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Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge

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open-ended commitments, runaway costs, and embarrassing entanglements. The arguments in this volume are likely to be dated within a few years. But the questions will not be.

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Magyar, Karl P., and Constantine P. Danopoulos, eds. *Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear Challenge*. Maxwell, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1994. 463pp. (No price given)

This book is an excellent historical-political analysis of prolonged wars during the Cold War era, when the superpowers had a measure of influence on nation-state behavior in the developing world. As the subtitle suggests, the post-Cold War challenge is to understand these conflicts in a post-nuclear environment. This book has special value for the international security community, because it gives an excellent analysis of the factors that influence the duration of conflicts. The editors argue that it is "analytically misleading to make no distinction between wars that are planned from the onset around a protracted war strategy and wars in which the warring parties expected a quick victory, but various factors prolonged the conflicts." Thus, prolonged wars and the factors influencing their length are the focus of this study. The editors' stated objective is to "establish the distinction between protracted and prolonged wars, to present a number of case studies of prolonged wars drawn from mostly contemporary examples, and to offer the rudimentary outline of a proto theory of prolonged wars."

Magyar and Danopoulos suggest that factors prolonging wars "may be divided into separate but often interrelated categories: general societal, international/regional, and strategic/military." Using this framework of analysis, one can begin to understand the complex nature of prolonged wars. The contributors offer excellent case studies, each providing valuable insight into the origin of the conflicts and the factors that tend to prolong them. While some of the studies are dated (e.g., Earl H. Tilford's analysis of the Vietnam War and Benjamin Kline's "Northern Ireland Conflict") their value is of a historical nature, suggesting how societal, national, and regional factors may lead to prolonged conflict in the post-containment era.

The international security community should find of special interest the case studies of Ann Mosely Lesch's "Prolonged Conflict in the Sudan," Frederick Belle Torimiro's "Chad: The Apparent Permanence of Ethno-Regional Conflict," Karl Magyar's "Liberia's Conflict: Prolongation through Regional Intervention" and "The War over Angola and Namibia: Factors of Prolongation," Christopher Gregory's "Civil War in a Fragile State: Mozambique," and J. Richard Walsh's "Cambodia: Prolonged War, Prolonged Peace?" Given the nature of current post-Cold War conflicts, these studies are useful examinations of the conflicts dominating the international environment today, and they point to a number of different approaches to limiting conflicts in the future.

The editors make no attempt "to develop a general or comprehensive theory of prolonged war." The value of this text is in its excellent case studies and its reflections on how the international community should deal with the dominant conflicts of the latter part of the twentieth century.

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Scharfen, John C. *The Dismal Battlefield: Mobilizing for Economic Conflict*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 239pp. \$29.95

John Scharfen is a retired Marine Corps colonel. Having held a number of senior planning positions while on active duty, he later worked as a civilian national security analyst. Now a resident of Alexandria, Virginia, Scharfen has written and lectured extensively on national security affairs.

Scharfen seeks to "analyze the dynamics of economic conflict" within the context of total national forces (e.g., military, political, and economic), but he falls short of his objective. This book is, principally, a collection of observations, opinions, and incidents on a complex subject, leading to an uncertain conclusion.

The concerted application of a nation's economic strengths as instruments of national power can be viewed as conflict by other means.

Political actions may be measured and assessed. Military actions may be measured and assessed. The author's implied thesis is that a nation's economic strengths and capabilities can also be measured and assessed, then catalogued and positioned for "economic conflict," just as a logistician catalogues and positions ammunition and rations for military conflict. By stating that "there is no department, agency, or staff within the federal bureaucracy that has responsibility or is organized for the overall management of the economic instrument,"

the author minimizes the extensive involvement of the departments of State and Commerce, and most assuredly the National Security Council, in such policy matters.

One concedes the importance of military instruments of power being under the operational direction of a professional military officer corps, as one does that of the diplomatic affairs of states being under the operational direction of a professional diplomatic corps. However, whether or not the instruments of a nation's economic power, as distinct from the nation's military and diplomatic powers, can be collectively assembled under the operational direction of a vaguely defined bureaucracy is, at best, problematic. The author suggests tasking the Department of State to create policy, doctrine, and strategy for economic conflict. He then calls upon the academic and private sectors to produce plans and "provide augmentation teams to assist and advise during [economic offensive?] operations," just as, in the opinion of the reviewer, an engaged military force might "call up the reserves." What the author is ultimately proposing, then, is the centralized command and control of the nation's economy under the operational direction of a public bureaucracy, perhaps an empowered U.S. version of Japan's often-misunderstood MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry).

But surely, U.S. industry cannot arbitrarily concede management controls, oversight, or strategic planning to a government bureaucracy, absent an overriding threat to the nation. The Axis powers effectively brought U.S. industry into full partnership with other elements of a World War II grand national strategy, mandating extraordinary government controls as befitting the threat. Centralized production