

1997

The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook

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Recommended Citation

Simoes de Carvalho, Paul M.; Danopoulos, Constantine P.; and Watson, Cynthia (1997) "The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 50 : No. 4 , Article 18.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol50/iss4/18>

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information about how the leaders of hostile states think, what their decision-making processes are, how to communicate with them effectively in a crisis, and what their national cultures are. The latter is most important, given that some cultures accept war and death with far less apprehension than do most Americans. Payne provides an eleven-point checklist as a guide to the kind of information needed; despite its brevity and simplicity, information collected under its guidelines would be very helpful to any national security decision maker.

Another and equally important point is that despite excellent intelligence collection and analysis, the United States still may not *really* know what such states as the People's Republic of China, North Korea, Libya, or Iraq will do when faced with a deteriorating economy; when sponsoring international terrorism that could include nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons; or when considering simple, naked aggression.

The author suggests that deterrence in the second nuclear age be based on "denial," the threat to destroy the challenging state's military assets. If deterrence should fail, the threat would become a reality. However, on the defensive side, the argument is made that a missile defense system would be feasible as a means of protecting against threats from "rogue" states.

These recommendations, of course, include some very broad assumptions. First, it is not always easy to destroy military assets quickly and effectively; second, the United States is still some time away from possessing a credible

missile defense system. Crisis-action planning scenarios need to be created that target the worst cases. It would, after all, be difficult for the U.S. government to accept a bloody nose caused, let us say, by a nuclear-tipped North Korean missile, only then deciding how to respond appropriately.

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Danopoulos, Constantine P., and Cynthia Watson, eds. *The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1996. 517pp. \$110

In this volume, the editors present twenty-seven case studies that trace the historical evolution of civil-military relations in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Their objective is to analyze socioeconomic and political factors that have influenced the role of militaries in government, political economy, and issues of national security. Essays by scholars from around the world place special emphasis on current and future scenarios of civil-military relations in the post-Cold War era. Attractive features of this work are its global scope and suitability for comparative analysis. For example, Rut Diamint and Cynthia Watson's piece on the Argentine military's steady withdrawal from internal politics contrasts sharply with Veena Gill's assessment of the increasing role of the Indian military in internal security and domestic affairs. Dongsung Kong's coverage of North Korea, Sharly Cross's analysis of Castro's Cuba, and Ulf Sundhussen's treatment of the

Indonesian military illustrate the varied degree of military influence in states characterized by single-party, authoritarian systems. The impending crisis of legitimacy inherent to each is carefully weighed against the historical circumstances that brought these military-backed regimes to power. Wisely, the editors have not given attention solely to the militaries of the proverbial "Third World." An essay by Stephen Cimbala on the United States military addresses the recent trend toward centralized civilian control and the complexities and challenges of multinational operations. Hitchens and Jacobs's survey of the United Kingdom presents the enduring dilemma of Northern Ireland and the military's role as an agent of domestic stability. George Vasquez's piece on the Peruvian military offers further comparative treatment of the impact of terrorism on a military's involvement in domestic politics. Other essays include coverage of the former Zaire, South Africa, Poland, Japan, Israel, and Denmark. They round off this handbook as a valuable tool for comparative study. Most importantly, each author provides valuable suggestions for further reading.

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Cohen, Eliot A., and Thomas A. Keane. *Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 226pp. \$38.95

Even before the Gulf war had ended, it was realized that a high-level and

independent study was needed to assess the performance of U.S. airpower. The Gulf War Air Power Survey was thus chartered by Air Force Secretary Donald Rice, and the well known scholar Eliot Cohen of Johns Hopkins University was tabbed to lead it. Published in six volumes in 1993, the Survey had limited distribution. Fortunately, the immensely readable summary volume, coauthored by Cohen and Professor Tom Keane of the National War College, has been revised and republished.

When General Norman Schwarzkopf began planning a response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, he quickly realized that all talk of AirLand Battle and ground assault was hopeless. Not only did he lack enough troops to dislodge the several hundred thousand Iraqis already digging in, but he knew such an assault would be extremely bloody. Instead, he turned to the Air Force chief of staff and asked for an offensive air option. The result was INSTANT THUNDER—a plan for the rapid and massive application of airpower at the strategic level of war. The codename was a deliberate counterpoint to the slow, painful, and ineffective policy of "gradual escalation" followed in Vietnam. That war had haunted American political and military leaders; the Gulf war would be an opportunity to expunge those ghosts.

INSTANT THUNDER was modified and expanded in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to include hundreds of targets at the tactical and operational levels of war as well as strategic. Republican Guard divisions were singled out for special attention. For five weeks beginning the night of