaven forbid, pass judgment. The fact is that McCauley, while trying to maintain what he would call "objectivity," leaves out critical facts, interpretations, and emphases that are all key to understanding Soviet totalitarianism—a word McCauley, not surprisingly, does not seem to like.

The author, then, is not nearly as balanced in his approach as he professes. For example, his bibliography in *The Origins of the Cold War* includes a seemingly calculated equivalency in the number of books of traditional interpretation (i.e., the Cold War is mostly or wholly the fault of the Soviets) versus the revisionist viewpoint that largely blames the United States. McCauley's text, however, leans decidedly toward the revisionist interpretation. In *Stalin and Stalinism*, there does not seem to be much balance at all: references to works identifying Stalin as one who continued and intensified (rather than invented) the Soviet totalitarian regime, such as recent histories by Martin Malia and Richard Pipes, are inexplicably absent.

Consequently, a major problem in the scene-setting chapters of both books is McCauley's diminution of Lenin's responsibility for what followed under Stalin. Lenin's creation of the Soviet totalitarian state, including establishing

very early the secret police and the Gulag, initiating terror against the Church, closing down newspapers, forcing grain requisitions, and so forth, is downplayed, not mentioned at all, or blamed entirely on Stalin. Meanwhile, the ideological differences between Lenin and Stalin are inflated in a way that would have surprised both men.

The text is generally skewed toward a revisionist apology for Soviet totalitarianism. Contrary to McCauley's assertions, Lenin was not forced by circumstances into creating his dictatorship; Stalin did not invent party discipline; Soviet Russia certainly did pose a threat to the West prior to 1941; Moscow did not begin its own atomic bomb project only in August 1945; in 1953 the United States was by no means convinced it would win the Cold War; Marxist-Leninists are not bound by ideology always to seize the initiative; and the Marshall Plan was not to blame for dividing the continent.

Numerous omissions, moreover, confirm the author's tendentiousness. Britain did break off Soviet relations in 1927, but there is no mention of Soviet subversion among British workers or in the army. When McCauley explains that the Poles and the German's "blamed the Soviets" for the Katyn forest massacre of fifteen thousand Polish officers, the reader waits in vain for the statement (in an aside, in a footnote, anywhere) that, by the way, the Soviets *did* do it, that Moscow confessed to the slaughter in 1992. In his discussion of Stalin's February 1946 speech, McCauley omits the fact that in it Stalin declared that war with the capitalist West was inevitable.

There are certain bizarre statements, specific word choices, and uses of the passive voice that show McCauley's true colors. For example, regarding the 1936

## 162 Naval War College Review

constitution, he states that "the Soviet Union appeared to be moving in the right direction and made a refreshing contrast to the rest of Europe where fascism was on the march." *Refreshing?* McCauley is apparently unaware that in the 1930s many in the West were making comparisons between the USSR and Nazi Germany. According to McCauley, following World War II, Poland and Czechoslovakia needed a powerful ally to protect them against a possible resurgent Germany, and "it was believed that the USSR fit the bill very well." *It was believed?* Soviets also initiated "democratization" in the eastern zone of Germany, created "people's democracies" throughout Eastern Europe, and introduced "reforms." Any untoward Soviet conduct in the region is described as merely "insensitive"!

Most tellingly, McCauley states that the Soviets, like the Americans in Japan, were "imposing their own agenda" in Eastern Europe. This last statement, which demonstrates a 1960s-style moral relativism, is by no means atypical. McCauley opines that "in 1947 the United States had to face the reality that there was an adversary which also had a universalist dream for mankind, and the two could not be reconciled." To McCauley, the communist vision—what led Lenin to create and Stalin to strengthen the world's first totalitarian state, imprisoning and killing millions of human beings in the process—is just another "universalist dream."

In McCauley's view, the Cold War came about largely through a U.S. misunderstanding of Moscow's "legitimate security needs," exaggerated Western views of Soviet military capabilities, and American and British attempts to turn

back the clock, too late, in Eastern Europe. The Soviets, McCauley states, really did want a "working relationship" with the United States. Unfortunately, the Americans "misread" Soviet "security interest" in Eastern Europe as (who would have thought it?) expansionism! Washington's problem was that it "never tried to see the problems from Moscow's point of view," although McCauley does admit that its sources of information were "poor." Of course they were! Washington was dealing with a totalitarian state, while "Moscow . . . was swimming in information." But remember, it was the Soviets who were misunderstood. Go figure.

McCauley is truly a historian for our politically correct times. Because the Soviet Union suffered from low self-esteem, it was the victim of a sensitivity deficit due to its background (for which it cannot be held responsible), and it was generally misunderstood with respect to its needs and feelings. The essential truth that McCauley misses is that the USSR was indeed an "evil empire." It was ultimately by treating it as such that the West won the Cold War, not by agonizing over whether we were hurting the feelings of Marxist-Leninists.

NICHOLAS DUJMOVIĆ  
Sterling, Virginia

---

Glantz, David M., and Jonathan House.  
*When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler*. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1995. 414pp. \$29.95

Spahr, William J. *Zhukov: The Rise and Fall of a Great Captain*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1995. 290pp. \$14.95

Readers interested in the Second World War have had all too few trustworthy views

of it from a Soviet perspective. The reasons are familiar: excessive Soviet secrecy, byzantine political motives that periodically revised the roles and importance of the principal actors, and a tendency to downplay Soviet mistakes and the contributions of its allies. The opening up of new sources in the past few years has shed some fresh light on the Great Patriotic War, beginning the process of better understanding from the Soviet perspective. *When Titans Clashed* and *Zhukov* are two entries benefiting from increasingly accessible Soviet sources.

David Glantz and Jonathan House, former U.S. Army officers, offer in *When Titans Clashed* an operationally oriented history that should satisfy the serious reader looking for a detailed battlefield description of this colossal struggle. It is well organized, generously supported by detailed maps, tables, and an array of appendices. Glantz, founder and former director of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, has written extensively on the wartime operational and tactical doctrine of the Red Army. His analyses of how the Soviets learned to cope with German battlefield skill and eventually transform themselves into a formidable offensive force are among the very best available. House has also focused his studies of war at the operational and tactical level, so it is no surprise that these authors' explanation of Soviet success is overwhelmingly oriented to the military dimensions of the war.

The book is organized into three periods of war, in a way that reflects the Soviet view of the struggle. The first period, the strategic defensive, ended with the springing of the trap around the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad. The

second period was one of transition from strategic defensive to sustained strategic offensive; the third period of war began in January 1944, when a greatly weakened Wehrmacht was driven westward by one Soviet offensive punch after another. The authors do a superb job of leading the reader through the operations of each period, which is a great aid to understanding the ebb and flow of the war from the Soviet perspective.

Because they stick to military explanations, however, the authors cannot deliver all they (or their publisher) promise. The dustcover claims that the book places "the war within its wider political, economic, and social contexts," but these facets of the larger strategic picture remain largely unexplored. The subtitle, "How the Red Army Stopped Hitler," is revealing; however, a history that explored "Why the Soviets Defeated Hitler" would be of more interest to the general reader. When Clausewitz took up why Napoleon's Russian invasion was such a disaster, he wrote, "We maintain that the 1812 campaign failed because the Russian government kept its nerve and the people remained loyal and steadfast." This thesis seems as valid in explaining Soviet tenacity in 1941-1942 as it was for czarist Russia, and it might have provided a good starting point for a broader look at the entire Soviet war effort. Why was Stalin able to maintain his grip on power despite his 1939-1941 policy and strategy blunders? Why was the Soviet economy able to produce such vast quantities of war materiel despite the loss of the most valuable industrial and resource regions? Why did the people continue to endure such intense hardship for so long yet remain loyal to Stalin's regime?

The principal strength of *When Titans Clashed* is also its biggest weakness. While

the serious student of the war will find this book valuable in providing a clearer picture of the clash between these armies, the general reader may be numbed by the details (unit designations, effective strength, etc.) that appear on seemingly every page.

*Zhukov: The Rise and Fall of a Great Captain* is a paperback edition of William J. Spahr's 1993 biography of arguably the preeminent military figure of the Second World War. Spahr, formerly a senior analyst and branch chief of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and a specialist in Soviet military policy and doctrine, seeks to undo five decades of Party misinformation that sought to diminish Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov's role in the achievement of Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. Additionally, he fills the void that existed in the story from 1946 until Zhukov's death in 1974.

Spahr uses as his principal source the recently published tenth edition of Zhukov's memoirs, which purportedly includes material that was missing from the original manuscript. Spahr points out passages Zhukov was required to include to get his memoirs published in the first place. As Spahr tells the story of Zhukov's life, he tests the veracity of the Marshal's version of events against the recollections of other key personalities and archival material now becoming available. The result is a readable, balanced, and generably favorable portrait of this Hero of the Soviet Union, who twice attained the pinnacle of his profession only to be dumped by a paranoid Stalin in 1946 and a jealous Khrushchev in 1957.

Zhukov emerges as profane and proud, a true and loyal communist who

played a critical role in every military crisis and opportunity that the Red Army faced in its struggle with Germany. Organized chronologically, this biography consists of short, essay-like chapters that portray Zhukov as a ruthless, hard-driving superior and an opinionated, uncowed subordinate. In this way, Zhukov became his own worst enemy. Stalin and his cronies recognized his talent but resented his independence, and bitter subordinates were eager to settle old scores. When the wartime crisis passed, these forces combined, seeking to tar Zhukov's loyalty to the regime and his reputation as a general.

*Zhukov* complements a detailed military history such as *When Titans Clashed* by providing a glimpse of the political and personal struggles away from the front. One of the most interesting aspects of this biography is that it reveals Stalin's constant involvement in making military strategy, as well as his "hands-on" approach in day-to-day operations.

While *Zhukov* is more suited than *Titans* to a wide audience, both books are highly useful in that they take a new look at a theater of the Second World War that is largely a blank spot for many American readers.

J. J. O'ROURKE  
Commander, U.S. Navy

---

Alexander, Joseph H. *Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 328pp. \$29.95

This is a history book that focuses exclusively on one tactical engagement in November 1943. In and of itself, that is not unusual; there have been numerous histo-



ries written about specific battles. Gettysburg, for example, was a three-day battle that has been the subject of several books.

What makes this book unusual is that its academic quality (its balanced and exhaustive treatment of the subject, set precisely within the context of the overarching strategic and operational considerations of global war), is nicely complemented by its literary quality (its vivid, haunting Leon Uris-like style, scene, and character development). It reads like a novel and at times you will wish it was. However, its characters are real heroes. It is a good, solid, professional history that you will not have to hide under the magazine rack in your office.

One might wonder why Colonel Alexander would choose to write this kind of book at this particular time. As Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, Marine Corps, Retired, points out in the foreword, there have been several fairly good books on the battle for Betio Island. Robert Sherrod's *Tarawa: The Story of a Battle*, published in 1944, is considered the definitive work on the subject. He was one of the many journalists who went ashore with the Marines, and his vivid, moving account still remains in print. (Betio, by the way, is the name of the actual island where most of Alexander's action takes place. It forms part of the *Tarawa* atoll which, in turn, lies within the *Gilberts* island chain. Betio, which rhymes with "ratio," proved difficult for American's to master phonetically, so the tactical engagement became known, however erroneously, as the battle of *Tarawa*. *GALVANIC* was the code name for the operation to seize the *Gilberts*.)

The book's preface explains what factors inspired Colonel Alexander's reexamination of *Tarawa*, an undertaking encouraged by the late Robert Sherrod. The first was the availability of new information drawn from recent translations of Japanese books and documents, personal accounts fostered by the occasion of *Tarawa's* fiftieth anniversary commemoration, and newly declassified *ULTRA* radio intercepts available in the National Archives. Secondly, *Tarawa* is generally considered the watershed event in the development of amphibious warfare doctrine, with *Gallipoli* on one side and *OVERLORD* on the other. Today's "Operational Maneuver from the Sea" is firmly rooted in lessons learned from *Tarawa* and subsequent Second World War amphibious assaults. The more precise picture of this battle afforded by the new information warranted a close reexamination of those lessons with regard to how they affect today's evolving amphibious assault doctrine. The third factor that Alexander believes makes this book relevant is what he calls *Tarawa's* spiritual legacy. There were 3,407 American casualties and 1,115 deaths during a seventy-six-hour period on a battlefield no larger than the Pentagon and its surrounding parking lots. The fighting was particularly close-in and savage, but in the end the Marines triumphed over a disciplined, determined, well equipped, and well led foe. It was a high price to pay, but it was deemed worthwhile. As a result, the United States steeled itself to the realities of war in the Pacific and proved ready to make the sacrifice necessary to obtain the ultimate victory. While true that the will of the people is often the Achilles' heel of modern democracies, it can also be an immense source of strength.

## 166 Naval War College Review

If Vietnam left an American legacy on this point, so did Tarawa.

*Utmost Savagery* is not about the Second World War. It is not even about the war in the Pacific. It is about the battle of Tarawa and its relationship to the rest of the war, its lessons and legacies, and its heroes, both Japanese and American. Although many characters leap from its pages, the most central character is a young Colonel David M. Shoup, USMC, commander of the 2nd Marine Division, who later became Commandant of the Marine Corps. Part action thriller, part war story, part detailed history, this book is everything but boring. *Utmost Savagery: The Three Days of Tarawa* is definitely bound for the Marine officer's professional reading list. It should also be of interest to any student of history, leadership, war, amphibious doctrine, planning, or operations. It will particularly enthrall anyone interested in the battle of Tarawa itself and should garner respect from other historians as well. Simply put, it's a good read.

ARTHUR A. ADKINS

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

---

Boyd, Carl, and Akihiko Yoshida. *The Japanese Submarine Force and World War II*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 272pp. \$32.95

With an ever-deepening hostility of more than thirty years, earlier in this century two great fleets, one based on North America's west coast, the other on islands off Asia's east coast, faced each other across six thousand miles of salt water.

As time went on, those fleets came to resemble each other in their strategic concepts, the nature of the forces of which they were composed, and their combatant strengths. Among other things both fleets, those of the United States and Japan, had powerful submarine forces, made up of long-range, fast (on the surface) boats. Those submarines were intended to seek out the opponent's fleet, report on it, ambush it, and in all ways contribute to its destruction before, during, and after the anticipated decisive battle between the rival fleets. Secretly and independently, each fleet agreed with the other that the decisive action would take place in the waters between Japan, the Marianas, and the Philippines. As it turned out, before the end of the anticipated war, which began in 1941, there would not be one great battle between the fleets in those waters, but two. Both came in 1944.

The opposing submarine forces took part in both battles, but with markedly different results for each. Indeed, by the time those battles took place the fortunes of the two submarine forces had already been decided. As its title makes plain, this book is about one of those forces.

When the war began, Japan's submarine fleet consisted of ships that were larger, faster (on the surface), and better armed than those of the Americans. Though the United States had many more submarines than the Japanese, on average Japan's ships were more modern and, unlike the Americans', all of them were in the Pacific. Carl Boyd and Akihiko Yoshida tell us that when Japan's carriers attacked the dangerously exposed ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, twenty-five of Japan's submarines were deployed north, south, east, and west of that harbor in order to attack whatever

U.S. ships sailed into or out of it. Five of them carried two-man minisubs intended to get inside the harbor and attack the unsuspecting Americans from under the water, while the carriers' planes attacked from above.

The aviators did their share of the job well. The submariners failed almost totally. In the next year Japan's submariners had a few good moments, notably one day in September when the *I-19*, on a picket line southeast of Guadalcanal, with one salvo of six torpedoes sank the carrier *Wasp*, fatally damaged the destroyer *O'Brien*, and sent the battleship *North Carolina* into drydock for repair. On the whole, however, that powerful force accomplished much less than it had expected of itself. That same year the U.S. submariners' record was even more depressing.

But on the war's first day, the Chief of Naval Operations had expanded the U.S. submariners' operational concept to include unrestricted warfare against enemy shipping. It took the American submariners more than a year to overcome their difficulties, which lay chiefly with faulty weapons and a too-cautious tactical doctrine. When those shortcomings were finally made good, U.S. submarines sank so many enemy merchant and fighting ships that they set the conditions under which for the rest of the war opposing air, surface, and ground forces would fight.

As Boyd and Yoshida make clear, though the Japanese certainly sank Allied merchant ships, especially in the Indian Ocean, the high command never expanded the submarine fleet's operational concept so as to focus on American logistical shipping. Rather, when there was no big battle in immediate prospect, the

commanders responded to the destruction of their own shipping by using their submarines as transports and cargo ships. The chief result was that their submarine losses increased.

In fact, because Japan's fleet in general was unpracticed in antisubmarine warfare (ASW), its submariners were unprepared to deal with American ASW. They seemed never to learn, and as a result, no matter what kind of mission they were on, they perished rapidly while achieving little. Moreover, the United States was more successful in penetrating its foe's radio communications than were the Japanese, and that imbalance cost the Japanese submarine force dearly.

Thus, during the first of the long-anticipated "decisive" battles, which took place in June 1944, while U.S. submarines not only effectively scouted out the Japanese fleet but sank two carriers at no cost to themselves, the Japanese submarines in contrast never saw the American fleet yet lost eight of their number. At the second of the battles, in October, U.S. submarines again served effectively both as scouts and as sinkers of enemy warships. Yet even with an improved tactical doctrine Japan's submarines again failed miserably, albeit expensively.

In the final weeks of the war, Japan's submariners had their first important success in nearly two years when the *I-58* chanced upon and sank a lone American cruiser, the USS *Indianapolis*. However, by that time their efforts had been focused for months on constructing hordes of minisubs with which to defend the country from the American invasion fleets, and on building a few supersized submarines able to launch aircraft with which to bomb the Panama Canal. Little came of the first of these efforts and nothing of the second.

Professor Boyd and Captain Yoshida, a retired officer of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, tell their story about the Imperial Japanese Navy's submarine force—formidable in prospect, forlorn in retrospect—economically and effectively. In doing so they miss almost nothing of importance. Moreover, they provide a number of helpful appendices.

Boyd and Yoshida have written a book worth owning.

FRANK UHLIG, JR.  
Naval War College

---

Ponting, Clive. *Armageddon: The Reality behind the Distortions, Myths, Lies, and Illusions of World War II*. New York: Random House, 1995. 376pp. \$27.50

Anyone who has delved into the vast collection of works on World War II can tell you his or her favorite books, perhaps volumes that uniquely describe the reality of combat, the intricacies of strategy, or the complexities of politics. Other works effortlessly transport the reader into the lives and deaths of men and women in every theater, every nation, every unit of the global conflict. Finally, there are books that reveal the role of the human intellect as well as the human heart in great technical or moral achievements, as well as in unspeakable savagery. This is not one of any of those kinds of books.

*Armageddon* is a revisionist tale, told by an individual who seems to have nothing but contempt for every leader and nation that engaged in that terrible war. Clive Ponting is described on the dust jacket as a professor of politics at the

University of Swansea, Wales, and a former assistant secretary at the Ministry of Defence under Margaret Thatcher. No other credentials or background is offered, and truthfully, no other data is needed, since the book lacks even the pretense of scholarship.

The author's basic method is to blend statistics with selected events to create an "impersonal" point of view. Ponting omits discussion of any military aspects of the war. In the preface he states that "there is little here on the detailed tactical handling of forces by military commanders, or maps and descriptions of particular battles. These have been exhaustively covered elsewhere and *tell us little about the reality of the war*" (emphasis added). Instead, the author takes a more remote and narrow perspective on the war, in which Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin are described as shrewd barbarians while Roosevelt is seen as an opportunistic political hack and Churchill as a prevaricator. This is akin to today's shoddy "gotcha journalism," not reputable history.

In this new telling of World War II, Britain and France are seen as cynically declaring war on Germany to preserve the status quo of their ill gotten imperial empires, not to stand alongside a nation being raped by Hitler. Germany, Italy, Japan (and also the Soviet Union) were "revisionist powers" that sought to change the world as it had stood for over a century. Ponting is more vague about the United States, although he does describe the critical role played by its overwhelming economic power. He also eschews any perspective concerning the *realpolitik* that drove many Allied contingency decisions at the senior levels. The well known political divergences among the Allies are retold with relish, especially if Ponting can claim that

the leaders involved were selling out governments in exile, abrogating articles of the Atlantic Charter, or otherwise acting just like our demonized foes. For example, the sad tale of the Royal Navy's reluctant attack on the French fleet at Oran in July 1940 is retold without any examination of the broader political debates and the ultimate rationale that drove the British to this option. A number of complex political processes are treated in a like manner, with the intricacies of military decision-making elements essentially omitted.

The book is broken into sections about the origins of the war (a mere eighteen pages long), the actions of the neutrals (but little concerning the embedded and complex historical, geographic, economic, and political relationships among the nonbelligerents), mobilization, strategy (which includes, *inter alia*, logistics, tactics, and technology but little discussion of broad strategic goals), life under occupation, liberation, and the aftermath of the war.

For readers who are familiar with the historiography of World War II, there are sections of this book that can act as excellent catalysts for debate and discussion. Certainly the role of the Atlantic Charter in shaping Allied policy (which was either used as a political template or summarily ignored when inconvenient) is a topic ripe for detailed analysis. This is where a real historian would be an immense pleasure to read, but this author offers mere pontificating.

The weakest element of the book is not the author's perspective, however, but rather the total lack of support he offers for any of his "revelations." It behooves an author telling a provocative version of well known historical events

to cite a wealth of sources to underscore the seriousness of his or her intentions and scholarship. Ponting, however, fails to cite a single source for any of his hypotheses. There are *no footnotes*, and instead of a bibliography one is presented with a "Guide to Further Reading." Such poor scholarship effectively reduces this work to the level of a supermarket checkout tabloid, with the same amount of credibility.

WILLIAM R. COOPER  
San Diego, California

---

Fowler, William M., Jr. *Silas Talbot: Captain of Old Ironsides*. Mystic, Conn.: Mystic Seaport Museum, 1995. 231pp. \$29.95

Silas Talbot is not well known today, although his event-filled life is an excellent example of what one could accomplish in the early days of the Republic. Twenty-three years old at the opening of the American Revolution, young Talbot, born of a hard-scrabble farm family, already had become a skilled stonemason-bricklayer, gained seafaring experience in the coastal trade, and had returned ashore to establish himself successfully in business, begin a family, and build his own house.

The outbreak of the Revolution made him a militia lieutenant, then a Continental Army captain, and by 1779 a lieutenant colonel, his promotions propelled by his bravery. He was badly burned and temporarily blinded while commanding a fire ship on the Hudson and, after recuperating, he was twice wounded while commanding the rear guard at Fort Mifflin. Engaged as an Army officer in quashing Tory privateering off Rhode Island, he took more than a dozen prizes himself.

## 170 Naval War College Review

Later, commissioned as a captain in the Continental Navy but denied his expected command, he turned himself to privateering. Soon captured by an overwhelming British force, Talbot spent the rest of the war in Mill Prison.

After a decade of civilian life, during which he managed to get himself elected first to the New York state legislature and then to Congress, Talbot took advantage of the renaissance of the Navy to get another captain's commission. His first intended command went a-glimmering, but in 1799 he was ordered to the USS *Constitution* as its second skipper. He made two cruises in the West Indies during the Quasi-War with France. During the first of these tours he kept his ship at sea for 347 out of 366 days with little sickness and few disciplinary problems, carried out the first attempts in the U.S. Navy at underway replenishment, and commanded the squadron off Hispaniola with leadership and diplomacy highly praised by the secretaries of State and the Navy.

Talbot resigned his commission in 1801 in a dispute over seniority and never went to sea, or served the government in any way, again. His wounds made him prematurely old; he died, largely unnoticed, in 1813.

The author will be familiar to students of naval history from his trilogy of general histories of the U.S. Navy through the Civil War. Fowler once more brings his considerable storytelling talent into play on a subject whose real-life derring-do is only enhanced by Fowler's way with words. In producing this biography, he had the benefit of extensive forty-year-old research by the

Commodore's great-great-grandson, William Richmond Talbot, and of the rich Talbot holdings of the G.W. Blunt White Library at Mystic Seaport.

This biography gives us a small window onto our country during its early years. In Silas Talbot we have a classic example of what a young man of small means but large ambitions could accomplish through his own efforts in those simpler days. While his command tour in *Constitution* comprised little more than two years and included no epic actions, it is precisely here where a serving officer today will find food for thought. Talbot was required by the confused diplomatic and political situation obtaining in and around Hispaniola to keep his force largely out of sight and yet be effective in putting down marauding privateers. To maintain his big frigate and the others on station, in concert with the Secretary of the Navy he devised a supply line from the United States that terminated with the delivery of foodstuffs and stores directly to his ships, *at sea*. In maintaining his crew in health and discipline (without recourse to the lash) for such a long time at sea, Talbot demonstrated exemplary leadership. Through his perfect understanding of his orders and of the situation in the area, and his resourceful solutions to tactical and administrative problems within that context, Silas Talbot has left us an important case study in command.

If not a biography of epic proportions, Bill Fowler's *Silas Talbot* is a good read with lessons applicable to today's service.

TYRONE G. MARTIN  
Commander, U.S. Navy, Retired