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BOOK REVIEWS

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

"It Takes More Than A Visionary"

Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. Millett, eds. *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period.* Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996. 415pp. $65

ONE OF THE MOST POPULAR MYTHS in today's business literature equates organizational success and adaptation with either charismatic leaders or the promulgation of a simplistic vision statement from corporate headquarters. However, a modern-day Moses is rarely found in American business, and it takes more than a single great visionary, or a paragraph about the future, to produce change or generate innovation.

Military history is replete with examples of great leaders and dramatic innovation. The era between the world wars of this century is a period particularly rife with dynamic change. The continued refinement of the submarine; the introduction of electronic warfare, with radio, radar, and sonar; the maturation of armored warfare; and the development of the airplane as a strategic instrument and its use at sea, all contributed to an extremely dramatic era in military innovation. Although people like "Billy" Mitchell, William Moffett, John H. Towers, Hugh Trenchard, Sir Hugh Dowding, John Fuller, Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Charles DeGaulle, and Heinz Guderian were all prominent forces in the development of new capabilities during this era, not all of their names are synonymous with good fortune in their respective fields. The early phases of World War II showed that not everyone in the military enjoyed equal success at adapting to changes in the strategic environment, or to new technologies. Some got it right, some did not. Why?

Military Innovation in the Interwar Period presents a historical analysis, based on seven major case studies, of the innovations of the 1920s and 1930s. The period

is extremely relevant to today's challenges. Both eras are characterized by strategic uncertainty, ambiguous threats, and sharply reduced defense funding. Yet despite an environment of dramatic and indeterminate change in the interwar years, there is clear proof of considerable military innovation. In fact, most historians point to that period as one containing several revolutionary innovations in warfare. The book's crucial hypothesis is that the United States is presently in the initial stages of a similar period of discontinuous change in its military capability.

For this reason, Millet and Williamson have put forth a timely effort, one that should prove to be a major contribution to our understanding of the deep mystery surrounding military innovation. They offer a probing response to the question, *Why did some military organizations innovate more successfully than others?* Without understanding the factors that gave rise to the fundamental changes in how military forces fought in the last revolution in military affairs (RMA), it is doubtful that the U.S. military will be successful at adapting to the nascent RMA—today's most pressing military intellectual challenge.

Many defense analysts are calling for wholesale change in strategy and tactics based on the purported RMA and its rapidly emerging new technologies. Others advocate a slower approach and emphasize experimentation and validation. But who is right? For example, consider the following questions:

- Is innovation the result of top-down vision from a single military leader, or are civilian policy makers or scientists the prime impetus to innovation?
- Does the introduction of new concepts, like blitzkrieg, push technology, or is it the other way around? What is the role of competition in spurring ideas?
- Are such technologies to be considered concepts and operational doctrines, or are they structural changes, driven by a specific threat or framed by an accurate strategic assessment?
- What is the relative importance of various resources, including time?
- Can innovation or the mechanics of successful innovation be institutionalized?

This book offers answers to such questions. It has been superbly crafted and edited by an acknowledged team of military history experts, Allan Millett and Williamson Murray. Dr. "Wick" Murray, professor emeritus from Ohio State University, is a recognized walking encyclopedia of twentieth-century European military history. Murray is also a familiar figure to many naval officers, having been at the Naval War College on the faculty as a visiting professor (1985–1986) and as a Secretary of the Navy research fellow (1991–1992). He presently holds the Horner Chair of Military Strategy at the Marine Corps University. His vitae includes numerous works, many of which are relevant to the current project. Murray's previous publications include the insightful *The Change in the European Balance of Power 1938–1939*, and the three-volume "Military Effectiveness" series, coauthored with Dr. Allan Millett. The latter is another well recognized

authority, particularly in American military history. He is both an editor of and a major contributor to this book.

The editors have assembled a distinguished field of defense experts to provide insights into today's volatile era. Their work is organized into seven comparative case studies, each focusing on the major powers of World War II. Murray himself authored assessments of armor and strategic bombing developments. Millett contributes an outstanding overview of the development of amphibious warfare by Britain, Japan, and the United States. Adaptation in close air support is ably reviewed by Richard Muller of the Air University. British historian Geoffrey Till offers his interpretation of British, American, and Japanese initiatives in carrier warfare. In an essay titled "Innovation Ignored," German, British, and American submarine programs are critiqued by the esteemed Holger Herwig of Calgary University. The final case study, by Alan Beyerchen, a noted strategic analyst presently with Science Application International Corporation (SAIC), is about electronic warfare; it deals with "the new wizards of war" and the development of radio, radar, and sonar. The issue is frequently overlooked, but it may be the most relevant, given its technical aspects and its association with the forerunners of what we now call the "information age."

In addition to the seven case studies, three summative essays have been included, one each by Millett and Murray and an incisive concluding chapter coauthored by Murray and Dr. Barry Watts, a retired Air Force officer whose last tour was with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Net Assessment. The latter provides an overview of twenty years of enormous change under conditions fraught with uncertainty, and it offers the most insight into the phenomenon of innovation in military organizations. The answers to almost all of our original questions are found in this culminating essay. The process of peacetime innovation, the authors find, is a highly nonlinear one, not subject to easy predictions or simple checklists. Strong leadership is a definite element, but not leadership from civilians or scientists. The main driver is not technology per se but the interaction of technology with the right doctrine and the proper organizational structure. Time is the most precious component. Successful innovation is an evolutionary progression that requires the systematic exploration of numerous technical choices to integrate the various elements of modern warfare into what Admiral Owens (former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) called a "system of systems."

Although Admiral Owens's pet phrase may often be derided, all major innovations are a synergistic combination of systems. The blitzkrieg was not the product of a singular technological spark but was predicated on hard-earned lessons that combined technology with new doctrine and even newer organizational arrangements. The Germans took advantage of new means of communications and advances in armor and the combustion engine, and married these

with close air support techniques to achieve a combined arms effect that Europe had never seen. Likewise, the development of the aircraft carrier by the United States in the interwar period was the successful amalgamation of various "systems" into an integrated whole.

Given the extensive expectations and hype about the present RMA, what implications can be drawn from this set of case studies? Watts and Murray offer three major considerations, which involve the need for vision, institutional processes to validate it, and procedures to ensure the bureaucratic acceptance of the requisite changes to organizations, doctrine, and military culture.

Collectively, this book points to the importance of vision. Successful innovation is the result of serious intellectual effort and a strong institutional commitment to an ever-evolving vision of future war. It is not necessary for such visions to be specific or even complete; "nevertheless, without the intellectual effort and institutional commitment to evolve a vision of future war," Watts and Murray note, "military institutions will almost certainly fail to take the first halting steps toward peacetime innovation." These visions are not static representations or prophecies; they must be continually agonized over and altered, as changes in the strategic environment occur and technical hurdles prove insurmountable.

Nor are such visions ephemeral matters of fantasy. All must be closely tied to operational reality and to the immutable fundamental nature of war—a clash of opposing wills. These case studies as a whole come close to damning British military leaders in this period for falling away from operational realism. Only Air Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, of the Royal Air Force (RAF), stayed close to reality. As Muller shows in his wonderful essay on close air support, were it not for Dowding, "the few" that saved England in the summer of 1940 might not have had a chance.

Some proponents of today's RMA seem to have lost touch with the fundamental nature of warfare. Arguments abound that information technologies alone afford the United States a superior capability—by which very small forces will be able decisively to overcome much larger ones. Such views, however, offer a sad testimony to a poor grasp of history and an inability to remember even as far back as Vietnam, when an infatuation with technology was of little help against an adaptive and determined foe.

Nor is vision the sole requirement for success at innovation. The second major implication is the requirement for institutional processes for exploring, testing, and systematically refining the stated conception of future warfare. This implication would reinforce, as engines of change, a number of current efforts like the U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory and the Navy's Strategic Studies Group. Likewise, the Joint Staff is looking at Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) as part of the implementation program to support the

Chairman's "Joint Vision 2010." Watts and Murray find such empirical processes for exploring, testing, and refining concepts "literally a *sine qua non* of successful military innovation in peacetime."

Whether the ACTDs actually become the sort of evidentiary process the authors believe necessary for experimentation, or instead a self-serving exercise in "proving" that "Joint Vision 2010" is *the* vision, remains to be seen. Britain's RAF made that mistake in the 1930s. It took theory for granted and rigged experiments to match its own concepts. Technology shortfalls and historical lessons were "tenaciously ignored." Murray convincingly shows that while bombers did actually get through, rarely could they place a bomb within miles of a target. In his review of strategic bombing, Murray charges the RAF with "cooking the books" in the aftermath of World War I; he calls the RAF official histories "a masterpiece of propaganda" rather than a clear-eyed attempt to learn from the past.

The final implication involves bureaucratic acceptance and institutionalization. Not only should visions be tied to operational reality; they must eventually be accepted and given credence by the senior military leaders who must lend support, provide funding, and establish career paths to attract and reward the best minds. It is hard to imagine successful innovation without an intellectual climate congenial to true experimentation and historical analysis, like that created by Germany's General Hans von Seeckt. Britain's failure to develop an effective strategic bombing capability per the dogmatic theories of Hugh Montague Trenchard (father of the RAF) offers an equally compelling example of the other side of the equation. In this regard the authors specifically reject "top-down" visions. Successful innovation is rarely imposed, and almost never from the outside. New ways of fighting have to work their way from the inside out. This is another insight relevant to bringing "Joint Vision 2010" to fruition.

This book highlights valuable lessons about how armed services can adapt in a fluid age of murky threats and revolutionary technological change. The issue is one of great strategic importance. Ultimately, the military's success in the twenty-first century will be tied to development of long-range visions, and to exploration into the nuances of new technologies that can actualize those visions. The Chairman's "Joint Vision 2010" will be a key element to this process, if it is allowed to evolve via experimentation. However, if it becomes a fixation, or should the Joint Staff attempt to impose arbitrarily an unproven series of concepts and structural changes, its potential will lessen. These are serious strategic organizational challenges; if they are not tackled forthrightly by America's military leaders today, we will produce new failures. Without the necessary leadership from warfighters with vision and credibility, mastering innovation and the RMA will be an elusive exercise.

Military Innovation in the Interwar Period offers detailed insights into how to proceed with today's revolution in military affairs. Those who find themselves today in the same position as Moffett, Towers, Liddell Hart, and Dowding did seventy years ago will want to study this book very closely.

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Howard, Michael, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, eds. *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1995. 303pp. $30

The law of war is all too often understood from a positivist perspective, one that is rule-oriented, textually based, and the product of supposedly systematic and orderly transformation. In this approach, ascertaining what norm to apply in a given situation requires only resort to the law-of-war manuals of the various services. When the law changes, the manuals are merely updated.

If it were only that simple. In fact, law is contextual. It evolves and is understood on the basis of the multifaceted context (social, ideological, religious, historical, practical, etc.) in which it is applied. Thus neither the valence of particular "rules" nor the understanding of them is a constant. This is true regardless of whether the source of a "rule" is a treaty, custom, or a general principle of law.

Unfortunately, this abstract understanding of law is almost exclusively the province of legal theorists. For the warfighter or operational judge advocate, it is far easier to pick up the rule book than to consider the genesis and development of the law. Yet in the same way that knowledge of the evolution and application of strategy through time makes for a better strategist (hence war colleges), grasping how and why constraints on warfare have shifted will necessarily contribute to reasoned, legal, and moral use of force. *The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World* is a superb product that clearly fosters such understanding.

Edited by three eminently qualified scholars, this book is a collection of essays that trace the development of constraints on warfare, formal and informal, across both time (from classical Greece to the age of national liberation movements) and medium (maritime, land, and air warfare). The list of contributors is impressive indeed. Particularly familiar to war college readers are John Hattendorf, the Naval War College's Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History; Adam Roberts, Oxford's Montague Burton Professor of International Relations and long a friend of the Naval War College's law department; and Harold Selesky, who directs the military history degree program at Air University. The fact that most of the contributors are historians

considering prescriptive norms (vice lawyers addressing law proper) is a unique benefit, for they tend to de-emphasize the legalistic process by which law develops and emphasize its dependence on cultural and technological influences. In other words, cause-and-effect, rather than process, is the focus of the studies. This approach, presented here in a well organized, wonderfully written work, fills a lacuna for those (academics and operators alike) who think about such matters.

Editor Michael Howard's introductory chapter on constraints sets the stage for the individual studies. It is here that he distinguishes between the *jus ad bellum*, norms governing when force may be resorted to, and *jus in bello*, those addressing how it may be used. The essays concentrate on the latter. Introducing a theme that pervades most of the case studies, Howard notes that the content of the applicable norms often depends on who is to be protected by them. Thus during the Middle Ages the nascent protections that did exist applied only during *bellum hostile*, conflict within Christendom; beyond that confine, *bellum Romanum*, or unbounded conflict, was the rule. The same sorts of distinction were evident in classical antiquity (i.e., Hellenes versus non-Hellenes), through the colonial period in America (settlers or natives), up to the present (distinctions based on national liberation movements). The essays clearly establish that the inclusivity of constraints on warfare is determined by the way "we" and "they" are defined by the group resorting to force.

This point is reemphasized in the excellent concluding chapter by Howard's coeditors, George Andreopoulos and Mark Shulman. They also highlight a second distinction evident in numerous essays, that between combatants and noncombatants. Over time, the idea slowly emerged that only warriors were the proper object of violence, albeit within certain bounds, such as the code of chivalry. Noncombatants generally enjoyed (at least theoretically) immunity from conflict, a right that carried with it the duty of nonparticipation; when that duty was breached, the immunity was rescinded. Andreopoulos and Shulman perceptively note that "one of the many darker ironies of the 20th century" is that as codification formalized the principle of distinction (e.g., in the Hague and Geneva conventions), the increasing prevalence of revolutions, civil wars, and insurgencies frustrated its implementation. Algeria's struggle for independence from France aptly demonstrates how such conflicts tend to involve forces that are not easily identifiable as organized military units; indeed, insurgents may use this fact tactically, to conduct surreptitious operations, and strategically, to force their opponents into excesses likely to turn domestic and international opinion against them.

A third theme emerging is that constraints are likely to be most resilient among stable societies with professional militaries and in the absence of significant technological change. For example, in Greece, until the fifth century B.C., wars had been quick, decisive events, usually decided by a single battle. However, as Athens became more economically powerful, it was able to wage war over extended periods. At the same time, the composition of the

military spread beyond the hoplite class, as Athenian naval strategy against the Peloponnesians demanded oarsmen for its triremes. Both trends ran contrary to a set of "rules" designed for short encounters fought by soldier-farmers who needed to return to work their crops. By contrast, the increasing professionalization of the military during the Thirty Years' and Napoleonic wars, which replaced the prior religious and revolutionary fervor, operated to strengthen restraints on conduct. More striking perhaps is the extent to which the scope of warfare grew and constraints receded as it became necessary to call upon the industrial strength of entire nations to wage war. Of course, this tendency reached its apogee during the nuclear brinkmanship of the Cold War. Throughout, changes in technology drove constraints in particular directions. At times the result was a strengthening of the prescriptive regimes, as was the case with gas following the tragic experiences with that "weapon" during the First World War. In other cases, emergence of new technology actually weakened the preexisting regime, at least until the ramifications of the emergent technology were fully grasped. This was certainly so with the advent of submarines, aircraft, and nuclear weapons.

Ultimately, there is little to criticize in *The Laws of War*. Such grounds for criticism as do exist have mostly to do with the editors' choice of case studies. John Keegan, for instance, has lamented the failure to address the silence of the laws of Rome on the subject. Others have pointed to the exclusion of Korea, Vietnam, and the Falklands (Malvinas). Most troubling for this reviewer is that the Gulf war is dealt with only meagerly, and then merely to surface such issues such as targeting, Security Council use of force authorizations, and the postwar collision between sovereignty concerns, humanitarian law, and human rights in such operations as PROVIDE COMFORT. Notwithstanding, the case studies selected are representative and clearly provide ample and fertile ground in which to consider forces that underlie the development and erosion of constraints in warfare.

Simply put, this book is a "must read" for warfighters, judge advocates, and scholars working in the field of military history, strategy and policy, or international law. It provides a much-needed historical backdrop for our sometimes sterile consideration of the laws and practices of war. In that sense, it is an immensely valuable contribution to our understanding of warfare.

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Rogers, A.P.V. *Law on the Battlefield.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996. 130pp. $35

According to Article 82 of Protocol I of 1977, which amends and extends the humanitarian law of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, legal advisers are to be attached to military commands. However, the Protocol makes no mention of what their qualifications should be. Therefore, any work that helps to define the type of specialised knowledge required is welcome. Major General Rogers is Director of Army Legal

Services at the British Ministry of Defence. His *Law on the Battlefield*, which is based on his master's of law thesis for the University of Liverpool, will help to fill any lacuna that may exist.

One problem that faces any commander when contemplating a particular operation is the balance between the law and military necessity, even though the law of armed conflict has developed with the full knowledge of the realities of *raison de guerre*; Rogers does not hesitate to draw attention to this dilemma. Those who participated in drafting the 1977 Protocols (Protocol I is concerned with international conflicts and Protocol II with noninternational armed conflicts) were often frustrated by the unrealistic, though idealistic and ideological, arguments sometimes put forward by the representatives of developing nations, many of whom were participating for the first time in an international conference dealing with this branch of the law. Conscious of this, Rogers, at the very beginning of his monograph, draws attention to the fact that "the less technologically advanced states sometimes see the law of war as an instrument for emasculating the mighty"—a view that is also implicit in the arguments of countries that are historically neutral or have not participated in combat for some time.

It was realised long ago, in 1899 and again in 1907 (at the time of the Hague Peace Conferences, which produced much of the "black-letter," or informal, law in this field, as may be seen in the "Martens clause"), that it will always be impossible to enact regulations likely to cover every eventuality or weapons development. This leads Rogers to remind military lawyers that "customary law cannot be replaced by treaty." In fact, a treaty will often do little more than give formal expression to customary law, thus making clear that the law is valid even for states that have not accepted the particular treaty—a fact that was significant during DESERT STORM, since many of the participants, including the United States, had not acceded to Protocol I. In his report to Congress on the legal aspects of those operations, General Colin Powell made it clear that he regarded many of the principles found in Protocol I to be nothing more than postulates embodying existing custom.

In past wars, the morale of the civilian population and a country's cultural monuments and establishments have frequently been objects of attack, even though the immunity of both has been rooted in history. Rogers reminds us that military operations are directed at weakening or destroying the opponent's military potential. Therefore to attack civilians or their monuments does not weaken the enemy's forces. While we cannot ignore the fact that such attacks have an adverse effect on the morale of fighting units concerned about the welfare of those at home, even the most ruthless of commanders will find it difficult to disagree with Rogers when he states that "destroying a cathedral or museum does not usually contribute to the defeat of an enemy's armed forces." This point has received statutory recognition by way of the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. To illustrate its significance during actual operations,

Rogers cites the "action by the Israeli forces when they occupied Sinai in 1956–57 in assisting in the running of the monastery of St. Katherine, looking after visitors, supplying the monks with food and investigating an attempted break-in to the treasury of the monastery church."

However, at times it is necessary to measure Rogers's comments against his English legal background and, to some extent, the impact of Western ideology. He states, for example, that "taking a direct part in hostilities must be more narrowly construed than making a contribution to the war effort, and it would not include taking part in arms production or military engineering works or military transports." Does he mean that it is forbidden to attack munitions factories or their workers while they are engaged in those factories, or even vehicles transporting weapons? It does not appear so, for later he argues that an attack on an aircraft factory and its employees is not an attack on civilians (which is forbidden), since it is only a direct attack on civilians that constitutes forbidden activity.

The legality of attacks that are known to cause collateral damage is dependent on the doctrine of proportionality: that is to say, the collateral damage must not exceed that which is absolutely necessary to achieve the particular military objective. Accordingly, it is submitted that Rogers's view would be contrary to that of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and possibly the actual wording of Protocol I, for he maintains that "the commander should, of course, be given the benefit of any doubt." However, shortly after making this statement, he appears to modify or even reject it: "Perhaps it is better to regard the various provisions of Protocol I as cumulative, requiring commanders to take care in their planning of an attack to ensure that separate military objectives are separately attacked, with incidental damage reduced as much as possible, and that if the incidental damage is likely to outweigh the military advantage the attack must be replanned."

It is well known that prisoners of war are not to be used for dangerous tasks or work that contributes to the holding power's war effort. While Rogers may, therefore, be right in stating that prisoners of war may not be employed in metallurgical, engineering, or chemical industries, it is perhaps not absolutely correct to say that Article 50 of the Prisoners of War Convention "recognizes [that those] industries may be made the object of attack because prisoners of war may not be employed in those industries."

The difficulties that are likely to confront the operational commander are illustrated by Rogers's comments concerning the bombardment of the Monte Cassino monastery in 1944. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower had issued an order drawing attention to the importance of cultural monuments in Italy, observing, however, that "if there were a choice between buildings and men's lives the buildings would have to go." However, he added that in many cases monuments could be spared "without any detriment to operational needs." Nonetheless, F.N. Alexander "gave clearance for the bombing of the abbey 'if there is any reasonable

probability that the building is being used for military purposes.'" The abbey was bombarded, causing some three to four hundred civilian deaths. Rogers points out that the attack was the result of faulty intelligence and supposition: that "the abbey made such a perfect observation point that surely no army could have refrained from using it. . . . There is little doubt that the abbey was a military objective in the sense of being a dominant feature whose use to the enemy it was intended to deny. It is not clear whether the presence of the civilian refugees was known to the Allies, but their deaths may not have been disproportionate to the value of the objective." But this surely is a contention that may be put forward to justify any questionable attack. Since almost every castle or ancient cathedral or monastery in Europe is built upon a "dominant feature," such a view would tend to nullify any rules concerning the preservation of religious and cultural establishments.

Legal advisers attached to any air force will lament the fact that there is no black-letter law directly concerning aerial combat. Although two mixed Arbitral Tribunals were held after World War I and Article 26 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 can be applied by analogy, Rogers states that "the provisions of Article 26, regarding warning before attack against places where civilians inhabit have no place in air warfare." He then states that Article 57 "of Protocol I endeavors to repair the harm done to international law by the practices of the Second World War and brings us back to the standards suggested in the Air Warfare Rules" of 1923, which never became part of the law, and in fact were in line with the principles to be found in Article 26.

As a result of Protocol I, reprisals have, for the most part, become illegal. Rogers states that they "are actions taken to redress violations of the laws of war," but is it true to say that they "are not actions taken in the conduct of military operations"? Similarly, is it realistic to suggest that "if enemy snipers are operating from protected property, it may be possible to bypass that property"? It is much more likely that a commander whose troops are under attack by such a sniper will conclude that the property in question is no longer protected and is a legitimate military objective. He will have far more justification in reaching this conclusion than Rogers suggests with regard to Monte Cassino.

Frequently, those who are accused of disregarding the law when authorising military action will contend that information subsequently received, whether as a result of the illegal action or otherwise, provides an ex post facto justification. Such reasoning tends to be rejected by most national legal systems. Yet when referring to recent conduct and the aftermath of coalition operations against Iraq, Rogers points out that "there were intelligence reports that Iraq was developing nuclear weapons, and evidence has since emerged through United Nations inspectors that Iraq was doing so." But this evidence was gathered after the termination of hostilities, rendering it difficult to accept Rogers's assertion that the production of nuclear weapons "would certainly have justified the attacks" on

the relevant installations had they taken place.

Given his professional status with the British Army Legal Services, it is perhaps not surprising that Rogers has not dealt with the law as it affects maritime conflict; however, the basic principles he outlines and discusses are significant for all theatres.

Law on the Battlefield may prove most useful for the army legal adviser, but those in the legal services of both the air force and the navy will find sufficient material to help them in their duties as advisers. They will often be able, without undue effort, to adapt them to their own specific problems.

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Parker, Geoffrey, ed. *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995. 610pp. $39.95

By any measure of achievement, attempting to write a single-volume history of warfare is a massive undertaking. In the latest of the Cambridge Illustrated Histories series, Geoffrey Parker has assembled an eminent group of historians (Christopher Allmand, Victor David Hanson, John A. Lynn, Williamson Murray, Geoffrey Parker, and Patricia Seed), who admirably meet the challenge. Subtitled "The Triumph of the West," Parker's latest opus argues convincingly that over the past two centuries the Western way of war has become dominant all over the globe. Consequently the rise and development of this tradition, together with the secret of its success, seems "worthy of examination and analysis."

According to Parker, the Western way of war rests upon five principles: technology, discipline, a highly aggressive military tradition, a remarkable capacity to innovate and also respond rapidly to the innovation of others, and (since approximately A.D. 1500) institutions to finance the escalating costs of war. The combination of these five factors provided a formula for military success that, with few interruptions, ensured the West's survival in times of adversity and its eventual expansion to a position of global hegemony.

Graduates of the Naval War College will find Parker's analysis of maritime strategy fascinating. What made Horatio Nelson the greatest sailor of his age, for example, was his transformation of the character of naval combat. Forsaking the line-ahead, which had dominated naval combat for centuries, Nelson relied on melee tactics that, by breaking up the enemy's formation, turned a fleet action into a series of ship-to-ship battles. Such melees would not have been feasible without the superior quality of Nelson's captains and their ships; this style of warfare reached its culmination at Trafalgar.

Great Britain's mastery of the seas remained unchallenged until Alfred von Tirpitz's construction of the German High Seas Fleet in the decades before World War I. However, Tirpitz's greatest mistake, states Murray, lay in his failure to recognize that geography had given Britain an almost unassailable

naval position. The British Isles lay astride Germany's path to the Atlantic, while they shielded Britain's own trade routes.

Nor did Tirpitz ever devise a plan for how he would use the navy if the British did not launch a close blockade of Germany's ports. Unexpectedly, in World War I the Royal Navy maintained instead a distant blockade of the German coastline. The Battle of Jutland in 1916, like Trafalgar a century earlier, merely confirmed Britain's status as ruler of the seas, a status it had yielded only reluctantly to the United States by the time of the armistice.

The authors also stress the significance of maritime operations in World War II. Murray states that the battle of the North Atlantic constituted the most important strategic achievement of the Western allies during the war. The successful defense of the sea lines of communication on which Britain and the United States depended for power projection and economic production was the *sine qua non* of the survival of Great Britain and the subsequent invasion of Europe. Despite numerous losses among commercial convoys, the Allies turned the tide in April 1943, sinking forty-one U-boats and causing Admiral Karl Dönitz to pull his boats from the central Atlantic.

Murray makes an equally insightful analysis of the American Civil War. He opines that it was the most important conflict of the nineteenth century, because for the first time opposing governments harnessed the popular enthusiasm (rising from the French Revolution to the industrial technology) that was sweeping the West. Other governments refined these principles in the latter half of the century, notably Prussia in its wars of German unification.

In summary, Parker concludes that war has served as the driving force behind the West's rise to global domination. Once the West harnessed its industrial power to its military endeavors in the eighteenth century, the investment in technology, discipline, and staying-power virtually assured world domination. Not surprisingly, World War II caused the economy of the United States to undergo the largest, fastest, and most sustained expansion ever recorded. As for the future, Parker argues that Western dominance will continue as long as the West demonstrates a sustained ability to manage international crises and prevent them from evolving into armed conflicts, and a continued willingness to pay for defense even against dangers that are not yet immediately apparent.

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Staar, Richard F. *The New Military in Russia: Ten Myths That Shape the Image.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996. 248pp. $41.95

Richard Staar, currently a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, is a former ambassador to the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations and a longtime analyst of the Soviet and Russian militaries. This book reflects his thorough understanding of key issues in the Russian military and is an excellent source for those seeking to gain insight

into the current military situation and to extrapolate what the future may hold. It accomplishes this by examining the current state of Russian national security doctrine (or lack thereof) and myths associated with official proclamations and statements. As an example, the book begins by examining the notion that "the military is outside politics." Staar quickly debunks this idea by illustrating the integral role played by the military leadership in the 1991 coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev and in Boris Yeltsin's 1993 attack on the parliament building.

Throughout the book, Staar demonstrates that despite official claims to the contrary, there is good reason for the West to maintain a watchful eye on Russian military actions. Staar shows that the Russian military is far from a reformed, democratic, or nonthreatening institution. Still lacking is effective and responsible civilian oversight of the top-heavy force. The cruel hazing of young recruits continues, and funding shortfalls have crippled any effort to professionalize. Russia's current military doctrine, published in 1993, includes the provision for military intervention in the "near abroad" (i.e., the other republics of the former Soviet Union) in order to protect Russian interests.

Staar also discusses Russia's continued pursuit of highly advanced weapon systems and its export of advanced and offensive arms to decidedly anti-Western markets. In "The Future Is Ours, Comrades!", Staar discusses the final myth concerning the Russian military's future. Having established its current state, the author turns to possible scenarios for the military in the twenty-first century. In the worst case, the country plummets into despair, with stormtroopers supporting Vladimir Zhirinovskii in a coup. In the most hopeful case, a young reformer comes to power and successfully transforms Russia into a new "United States of Russia"—but the military is missing from this scenario. Therefore the case most likely to occur will be a continued fight between reformers and conservatives, in which the military is charged with maintaining law and order. In this scenario, the president's national security concept includes a more aggressive use of military forces to protect Russian interests in the former Soviet republics.

Each of these scenarios provides an interesting and plausible picture of how events could unfold in Russia. My criticism is not about their credibility but rather about how they incorporate the information preceding them. The prognostications of this section would benefit greatly if each myth were discussed in the context of future cases. As an example, how would a "United States of Russia" (the scenario in which the military is not discussed) affect the military? What steps would a young reformer need to take in order to reform the military yet still maintain a modern military? What national security doctrine would exist under such a reformer? All these questions point to the issue underlying the current military situation and the larger question of why today's Russian military is myth-laden at all—something not discussed in this book. What is it about Russia's current government that it cannot solve the challenges facing military reform?

The book concludes with an appendix containing biographical information on key military figures. Both students and policy experts will find this information useful. Indeed, the entire book is based on an impressive use of primary source material, making it a valuable resource for those seeking an introduction to, or a clear overview of, the current issues facing Russia's military. Overall, it is an excellent work, and the author should be commended for tackling this subject in Russia's rapidly changing and often chaotic political environment.

BRENDA J. VALLANCE
U.S. Air Force Academy

Navias, Martin S., and E.R. Hooton. *Tanker Wars: The Assault on Merchant Shipping during the Iran-Iraq Conflict, 1980–1988.* New York: I.B. Taurus, 1996. 244pp. $110

This small book is impressive for a lot more than its price. The authors know their subject. They understand the nature and the language of shipping, insurance, weaponry, and navies; they know the Persian Gulf; and they know why things happen the way they do. Moreover, they know how to write of such things clearly, concisely, completely, and interestingly. They tell us when the Iran-Iraq War began (Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980), when the tanker war began (in May 1981), who started it (Iraq), why (to halt Iran's ability to buy arms from abroad), and with what results (first, that Iran also began to attack shipping in the Gulf, chiefly those ships indirectly in the service of Iraq, and second, that as a consequence the U.S. Navy became a participant in the war). In detail, day by day, we learn who attacked, against what ships, with what weapons, and with what outcome.

The man who started this war, Saddam Hussein, rules a country with very little seacoast and not much of a fleet. However, by using neutral-manufactured missiles launched from neutral-built aircraft flown by neutral-trained pilots, he attacked tankers that mainly were neutral in ownership, in flag, in crew nationality, and in cargo destination. The Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini ruled a country with a long seacoast and a fleet modest in size but less than modest in effectiveness. Iran's neutral-supplied aircraft and missiles, effective at first, faded as their age and lack of spare parts caught up with them. Thereafter the ayatollah's zealous forces attacked shipping with neutral-built speedboats armed with rockets and machine guns. The boats were manned by fanatical irregulars. Since Saddam no longer had either ships or a port for ships to sail to or from, what did the Iranian zealots attack? They attacked neutral ships, mainly those carrying oil from Kuwait, and cargo ships headed for Kuwait filled with neutral-built arms and other supplies destined for Saddam, but paid for with Kuwaiti oil.

Seven years after Saddam began his smash-and-grab attack, the ayatollah's faithful amateur warriors were still resisting strongly. Fearful that the Shiite Muslim fanatics in Iran (who not only terrified the Sunni Muslim Arabs on the Gulf's opposite shore but also supported terrorist attacks upon the Western

world and made plain that in their view the United States was "the Great Satan") might after all beat the criminal in Baghdad, the United States (the originator of the concept of the "flag of convenience") turned its own national ensign into such a flag in order to provide a pretext for U.S. naval protection to half of Kuwait's small merchant fleet. After a year of U.S. naval participation in the war, the ayatollah sagged, and in mid-1988 he conceded defeat. Interestingly, in 1990, after Saddam had turned against and consumed his ally Kuwait, he found himself menaced by the United States and many other states he had imagined to be his friends. Saddam returned to Iran all the territory he had gained during his long war against that country.

What was happening during the seemingly endless tanker war? Navias and Hooton explain with well constructed tables every attack on every ship by either side. Altogether about four hundred ships came under fire; some were hit five or six times. Though the focus of the assault was on tankers, about 40 percent of the ships attacked were bulk carriers, container ships, general cargo ships, salvage tugs, and so on. Of those attacked, only about one-quarter were sunk or declared to be "constructive total losses." When an oversupply of large tankers disappeared from the world market, the number of constructive total losses dropped substantially, for it had become cheaper to repair a damaged ship than to buy another one.

During the attacks about four hundred men died, or about one per ship. The USS *Stark* (FFG 31), hit by two Iraqi missiles, accounted for twenty-seven dead.

Here are some of Navias's and Hooton's summary observations (pages 186–188):

"Given that there are 900–1,000 major ship movements a month through the Straits of Hormuz even at its most intense the Tanker War is unlikely to have involved more than 1 percent of the ships sailing in the Gulf."

"For navies the Tanker War reinforced lessons on ship self-defense and demonstrated the need for better briefing of ship's commanders before they entered volatile quasi-war zones."

"Once laid, as the Tanker War demonstrated, mines can do great damage to both merchantmen and warships alike."

"The Tanker War demonstrated that the robust construction of merchantmen made them far less vulnerable to modern weapon systems than might have been expected." Tankers were "especially difficult to sink."

"Although Saddam Hussein made many mistakes, his decision to attack merchant shipping proved extremely perceptive. The Iraqi strategy of striking merchant vessels to bring indirect pressure upon the Iranian war effort, as well as emphasizing the international aspect of the war, was fully vindicated, for Baghdad was able to manipulate such attacks for political ends."

This book is filled with much more such acute analysis, but let us end with a couple of related observations on the future, from the final page of text: "The trend has been for owners to seek flags of convenience. In seeking cost benefits owners have abandoned protection, swapping steel for gold, for the price of

financial freedom is the absence of naval power."

Further: "With international action unlikely and the major naval powers reluctant to take unilateral action, neutral shipping . . . may again be exposed to attack in regional conflicts, notably in the eastern Mediterranean and the South China Sea, and it is extremely likely that the world's merchant fleets will remain at the sharp end."

FRANK UHLIG, JR.
Naval War College

Wildenberg, Thomas. *Gray Steel and Black Oil: Fast Tankers and Replenishment at Sea in the U.S. Navy, 1912–1992*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996. 360pp. $39.95

When Alfred Thayer Mahan spoke of "those far distant, storm-beaten ships, upon which the Grand Army never looked," he neglected to credit the water hoys: sturdy, reliable vessels that brought fresh water to the British fleet as it blockaded the French coast. Without them the British could not have "stood between it [the Grand Army] and the dominion of the world." Those water hoys were the progenitors of today's fast oilers and underway replenishment ships of which Thomas Wildenberg has written.

In 1916, as events presaged American involvement in the First World War and the U.S. Navy realized that many of its ships were too short-legged to reach Europe unaided, the first oilers, USS *Maumee* and USS *Kanawha*, joined the fleet. By July 1917 *Maumee* had refueled thirty-four destroyers at sea on their way to Europe.

These first at-sea refuelings were done with a rig that required taking the receiving ship under partial tow, while it remained under power, in relatively benign sea conditions. Robust deck seamanship for alongside refueling at speed, the capability to do it in heavy seas, and the development of refueling ships (fleet oilers) are the stuff of Wildenberg's admirable history.

These ships are an important and often overlooked part of American naval history. The technical and operational development of reliable at-sea replenishment in the U.S. Navy was a major revolution in military affairs. It gave the Navy the capability to wage an oceanic campaign across the expanse of the Pacific theater. Without extensive at-sea replenishment capability, the World War II Pacific campaign would have had a very different character and probably lasted much longer.

The basic technical and operational elements of at-sea replenishment were laid down in the interwar period. Wildenberg does a thorough job of recounting the design and acquisition of standardized fleet oilers, the practical matters of refueling rigs, at-sea exercises, and the emergence of replenishment doctrine in this period.

By the mid–1920s, Japan's expansionism in the Pacific had led the U.S. Navy to begin staff planning for a campaign across the reaches of the Pacific Ocean. This campaign, dubbed War Plan Orange, became the centerpiece of interwar naval planning, and it also had significant ramifications for the design and operation of fleet support vessels.

Many combatants of the day were unable to cross the Pacific, let alone operate in the theater, without refueling en route. Both war games at the Naval War College and fleet exercises showed clearly that to enable a wide-ranging Pacific campaign the Navy would need a fleet of oilers with considerable speed and range. In 1933, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration included the construction of naval vessels in the public works program. The Navy Board responded with specifications for a class of fleet oilers capable of six thousand miles at fifteen knots, with ten thousand tons of fuel oil and basic self-defense armament. In 1934, Rear Admiral Emory Land, father of the Navy's at-sea replenishment capability, pushed those specifications up to ten thousand miles, 16.5 knots, and twelve thousand tons. But in fiscal 1937 funding for construction of naval auxiliaries lapsed, and no further design work on Land's specifications was done by the Bureau of Engineering.

Fortuitously, the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 authorized the U.S. government to pay the cost of "national defense features" added to privately constructed vessels of interest to the Navy. Rear Admiral Land, whom Roosevelt had appointed to the United States Maritime Commission, lost no time in seizing the opportunity. In January 1938 a contract was signed with Standard Oil for the construction of twelve high-speed tankers with naval features including 16.5-knot sustained speed, gear for fueling at sea, gun mounts and magazines, and twin screws. These features added $880,250, or 28 percent, to the construction cost for each hull. The ships became the first of the famed T3 class of fast tankers. The first of them, *Cimarron*, was completed in February 1939, and following trials during which it made good 19.25 knots while fully loaded, the ship was accepted by Standard Oil and immediately sold to the Navy. After commissioning, *Cimarron* gained a hull number, AO 22, and promptly set out carrying fuel oil from Texas to Pearl Harbor. In 1938 it was followed into the Navy by USS *Neosho* and USS *Platte*; the remaining nine of the class were in service by July 1941.

The evolution of deck rigs for at-sea refueling at useful speeds and in heavy seas is a parallel story of equal importance. Wildenberg tells it superbly, offering many fine drawings and photographs, each a delight to the boatswain's eye. Engineering constant-tension rigs for fuel hoses slung between ships was the crux of the matter. A variety of hoses, ship connections, and rigs were tested; fleet trials proved the capability for, and worth of, refueling alongside with both ships steaming at significant speeds.

The cleverest innovation, and one still in use, was a line hung with flags at regular intervals to be stretched between ships as a guide for the officer of the deck in controlling the distance between them while refueling. That innovation may have been the creation of Commander Arleigh Burke.

Chester Nimitz played several notable roles in the development of at-sea replenishment. (Readers of the *Naval War College Review* may recall Wildenberg's article on that very subject in the Autumn 1993 issue.) As a lieutenant, he

oversaw the design and construction of large marine diesel engines for the *Maumee* and prepared the deck equipment used during the 1917 transfer of destroyers to the European theater. As a rear admiral commanding Battleship Division 1, Nimitz advanced the state of the art, moving from fore-and-aft rigs to refueling alongside for ships larger than a destroyer. In 1939 during Fleet Problem XX, which Nimitz commanded, both the battleship USS *Arizona* (BB 39) and USS *Saratoga* (CV 3) were refueled alongside *Kanawha* (now AO 1), and this became standard.

The work of the interwar period paid off when the Second World War broke out. The Navy now knew how to refuel, rearm, and roam the Pacific at will. All that was needed was enough oilers. The Navy commissioned sixty-six oilers for service with the fleet between February 1942 and August 1945.

Early in the Pacific campaign, oilers were used to top off the carriers just before they thrust at the enemy. As the campaign progressed, large numbers of combat ships were required to stay at sea in the forward area for extended periods. In August 1942, Service Squadron 8 was established to manage all the oilers and other replenishment ships in the Pacific. Groups of fast oilers rendezvoused with combat task forces on predetermined schedules; slower tankers moved fuel from the rear areas to the combat zone and reloaded the fast oilers. The system worked smoothly, and the Pacific campaign was not circumscribed by fueling problems.

Standard operating practice at first called for the oiler to approach the receiving ship and for both to turn into the wind while refueling. This often pulled the receiving ships away from their intended course, with a net loss in speed of advance for the task group. However, Captain Truman Heeding of Carrier Division 8, had a better idea: "We all know how to fly formation [all carrier skippers were, and are, aviators]. . . . Let everybody come up and make an approach on the tanker and just run the fuel lines across." It worked and sped up the process greatly. Said Heeding, "It was very simple; you just flew formation and it worked fine." As the ships became practiced, fleet oilers began to fuel two ships at once, port and starboard.

By the fall of 1944, fleet oilers were also carrying lubricating oil, general stores, and ammunition. Fast carrier task forces were now virtually free of any need to visit land, save to attack it where the enemy lay.

In the fifteen years after the war, the Navy commissioned another sixty oilers, most based on the venerable T2 design. By the 1970s, many of these were nearing the end of their useful life, and the new *Cimarron* (AO 177) class was brought into service. In 1987 the *Henry J. Kaiser* (T-AO 187) class was introduced, the largest pure oilers ever built for the Navy. They proved their worth in Operation DESERT STORM.

During the Pacific War, replenishing at sea from different ships (fuel from one, ammunition from another, and stores from a third) had proven time-consuming and inefficient. Following a Chief of Naval Operations conference on mobile logistic support in 1952, the concept for the fast combat support ship (AOE) emerged. As a forerunner, the *Conecuh*, a German supply ship that had

come to the U.S. Navy as part of war reparations, was commissioned as AOR 110. During trials in the Mediterranean it proved remarkably successful at "one stop" service. From it grew the modern AOE, designed to be an integral part of the carrier battle group. The AOE (of which a new class is now appearing) and its lesser cousin the AOR are the zenith of the modern at-sea replenishment art.

That art, the product of an earlier revolution in military affairs, continues to contribute to the unique character of the U.S. Navy as a force able to meet national security needs across and around the world; no other modern navy has such blue-water reach and sustainability.

Operation DESERT STORM produced the phrase, "Global Reach, Global Power." It describes precisely what at-sea replenishment does for the Navy and for the United States.

Wildenberg's own epilogue says it well: "For more than seventy years oilers have been the workhorses of the fleet. Throughout this century—in war and in peace—they have had the unglamorous duty of keeping the fighting ships of the U.S. Navy topped off with black oil, ordnance, and provisions. This task has been carried out with every type of vessel imaginable, seven days a week, in good weather and bad, in daylight and in the pitch darkness of night. Though not a combat assignment, it has proved to be an essential component of the war fighting doctrine of the U.S. Navy."

Gray Steel and Black Oil is a well done, comprehensive treatise on an important subject, one that is central to the Navy's worldwide reach.

FRANK C. MAHNCKE
Washington, D.C.

Moïse, Edwin E. *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War.* Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1996. 324pp. $39.95

Edwin E. Moïse, a historian at Clemson University, uses newly available information and personal interviews to reconstruct the events that transpired in the Gulf of Tonkin on 4 August 1964. He presents a careful and incredibly thorough account, which shows that no attack took place that night against USS *Maddox* and USS *C. Turner Joy*. He attempts to place events in the context of increasing tensions between the United States and North Vietnam, tensions that would escalate after August 1964. The events that transpired in the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 are controversial even today, so it is likely that this book will meet with some debate. It is, however, an excruciatingly detailed account and, in my view, quite persuasive.

The author begins by discussing of the covert operations being executed in Vietnam in the 1960s. These operations, under Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A, were run by the United States and the Republic of Vietnam against North Vietnam, their intensity increasing through the summer of 1964. Moïse argues that by this time, Washington officials had already begun thinking about escalating the war but did not wish to present a resolution before Congress unless it could be passed

quickly by an overwhelming majority. Moïse then covers the "DeSoto" patrols, in which *Maddox* participated. These patrols took place off the coast of North Vietnam, monitoring electronic activity to aid the coastal raids that were part of OPLAN 34A. Moïse shows that these raids took place in the Tonkin Gulf on the night of 30–31 July, just before *Maddox* entered the area. The attack by the North Vietnamese against *Maddox* on 2 August took place in this context. There was no American response, save a warning and more OPLAN 34A operations on 3–4 August, along with the movement of *C. Turner Joy* to join *Maddox* on patrol. Moïse details the events of 2 August and the resumption of the DeSoto patrols, emphasizing how members of the Johnson administration misled Congress about these events.

The most engrossing part of this book recounts the events of 4 August with painstaking detail, piecing together documents and interviews to reconstruct what did, and what did not, happen. Here the book has a tendency to bog down a bit, as Moïse takes care to sort out details of everything, including time zones and tracking charts. He concludes that it was a combination of bizarre weather conditions, a dark night, and overzealous radarmen that led to the inaccurate conclusion that *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* were under attack. His final chapters discuss U.S. retaliation for the incident, including how the Johnson administration used the information to sway the passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and escalate the war—even though many in the Joint Staff, "even the Navy people," had concluded that probably no attack had occurred.

In retrospect, does it matter if the 4 August attack took place? Moïse recalls that in 1965 McGeorge Bundy referred to events in Vietnam as streetcars: if you don't hop on one, you can hop on another. Perhaps this was the case, Moïse argues, although it is hard to imagine the same flow of events happening in Vietnam *without* the Tonkin Gulf incident. This streetcar, states the author, came about by accident, but once the United States jumped on, there was no going back; the streetcar metaphor implies too much linearity. The very fact that the Tonkin Gulf streetcar was a phantom makes its place in our policy history worthy of study.

This is an excellent book, chosen as a selection in the History Book Club. While it is slow reading at certain points, it is thorough and provocative throughout. The subject is an important one, because the issues of war, advice, presidential power, and truth are always with us. It is essential reading for the national security community and those interested in U.S. policy in Vietnam or the U.S. presidency.

PATRICK J. HANEY
Miami University

Buzzanco, Robert. *Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era.* New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996. 386pp. $29.95

Masters of War is a version of the author's 1993 doctoral dissertation at Ohio State. He is presently an assistant professor of history at the University of Houston. The subject, as its subtitle implies, is the interplay and conflict between U.S. military and civilian leadership during the Vietnam War. While the author does not confine himself strictly to the area of civil-military relations, that is his principal focus.

The historical laboratory that Buzzanco employs is the period from the beginning of the John F. Kennedy administration in 1961 through the immediate aftermath of the Tet Offensive in 1968, where the book cuts off. He breaks down his examination into seven time periods, beginning with the early Kennedy miscues in foreign and strategic policy.

Throughout his analysis the author employs four themes: military perceptions of the risky basis of the war, civilian responsibility for commitment to the war, antagonisms between civilians and the military, and rivalry between services regarding strategy and resource allocation.

Buzzanco provides the usual parade of documents for this period, interspersed with occasional value judgments and also summary assessments of each section. However, the judgments appear to be preconceived, since they are not based on any analysis of the documentary evidence. Also, in certain of the summary evaluations the author is on questionable ground. He states, for example, that "in the early 1950s, despite the military's bold stand against intervention, [President Dwight D.] Eisenhower and [Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles continued to seek ways to get American troops involved in Indochina." To begin with, Eisenhower and Dulles were not of the same mind on this subject, and Ike ran the show. Recall, for example, Eisenhower's disapproval of Secretary Dulles's and Admiral Arthur Radford's plans for U.S. intervention at the time of Dien Bien Phu. While he was president, Eisenhower had no intention of getting U.S. troops involved in Vietnam beyond the level of advisors, who numbered well under one thousand while he was in office.

In part, Buzzanco's problem seems to be the magnitude of his initial goals without any overarching central question or hypothesis. In certain of his conclusions it is not clear what he had in mind. For instance, he writes, "During the Johnson years, as combat troops entered the battlefield and took over the war . . . politics increasingly determined the U.S. approach to Vietnam." What else, one wonders, could have? As Karl von Clausewitz stated long ago, "War has its own language but not its own logic." The subordination of the military to the political point of view is the only thing possible under our form of government. If, however, what he meant was that the senior military should have been more forthright with the president in disagreeing with certain decisions, he is correct. The acceptance in July 1965 by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Earle G. Wheeler of President Johnson's decision not to call up the reserves is a prime example.

The subject of this book is an important one, and Buzzanco writes well. I hope in the future he will pursue the

matter more analytically and expand the historical period of his study. In the context in which he is writing, one cannot end an examination of the matter at Tet 1968 but must continue on through the U.S. withdrawal, or at least until 1973. He also, I submit, should answer for himself that most difficult of all issues—What is the question? Nevertheless, I recommend this book to those who are interested in studying America's major foreign and strategic policy failure of the twentieth century—the Vietnam War. This book is provocative, interesting, and worth the time of student and policy maker alike.

DOUGLAS KINNARD
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Dawes, Robert A., Jr. *The Dragon's Breath: Hurricane At Sea.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996. 248pp. $29.95

The defining features of Commander Dawes's account of a ship's disastrous end are as intertwined and interdependent as the strands of a nautical cable. He combines the theory and analysis of failure with the fatal links in the chain of real events in 1944 that led the "broken decker" USS *Warrington* (DD 383) to its grave fourteen thousand feet below the surface of the Atlantic. To these Dawes tightly weaves a critical review of the court of inquiry's findings and the voices of actual survivors.

The result is no mere tale of wind and water. The story unfolds in scenes with pace and panic well matched to any movie thriller, but also with the attention to detail found in training manuals and exercises aimed at preserving ships and lives at sea. The ill-fated vessel encounters a hurricane, capsizes, and sinks. Two hundred forty-seven perish, and sixty-eight survive. Dawes's research, interviews, and personal familiarity with ship and crew allow the narrative to proceed as if it were his own diary, overlaid upon the log itself. The reader can hear the howl of the 140-mile-per-hour winds, see the monstrous waves nearly seventy feet high, and taste the brine itself as officers and crew fight for the ship and their own lives.

Those who have served at sea will find themselves swept up in the flow of fact and testimony, just as *Warrington* was carried to oblivion as it attempted to turn 180 degrees and run before the wind. It was doomed by a combination of flaws in the hull design, seam and structural separations that allowed massive surges to flood the vital spaces below. In this sense, the term "broken deck" applied to the ship in eerily prophetic ways. A sailing bow in crosswind conditions coupled with a series of deferred repairs made steering in the following seas an almost impossible task. Torn and fractured in the final hours, *Warrington* was at last unable to right itself.

The author relinquished command of the ship just fourteen days before its loss in September 1944. Prior to the turnover he had taken *Warrington* in harm's way, into action in the Pacific. He came to know the ship intimately, along with its increasingly overworked but effective crew. Dawes consistently brought attention to the urgency of the

need for repair and replacement; ultimately, fatigue in the men and the metal plates beneath them grew until both were overcome by the raging forces of nature that converged three hundred miles east of the Florida coast.

The author's affection for the vessel and those who served aboard is unbounded. Dawes communicated. He led. And he found a responsive and cohesive fighting platform under his firm control. Dawes strives to summon up all that emotion and understanding in re-creating the loss, which he achieves in large part with help from the surviving crew, who returned his bonds of loyalty with vivid recollection and recall. Dawes's successor, on the other hand, had neither the time nor the temperament to achieve this kind of relationship. Under his command morale unraveled quickly, causing huge ruptures in the communication process. Only faults were acknowledged, and that storehouse of confidence that is critical to all mariners was soon exhausted.

The work is not without flaws, but they are as a few broken welds or missing fittings aboard ship. Some are perhaps due to the passage of years and failure of memory. Others are inconsistencies that reflect differences in positions on the ship at various times, or in perspectives due to job or rank. This book is about the frailty of men and ships; yet it leaves one with the certain knowledge of their compensating strengths.

I would never have slept well at sea knowing that such a combination of human error and miscalculation, mechanical defect and deficiency, and communication breakdown could lead so swiftly to total confusion and chaos. Imagine if you will what it must feel like inside 1,850 tons of steel poised to plummet down a roller-coaster ramp of mountainous waves generated by a category-A Atlantic hurricane. The officers and crew demonstrated courage and strength. Where they were to be judged lacking was left to the official inquiries and boards of review. The crew's brave record and the lessons learned stand as grim testimony to the relentless and unforgiving power of the sea.

Admittedly, this book has little intrinsic value for the national security community. Meteorological science and naval architecture have evolved in the past fifty years and afford a stronger and more coherent shield against the ravages of the ocean. However, as a naval meteorologist, I am frequently reminded that operational forces sometimes still forget to solicit or fail to heed our warnings.

JOSEPH R. BRENNER
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy

Ruhe, William J. *Slow Dance to Pearl Harbor: A Tin Can Ensign in Prewar America.* Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1995. 210pp. $23.95

This excellent personal memoir tells a tale of the peacetime Navy as it prepared for a conflict that many Americans believed would never occur. For years Congress refused to approve funding for manpower and materials required by the armed forces to defend U.S. security. Too many Americans were living

in the dreamworld of pacifism. The author paints an interesting picture of what America was like prior to World War II.

The focus of the book is Ruhe's experience as a young naval officer, who in August 1940 returned to the United States after his detachment from the cruiser *Trenton* and joined the recently commissioned destroyer USS *Roe* (DD 418) as it began a busy year of fitting out and training. By Ruhe's account, the skipper, Lieutenant Commander Richard Martin Scruggs, must have been a clone of Captain Bligh of the HMS *Bounty*. However, there is a lot more to this book than the conflict between Ruhe and his commanding officer. It accurately portrays the prewar peacetime Navy: the scores for gunnery practices, which were of marginal value in preparing for war; practice torpedo firings that emphasized the torpedo's performance but not its exploder mechanism (which later in combat proved to be fatally defective); inhibited shiphandling by destroyer skippers whose fear of damage to their ships when mooring or coming alongside generated timidity instead of the boldness and precision that were required. It also shows how "rank hath its privileges" often resulted in poor leadership, which was damaging to morale. The skipper of the *Roe* made both operational and administrative decisions on the basis of what he perceived to be the most career-enhancing outcome. But the results often proved to have the opposite impact.

Finally, there are many lessons in leadership. Ruhe concentrates on the command style of only one destroyer captain, a martinet, and one junior officer, whose pride and high spirits may have exacerbated his situation. But the author's experience was not unique in the prewar and early war years. This reviewer served under a destroyer division commander who exhibited similar characteristics, generally abusing the officers of four ships. Later, the same individual commanded a squadron, where his attitude and decisions affected the officers of eight destroyers. The record shows that many martinets, and the majority of the officers who served under them, were highly competent and courageous in combat. However, Ruhe's commanding officer and my martinet commodore (like Captain Bligh) became decorated flag officers.

The U.S. Navy has always survived its Blighs. Most of us old-timers believe that it will continue to do so.

C. R. CALHOUN
Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired
Wilmington, North Carolina

King, Irving H. *The Coast Guard Expands, 1865–1915: New Roles, New Frontiers*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996. 293pp. $37.95

In their first summer at the Coast Guard Academy, fourth-class cadets are sometimes called upon to sing the Coast Guard marching song, "Semper Paratus." The melody, a catchy tune, is not difficult; the lyrics, however, are another matter. They make reference to obscure locations, such as "Barrow's shores," and list ships that include unfamiliar names, like *Hudson*. The cadets

often learn these lyrics by rote, without exploring their meaning. But the cadets would find them less obscure if they were exposed to the history of the Coast Guard written by Professor King. The ships, their geographic locations, and the tales that go with them would become familiar and memorable.

Irving King is a member of the Coast Guard Academy's staff, and he is writing a series of books that chronicle the history of the U.S. Coast Guard. This volume is the latest in the series, and despite its cumbersome title it is a solid and welcome piece of scholarship. King explores the histories of the Revenue Cutter Service and its counterpart, the Life-Saving Service, from the end of the Civil War until 1915, the year the organizations were joined to create the modern Coast Guard. The author includes many exciting tales of shipwrecks, rescues, and battles; yet where he truly succeeds is in balancing these adventures with his discussion of more mundane issues, such as personnel practices, budgets, procurement, and bureaucratic infighting.

The book shows careful scholarship throughout. A fine example is his description of the destruction of an Alaskan native village after a hostage-taking incident, giving an account of the controversial event from both sides. He does not avoid describing problems, including excessive drinking, tampering with ships' logs, and abuse of political patronage. Thus we see not only the glamorous surface of the organization but also its guts and sinews, both its strengths and weaknesses.

King's work is rich with such primary sources as original logs, official documents, letters, and diaries. He arranges this volume in a rough chronological order, with chapters summarizing the service's operations and administration alternating with chapters devoted to major events. The summary chapters are rich in detail and well rooted in statistical data. Included are the accomplishments of Sumner Kimball, noted head of both the Revenue Cutter and Life-Saving Services; the exploits of revenue cutters on the new Alaskan frontier, most notably Captain Michael Healy and the cutter *Bear;* the adventurous Overland Expedition in which crewmembers of the *Bear* relieved stranded crews of the whaling vessels (one of the events "Barrow shores" refers to in "Semper Paratus"); and the role of revenue cutters in the Spanish-American War, in both the Philippine and Cuban theaters (the *Hudson* earned its place in the song off Cuba). The Revenue Cutter School of Instruction also receives a chapter; the author shows the events leading up to its current incarnation as the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut.

Two separate challenges to the Revenue Cutter Service's existence are discussed, the first in the 1880s and the second just prior to its merger with the Life-Saving Service. The echoes of the attempts at government reorganizations and budgetary struggles are still heard today, revealing that many "new" ideas have already been explored. The only thing lacking in King's discussion is mention of the broader historical context and developments in the maritime industry that affected the service's operation. This is a result of his nearly exclusive focus on the service itself.

After reading this thoughtful history of the last days of the Revenue Cutter Service and Life-Saving Service, I look forward to the next volume in the series. There has been much change in the Coast Guard, and no lack of events for King to chronicle. The Coast Guard's activities in this century have been considerable: participating in two world wars; creating an aviation arm; enforcing Prohibition; absorbing the Lighthouse Service and the Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation; creating the Coast Guard Reserve and Coast Guard Auxiliary; and taking on environmental duties.

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Tracy, Nicholas. *Nelson's Battles: The Art of Victory in the Age of Sail.* London: Chatham, 1996. 224pp. £28

There is no doubt that Horatio Nelson's name will always be associated with victory. His tactical innovation, charismatic leadership, and devotion to duty have become legendary. Yet there is a definite shortage of one-volume accounts on Nelson's strategy and tactics, and this volume offers to fill that void. Tracy is a well known authority on the era of sail, but there is another compelling reason why we should read this work: it is one of the first under the imprint of a new publishing company, founded by the original directors of Conway Maritime Press.

The text is divided into five sections and a concluding epilogue. It also features a thought-provoking foreword by David Brown, a brief suggested-reading list, and a detailed index. The book is profusely illustrated with contemporary drawings of ships, equipment, and key personages, as well as official portraits. In general, they complement the text, are of good quality, and bear the mark of careful selection. The publishers have also included a collection of tactical maps depicting crucial stages of key battles throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. While the lack of detailed line drawings of various ships is disappointing, it does not detract from the utility of this book for its stated purpose.

The first section provides a very brief introduction to Nelson's early career, as well as a good summary of England's dependence on, and appreciation of, sea power. The second is primarily devoted to ships, sailors, equipment, tactics, and strategy during the early days of Nelson's career. The third analyses four battles, including Cape St. Vincent (1797), where Nelson first made a name for himself, and concludes with his first major victory at the Battle of the Nile (1799). The last two sections detail Nelson's greatest triumphs, Copenhagen (1801) and Trafalgar (1805). Tragically, the last victory was achieved at the cost of his life.

Tracy's narrative makes it clear that Nelson's tactics were based as much on innovation as on careful assimilation of the lessons of earlier battles. His impetuosity, dynamic leadership, and inherent ability to take the measure of the enemy's weaknesses and willingness to fight are the elements that define the "Nelson Touch." To his credit, Tracy

has not attempted to write another biography of Nelson, nor has he indulged in hagiography. Nelson's few faults as a commander are illustrated and his main human failings (vanity and an unscrupulous disregard for the sanctity of marriage) are also discussed; given the focus of this work, the author could easily have ignored them. In his subject's defense, Tracy argues that the traumatic head wound that Nelson received at the Battle of the Nile may have rendered him more susceptible to the seductive charms of Lady Hamilton.

Fortunately, Nelson's lapses in judgment were usually confined to the conduct of his personal life ashore and not his commands at sea. In the end, his vanity may have contributed to his death aboard the *Victory*—but when he was fatally wounded, the outcome of the Battle of Trafalgar was no longer in doubt. Tracy is undoubtedly correct when he alleges that because the Royal Navy has tended to emphasize the wrong aspects of Nelson's tactics and strategy, it has failed to appreciate the strength of his humanity, his leadership style, and the tactical freedom that he always sought and freely granted to his subordinates.

Overall, this is a well written and carefully researched study of the man and of the weapons, tactics, and strategy that contributed to the defeat of Napoleon's forces at sea. It offers insight into the successes and failures of the Royal Navy since the eighteenth century. There are many modern commanders who may still have something to learn from Nelson's example of the true essence of leadership. Therefore this will be a welcome addition to their library and of naval historians. It clearly shows that the directors of Chatham have lost none of their "Conway touch."

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Hough, Richard. *Captain James Cook: A Biography*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1995. 327pp. $29.95

What always amazes me about Richard Hough is the number of books, both fiction and nonfiction, that he has written over the years about seagoing figures and maritime tales—keeping in mind that he served, not in the navy, but as a fighter pilot in the Royal Air Force during World War II.

This work is unlike his 1979 book about Cook's last voyage; it is more scholarly, with a less colorful narrative. Hugh begins his tale with a glimpse into the life of the newly commissioned lieutenant aboard HMS *Endeavour*, who in 1768 was given sealed orders to conduct celestial observations, discover an unknown continent, survey coastlines, study the people, examine the botany, and, with the support of the natives, colonize the land in the name of King George III. This was James Cook's first command.

Twenty-eight chapters trace the naval career of Captain James Cook. Through tireless research and analysis of archives, logs, and records from London to Tasmania, Hough brings to life one of the greatest navigators ever to exist. He reviews Cook's journey from a small Yorkshire town through three global circumnavigations. Hough begins with Cook's early infatuation with the sea. He joined a merchant shipping family

and in nine years reached the level of mate. However, discontented with sailing the English Channel, North Sea, Irish Sea, and the Baltic, Cook dreamed of exploring more distant shores and believed that the Royal Navy could satisfy his craving for discovery. In a harsh navy of sail and something akin to indentured servitude, Cook's maritime skills quickly surfaced and enabled him to become master's mate in two years. He served first aboard HMS *Eagle*, taking part in the capture of Quebec in 1759. Upon his return to England, he was given a warrant and appointed surveyor of Newfoundland in 1763. It was here that he became known for his passion for surveying and drafting charts.

Cook circumnavigated the world, completing accurate charts of Newfoundland, the South Pacific islands, Antarctica, the west coast of North America, and New Zealand. His work would serve navigators for decades. Hough has included fourteen maps and charts, a few of which illustrate Cook's own surveys of the Pacific islands and Newfoundland. There are also twenty-five illustrations that introduce the reader to those who influenced Cook and his expeditions.

Cook's crowning achievement was the discovery of a totally unknown area, the east coast of Australia. Hough also describes a crew in awe of what they see as they cross the Antarctic Circle and come face to face with icebergs of a size they could never have imagined. Another subject is Cook's attention to his men's health; he forced them, under the threat of the lash, to consume sauerkraut and scurvygrass to prevent the dreaded scurvy. On Cook's second voyage he carried with him a newly developed chronometer, which allowed him to figure longitudes, which had always been a mystery. Captain James Cook met his fate at Kealakekua Bay in Hawaii at the hands of natives who had come to resent the English presence.

Richard Hough weaves a masterful tale of the famous Captain Cook. It is a heavily documented study that I recommend to those with a great interest in the life and times of Captain James Cook.

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