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Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander

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traitor; he was a killer. Maas puts the betrayal into proper perspective—Ames was personally responsible for the deaths of at least twelve people, probably more. This is an important point that is often overlooked when discussing espionage. It is why this book is a valuable addition to the many written about Aldrich Ames.

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Bin Sultan, Khaled. *Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander*. New York: HarperCollins, 1995. 492pp. \$35

This is the first book written by a member of the Saudi royal family about the Gulf war. It is largely a descriptive account of the conflict and its coalition forces, containing little real tactical or strategic information on the war.

The author delves into the initial stages of the Iraqi invasion and the desperation of the Saudi government (its forces were unprepared—only eight thousand troops were guarding the northern frontier) as Saddam Hussein's troops threatened the Eastern Provinces of Saudi Arabia.

Khaled offers a well written analysis of the circumstances leading Saddam Hussein to his decision to invade Kuwait, from the Rumaila oil field dispute to threats of unemployment and social unrest arising from the demobilization of Iraq's armed forces after the Iran-Iraq conflict. Only after many failed attempts at diplomacy did King Fahd fully understand that "if Saddam were allowed to get away with the seizure of

Kuwait, the independence of Saudi Arabia, and indeed of the whole Arab Gulf, would be threatened." It was then that the King turned to the United States for help.

The author follows with a glorifying history of the Al-Saud family, which includes his own experiences at Sandhurst Military Academy and his rise to head of Saudi Arabia's Air Defenses. What is noteworthy, however, is his description of the development of the Saudi air defense system, his dealings with Raytheon, and a glimpse into the internal command structure of the Saudi forces.

Khaled also attempts to set the record straight on a variety of issues concerning General H. Norman Schwarzkopf's account of the war. One important issue was that Khaled understood early on that "American troops could not serve under Saudi command; equally, Saudi troops—and other Arab forces, for that matter—could not serve under American command. A novel formula was required. The idea of a parallel command was sufficiently flexible to accommodate these difficulties. I was not seeking to compete with Schwarzkopf or downgrade his importance. But I wanted Schwarzkopf to understand that it was necessary to assure Saudi and Arab opinion that we [Saudi Arabia] were exercising control over these Westerners arriving in the heart of Islam. Without such Saudi control, it would have been seen as an invasion by stealth, an occupation by the backdoor, an overturning of our most cherished values. Hence, the need for people to see that I was up there with the American commander in a parallel

command." How coalition forces obtained intelligence from the mass desertion of Iraqi troops and how the threat of Scud missiles was neutralized are also discussed. (To my amazement, Khaled states that when U.S. forces arrived in Saudi Arabia, no Memorandums of Understanding or Status of Forces agreements were in place.)

The last chapters are devoted to the planning and execution of the battle for the town of Al-Khafji and the push to free Kuwait. They offer valuable insight into the positioning and action of coalition forces, supported with a few maps that highlight the general strategy of Operation Desert Storm.

The author was not satisfied with the peace terms dictated at Safwan, which he believes to have been a failure on the part of the coalition forces. He specifically mentions the failure to protect prisoners and Kuwaiti citizens abducted by Iraqi forces. He concludes with ideas about Gulf security and the importance of strengthening the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Scholars of Southwest Asia will find this book a worthwhile addition to their reading list. It offers an interesting view of the Gulf crisis from the Saudi perspective.

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Kitfield, James. *Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. 480pp. \$25

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, a number of important monographs have appeared outlining the transition of the American armed forces from the hollow force of the post-Vietnam era to the triumphant one of Desert Storm. No one tells the story more authoritatively than freelance journalist James Kitfield in *Prodigal Soldiers*. Relying extensively on personal memoirs and interviews, the author focuses on the principal commanders of Desert Storm. The result is a highly favorable account of the military officers who weathered the tumultuous decades between the wars.

The central theme of *Prodigal Soldiers* is military effectiveness, which, according to Kitfield, is now founded on a renewed appreciation of joint operations mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986. Over the next five years, joint and combined operations, coupled with the discriminate use of overwhelming force, produced a revolution in military affairs. At its heart is the concept of "operational art," the intermediate level of war between military strategy and tactics.

What Kitfield does best is to examine the trials and tribulations of the junior and field grade officers who served in Vietnam—during which time they encountered racial tension, insubordination, drug addiction, and public hostility to the armed forces in their quest to rejuvenate the nation's military forces—and how they learned from the military and political mistakes of the war, to produce the joint and combined-arms team that prevailed in 1991.

Graduates of the Naval War College will find the discussions of the Maritime