China’s Container Missile Deployments Could Violate the Law of Naval Warfare

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97 Int’l L. Stud. 1160 (2021)

Volume 97 2021
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The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of the Navy, or the U.S. Naval War College.
I. INTRODUCTION

In 2019, a report indicated that China was building a variant of the YJ-18 long-range cruise missile that can be fired from standard shipping containers loaded on Chinese-flagged merchant vessels.1 Given that China is the second-largest ship-owning nation in the world, controlling over 5,600 vessels with a capacity of 270 million deadweight tonnage (dwt),2 deploying container-launched missiles on its merchant fleet would significantly enhance China’s warfighting capabilities. The State-owned China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) is the world’s largest shipping company with over 800 merchant vessels (74.5 million dwt).3 It is the world’s third-largest container shipping company, operating 507 container vessels with a combined capacity of 3.1 million twenty-foot equivalent units, which could be equipped with these new lethal missile batteries.4

The Chinese missile system is similar to the Russian Klub-K container missile system. Once perfected, it will provide China with a long-range precision strike capability that can engage both surface combatants and land-based targets. Some of the advantages of the container-launched system include:

(1) The missiles are housed in a standard maritime shipping container, making them difficult to detect.
(2) The system can be designed to use containers of different loading capacities (e.g., 20- or 40-foot containers) depending on the mission.

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2. Deadweight (dwt) is defined as the measure of the ship’s carrying capacity, taking into consideration the weight of the cargo on board, fuel, ballast water, fresh water, crew, and provisions for the crew, but excluding the weight of the ship.


(3) The loaded containers can be delivered using civilian logistics, thereby avoiding attention.

(4) The missile system can be deployed from sea, rail, truck, or ground platforms.

(5) The missiles can be launched autonomously using targeting data from an external source.

The missile system can be equipped with active or passive target acquisition and designation systems that allow it to detect, identify, bear, and determine target coordinates at a distance exceeding the missile range. The system can also receive targeting data from coastal, shipborne, airborne, or satellite systems.5

In 2016, China superseded its 1995 Regulation on National Defense Transportation with a new law. The National Defense Transportation Law6 clarifies the requirements of civil transportation resources to support military operations “to improve the PLA’s [People’s Liberation Army] ability to leverage civilian carriers to support strategic projection.”7 The new law also creates a “strategic projection support force” made up of large- and medium-sized Chinese shipping companies organized into “strategic projection support units,” responsible for providing “rapid, long-distance, and large-scale national defense transportation support.”8 National defense mobilization standards are promulgated by the National Transportation War Readiness Office, which is under the supervision of the Transport and Projection Bureau of the Central Military Committee (CMC) Logistic Support Department. Civilian carriers are under the command and control of the five Theater Commands and the Joint Logistics Support Force, a subordinate command of the CMC that supports the PLA for all general logistics requirements.9 The law also requires that future Chinese commercial shipping be

8. Id.
9. Id.
“designed, built and managed to support future military operations” during times of war.\textsuperscript{10}

Some commercial vessels have already been modified and have participated in PLA Navy (PLAN) exercises. In 2020, naval engineers installed a removable helicopter deck on a heavy-lift ship, converting it into a de facto assault ship/expeditionary sea-base to support amphibious operations.\textsuperscript{11} A 2021 report indicated that China is also converting roll-on roll-off (RORO) passenger/car ferries to allow them to launch armed amphibious vehicles in support of amphibious operations.\textsuperscript{12} These vessels can carry up to 1,200 passengers and have a 2,740-foot vehicle lane capacity on their main and lower decks, which equates to an amphibious mechanized infantry battalion. As cross-strait tensions increase, raising the possibility of a conflict with Taiwan, these converted RORO vessels will significantly enhance the PLAN’s amphibious capabilities. As a proof of concept, the converted 15,560-ton RORO ferry Bang Chui Dao participated in a landing exercise with the PLAN in the summer of 2020 on the coast of Guangdong Province.\textsuperscript{13} This improvised fleet of converted merchant vessels could be used to provide additional inexpensive lift capacity to support an invasion of Taiwan.

While none of these activities are illegal per se, they raise potential concerns under the law of naval warfare. These concerns are compounded given China’s disregard for its international legal obligations under a number of treaties, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),\textsuperscript{14} the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS),\textsuperscript{15} and the Safety of Life at Sea Convention

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Id.
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Using converted commercial ships in a military support role also increases the risk that all Chinese-flagged merchant vessels in the area of operations will be targeted as military objectives during an armed conflict given that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between a converted and non-converted vessel, particularly container ships armed with Klub-K missile batteries.

This article will briefly review the law applicable during an international armed conflict (IAC) at sea. It will also discuss the law of armed conflict (LOAC) requirements that apply to the conversion of merchant ships into warships, as well as issues related to the inviolability of neutral merchant ships during an IAC at sea. Finally, it will address the limited protections afforded enemy civilian passenger vessels against destruction and the potential implications of using such vessels to actively support naval forces during offensive operations.

II. WARSHIPS AND BELLIGERENT RIGHTS

Only warships and military aircraft may exercise belligerent rights during an IAC at sea. These rights include, \textit{inter alia}, the right to conduct offensive attacks (kinetic or non-kinetic), the right of visit and search, the right of capture, the right to take reprisals, the right to control neutral vessels and aircraft in the immediate vicinity of naval operations. Other vessels, such as naval


auxiliaries and merchant vessels, even when carrying out support services for
the naval forces, are not entitled to engage in belligerent acts during an IAC,
but they may defend themselves, to include resisting attacks by enemy
forces.\textsuperscript{18}

A “warship” is defined as

a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks
distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of an of-
clicer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose name
appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a
crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.\textsuperscript{19}

This definition originated during the negotiations of 1907 Hague VII and is
widely accepted as customary international law.\textsuperscript{20} Warships do not have to
be armed but must be under the command of a duly commissioned officer
and manned by a qualified crew subject to armed forces discipline.\textsuperscript{21} None-
theless, warships maintain their status, even if civilians form part of the crew
if they have been designated as a warship by the flag State.\textsuperscript{22} In the United
States, all Navy ships designated “USS” and Coast Guard vessels designated
“USCGC” are considered warships under international law.\textsuperscript{23}

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\textsuperscript{18} OXFORD MANUAL OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 17, art. 12; COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 2.2.1; DO\textsuperscript{D} LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 3.3.3.3;
GERMAN MANUAL, supra note 17, ¶ 1020.

\textsuperscript{19} Hague VII, supra note 17, arts. 1–4; Convention on the High Seas art. 8, Apr. 29,
1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 29;
A. PEARCE HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCES CONCERNING THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR: TEXTS OF CONVENTIONS
WITH COMMENTARIES 316–20 (1909); NWIP 10-2, supra note 17, ¶ 500c; COMMANDER’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 2.2.1; DO\textsuperscript{D} LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 13.4.1.

\textsuperscript{20} HIGGINS, supra note 19, at 316–20; C. JOHN COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF

\textsuperscript{21} COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 2.2.1; DO\textsuperscript{D} LAW OF WAR MANUAL,
supra note 17, § 13.4.1.

\textsuperscript{22} COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 2.2.1; DO\textsuperscript{D} LAW OF WAR MANUAL,
supra note 17, §§ 4.16.1, 4.16.2.

\textsuperscript{23} U.S. Department of the Navy, United States Navy Regulations art. 0406 (1990); U.S.
Department of the Navy, SECNAVINST 5030.8c, General Guidance for the Classification
of Naval Vessels and Battle Force Ship Counting Procedures (2016). The U.S. Coast Guard
is considered an armed force of the United States. See 10 U.S.C. § 101; 14 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2.
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III. ENEMY MERCHANT VESSELS

Enemy merchant vessels can only be attacked if they become a military objective by their conduct or operation. However, even if not engaged in acts that would allow them to be attacked, they may be captured and (after adjudication) condemned as prizes. Using merchant vessels to actively support military operations during an IAC forfeits their protected status and intentionally puts civilians in harm’s way. For example, all Chinese-flagged container ships at sea or in port would be targetable given the inability to detect whether the ships have a Klub-K battery onboard until the weapon system is employed.

A. Capture

Enemy merchant vessels may be captured anywhere beyond neutral territory. If military circumstances do not permit capture and adjudication as an enemy prize, the merchant vessel may be destroyed after taking all possible measures to provide for the safety of the passengers and crew. The officers and crew of a captured enemy merchant ship may be detained as prisoners of war. However, if the enemy merchant ship did not take part in the hostilities, the officers and crew should not be detained if they “make a formal promise in writing, not to undertake, while hostilities last, any service connected with the operations of the war.” Enemy merchant vessels may resist attacks or capture by enemy forces but may not commit hostile acts in offensive combat operations.

B. Destruction

As a general rule, as embodied in the London Protocol, international law prohibits the destruction of an enemy merchant vessel unless the safety of

24. See infra Section III.B.
26. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 8.6.2.1.
27. Convention No. XI Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War arts. 6, 8, Oct 18, 1907, Stat. 2396, T.S. No. 544; DoD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, § 4.16.2.
passengers and crew is first assured. During World War II, however, enemy merchant ships were routinely attacked and sunk by belligerent warships and submarines without prior warning and without first providing for the safety of the passengers and crew. Initially, the belligerents justified these attacks as reprisals. As the war progressed, merchant vessels on both sides were armed and convoyed by warships, collected intelligence, or were otherwise incorporated into the enemy’s warfighting/war-sustaining effort and were therefore regarded as legitimate military objectives. Although the 1936 London Protocol remains valid, it has been interpreted in light of State practice during and after World War II. An enemy merchant vessel may therefore be attacked and destroyed, either with or without prior warning if it:

1. Persistently refuses to stop upon being duly summoned to do so;
2. Actively resists visit and search or capture;
3. Sails under convoy of enemy warships or enemy military aircraft;
4. Is armed with systems or weapons beyond that required for self-defense against terrorists, piracy, or like threats;
5. Is incorporated into, or assisting in any way, the intelligence system of the enemy’s armed forces;
6. Acts in any capacity as a naval or military auxiliary to an enemy’s armed forces;
7. Is integrated into the enemy’s warfighting/war-sustaining effort and compliance with the rules of the 1936 London Protocol would, under the circumstances of the specific encounter, subject the surface warship to imminent danger or would otherwise preclude mission accomplishment.

C. Protected Civilian Vessels

Certain classes of enemy vessels are exempt from capture or destruction if they are innocently employed in their exempt category. These vessels lose their protected status if they take part in hostilities or hamper the movement

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30. NWIP 10-2, supra note 17, § 503b(3); Commander’s Handbook, supra note 17, § 8.6.2.1; DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 17, § 13.5.2.
of combatants, refuse to submit to identification and inspection procedures, or refuse an order to stay out of the area of operations. Civilian passenger vessels at sea may be captured but are exempt from destruction unless they are used by the enemy for a military purpose (e.g., transporting troops or military cargo), resist capture, or refuse to comply with the direction of the intercepting warship. China has a legal obligation not to take advantage of the exempt character of a vessel in order to use it for a military purpose while purportedly preserving its innocent appearance. This obligation would be violated by using a nondescript RORO ferry as an amphibious assault ship to support an amphibious landing. Moreover, any RORO ferry operating outside its normal coastal sea routes or in the area of military operations would be at risk of being attacked since it would be virtually impossible to distinguish a militarily enhanced ferry from a normal ferry and would be presumed to be supporting the invasion fleet.

D. Conversion of Merchant Vessels

Merchant vessels can become warships if they are converted into a warship by the flag State consistent with the rules set out in Hague VII. The Convention requires that converted merchant ships: (1) be placed under the direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the State whose flag it flies, (2) bear the external marks that distinguish the warships of their nationality, (3) be under the command of a duly commissioned officer in the service of the State whose name is on the list of the officers of the fighting fleet, and (4) be manned by a crew subject to military discipline. Once converted into a warship, merchant vessels must comply with the LOAC. Additionally, a belligerent who converts a merchant ship into a warship must, as soon as possible, announce such conversion in the list of warships. Once a merchant vessel is converted and announced in the list of warships, it becomes a valid military objective and may be targeted or captured on sight.

To the extent China places container missile systems on civilian container ships for the purpose of conducting offensive precision strikes during an IAC, it must first convert and designate the container ship as a warship consistent with Hague VII. Similarly, to the extent China converts heavy-lift

31. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, § 8.6.3.
33. Id. art. 5.
34. Id. art. 6.
commercial ships and RORO vessels into amphibious assault ships to support combat operations in an IAC, it must first convert and designate the commercial vessels as warships in accordance with Hague VII.

Whether China will comply with these requirements is questionable, at best. In the past, Chinese-flagged civilian vessels, which had not been designated warships, were used to conduct offensive belligerent acts in support of PLAN operations. Following a series of incidents between South Vietnamese warships and Chinese fishing vessels operating in the vicinity of the Western Paracel Islands (Crescent Group), Chinese forces seized the islands from South Vietnam on January 20, 1974. The Chinese invasion force was comprised of a flotilla of PLAN warships and civilian maritime militia fishing boats, which were used as de facto amphibious assault ships to land PLA troops on the islands.³⁵

IV. PERFIDY (TREACHERY)

International law prohibits the killing or wounding of the enemy by resorting to perfidy.³⁶ Perfidy is defined as an act that invites the confidence of the enemy to lead them to believe that they are entitled to, or are obliged to accord, protection under the LOAC, with intent to betray that confidence.³⁷ The key element is the false claim to protections under the LOAC to secure a military advantage over the opponent.³⁸ An example of perfidy would be feigning civilian status as a merchant vessel and then engaging the enemy with a Klub-K missile battery or feigning status as a passenger ferry and then participating in an amphibious assault.


³⁶. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(b), Annex to Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295; DoD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 17, §§ 5.4.2, 5.21, 5.22, 5.22.2.


Q-ships are a historical example. During World War I and II, Allied merchant ships, known as Q-ships, were armed to counter Germany’s effective use of U-boats to interdict allied shipping. They would loiter in sea lanes or straggle behind allied convoys, inviting U-boats to attack. When hailed, a portion of the crew would purportedly abandon ship. When the U-boat surfaced to sink the ship, the Q-ships would uncover their concealed weapons, raise the naval ensign, and open fire on the submarine. Most experts today would consider that the use of Q-ships is no longer acceptable and would constitute a perfidious act.

V. CONCLUSION

Generally, enemy civilian vessels shall not be the object of attack. Enemy merchant vessels may be captured as prizes but should not be attacked outright unless they become a military objective by their conduct or operation. It is not unlawful to convert merchant vessels into warships or use such vessels as naval auxiliaries so long as China follows the rules, something it has not shown a propensity to do in other contexts (e.g., use of excessive force in maritime law enforcement operations; intentional violations of the COLREGS, UNCLOS, and SOLAS; failure to comply with the International Health Regulations during the COVID-19 pandemic; etc.). Failure to comply with the law of armed conflict by surreptitiously incorporating merchant vessels into China’s warfighting/war-sustaining effort endangers civilian seafarers and puts all civilian ships at risk that may be operating in the area of hostilities.

41. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 186 (Louise Doswald Beck ed., 1995).
42. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS (3d ed. 2005).