International Child Law and the Settlement of Ukraine-Russia and Other Conflicts

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the months since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, discourse on settling the war has tended to dwell on grand strategy. At the center of this discussion, of course, is the disposition of territorial claims that encompass the 2014 takeover of Crimea as well as recent seizures of land in eastern Ukraine. In discussions of a potential settlement much also has been said about ensuring Ukraine’s independence and bolstering its security, about prosecuting perpetrators of war crimes and harnessing weapons of mass destruction. Much less has been said about protecting and redressing vulnerable populations, however, and very little at all about children. That is unfortunate. At various times and in various contexts, armed conflict renders every individual vulnerable. What is more, failure to repair wrongs done to human beings amid conflict may sap a post-conflict nation’s lifeblood and even nurture post-conflict insurgency. These concerns most surely apply to one group of humans upon whom war’s havoc wreaks disproportionate harms: children.

Grim experience demonstrates that in times of armed conflict children will be killed or maimed, by weapons ranging from machine guns to cluster munitions and, in a twentieth century onslaught not since repeated, by nuclear arms. Children of all genders will be subjected to sexual and gender-based violence. They will lose their loved ones and be forced to flee their communities and ways of life, thus deprived of medical care, shelter, even food. And they will be recruited into armed service or used to participate in hostilities—perhaps even compelled to take part in the crimes of war. Alt-

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1. By way of an exception, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky included “the return of more than 5 million refugees” in his early May list of terms to be discussed in any peace settlement. Liz Sly et al., Ukraine Lays Out Peace-Talk Demands as the West Braces for Escalation, WASHINGTON POST (May 6, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/05/06/zelensky-demands-ukraine-biden-funding.

2. See Diane Marie Amann, The Post-Postcolonial Woman or Child, 30 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW 41, 52 n.49 (2014) (discussing, with citations to writings by Professors Fionnuala Ní Aoláin and Martha Albertson Fineman, theorization of vulnerability that “refocuses analysis away from a singular identity as ‘woman’ or ‘child,’ and toward the varied ways that all persons, on account of some traits but not others, at some periods in their lives but not others, may be vulnerable,” and adding that “the making and implementation of law” should be directed to “those moments of vulnerability”) [hereinafter Amann, Post-Postcolonial].
hough adults too will face ordeals like these, conflict imposes greater burdens upon children: inevitably younger and often more vulnerable than an adult, the child is destined to bear war’s memories and traumas for more years, and so more likely to pass them on to future generations.

Recognition of this reality may be found in several twenty-first century projects that examine the lives of children in armed conflict by synthesizing international child law, a body of law that encompasses not only treaties devoted to child rights, but also national, regional, and international instruments and institutions concerned with aspects of children’s experiences as varied as adoption, abduction, armed conflict, criminal accountability, indigeneity, labor, sexual exploitation, and digital technology. Sources of international child law comprise not only the near-universally ratified 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, its 2000 Optional Protocols on the involvement of children in armed conflict and on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, and its 2011 Optional Protocol on a communications procedure, but also many other international legal frameworks on child rights, human rights, humanitarian law, criminal law, refugee law, and transitional justice. The syntheses developed in these twenty-first century projects have influenced the work of bodies ranging from the United Nations Secretariat to the investigating mechanism on Syria to the International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor.

These international child law syntheses have had far less influence, however, on peace settlements. This article seeks to change that dynamic, with the aims that provisions relating to children will form part of any settlement of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and that children will have opportunities to take part in settlement processes. The article first will show that, in this as in


other wars, children have endured particular harms deserving particularized attention. Next, recognizing that international law positions taken during conflict may guide eventual peace agreements,5 it will sketch recent syntheses of relevant international child law and then apply them to conflict resolution. The article will conclude by proposing options for peace settlement processes and provisions that give due consideration to children. Not least among these will be proposals that children play a role, and that the parties to any peace agreement commit to adhere to obligations contained in numerous international instruments related to children and armed conflict.

II. CHILDREN AND THE UKRAINE-RUSSIA CONFLICT

As the Ukraine-Russia conflict entered its third month, one news outlet reprinted an eight-year-old’s drawings of the protracted assault on a port city while another wrote of an eight-year-old in a village four hundred kilometers to the north who “spends much of his time drawing at a little table, dimly illuminated from above by a tiny LED light, in the corner of the otherwise almost completely dark 40-by-five-metre basement that he shares with 23 others including his mum, aunt and grandmother.”6 Such accounts underscored society’s shame respecting the wartime suffering of children. But they also served to remind that the infliction of such suffering may be intentional, a fact likewise reflected in reports that Ukrainian children had been used as human shields and that schools where children sought shelter had been targeted for bombings.7

Indeed, by the end of the war’s first few months children reportedly had sustained a panoply of harms. Hundreds of them had been killed, lost arms and legs, or otherwise been wounded,8 often by cluster bombs,9 landmines,10 and other weapons meant for indiscriminate attacks.11 At moments in the

and, as with the tragic bombing of the Mariupol theatre, children sheltering have been mercilessly targeted”).

8. Martin Belam & Samantha Lock, Lviv Commemorates 243 Dead Children in Ukraine War with School Buses Memorial, GUARDIAN (June 2, 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jun/02/lviv-commemorates-243-dead-children-in-ukraine-war-with-school-buses-memorial (reporting Ukraine president’s statement that “Ukraine’s emergency services had counted 243 children as killed, 446 wounded and 139 missing” since the February invasion); Claire Parker & Bryan Pietsch, Nearly Two-Thirds of Ukrainian Children Displaced-ukraine (quoting Manuel Fontaine, UNICEF’s emergency programs director, who said he had been told during a visit to southeast Ukraine that doctors at one hospital had “treated 22 children who had lost limbs because of the violence”); Woodward, supra note 7 (stating that “[c]hildren have been killed and maimed” and elaborating that a report from the UN Office of the High Commissioner “suggests that at least 238 children have been killed, and 347 injured—although the true toll is likely to be far higher”).


conflict, even the specter of nuclear attack loomed. Children had been subjected to sexual and gender-based violence. They had lost thousands of loved ones, civilians and combatants alike. More than half of Ukraine’s children—4.5 million or more—were said to have fled their communities, crossing national borders as refugees, or enduring displacement within

12. Russia’s campaign in Ukraine stirred debate on whether there was a weakening of the norm against using nuclear weapons which had held since the United States dropped two atomic bombs in 1945, and so brought about Japan’s surrender in World War II. See David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Putin’s Threats Highlight the Dangers of a New, Riskier Nuclear Era, NEW YORK TIMES (June 1, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/01/us/politics/nuclear-arms-treaties.html; Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Has Eroded the Nuclear Taboo, ECONOMIST (updated June 14, 2022), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2022/06/02/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-has-eroded-the-nuclear-taboo; Russia Won’t Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine, Says Ambassador to UK, BBC (May 29, 2022), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/europe-61618902 (quoting interview in which Ambassador Andrei Kelin told a BBC reporter “that according to Russian military rules, such weapons are not used in conflicts like this”).

13. Beth Van Schaack, Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice, Press Briefing on War Crimes and Accountability in Ukraine (June 15, 2022), https://www.state.gov/briefings-foreign-press-centers/war-crimes-and-accountability-in-ukraine (mentioning, in briefing at Washington, D.C., Foreign Press Center, that investigators have “heard horrific accounts of sexual violence against women and girls” during the conflict); Woodward, supra note 7 (stating, in speech to UN Security Council by British ambassador, that “[t]here are credible allegations of sexual violence against children by Russian forces”).

14. In mid-May, Matilda Bogner, head of the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission, told news reporters that her unit had “corroborated 7,061 civilian casualties, with 3,381 killed and 3,680 injured across the country”; she added, however, that “[t]he actual figures are higher and we are working to corroborate every single incident.” Ukraine Civilian Deaths “Thousands Higher” than Official Toll: UN, AL JAZEERA (May 10, 2022), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/10/russia-ukraine-war-civilian-death-toll-un.

15. In late May, Ukraine’s president estimated losses as a result of fighting in the eastern part of the country at “60 to 100 soldiers per day, killed in action, and around 500 people wounded in action.” Agence France Presse, Zelensky: Ukraine Losing Up To 100 Soldiers A Day, BARRON’S (June 1, 2022), https://www.barrons.com/news/zelensky-ukraine-losing-up-to-100-soldiers-a-day-01654113907. A month earlier, American intelligence agencies reportedly estimated that by that time “5,500 to 11,000 Ukrainian troops had been killed, and more than 18,000 wounded.” Jane Arraf, Deaths of Foreign Fighters Draw Renewed Attention to the Military Volunteers in Ukraine, NEW YORK TIMES (May 1, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/01/world/europe/foreign-legion-volunteers.html.
Ukraine, or suffering forced deportation to Russia. Children were compelled to flee their ways of life, to abandon their education. They were denied medical care, even attacked, as in the bombing of a maternity hospital.


17. Ukraine Accuses Russia of Forcibly Deporting Over 210,000 Children, REUTERS (May 13, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-accuses-russia-forcibly-deporting-over-210000-children-2022-05-13 (reporting assertion by Lyudmyla Denisova, Ukraine’s human rights ombudsman, that “Russia had forcibly deported” from Ukraine to Russia “more than 210,000 children” and “1.2 million Ukrainians” in total). Ukraine’s president repeated the claim that 200,000 children had been taken in a June 2022 speech, contending: “The purpose of this criminal policy is not just to steal people but to make those who are deported forget about Ukraine and unable to return. Ukraine cannot be conquered, our people will not surrender and our children will not become the property of the occupiers.” Belam & Lock, supra note 8. See also Anthony Deutsch & Stephanie van den Berg, Exclusive: Ukraine Probes Deportation of Children to Russia as Possible Genocide, REUTERS (June 3, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-ukraine-investigates-deportation-children-russia-possible-genocide-2022-06-03 (reporting that Iryna Venediktova, then Ukraine’s Prosecutor General, said she was pursuing “more than 20 cases about forcible transfer of people,” including “forcible transfer of children” which may constitute an act of genocide).

18. Omar Abdi, UNICEF Deputy Exec. Dir., Remarks at the UN Security Council Meeting on the Maintenance of Peace and Security in Ukraine, Children in Ukraine Need an End to Their War—Their Futures Hang in the Balance, UNICEF (May 12, 2022), https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/children-ukraine-need-end-war-their-futures-hang-balance (stating that “[h]undreds of schools across the country are reported to have been hit by heavy artillery, airstrikes and other explosive weapons in populated areas, while other schools are being used as information centers, shelters, supply hubs, or for military purposes—with long term impact on children’s return to education”); Churchman, supra note 9 (quoting Agnès Callamard, Secretary-General of the nongovernmental organization Amnesty International, who criticized a fatal attack in northeastern Ukraine by stating that “[t]here is no possible justification for dropping cluster munitions in populated areas, let alone near a school”); Julia Horowitz, Exclusive: A Crypto-Based Dossier Could Help Prove Russia
that claimed the life of a just-delivered infant and its mother.\(^{19}\) Access to humanitarian aid was blocked.\(^{20}\) Children were deprived of shelter\(^{21}\) and even—in a crisis that also menaced many other countries—of food.\(^{22}\) Alt-


\[^{21}\text{Before the invasion, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said Ukraine fed its own people and “was feeding the world with abundant supplies of food.” Antonio Guterres, Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Security Council on Conflict and Food Security (May 19, 2022), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2022-05-19/secretary-generals-remarks-the-security-council-conflict-and-food-security-bilingual-delivered-scroll-down-for-all-english. But by April the UN “World Food Programme and its partners distributed food and cash to more than 3 million Ukrainians,” he said—and by May, given that “Russia’s invasion of its neighbour has effectively ended its food exports,” the conflict was “adding a frightening new dimension to this picture of global hunger.” Id. See also Kylie Atwood et al., Blinken Announces $215 Million in New Emergency Food Assistance for Ukraine, CNN (May 18, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/18/politics/ukraine-food-assistance-blinken/index.html.}\]
hough early allegations that children had been used in hostilities were debunked as disinformation, it must be said that the longer the conflict drags on, the more likely it will become that one or more parties will recruit children into armed service or use them as participants in hostilities. The risk that children will be trafficked has already been acknowledged. Besides age, attributes like ethnicity, LGBTI identity, and disability generate additional

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24. In the years of conflict preceding the 2022 invasion, the use of children by separatist groups was documented. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs, Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor: Ukraine 2 (2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/child_labor_reports/tda2017/ukraine.pdf (stating that “children continued to take part in active combat as part of the Russia-led forces,” and that “[r]ecruitment of children by militant groups took place primarily in Russia-controlled territory and areas where the government was unable to enforce national prohibitions against the use of children in armed conflict”). It is likewise worth noting that many combatants, even if not under eighteen, are quite young; for example, the first Russian soldier convicted in a 2022 war crimes trial in Ukraine was a gaunt-looking male, twenty-one years of age. See Bryan Pietsch et al., Russian Soldier Gets Life in Prison in Ukraine’s First War Crimes Trial, WASHINGTON POST (May 23, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/05/23/ukraine-russia-soldier-war-crimes-verdict.

25. Josh Meyer, Putin’s War in Ukraine is Driving a Hidden Horror: Sex Trafficking of Women and Children, USA TODAY (May 20, 2022), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2022/05/20/putins-ukraine-war-sex-trafficking/9733542002; Woodward, supra note 7 (stating that “as others have said, mass displacement has left children exposed to human trafficking and sexual exploitation,” and adding further that “[r]eports of forced deportations continue, with over 700,000 people, including many mothers and children, having been moved to Russia”).
risks. Many harms have affected children disproportionately. By way of example, the invasion put an abrupt end to Ukrainian children’s school year, and more than half of all the war’s refugees were said to be children.26

III. SYNTHESES OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS ON CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT

Despite evidence of the Ukraine-Russia conflict’s severe, disproportionate, and doubtless long-lasting consequences on children, public discussions of settlement seldom have included provisions for redress to children. That may reflect a tradition by which peace agreements tended to focus more on so-called hard security issues such as land and power and far less on violations of human rights. Over time human rights terms became more common; a mid-1990s article, for instance, took note of the emergence of then-

26. See David de Groot & Micaela Del Monte, Russia’s War on Ukraine: The Situation of LGBTI People, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICE (May 2, 2022), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/729412/EPRS_ATA(2022)729412_EN.pdf; U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ukraine: UN Expert Says War Against Multi-Ethnic Population Must Stop, Calls for Protection of All Minorities (Mar. 16, 2022), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/03/ukraine-un-expert-says-war-against-multi-ethnic-population-must-stop-calls (highlighting, in statement by Fernand de Varennes, UN Special Rapporteur on minority issues, the additional hardships confronting minorities, “including people of African, Asian, Middle Eastern descent and Roma,” and urging that all persons “regardless of the colour of their skin, or their ethnicity or religion, must all be dealt with without discrimination along their evacuation route out of Ukraine”); U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ukraine: 2.7 Million People with Disabilities at Risk, UN Committee Warns (Apr. 14, 2022), https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/04/ukraine-27-million-people-disabilities-risk-un-committee-warns (detailing additional risks facing persons with disabilities and their families, in statement by UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and urging in particular that “[c]hildren with disabilities should be provided with individualised support to ensure they are not separated from their families and are protected from institutionalisation and other harmful practices, such as trafficking”). This article recognizes that the attributes or identities described in the text may go by additional names or acronyms; in using “LGBTI” and “disability,” this article follows the sources it has cited.

27. Abdi, supra note 18 (stating, in speech by UNICEF Deputy Executive Director at Security Council meeting on Ukraine, that “the school year came to a standstill when the war broke out”).

28. UNICEF, Two Million Refugee Children, supra note 16 (reporting in March 2022 that “[c]hildren make up half of all refugees from the war in Ukraine, according to UNICEF and UNHCR,” the latter the United Nations’ refugee agency); see Parker & Pietsch, supra note 8 (writing in April 2022 that UNICEF’s emergency programs director said that over 90 percent of Ukrainian refugees were “women and children”).
recent instances in “which there has been explicit affirmation of the central place of human rights in shaping the content of” agreements arising out of “peace negotiations.” Even so, early references to children, if any, dwelt on child soldiering—although that is just one out of many experiences that children may confront in time of war. An example is the 1999 Lomé Agreement designed to end a civil war in which children’s experiences had garnered significant attention. The agreement’s broad preambular reference to “the imperative that the children of Sierra Leone, especially those affected by armed conflict, in view of their vulnerability, are entitled to special care and the protection of their inherent right to life, survival and development” gave way to just two operative provisions, one on education and health and another on child soldiers.

In the decades since the Lomé Agreement, multiple projects have examined the lives of children in armed conflict through syntheses of international legal frameworks like child rights, human rights, humanitarian law, criminal justice, refugee law, and transitional justice. Such projects include the United Nations’ children and armed conflict agenda, which monitors and reports on serious violations, efforts by the International Criminal Court

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30. See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile Chamber in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 29 PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 167 (2001); Cécile Aptel, Unpunished Crimes: The Special Court for Sierra Leone and Children, in SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND ITS LEGACY 340 (Charles Cherney Jalloh ed., 2014).


32. For further discussion of this synthesis, see, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, The Policy on Children of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor: Toward Greater Accountability for Crimes Against and Affecting Children, 101 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 537 (2019) [hereinafter Amann, Policy on Children].

Office of the Prosecutor including its Policy on Children,34 and other initiatives.35 Today, their analyses frame the work of these international organizations and others; the mechanism established to investigate Syria war crimes,
for instance, is mandated both to consider children and to appoint personnel “with expertise in . . . children’s rights and crimes against children.”

Notwithstanding that such work often focuses on post hoc accountability, these syntheses of international child law additionally offer a basis for ex ante prevention of the harms they catalogue. They also may inform peace processes given that, as Professor Christine Bell observed in her 2003 study of peace negotiations, “the international legal positions taken during the conflict shape the central deal.” Such shaping can be “positive,” as in “minimum standards set out with which any solution must comply,” or “negative,” as in “a failure to set and/or enforce such minimum standards,” Bell wrote.

Even when conflict is ongoing and settlement seems still far off, she continued, “willingness and ability to enforce a human rights framework is therefore crucial.” Her conclusion signals that recent projects’ syntheses of international child law indeed may provide a structure for drafting terms on children in an eventual peace settlement. Some of these syntheses thus are outlined below: first, by a recitation of sources on which the projects relied; second, by a précis of what is meant by “child” and “child rights”; and third, by an identification of certain armed-conflict injuries to children as grave, even criminal, violations of international law.

pdf; and another by the Inquiry into Protecting Children in Armed Conflict chaired by Gordon Brown, UN Envoy and former UK Prime Minister: SHAHEED FATIMA, PROTECTING CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT (2018). Analysis of a State’s international legal obligations contributed to another project on which this author worked—one centered on accountability rather than children, and designed to assist persons who might have a role in then-hoped-for negotiations for settlement of the conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan. See Toward Peace with Justice in Darfur: A Framework for Accountability, 18 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DAVIS JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 1, 22–31, 112–13 (2011) (reprinting project jointly produced by the California International Law Center at the University of California-Davis and the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Human Rights, with Kathleen A. Doty as principal author).


37. BELL, supra note 5, at 313 (summarizing findings from her studies of conflict resolution efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland, and South Africa).

38. Id.

39. Id. Although Bell’s precise reference was to the “willingness and ability” of “[t]he international community,” her point likewise would extend to parties to the conflict.
A. International Legal Sources

The projects under review reflect distillations of norms found in a myriad of international legal sources. As would be expected in international child law analyses, a touchstone is the treaty regime comprising the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, its three Optional Protocols, and the work of its Committee on the Rights of the Child.40 Along with UN Security Council resolutions, international jurisprudence, and customary international law, other sources relevant to children and armed conflict41 include:


41. For citations to these sources, see, e.g., ICC OTP POLICY, supra note 34, ¶ 3 nn.8–9, ¶ 11 n.19 passim; SIX GRAVE VIOLATIONS, supra note 33, at 27–29. See Government of Canada, The Vancouver Principles, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/human_rights-droits_homme/principles-vancouver-principes.aspx?lang=eng (modified Nov. 17, 2021) (labeling several of these sources “the existing international child protection framework”).
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions; and relevant protocols.


This article will revisit some of these sources in its descriptions of synthesizing projects and in its discussion of international law (re)commitments that could be included in peace settlements related to Ukraine-Russia and other conflicts.

42. To be precise, an early UN document, in stating that “use of schools for military purposes puts children at risk of attack and hampers children’s right to education,” expressed support for the “Lucens Guidelines.” SIX GRAVE VIOLATIONS, supra note 33, at 20. These guidelines were a precursor to the 2015 Safe Schools Declaration, supra note 35. That 2015 declaration has been endorsed by 114 States, including Ukraine but not Russia. See Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Safe Schools Declaration, GOVERNMENT.NO (last updated Aug. 3, 2022), https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/development-cooperation/safeschools_declaration/id2460245/. For background, see Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack, The Safe Schools Declaration, https://ssd.protectingeducation.org (last visited Sept. 14, 2022). On its significance to the instant discussion, see SRSR Statement, supra note 18 (making reference to attacks in Ukraine and “encouraging all States to endorse and implement the Safe Schools Declaration,” in statement by UN Special Representative to Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict); see also infra text accompanying note 96.


44. See infra Appendix. In consideration of debate regarding nuclear-arms discussions, see supra note 12 and accompanying text, the Appendix tables illustrating that discussion add,
B. The Child and Child Rights

Syntheses of international law on children and armed conflict typically embrace the four general principles that undergird all the rights listed in the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child:\(^45\)

- non-discrimination;
- the best interests of the child;
- the right to life, survival, and development; and
- the right to express one’s views and have them considered.\(^46\)

Embrace of these four principles has implications, not least with respect to the question of age.


Like the 1989 Convention, international child law syntheses generally define “child” as any person who has not yet turned eighteen.\(^{47}\) The 1989 Convention sets a lower age threshold of fifteen for its child-soldiering prohibitions;\(^{48}\) however, its 2000 Optional Protocol on children in armed conflict, to which 172 parties including Russia and Ukraine belong, raises to eighteen the age for use in hostilities and for compulsory recruitment.\(^ {49}\) The United Nations’ children and armed conflict agenda favors those higher age limits.\(^ {50}\) The 2016 Policy of the International Criminal Court (ICC) Office of the Prosecutor, meanwhile, regards the under-fifteen threshold in the 1998 Rome Statute as a jurisdictional element applicable solely to child-soldiering crimes.\(^ {51}\) In all other instances under the Rome Statute, including

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\(^{47}\) Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 4, art. 1 (stating that “a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless,” in a reference understood to refer to national legislation, “under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”), cited with approval in ICC OTP POLICY, supra note 34, ¶ 16, and SIX GRAVE VIOLATIONS, supra note 33, at 9.

\(^{48}\) Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 4, art. 38(2) –(3). Treaties with analogous provisions include Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 77(2), June 8, 1977 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (174 parties, including Ukraine, though Russia withdrew its ratification in 2019) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I], and Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), (e)(vii).


\(^{50}\) SIX GRAVE VIOLATIONS, supra note 33, at 11.

\(^{51}\) ICC OTP POLICY, supra note 34, ¶ 40 & n.51.
enumerations of crimes and pledges to take children’s experiences into account, any person under eighteen is considered a child.

But age alone neither defines children nor predetermines how every child is to be treated. Also pertinent are the facts that children live within larger societies and that children’s capacities and vulnerabilities change according to time and context.

Even as it sets forth rights of the child, the 1989 Convention makes clear that such rights must be considered in relation to the rights of others. Exemplary is the emphasis in its education provision not only on the child’s personal development, but also on “development of respect” for family, cultural identity, national values, international human rights, and the natural environment—all with an aim to “preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and persons of indigenous origin.” The interplay of personal and societal concerns is especially salient in adolescence, as discussed in a General Comment that the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child published in 2016.

In a similar vein, the Policy on Children, which the ICC Office of the Prosecutor issued that same year, acknowledges “children as persons with individual rights, as members of families and as constituents of multi-generational communities.” These distinctions affect practice: because “children

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52. See, e.g., Int’l Crim. Ct., Elements of Crimes 3 (2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf (stating that for purposes of “forcibly transferring children,” which may constitute an act of genocide punishable by the ICC pursuant to Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 6(e), “children” are persons “under the age of 18 years”).

53. See Rome Statute, supra note 34, arts. 36(8)(b), 42(9), 54(1)(b), 68(1).

54. See ICC OTP POLICY, supra note 34, ¶ 16.


56. Id. art. 29. See also id. art. 30 (stating, with respect to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities and to indigenous groups, “a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her culture, to profess and practice his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language”) (emphasis added).


58. ICC OTP POLICY, supra note 34, ¶ 3 (referring to Rome Statute, supra note 34).
may be impacted differently by crimes based on their sex, gender, or other
status or identities,”59 the policy encourages inquiry into both
the significance of attributes like age and birth, and the degree to which
they may give rise to multiple forms of discrimination and social inequali-
ties, either alone or as they intersect with other factors, like race, ability or
disability; religion or belief; political or other opinion; national, ethnic or
social origin; gender, sex, sexual orientation; or other status or identity.60

Also meriting careful consideration is the question of a child’s capabili-
ties. Protection is of course a facet of frameworks regarding children; to cite
by way of example the International Committee of the Red Cross, in inter-
national humanitarian law “[c]hildren affected by armed conflict are entitled
to special respect and protection.”61 That said, the 1989 Convention’s listing
of child rights does not presume that all children always are “vulnerable”—
 indeed it does not use that word—but instead requires attention be paid to
“the evolving capacities of the child.”62 Following suit is the 2016 Policy on
Children, in which the ICC Office of the Prosecutor states:

59. ICC OTP Policy, supra note 34, ¶ 18.
60. Id. ¶ 37. See also id. ¶¶ 28, 30 (delineating as part of policy’s “child-sensitive ap-
proach” a “best interests inquiry” that considers both “the individual profile of the child”
and “the child’s social and cultural context”); id. ¶ 100 (indicating expert testimony to be
adduced might include “the prevalence of crimes against or affecting children” and “the
multi-generational and multi-layered impact of such crimes on children”). Notably, many of
the attributes in the passage of the ICC OTP Policy quoted in the text likewise appear in
specific provisions of the principal child rights treaty; not least, its non-discrimination pro-
vision, which speaks of “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status.” Convention
on the Rights of the Child, supra note 4, art. 2(1).
61. Rule 135, in 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 479 (Jean-Marie
Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005). Cited inter alia in support of this rule were
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 23–24,
38, 50, 76, 89, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (196 parties, including Russia
and Ukraine), and Additional Protocol I, supra note 48, arts. 70, 77. See, e.g., supra text ac-
companying note 31 (quoting statement in preamble of 1999 Lomé Agreement, supra note
31, that children, “in view of their vulnerability, are entitled to special care,” as well as “pro-
tection”).
62. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 4, art. 5 (mandating that States
parties “provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, appro-
appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present
Convention”); id. art. 14(2) (requiring States parties to respect rights and duties of parents
or guardians “to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner
consistent with the evolving capacities of the child”).

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Children, by the very fact of their youth, are frequently more vulnerable than other persons; at certain ages and in certain circumstances, they are dependent on others. Notwithstanding any vulnerability and dependence, children possess and are continuously developing their own capacities—capacities to act, to choose and to participate in activities and decisions that affect them.63

That last reference, to participation, points to an aspect of child rights sometimes lost in victim-centered discourses. Even when caught in the mire of armed conflict, not every child warrants, exclusively and at all times, the label of “faultless passive victim,” to quote Professor Mark Drumbl.64 Rather, children, like adults, are complex, rights-bearing human beings who possess measures of autonomy even as they live, interact, and coexist, or not, with others in society. The 1989 Convention thus includes as one of its four general principles “the right to express one’s views and have them considered.”65 Initiatives in furtherance include international organizations’ consultations with children,66 as well as some jurisdictions’ lowering of the voting

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63. ICC OTP POLICY, supra note 34, ¶ 25 (adding, in sentence just after those quoted in the text: “The Office will remain mindful, in all aspects of its work, of the evolving capacities of the child”). See also id. ¶ 22 (stating that the “child-sensitive approach” taken in the policy “appreciates the child as an individual person and recognises that, in a given context, a child may be vulnerable, capable, or both”); id. ¶ 27 (“children are not a homogenous group” and “will not always have the same interests or concerns,” and that “[t]he vulnerability, capacity and resilience of each child will be different”). See also SRSG STUDY, supra note 45, at 91 (anticipating efforts to “support national and regional entities engaged in the protection of conflict-affected children in developing or enhancing their capacities, including in the framework of mediation and prevention efforts”).

64. MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 9 (2012).

65. Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 5, supra note 46, ¶ 12. Central to this right is the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 4, art. 12(1), which provides: “States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.” For additional relevant provisions, see id. arts. 9(2), 23(1), 31.

A recent General Comment by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child indicates that inclusion in decision-making is particularly urgent in the case of adolescents, and the Committee’s newest General Comment, on digital technologies, looks to “realize children’s participation at the local, national and international levels,” to enable “children to express their views,” and “to participate on an equal basis with adults... so that they can be effective advocates for their rights, individually and as a group.”

These developments counsel that any peace process include a participatory role for children in addition to paying attention to what harms children endured during the conflict. Before addressing that role further, this article now turns to international law’s evaluation of children’s wartime experiences.

C. Conflict Harms to Children As Grave, Even Criminal, Violations of International Law

A milestone in international child law occurred just weeks after the July 1999 Lomé Agreement respecting Sierra Leone, when the UN Security Council said, in its Resolution 1261, that it

*Strongly condemns* the targeting of children in situations of armed conflict, including killing and maiming, sexual violence, abduction and forced displacement, recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in violation of international law, and attacks on objects protected under international law, including places that usually have a significant presence of children


68. Child Rights Committee General Comment No. 20, supra note 57, ¶ 17 (citing “opportunities for participation and decision-making” among “[f]actors known to promote the resilience and healthy development of adolescents”).


70. *See infra* notes 84–94 and accompanying text.
such as schools and hospitals, and calls on all parties concerned to put an
end to such practices.71

The Resolution spurred further advocacy, research, and implementation,
including in the context of what is called the UN conflict and armed conflict
agenda. The UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-Gen-
eral for Children and Armed Conflict coordinated efforts, which also in-
volved the Council’s own Working Group on Children and Armed Con-
flict,72 the Secretary-General, UNICEF, and other UN entities, as well as
nongovernmental organizations and affected communities. By means of a
monitoring and reporting mechanism and with an eye to enhancing both
compliance and accountability, they gather and make public data respecting
the commission of the practices that Resolution 1261 condemned.73 Known
today as the “Six Grave Violations” against children during armed conflict,
and mirrored in this article’s foregoing description of children’s experiences
in Ukraine, the UN-monitored practices are:

• killing or maiming of children;
• rape and other forms of sexual violence against children;
• abduction of children;
• attacks against schools or hospitals;
• recruiting or use of children in armed forces or armed groups; and
• denial of humanitarian access.74

ment, supra note 31, see supra text accompanying notes 30–32, 61 and infra text accompanying
notes 81–82, 86, 97–98.

un.org/securitycouncil/subsidiary/wgcaac (last visited Sept. 14, 2022) (explaining that this
working group, established pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1612 (July 26,
2005), “comprises all 15 members of the Security Council and makes its decisions by consen-
sus,” and is chaired through 2022 by Ambassador Mona Juul, Norway’s Permanent Rep-
resentative to United Nations).

73. See generally MRM Guidelines, supra note 33.

74. See id. at 7; SIX GRAVE VIOLATIONS, supra note 33, at 9. Although the paragraph
quoted supra in the text accompanying note 71 omits mention of the denial of humanitarian
access, the 1999 resolution did call for “the full, safe and unhindered access of humanitarian
personnel and the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all children affected by armed con-
flict.” S.C. Res. 1261, supra note 71, ¶ 11. Denial of humanitarian access is expressly set forth
as the sixth violation no later than S.C. Res. 1882, ¶ 1 (Aug. 4, 2009).
The UN’s Six Grave Violations overlap considerably with what are identified as “crimes directed specifically against children or those that disproportionately affect them” in the 2016 Policy on Children of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor.75 “Almost all crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court affect children,” the policy observes before it names “some” of those crimes.76 Codified in Articles 5–8 of the 1998 Rome Statute, they are:

- torture and related crimes such as inhumane acts, inhuman or cruel treatment, and willfully causing great bodily suffering, as war crimes and crimes against humanity;
- sexual and gender-based crimes against children of all genders,77 including rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, and enforced sterilization, as war crimes and crimes against humanity;
- forcible transfer of children and prevention of birth, as acts of genocide;
- attacks on buildings dedicated to education and health care, as war crimes;
- conscription, enlistment, and use of children under fifteen years to participate actively in hostilities, as war crimes;
- trafficking of children as a form of enslavement constituting a crime against humanity; and

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75. ICC OTP POLICY, supra note 34, ¶ 38 n.48; see Amann, Policy on Children, supra note 32, at 544–45 (discussing overlap).

76. ICC OTP POLICY, supra note 34, ¶ 38; see id. ¶ 17 (“recognis[ing] that most crimes under the Statute affect children in various ways, and that at times they are specifically targeted”).

77. The 2016 Policy acknowledges that girls and boys both may be subjected to sexual or gender-based crimes. Id. ¶ 19 n.28 (“Gender-based crimes are committed against boys or girls because of their sex and/or socially constructed gender roles, and are not always manifested as a form of sexual violence”). Although it does not expressly refer to children who identify as LGBTI, the inclusion of these children is implicit in the policy’s overall content. See id. ¶ 37 (stating Office will pay heed to child’s “gender, sex, sexual orientation; or other status or identity”); see also id. ¶ 30(i) (referring to child’s “sex, and gender”); id. ¶ 43 (noting that “[c]hildren in armed forces and groups may perform an array of tasks, including those of combatant, sexual slave, cook, porter, spy or scout,” and adding: “The experiences endured may differ on account of a child’s sex or gender”). See also 2016 Acuerdo Final, supra note 31, at 2 passim (including “the LGBTI population” in guarantees set forth in Colombian peace agreement).
persecution, on grounds including status as a child, ethnicity, religion, and gender, as a crime against humanity.\textsuperscript{78}

In light both of jurisprudential developments after publication of the 2016 Policy and of the particular nature of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, other Rome Statute crimes against and affecting children that merit addition to this list are:

- deportation or forcible transfer of population, and enforced disappearance, as crimes against humanity;\textsuperscript{79} and the
- crime of aggression.\textsuperscript{80}

\textsuperscript{78} ICC OTP POLICY, supra note 34, ¶¶ 39–52 (including citations to relevant provisions of the Rome Statute, supra note 34). On the child-soldiering age threshold, see supra text accompanying notes 48–54.

\textsuperscript{79} Rome Statute, supra note 34, arts. 7(1)(d), 7(2)(d) (enumerating and defining crime against humanity of deportation or forcible transfer); id. arts. 7(1)(i), 7(2)(i) (enumerating and defining crime against humanity of enforced disappearance and explaining that it may include “abduction”). On deportation, see Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute,” ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37 (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/court-record/icc-roc463-01/18-37 (ruling that ICC has jurisdiction over crime against humanity of deportation if requisite crossing of national border took place on territory of at least one ICC State party); on forced displacement within a country’s borders, see Walter Kälin, The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement As International Minimum Standard and Protection Tool, 24 REFUGEE SURVEY QUARTERLY 27 (2005) (discussing UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement). On the Ukraine war and legal prohibitions of enforced disappearances, see this series by Ruby Axelson and Anna Mykytenko: The Disappeared: Ensuring Future Investigations Recognise Enforced Disappearances in Ukraine (Part I), INTLAWGRRLS (May 13, 2022), https://ilg2.org/2022/05/13/the-disappeared-ensuring-future-investigations-recognise-enforced-disappearances-in-ukraine-part-i/, and The Disappeared: Ensuring Future Investigations Recognise Enforced Disappearances in Ukraine (Part II), INTLAWGRRLS (May 15, 2022), https://ilg2.org/2022/05/15/the-disappeared-ensuring-future-investigations-recognise-enforced-disappearances-in-ukraine-part-ii/.

\textsuperscript{80} Rome Statute, supra note 34, art. 8 bis. Russia’s Feb. 24, 2022, invasion of Ukraine prompted immediate and widespread allegations of aggression, a crime established in the wake of the post-World War II international criminal proceedings at Nuremberg and Tokyo. Article 5 of the 1998 Rome Statute gave the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Article 8 bis, which codified in amendments that took effect in 2010, activated the Court’s authority to punish the crime, but only as to the forty-three parties that have ratified those amendments; neither Ukraine nor Russia is among them. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Amendments on the Crime of Aggression to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10-b&chapter=18
Taken together, these two syntheses of international law constitute a catalogue of unlawful injuries that—recalling the 1989 Convention’s general principles—likely entail discrimination, never are in a child’s best interests, and acutely affect the child’s right to life, survival, and development. The catalogue should prompt investigators to seek out evidence that will permit prosecution and punishment of those who perpetrate conflict-related offenses. It also offers a basis for transitional justice efforts short of criminal prosecution—and for examination, as discussed below, of all such efforts during peace settlement processes.

IV. INTERNATIONAL CHILD LAW SYNTHESES AND OPTIONS FOR THE UKRAINE-RUSSIA PEACE SETTLEMENT PROCESSES

The preceding discussion establishes that in settling conflicts like that involving Ukraine and Russia it is “imperative” —to borrow a term from the 1999 Lomé Agreement—to give distinct consideration to children’s experiences, needs, rights, and capabilities. Informing this consideration will be two peace agreements, along with the syntheses of child rights and conflict harms found in the UN children and armed conflict agenda and the ICC Office of the Prosecutor Policy on Children. Because they reflect customary international law as well as UN Security Council resolutions, these syntheses apply even if neither State is cooperating with the ICC. In the instant case neither Russia nor Ukraine belongs to the Rome Statute, but Ukraine accepts...
the ICC’s jurisdiction over acts since 2013 and is working with its investiga-
tors.83 Focusing therefore on Ukraine-Russia, this article first applies pertinent child rights precepts and then evaluates what it calls “independent” and “composite” options for including children within the terms of a peace agreement.

A. Precepts: Process and Preamble Options

Peace process precepts addressing children should be grounded in the global treaty regime established by the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and its three Optional Protocols. That is surely true in this conflict, since Ukraine and Russia are States parties to the 1989 Convention and its two substantive Optional Protocols, on the involvement of children in armed conflict and on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography.84 Settlement processes thus should take that regime into account. Any eventual agreement should confirm, as early as its preamble, adherence to that regime.

Such a precept was included in the 2016 accord that brought the decades-long civil war in Colombia to an end. The accord’s preamble included “the right of boys, girls, and adolescents” in a list of the many types of human rights to be honored.85 A fuller statement seems in order, however, to assure due regard for the significance and scope of children’s rights. To that end, this proposal builds on the already-quoted paragraph in the 1999 Lomé Agreement:


84. See supra note 4 (stating further that only Ukraine is party to the third protocol, which establishes a procedure by which individuals may file complaints with the Committee on the Rights of the Child).

85. 2016 Acuerdo Final, supra note 31, at 2. An English translation of this accord may be found in the University of Edinburgh Peace Agreements Database. See Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace (Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocument/1845 [hereinafter 2016 Colombia Final Agreement Translation]. However, this article takes issue with certain translated passages, see infra note 111; accordingly, unless otherwise stated, all translations are by this author.
Recognizing that this armed conflict has affected children of all ages, genders, capacities, and vulnerabilities, in particular and often disproportionate ways, it is imperative that the parties, as well as this agreement and its implementation, respect and ensure the rights of children, articulated in treaties to which the parties belong, especially the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocols, and understood to comprehend, as guiding principles, the right of non-discrimination, the right of best interests of the child, the right of life, survival and development, and the right to express one’s views and have them considered.86

This pledge, in particular its reference to the four general principles, suggests directions both for peace processes and for the preamble of an eventual agreement.

1. Processes

The fourth general principle just listed, the right to express one’s views and have them considered, bears relevance to negotiations leading to a peace agreement and not just to programs in implementation of that agreement. By no means is every child too young, too vulnerable, either to express views on armed conflict or to take part in processes designed to bring it to an end. Based on her study of Ukrainian children’s wartime social media, Professor Aparna Mishra Tarc wrote:

[Children understand what is happening to them and in their world. They are not unwitting, oblivious or resilient in social and political events. Children are deeply affected, able to comprehend and reel from witnessed atrocities. Far from being helpless victims, children show themselves to be remarkably like adults or, more precisely, like adults ought to be in times of war. They console, uplift, despair, find beauty in devastation and join in armed combat.87

86. Compare Lomé Agreement, supra note 31, preamble, with quoted supra text accompanying note 31. On the guiding influence of the 1989 Convention’s four general principles, see supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
Throughout the development and implementation of a peace agreement, therefore, children who possess what one project described as the “capacities to act, to choose and to participate in activities and decisions that affect them” must be given an opportunity to do so.88 Adolescents especially must have this opportunity.89

Peace processes increasingly involve once-excluded stakeholders. A potential model for children’s participation is the Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Remedy and Reparation, which arose out of a 2007 meeting that included “survivors of sexual violence in situations of conflict” on all continents, including Europe.90 “Processes,” this declaration said, “must empower women and girls, or those acting in the best interests of girls, to determine for themselves what forms of reparation are best suited to their situation,” and “must also overcome those aspects of customary and religious laws and practices that prevent women and girls from being in a position to make, and act on, decisions about their own lives.”91 The Nairobi Declaration included additional paragraphs on participation:

In order to achieve reparation measures sensitive to gender, age, cultural diversity and human rights, decision-making about reparation must include victims as full participants, while ensuring just representation of women and girls in all their diversity. Governments and other actors must ensure that women and girls are adequately informed of their rights.92

... Full participation of women and girls victims should be guaranteed in every stage of the reparation process, i.e. design, implementation, evaluation, and decision-making.93

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88. ICC OTP POLICY, supra note 34, ¶ 25; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text (quoting Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 4).
89. See supra notes 57, 68 and accompanying text (discussing Child Rights Committee General Comment No. 20, supra note 57).
91. 2007 Nairobi Declaration, supra note 90, ¶ 1(D).
92. Id. ¶ 2(A).
93. Id. ¶ 2(B).
Reconciliation is an important goal of peace and reparation processes, which can only be achieved with women and girls victims’ full participation, while respecting their right to dignity, privacy, safety and security.94

Use of these paragraphs mutatis mutandis—applying them to peace processes as a whole and replacing “women and girls” with a phrase like “children of all ages and genders, to the extent of their capacities”—could delineate children’s participation in Ukraine-Russia and other peace processes.

2. Preamble

The 1999 Lomé Agreement’s reference to the three other general principles—of non-discrimination, best interests, and life, survival, and development—merits further development in the peace agreement’s preamble. One paragraph might recite legal prohibitions against conflict harms affecting children. For instance:

Recognizing that the particular, and often disproportionate, harms that children endure in armed conflict may constitute grave, even criminal, violations of international law, including but not limited to those harms enumerated in the “Six Grave Violations” of the UN children and armed conflict agenda and in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and pledging to refrain from commission of those harms.

Subsequent paragraphs then might contain commitments—or recommitments—to treaties that implicate child rights or that protect against harms against and affecting children in armed conflict. Such (re)commitments aim to advance the goals of international legal regimes. Grant Dawson, formerly the principal legal officer of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, thus wrote in considering Ukraine-Russia settlement options regarding disarmament: “Where such obligations exist, they may be recalled or reinforced in any peace agreement. Where obligations do not exist, new obligations can be contemplated and memorialised in the peace agreement.”95 Soft law instruments also may warrant support, as evinced by a mid-

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94. Id. ¶ 3(D).
95. Grant Dawson, Options for a Peace Settlement for Ukraine: Option Paper III—Weapons of Mass Destruction, OPINIO JURIS (May 6, 2022), http://opiniojuris.org/2022/05/06/options-for-a-peace-settlement-for-ukraine-option-paper-iii-weapons-of-mass-destruction. Dawson added, with respect to conduct not yet proscribed by any treaty, such as the development
May 2022 speech on the Ukraine-Russia war in which Britain’s UN ambassador “urge[d] all countries to endorse and implement the 2016 Safe Schools Declaration, designed to protect education in armed conflict.”

An inventory of relevant instruments would make for dense reading. This article locates its full list in its appendix, and proposes a preambular paragraph doing the same, along the lines of the following:

Realizing that compliance with relevant international instruments promotes the fulfillment of children’s rights, the parties:

Reaffirm the international legal obligations they assumed upon adhering to relevant international treaties, including the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocols as well as other human rights, anti-discrimination, anti-torture, protection of civilians, and arms control treaties detailed in the Appendix;

Will consider joining relevant treaties to which one or more of them do not belong, including the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, as well as other human rights, anti-discrimination, anti-trafficking, protection of civilians, and arms control treaties detailed in the Appendix; and

Reaffirm the endorsement, or in some cases endorse for the first time, relevant soft law instruments, including but not limited to the 2005 UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 2007 Paris Principles on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, 2015 Safe Schools Declaration, and 2017 Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers.

or use of radiological weapons, that if the parties “wish to include” prohibition of this conduct “as part of a comprehensive agreement to end hostilities, this could be achieved through a voluntary commitment.” For additional papers in the Ukraine-Russia project, see University of Cambridge Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, Settlement Options, https://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/researchcollaborative-projects-housed-leilukraine-peace-settlement-project/settlement-options (last visited Sept. 14, 2022) [hereinafter Lauterpacht Centre, Settlement Options].

96. Woodward, supra note 7; on the Safe Schools Declaration initially adopted in 2015, see supra notes 35 and 43 and accompanying text.
B. Options for Including Children in the Substance of the Agreement

Within a given peace agreement, due consideration of children may take multiple forms. These include two opposite paths: the “independent” option and the “composite” option.

1. Independent Option: Stand-Alone Provisions Related to Children

By what this article terms an “independent” option, a chapter of the agreement might be labelled “Children,” with the articles in it amounting to an itemization of pertinent children’s issues; alternatively, in an agreement organized by thematic chapters, on “Demobilization,” “Education,” “Resettlement,” and the like, each such chapter might include a separate, child-specific article.

An initial template may be found in the 1999 Lomé Agreement’s two child-specific provisions. The first is titled “Child Combatants” and reads:

The Government shall accord particular attention to the issue of child soldiers. It shall, accordingly, mobilize resources, both within the country and from the International Community, and especially through the Office of the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF and other agencies, to address the special needs of these children in the existing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes.97

The second provision is titled “Education and Health” and provides:

The Government shall provide free compulsory education for the first nine years of schooling (Basic Education) and shall endeavour to provide free schooling for a further three years. The Government shall also endeavour to provide affordable primary health care throughout the country.98

This format could be adapted to the spectrum of conflict-resolution issues in which children figure. To cite a very few of these:

- An end to the war and “the withdrawal of Russian troops,” actions that Britain’s UN ambassador has identified as the “solution” for ending “the

97. 1999 Lomé Agreement, supra note 31, art. 30.
98. Id, art. 31.
suffering of children in Ukraine,” 99 as well as guarantees of Ukraine’s independence, stability, and security.

- Maintenance of a humanitarian-aid corridor and provision of all needed aid.100

- Return of children to their families, homes, and communities, regardless of whether those children have become refugees, are internally displaced, or have been subjected to forced deportation, as well as provision of all services needed to redress harms resulting from their departures.

- Reintegration, in the broadest sense of that term, of children uprooted through conflict harms including not only recruitment into armed service or use in hostilities, but also child trafficking and the like.

- Accountability for crimes against and affecting children, achieved through evidence-gathering and investigation, as well as the establishment and operation of mechanisms able to secure measures of accountability.101 These might include existing or proposed criminal tribunals,102 truth and reconciliation commissions, and claims commissions, to name a few. In the case of children, each mechanism would be required to engage personnel with expertise in issues related to children and armed

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100. See id. (calling for improvement of the “humanitarian effort in Ukraine, delivering vital supplies and life-saving medical aid to those most in need, including children”).

101. See id. (seeking to “ensure that all credible allegations of crimes on the territory of Ukraine are investigated, including grave violations against children, whoever is accused of committing them,” and, with reference to the mechanism described in MRM Guidelines, supra note 33, “to improve our collective understanding of the situation on the ground, through evidence and data collection, and the work of the monitoring and reporting mechanism”).

102. Among proposals under discussion is one for an ad hoc tribunal, sometimes labelled a “Special Tribunal for the Punishment of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.” UK Parliament, supra note 44 (describing content of mid-2022 joint statement on Ukraine by nine European parliamentary delegations); see supra note 80 (discussing jurisdictional issues related to prosecuting the crime of aggression).
conflict—an expertise present in institutions like the ICC and the investigating mechanism for Syria, but not stated in public documents related to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine launched in March 2022.

2. Composite Option: Explicit Mentions of Children Together with Other Persons

An advantage of the just-described “independent” option is its repetitive specificity. Placement in the peace agreement of stand-alone articles on children would single out children’s experiences, capacities, and needs. But disadvantages are obvious. The list above is woefully incomplete, yet a complete list would add considerable length to an already-long agreement. Insertion of child-centered articles that reiterate concerns set out elsewhere as to other persons also would be duplicative. Full separation of children from others further would risk cutting children off from others—their families, their cultures—and undercutting children’s rights to live as members of communities. And that could put at risk the community’s sense of responsibility towards its children.

103. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. See also 2007 Nairobi Declaration, supra note 90, ¶ 2(D) (insisting that “[m]ale and female staff who are sensitive to specific issues related to gender, age, cultural diversity and human rights, and who are committed to international and regional human rights standards must be involved at every stage of the reparation process”).

104. This commission’s mandate contains one brief, preambular reference to children, and another to girls, but it does not mention child rights as a requisite expertise. U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 49/1 (Mar. 4, 2022) (“Situation of Human Rights in Ukraine Stemming from the Russian Aggression”). See Aubert, supra note 34 (urging “that dedicated expertise and analysis regarding crimes committed against children is included in the work of the Commission, despite the absence of a child rights expert included in the list of positions currently advertised”). Nevertheless, Commission members have said that their investigation will encompass wartime harms to children. See U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Opening Statement: Press Conference by the Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine the Conclusion of its First Visit to Ukraine, Kyiv, Ukraine (June 15, 2022), https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/06/opening-statement-press-conference-commission-on-inquiry-ukraine-conclusion-its.

105. The Colombian agreement, for instance, exceeds three hundred pages though it contains no separate chapter on children. See 2016 Acuerdo Final, supra note 31. Examples of issues that implicate children as well as other persons may be found in the many provisions of that agreement and also, for example, in the list of papers at Lauterpacht Centre, Settlement Options, supra note 95.

106. See supra text accompanying notes 58–60.
What may be called a “composite” option could lessen such disadvantages. According to this option, the peace agreement would have no provision devoted solely to children—or at least few such provisions—and yet would address children’s issues by naming children explicitly in every provision in which they have a stake. In view of this article’s comprehensive account of conflict-related rights and experiences, express references to children still would appear frequently. Yet such insertions scarcely would lengthen the agreement. Multiple express references would serve as reminders, moreover: first, that children are simultaneously “persons with individual rights,”107 “members of families,”108 and “constituents of multi-generational communities,”109 to quote one of the syntheses outlined above; and second, that children’s experiences are not determined by age alone but in intersection with “race, ability or disability; religion or belief; political or other opinion; national, ethnic or social origin; gender, sex, sexual orientation; or other status or identity.”110

Precedent for this option may be found in Colombia’s 2016 Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera, or Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace, which makes no fewer than thirty-six explicit references to children and child rights.111 Often it speaks of “niños, niñas y adolescentes,” or “boys, girls, and adolescents.” The formulation is welcome, for it invites acknowledgment that the experiences, capabilities, and needs of a child—that is, of a person under eighteen—will differ according to the child’s age, gender, sex, and sexuality.112 Nor is that formulation happenstance; various provisions

107. ICC OTP Policy, supra note 34, ¶ 3.
108. Id.
109. Id.
111. For these references, some of them further examined in this paragraph, see 2016 Acuerdo Final, supra note 31, at 2–3, 6, 10–12, ¶¶ 1.2.1, 1.3, 1.3.2.1, 1.3.2.2, 1.3.4, 2.2.4, 3.2.2.5, 3.4.1, 3.4.3(g), 3.4.4, 4.1.3.6(a), 4.1.3.6(f), 4.2, 4.2.1.4, 4.2.1.4, 5.1, 5.1.1.1, 5.1.1.2, 5.1.2(l)(7)–(8), 5.1.4, 5.2, 6.1.3. For English renderings, see 2016 Colombia Final Agreement Translation, supra note 85.
112. It is thus unfortunate that the 2016 Colombia Final Agreement Translation, supra note 85, frequently combines “niños, niñas” into a single word, “children.”
mention “boys, girls, and adolescents” not only as a distinct group, but also in relation to “women,” to “women and men,” to “elder persons,” to “youths,” and to the “LGBTI population.” Indeed, the agreement repeatedly situates boys, girls, and adolescents within an array of communities—some described as “vulnerable” or subjected to “discrimination” or “exclusion”—defined by attributes such as color, race, ethnicity, indigeneity, African ancestry, pregnancy or lactation, disability, rural or displaced status, religion, and political or social opinion or affiliation.

The express references furthermore identify children as stakeholders in many aspects of the peace agreement. These aspects reflect the precise circumstances of the Colombian conflict. For example, the agreement mentions children in its enumerations of those who were most affected by the conflict in ways violative of rights, and who thus were in special need of “public services like education” and physical and psychological “health, recreation, infrastructure, technical assistance, food and nutrition.” Children are also mentioned in its guarantees of personal security from criminal organizations and of investigatory focus on crimes against children. It also mentions children in its preventive measures regarding poverty, illicit drugs, and other areas. The agreement provides as well that children would be a central concern in the contemplated work of documenting disproportionate harms and making recommendations for redress, to “truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition.” With respect to all facets of implementation, in fact, the agreement promises that “the best interest of boys, girls, and adolescents, as well as their rights, and its prevalence over the rights of others, will be guaranteed.”

113. The treatment described also deserves credit for avoiding “women and children” conflation. See Amann, *Post-Postcolonial*, supra note 2, at 48.

114. 2016 *Acuerdo Final*, supra note 31, at 11 (listing these services with particular reference to rural areas). For references to psychological as well as physical health care for children, see id. ¶¶ 1.3.2.1, 3.2.2.5, 3.2.2.2.7, 4.2.1.4.

115. See id. at 8 (citing these in relation to an “Integral System” of redress).

116. Id. ¶ 6.1.3 (“En la implementación de todo lo acordado se garantizará el interés superior de los niños, niñas y adolescentes así como sus derechos y su prevalencia sobre los derechos de los demás”). The second clause of the sentence bears echo with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 4, art. 3(1), which requires: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
V. CONCLUSION

No less than other conflicts, the Ukraine-Russia war has had grave, disproportionate, and enduring effects on children. The experiences, needs, capacities, and rights of children—of persons of all ages, genders, and identities who have not yet reached their eighteenth birthday—thus must form part of any peace processes and ensuing peace agreement. In order to establish contemporary legal understandings of children and armed conflict, this article first detailed international legal syntheses arising out of projects by the United Nations and by the International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor. The projects’ syntheses have influenced the work of certain international organizations but not, to date, the work of peace settlements. Having mapped child rights and conflict harms, the article then examined the treatment of children in Colombia’s 2016 peace agreement and in a 1999 agreement related to Sierra Leone. The article concluded by proposing child-inclusive options for peace processes and ensuing agreements, in Ukraine-Russia and in other conflicts. A given conflict may recommend different mixes of options, depending on the particular circumstances at hand. Only one thing is essential. The mix chosen must meaningfully include the experiences, needs, capacities—and views—of children.
Table 1. Relevant treaties to which both Ukraine and Russia are parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Entered into force</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949 Geneva Conventions on protection of victims of armed conflict</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>(I) Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; (II) Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked of Armed Forces at Sea; (III) Prisoners of War; (IV) Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms</td>
<td>1953</td>
<td>47**</td>
<td>1998**</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>**Having been expelled from the Council of Europe on Mar. 16, 2022, as of Sept. 16, 2022, Russia no longer is subject to jurisdiction of court that adjudicates violations of this regional human rights treaty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Treaty/Protocol</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty Description</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Article</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Protocol(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Framework treaty; both States also belong to all its Protocols: (I) non-detectable fragments; (II) mines, booby traps, and other devices; (III) incendiary weapons; (IV) blinding laser weapons; (V) explosive remnants of war</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Only Ukraine is party to treaty’s 2002 Optional Protocol</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Main child-rights treaty with two 2000 Optional Protocols, to which both Russia and Ukraine belong, and one 2011 Optional Protocol, to which only Ukraine belongs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 Int’l Labour Organization Convention (No. 182) concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Pledges to end egregious forms of child labor including trafficking and recruitment for armed service or use in hostilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treaty Description</td>
<td>Year 1</td>
<td>Year 2</td>
<td>Year 3</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
Table 2. Relevant treaties to which either Ukraine or Russia is party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Entered into force</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>Outlaws use, production, and stockpiling of landmines, reportedly used in Ukraine-Russia conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>Both Russia and Ukraine belong to main 1984 Convention Against Torture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>Authorizes individuals to file complaints alleging violations of 2006 Convention to which both States belong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Relevant treaties that neither State has joined

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Entered into force</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1998 Rome Statute of the Int’l Criminal Court</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>***</td>
<td></td>
<td>*** Though not party to treaty, Ukraine has accepted ICC jurisdiction over crimes since 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Outlaws manufacture and use of cluster bombs, weapon reportedly used in Ukraine-Russia conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Relevant soft law instruments that both States endorsed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Adopted</th>
<th>Endorsing States</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paris Principles on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. Relevant soft law instruments that one State endorsed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Adopted</th>
<th>Endorsing states</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safe Schools Declaration</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td></td>
<td>Condemns conflict harms to education, including military use of schools and physical attacks on school buildings, students, and educators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>Particularly concerned with peacekeeping situations, sets out principles aimed at preventing recruitment and use of children in armed conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Other relevant soft law instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Adopted</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nairobi Declaration on Women’s and Girls’ Right to a Rem-</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>edy and Reparation</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>