

1996

The United States and Sub-Saharan Africa

Robert W. Higgs

Follow this and additional works at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review>

Recommended Citation

Higgs, Robert W. (1996) "The United States and Sub-Saharan Africa," *Naval War College Review*: Vol. 49 : No. 1 , Article 7.
Available at: <https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol49/iss1/7>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.

The United States and Sub-Saharan Africa

Commander Robert W. Higgs, South African Navy

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA HAS a state system that was imposed from abroad during the era of colonialism and that does not reflect ethnic realities. Most of these states achieved independence in the 1960s and emerged into the bipolar system of the Cold War. The international rivalry produced assistance and also a measure of influence for their governments, despite the fact that the fifty-three nations in Africa make it the world's most balkanized and fragmented region.¹ When African states were supported by bipolar forces, methods of governing seemed to be of little consequence, and there were many abuses of human rights by both military and civilian governments.² Today, African states have a desire for democracy, based on the perception that democratic governments can be stable, effective, and responsible, and can attract foreign capital to ensure equitable economic growth. In addition, democracies are understood to be able to prevent and resolve conflicts with the involvement of all parties.³ Well structured democracies are also seen to be more responsive to the material needs of their people.⁴

Yet today, economic viability and internal political stability are two major problems for the troubled continent. Democratic revolutions sweeping through Africa bring with them a number of difficulties. Strong authoritarian leaders of the past are being replaced by new leaders within states having only weak democratic traditions.⁵ The resulting instability could cause reticence or even

Commander Higgs, the first officer to represent the South African Navy at the Naval War College's Naval Command College, earned a bachelor's degree in military science from the South African Military Academy and a master's in international relations from Salve Regina University, Newport, R.I. He has commanded the torpedo recovery vessel and diving tender SAS *Fleur* and also SAS *Johanna Van Der Merwe*, a *Daphne*-class conventional submarine.

This article was the winner of the Naval War College 1995 Robert E. Batemans International Prize Essay Award. The views expressed in it are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect any official position held by the South African Navy.

Naval War College Review, Winter 1996, Vol. XLIX, No. 1.

detachment in the developed world, which sees hopeless anarchy prevailing in Africa. However, many states in the region suffer from these conditions but do not collapse into disorder, because where there is good government, lawlessness, violence, and breakdown of authority do not occur. Concurrently, most African nations are attempting to develop free market economies. However, this reform is painfully challenging. In the past, wealth was distributed along traditional tribal lines, and such arrangements are now in question.⁶ With respect to either governance or finance, however, to assume that the development of Africa is beyond hope is premature.⁷


The United States, as the preeminent superpower, identifies with sub-Saharan Africa primarily on humanitarian grounds arising from fundamental values of the American philosophy. Budgetary constraints, shifting policies, and the lack of tangible humanitarian successes have caused the United States to disengage from the region. The U.S. will continue to back away until it is deemed to be in the American interest to reengage, or until a program with the potential to assure sustained reconstruction and development in sub-Saharan Africa is recognized.

This article addresses U.S. foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. Its aim is to investigate ways in which the United States can engage and enlarge its interests in the region, to mutual benefit. It will deal in general with U.S. interests and American security strategy in the region. Thereafter it will focus on the maritime component in detail. The analysis makes three major assumptions. First, there will continue to be international interest in Africa, but a significant, coherent, and coordinated effort for the region's reconstruction and development will require the support of the United States, through the United Nations. Second, it is unlikely that powerful economic blocs will compete for influence in Africa, because of the lack of tangible returns in comparison with other emerging markets. This situation could change if Africa becomes able to compete successfully with the emerging markets. Third, if African states wish to achieve the level of production and wealth that the developed nations enjoy, their leaders will have to demonstrate that they are committed to a transition toward a work ethic, competitiveness, the freedoms associated with democracy and capitalism, and elimination of class status.⁸ Such commitment is a prerequisite for attracting the developed world to reengage economically and politically in the region.

Factors Influencing United States Policy

As noted, significant transformations are occurring in Africa today; they include the expansion of democratic governments and the growth of economic reform and of liberalized economic policies aimed at building an environment for private sector-led growth.⁹ Currently nearly two-thirds of African countries

92 Naval War College Review



Joseph R. Nunes, Jr.

are at some stage of democratic transition, compared to only four in 1989.¹⁰ However, these fledgling governments are fragile and often not fully consolidated. In a June 1994 address at the White House Conference on Africa, the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, Brian Atwood, observed that "what is most significant today is that a new group of African leaders has come to power. These leaders are pushing the continent to realize its potential. They are encouraging people to participate in government and in the development of their societies. These are leaders like Nelson Mandela of South Africa."¹¹ There have been fewer major unresolved conflicts or instances of state collapse in the 1990s than there were in the 1980s, when battles raged in Uganda, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Western Sahara, Sudan, and Angola. It is true that there has been a major setback for democracy in Nigeria, where the 1993 elections were nullified, and also a number of smaller reversals. The point, though, is not that there will be no more trouble in Africa, but rather that anarchy is not a foregone conclusion.¹² There is hope.

From an economic point of view, it is well understood that Africa is not healthy. In the decade from 1980 to 1990 its gross domestic product (GDP) showed a decline of 1.1 percent. By almost every social and economic indicator,

sub-Saharan Africa performs less well than any other developing region of the world.¹³ In addition, many African nations face high debt burdens, which can hamper any economic transition.¹⁴ On the other hand, the African consumer market, with over one-half billion potential buyers, is already significant. In 1992 sub-Saharan Africa imported about \$60 billion in goods, but only about \$5 billion came from the United States; this disparity indicates that other developed nations are benefiting from this marketing opportunity.¹⁵ In addition, the potential of the southern sub-region has led the U.S. Commerce Department to declare southern Africa one of the world's ten major emerging markets for U.S. exports.¹⁶

United States Leadership. A number of countries have dealt successfully with Africa. However, if one assesses the present situation, there clearly is no coherent and coordinated approach to the continent by the developed world. If Africa is to succeed in its reconstruction and development, international efforts must be coordinated. The United States—and only the United States—could provide the leadership that is needed at the international level among the developed countries and also coordinate support efforts within the continent.

The leading role in facilitating support for the reconstruction and development of sub-Saharan Africa, one might think, should surely lie with the major trading partners. If one measures the penetration of African markets as a criterion, then the United States, with only 8.3 percent of the trade with Africa, has no place.¹⁷ But some African leaders do not see it that way. In the 1994 White House conference, the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Salim Ahmed Salim, said, "We see the American experience in social accommodation as the most readily adaptable to the African situation. . . . I see the United States providing the leadership at the international level, with the industrialized countries and the monetary and financial institutions, in mobilizing support for reforms and development generally in the continent."¹⁸ He argued further, speaking to the Americans in his audience, that the United States should care about Africa because "it is in your interests as well. Africa and this country share common bonds of history and culture. In this rapidly shrinking global village, we need global solidarity to sustain cooperation and our interdependence. . . . You need a strong Africa that can be a strong partner in global development and not a subject of your constant compassion and unending charity."¹⁹

Secretary General Salim's view is shared by some senior U.S. leaders. Ambassador Herman Cohen, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until 1993, contends that respect for the United States in Africa has never been higher. He sees this as primarily a result of the Cold War victory of democratic and free market systems. In addition, U.S. work in the field of conflict resolution

94 Naval War College Review

in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia added to its reputation; Africans feel that the "moral guarantee" of the United States is important to the success of agreements reached.²⁰ Probably most significant, however, is the example U.S. democracy provides.

African and U.S. leaders conceive a prominent role for the United States in African affairs, but how feasible is this? Can the United States lead, and collaborate with, the rest of the developed world, catalyzing an international program of reconstruction and development of Africa? The answer is a qualified "yes." The crucial issue is that America has achieved since World War II something that is quite rare for a superpower—it has identified its national interests with international institutions. The United Nations, the Marshall Plan, Nato, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund—these are phenomena that germinated on American soil.²¹ They are proof that the United States has the ability to lead and facilitate world cooperation and solidarity in support of Africa.

U.S. Interests in Africa. Despite diminished political influence and weak economies, Africa is becoming more important in the scale of U.S. regional and global interests. Africa presently accounts for about one-third of United Nations membership and has considerable leverage in the Group of 77, the UN Conference on Trade and Development, and many institutions where African states sit as de facto regional representatives, including the UN Security Council and the World Bank.²² In addition, African states have started to play an active and prominent role in global and regional peacekeeping efforts.²³ On the domestic side, 23.8 million African-Americans form a potentially powerful interest group in the United States; their cultural concerns about their roots and heritage cannot be summarily dismissed.²⁴

From an economic perspective, Africa's oil-producing states are of direct importance to the United States. Nigeria pumps nearly two million barrels of oil a day, most of which ends up in the United States. During the 1973 Arab oil boycott, Nigeria was the number-one supplier to the United States and today is one of the top five. Together Nigeria and Angola have nearly twenty-five billion barrels of proven reserves.²⁵ Their location makes these reserves of strategic importance to the United States.

U.S. direct investment in Africa approaches \$3.5 billion. In 1993 U.S. firms exported nearly \$4.8 billion in goods and services to sub-Saharan Africa; this figure is 20 percent greater than U.S. exports to the Commonwealth of Independent States. Every \$1 billion in exports adds nineteen thousand new jobs in the United States. Doubling exports to Africa could create an additional ninety thousand, provided the political and economic transformation currently underway is sustained. To further illustrate not-improbable assumptions about African

demand for foreign goods, Brian Atwood projects that the average \$3 per year that each American family presently contributes to African development assistance could, if sustained over thirty years, generate an annual \$600 in African exports per family by the year 2025.²⁶

Also, the United States and other nations have a stake in the environment of Africa in the next century. Today many African leaders are taking impressive steps to preserve natural habitats and promote methods of sustainable forestry development.²⁷ But the continent is under great environmental strain. Two-thirds of sub-Saharan Africa's wildlife habitat has been destroyed by development.²⁸ Uganda's forests have been decimated, and its once plentiful grasslands have been nearly eliminated by overgrazing, itself caused by the excessive livestock per acre necessary to support the increasing population.²⁹ In Ethiopia, the Rift Valley's acacia forest is fast becoming semi-desert.

Finally, humanitarian concerns particularly affect the people of the United States, especially when scenes of famine, violence, and destruction are projected into its living rooms. The violence characteristic of Africa, which has so far prompted nine UN peacekeeping operations, will continue to prod the sensitivity of the American public so long as there is instability in the region. However, in view of both the Clinton administration's policy on multilateral peace operations and the Republican narrowing of "vital interests," the "CNN factor" alone is unlikely to induce active U.S. participation in these operations.³⁰

Other Key Players. Europe has a longstanding interest in the condition of Africa. Western Europeans can help with stabilization and the development of democratic and free market administrations, economies, and infrastructures. Also, as a result of their colonial experience, they still have specialists for these regions: the Italians know Somalia, the French know West and Central Africa, the British East Africa, the Belgians Zaire, and the Portuguese Angola and Mozambique. This could prove to be an opportunity for the European Union to assume collectively some responsibility, in cooperation with the UN and OAU, for the reconstruction and development of the continent.³¹ As for Asia, Japan already provides a great deal of economic and infrastructural assistance. While the Chinese and other stable and prospering East Asian countries do not have great interests in the region, they could contribute by providing unique assistance, drawn from their own experience, in the transformation of the work ethic and attitudes toward competitiveness.

Among international organizations, the United Nations is positioned to coordinate and legitimize international support for the reconstruction and development of the region. It has the infrastructure and international interface to play a vital part in the process. The OAU is a major regional organisation and a key player in the solution of the sub-Saharan problem. With the demise of the

96 Naval War College Review

Cold War, the OAU is achieving broad acceptance and significance. Establishment of appropriate OAU consultative security forums and procedures on a permanent basis could help the region secure cooperation in economic development and ensure the growth of democracy. Nato, despite its present geographical limitations, could play a significant role, primarily as a facilitator as well as a model for collective defence in the African context. Such a role would help Nato define for itself, in the responsible development of the African military, an interim out-of-area mission.

Finally, within the region, South African capabilities will be increasingly critical in the medium and long term to the success of efforts to contain or resolve crises throughout sub-Saharan Africa. The Republic of South Africa has the military establishment needed to support peacekeeping operations; in this regard it occupies a regional position analogous to that of the United States, which has a global ability. Although presently wary of committing combat personnel to peace operations, it can provide logistical support, medical assistance, communications systems, and air transport facilities for any regional security endeavor. South African infrastructure can deliver humanitarian assistance, as has been done in the past three years (for Malawi, Zaire, Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique, and Rwanda). South Africa can and has used its training facilities and expertise to assist neighboring countries: military personnel from Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, and Namibia have taken courses at South Africa's various training colleges, and South African personnel have trained regional army personnel in combat support (notably in connection with mine demolition in Mozambique and Angola). Finally, South Africa can offer extensive assistance in efforts to rebuild the infrastructure of the region.³²

U.S. Military Engagement Options

The United States has a wide range of tools that can be used to promote democracy, human rights, and prosperity.³³ Central to these is the U.S. Department of Defense. Options for military engagement include the establishment of a "School for Africa," the development of an anti-drug campaign, programs of military civic action, support of indigenous efforts on behalf of biological diversity, and confidence-building measures. Peacekeeping operations will continue to occupy both the United States and UN as part of a reactive strategy, because of the violence characteristic of Africa.

The establishment of a "School of Africa" in which African military, coast guard, and foreign ministry leaders would study together and develop a common cultural foundation based on common destiny could help Africa emulate the success of Latin America. There the U.S. military-sponsored School of the Americas has been very successful in helping develop that region to its present

position of largely prospering democracies, sustained economic expansion, and increasing trade. Such a school could also produce a network connecting future leaders of Africa with those of the more developed world, who would have the opportunity to explain the pitfalls that they have experienced. The statesmanship developed at the School of Africa could also be a source of African-led initiatives. This school would not replace current international military education and training programs but would complement them.

A strategy to counter the proliferation of drugs in the region demands further attention. What should be of concern to the United States and the developed world is the possibility of Africa becoming a narcotic production area. As has been seen elsewhere, enterprising individuals without moral values could see in drugs a method of enriching themselves and their region. The problems associated with containing an African drug industry led by either local or foreign drug lords could be significant. That the post-Cold War power vacuum in Africa might be filled by international drug cartels, as they find life in the traditional narcotics areas more risky, is a possibility that should be addressed. The U.S. military could help develop awareness of the problem and assist in the establishment of organisations that would counter the problem when it arises.

Additionally, the U.S. military could engage in *military civic action* (support of African military infrastructure projects that benefit the civilian sector) and in maintaining the *biological diversity* of Africa (assisting African defense agencies interested in protecting and maintaining habitats and in developing wildlife management and fisheries and plant protection programs). These are activities that could be meaningful in the revitalisation of Africa. At the outset, positive programs that are considered low risk but have potentially high returns could be instrumental in gathering the necessary sustained international support.

The U.S. military could participate in confidence-building exercises. The armed forces of Africa, rather than being marginalised, should be made shareholders in, and part of, the development of the continent. African militaries have an important role to play in the transition to and support of democratic governments. In fact, a stable and open military is not a by-product of democracy but a prerequisite. American contacts with and assistance to African militaries can promote the transition to democracy, respect for human rights, and civilian control. If the United States can help the military of an emerging democracy to find its niche and accept a proper role in society, it will have gone a long way to creating a condition in which democracy can flourish.³⁴

Additionally, the U.S. military can act as a catalyst for international cooperation and reduction of tensions between states in the region. Ground, air, and naval units can foster interactions through multinational military conferences, exercises, and operations that (as has been shown elsewhere) reduce tension and promote understanding between rivals. In particular, the U.S. Navy, Marine

98 Naval War College Review

Corps, and Coast Guard can play leading roles in building confidence within and between states of sub-Saharan Africa.

U.S. Maritime Strategy and Sub-Saharan Africa

The U.S. National Military Security Strategy of February 1995 articulates the promotion of global stability as one of its two objectives. The strategy of flexible and selective engagement focuses on future challenges and opportunities. The concept is to promote long-term stability, because it is advantageous to the United States; stability establishes conditions under which democracy can take hold and expand about the world.³⁵ Against this background of strategic intent it is necessary to remember the volatility of sub-Saharan Africa: "For the last 12 months, sub-Saharan Africa has been the region [in the world] most plagued by conflict and instability."³⁶

Present U.S. naval thinking is succinctly articulated in "Forward....From the Sea," in which traditional Mahanian command of the sea and the decisive sea battle are rejected in favor of joint operations *from* the sea and activity in the littorals. This thinking is consistent with the U.S. National Security Strategy's focus upon peacekeeping and maritime conflict management.³⁷ The demise of the Cold War brings with it a new set of maritime circumstances and opportunities in which "the free nations of the world now claim preeminent control of the seas and [can] ensure freedom of commercial passage."³⁸ This change in the maritime situation suggests that a restructuring of the traditionally unintegrated sub-Saharan maritime region is in order.

Maritime forces play an important role in establishing beneficial relationships with allies. They promote a cooperative and collaborative approach to common problems. The nature of the maritime environment ensures that the professionals who use it develop mutual bonds, common habits and attitudes that are conducive to yet further cooperation. Each successful combined activity leads to another, and the result is an ever-widening circle of shared interests. The sea environment itself is largely non-threatening and is not limited by national boundaries. Also, maritime forces are able to serve all types of alliance systems, for a variety of reasons. Cooperation with an ally who is technically and tactically advanced can have significant benefits in training and equipment; in addition, it can influence the perceptions and behavior of the stronger ally, winning for the weaker one a degree of political influence not necessarily forthcoming otherwise. Cooperation with a developing nation's maritime forces bespeaks respect, recognition of shared challenges, and acknowledgment of mutual interests. And multinational activities heighten appreciation of regional opportunities for friendship and acceptance of common responsibilities. The U.S. Navy's extensive network of both bilateral and multilateral exercises around the world,

such as with Nato in Europe, the UNITAS program for South America, and the RIMPAC exercises with the nations of the Pacific Rim, show that the advantages of alliance-building through maritime power are universally understood.³⁹

How does this relate to peacekeeping and operations other than war in sub-Saharan Africa? This is where the development of a common maritime strategy and institutions can be of benefit in the stabilization of the region. There is much talk about naval peacekeeping across the beaches, or rather, "from the sea." Since the Gulf war, much of the activity of naval forces has been in monitoring cease-fires, embargoes, and separation of forces, caring for refugees, clearing mines, escorting merchant shipping, and furnishing and protecting humanitarian relief. There have also been three recent instances of sea-based noncombatant evacuation operations on the African continent by the U.S., in Liberia and twice in Somalia; these rescues highlighted the ability of navies to provide rapid and sustained, but controlled and limited, presence. The capability of these forces was demonstrated by their sending helicopters 460 miles at night to rescue 281 diplomats and foreign nationals from the embassy in Somalia.⁴⁰ The expeditionary nature of naval forces was exhibited by the deployment of a U.S. Navy amphibious squadron with an embarked Marine expeditionary unit off Liberia for ten weeks, leading to the evacuation of more than 1,600 foreigners escaping from civil war in that West African nation.⁴¹

On a regional scale, local forces able to operate helicopters and small boats from the sea would help in diffusing crises such as these; to make this kind of limited littoral and expeditionary capability a reality, it would be necessary for regional navies to improve their equipment and develop interoperability. Achieving interoperability, in turn, would highlight the requirement for common doctrine and regular exercises between these navies.

The United States could assist by supporting the establishment of a collective maritime security structure in the sub-Saharan region. The combat capability of sea-borne forces was illustrated by the U.S.-led fleet of twenty-one ships from six navies that in March 1995 withdrew the men and equipment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia, at night, under fire, with no friendly casualties.⁴² Multinational naval cooperation could stimulate interest in the developed world, which would see it as a possible method of exploratory, low-risk contact and integration with the less-developed littoral nations of the region.⁴³ As the hard-pressed African navies find that fewer funds come their way, their only alternative—if they wish to remain relevant and achieve their missions—will be to combine their efforts.

Because of the transnational and transagency nature of maritime problems, the optimum method for addressing them is a coherent and combined regional

100 Naval War College Review

maritime sovereignty and ocean policy as a precursor to a form of collective security. Such a policy would create a combined force drawn from regional navies and would address specific functions (listed below). The practical issues involved would facilitate the development of legal, political, economic, social, and environmental interconnections between the more developed world and Africa, in a low-risk environment. An OAU-sponsored international law forum to lay the foundation for such a policy could have a "trickle down" effect for the legal structures of the African littoral states, inculcating the principles of the international legal framework—from concepts of sovereignty to ideas about human rights and democracy. The United States, by virtue of its maritime orientation, could play a key role in the planning and consequent integration of a regional ocean policy, making available the lessons of its own international successes and failures.

The benign nature of the program could expose African states to the advantages of synergism and integration rather than fragmentation. As it started achieving success, a non-contentious symbol of regional identity could be formed. An African maritime force could establish itself as a "pure," professional, and non-threatening vehicle of long-term international interaction. In addition to providing a symbol for the people it represents, this coalition of professional maritime forces could help restore the developed world's confidence in Africa, a necessary precursor to greatly increased international investment and tourism, both of which would be very positive and much needed developments.

Search and rescue, and aids to navigation are the first improvements that could be undertaken, with the assistance of the U.S. Coast Guard. The basic navigation infrastructure already exists; most sub-Saharan port facilities work reasonably well. The establishment of a coordinated regional search and rescue organization would improve the usefulness of African resources in international operations within the area, and possibly in adjacent oceans also. Regular exercise of this ability would help develop an integrated approach and also provide an interface with the developed world on a sustained basis.

Marine resource management and environmental protection form another area in which a regional ocean policy could function. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea grants to states unprecedented jurisdiction over the economic resources within two hundred nautical miles of their coasts, by delineation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). These assets include biological stocks and deep-seabed minerals.⁴⁴ In the developed world, marine economic resources are jealously protected by sovereign states, with naval and other maritime law enforcement assets. However, the countries where fish constitutes more than 40 percent of animal protein are, with the major exception of Japan, the developing countries in Asia and Africa;⁴⁵ unfortunately, many sub-Saharan states lack the ability to protect these resources.

The inability to enforce sovereignty over EEZs is a problem that will get worse; as the 1995 incidents between Canada and Spain over fishing rights suggest, there is no easy solution. The world's oceans are being overfished, and catches are declining steadily. This fishing is being carried out by sophisticated ships—large, fast, expensive, and able to harvest vast areas. Sweeping the ocean clean, the multibillion-dollar worldwide industry is losing money at an increasing rate. The result is pressure either to cut corners on operating expenses in an effort to recover investments in the ships or to exploit every opportunity to catch more fish.⁴⁶ As developed countries become more concerned about the depletion of their fisheries, they can be expected to protect rigorously what is legally theirs, forcing the fishing fleets of the less scrupulous into the rich zones of the sub-Saharan African states—where there is a maritime power vacuum. This scenario was sketched out at the 1992 International Conference for Responsible Fishing, in Mexico, which identified the southeast Atlantic as a region where numerous “distant-water high seas fleets” were increasing their catches.⁴⁷ It is imperative that sub-Saharan states ensure that their respective EEZs are not violated; protection can best be guaranteed by the regional development of maritime law enforcement.

Marine pollution is the shadow of progress, to which developing nations often turn a blind eye. The threat of large-scale oil pollution is very real on the east coast of Africa, where heavy seas have often caused ships to break up with catastrophic consequences. These accidents already have had a major impact on the estuaries and fishing areas of southeastern Africa. As the merchant fleets of the world grow older, the threat of disaster increases; in the longer term, as the importance of tourism in the development of the region grows, the impact of major pollution disasters could be very negative indeed.⁴⁸ The pollution issue is of global concern, but its regional causes and effects can be minimized if preemptively addressed in a forum having power to effect treaties on pollution and to clarify the obligations and incentives that regulate and balance competing environmental and economic interests. Methods for dealing with the inevitable pollution accidents could be clearly articulated and contingency plans developed.

Enforcement of maritime border security is a fourth arena for an African nations' ocean policy. A major scourge in the region is smuggling, especially of ivory and weapons. The uncontrolled movement of arms makes them a type of currency in the region and adds to instability and lawlessness. Much of the smuggling today takes place across land borders; however, the ocean is important for smugglers because it is a link with the money of the developed world. Customs and anti-smuggling issues could be addressed in the development of a comprehensive strategy.

A combined and joint *rapid deployment force* could be formed by bilateral and multilateral maritime agreements between the African littoral states for local

102 Naval War College Review

peacekeeping and disaster relief. Maritime regional cooperation could be further strengthened by deploying vessels and aircraft to conduct combined maritime exercises and patrols. Coordinating these activities with the operations of invited maritime forces from the developed world under the auspices of the UN would further strengthen the concept and enhance international legitimacy.

The enforcement of state authority in a regional context could be demonstrated by collectively focusing on the protection of fishing and other marine resources against plundering, piracy, and environmental depredation. Such law enforcement operations could then be extended to include the development of disaster relief doctrine, scientific research programs, and effective prohibition of drug and weapons smuggling and illegal immigration.

Training and education in naval standards would be necessary to ensure the development of a professional attitude amongst the forces. This professionalism would have to be established first in the functionally critical areas, such as combined doctrine, procedures, and communications, to allow competent conduct of operations. To sustain momentum it will be necessary to pursue commonality in professional military education, perhaps through exchange assignments and bilateral or multilateral staff formations.

Compatibility, maintenance, combined procurement, and technology transfer are major considerations for any regional maritime force. If maritime forces are to operate safely, there must be compatibility in communications through establishment of a standard. Other forms of compatibility would be addressed on a continuing basis. Maintenance, which has previously been a problem in the region, could be addressed by the use of South African naval maintenance resources. Simon's Town could provide the facilities for major refits and extended dockings; for lesser maintenance, a core of South African-trained technicians could meet the need *in situ*. Correct technical standards could be established and enforced by regionally integrated technical inspection groups, their core perhaps supplied by South Africa. Synergy and economy could be achieved through a combined procurement agency, which would ensure that suppliers take serious note of the region in terms of after-sales service. The continued success of such technical synergy would result in the sustained transfer of technology to sub-Saharan Africa, with its associated social and economic benefits.

It is to be hoped that the interest of the United States in a maritime strategy for sub-Saharan Africa would encompass encouraging the developed world to support such an African-led initiative. The U.S. could also help to educate regional leaders as to their maritime opportunities, commitments, and responsibilities, and, further, could assist in building a legal and political infrastructure.

A "School of Africa" might shortly follow. Regional powers should be encouraged to develop common training and doctrine in the maritime environment, as a precursor to broader collective activities. Ultimately, direct security assistance as an incentive and reward for fulfilling international maritime obligations would signal the beginning of United States reengagement and of the reconstruction and development of sub-Saharan Africa.

For any reconstruction and development of Africa to succeed, it is critical that the people of Africa take the lead. The future of the region depends on those Africans who have a positive, feasible, and appropriate vision for their continent. What has been described in this article is how this turn-around in Africa can be supported, in the security and maritime arenas, by the United States and the developed world. The most worthwhile strategy the United States could follow is to recognize a program that has a good possibility of success and then support those Africans who have the motivation and ability to make it work.

Notes

1. Chester A. Crocker, "Some Thoughts on Africa in the Year 2000," *CSIS Africa Notes*, September 1993, p. 2.
2. John Shattuck, "Human Rights and Democracy in Africa," *US Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 6, no. 9, 27 February 1995, p. 153. From a statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., 22 February 1995.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
4. Anthony Lake, "Remarks as Prepared for Delivery," *Brookings Africa Forum Luncheon*, Washington, D.C., 3 May 1993, p. 2.
5. General George A. Joulwan, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief United States European Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 3 March 1994, p. 24.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Carol Lanchester, "The Coming Anarchy," *CSIS Africa Notes*, August 1994, p. 1.
8. Robert E. Riggs and Jack C. Plano, *The United Nations: International Organization and World Politics*, 2d ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1994), p. 260.
9. George E. Moose, "Encouraging Trade and Investment: An Integral Part of U.S. Policy towards Africa," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 6, no. 9, 27 February 1995, p. 150. From a statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
11. Brian Atwood, "The White House Conference on Africa," *CSIS Africa Notes*, July 1994, p. 5.
12. Lanchester, p. 5.
13. Walter H. Kansteiner, "US Interests in Africa Revisited," *CSIS Africa Notes*, February 1994, p. 1.
14. Lake, p. 3.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
16. Moose, p. 148.
17. Lake, p. 4.
18. Salim Ahmed Salim, "The White House Conference on Africa," *CSIS Africa Notes*, July 1994, p. 6.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Jannie Bates, "An Exit Interview with Hank Cohen," *CSIS Africa Notes*, April 1993, p. 6.
21. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich), 16 February 1995, trans. FRG Office of Defense Administration for USA and Canada Foreign Language Department.
22. Kansteiner, p. 1. Demands by developing countries for a new international economic order can be traced to the 1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), where they banded together to form the "Group of 77" as a coalition of the world's poor to press for concessions from the rich. Known as the G-77, the group combined forces with the Nonaligned Movement during the 1973 Algiers summit, where issues relating to economic and political "liberation" came to the fore. This led to the 1974

104 Naval War College Review

Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, where the G-77, with its superior numbers, succeeded in passing the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. Thus, the voice of the Third World began to be heard; however, in the course of the Cold War this dialogue degenerated into a dialogue of the deaf. See Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformation*, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 254-6.

23. U.S. *European Command Strategy for the Support of U.S. Policy in Africa*, 27 December 1993, p. 3.
24. Joulwan, p. 4.
25. Kansteiner, p. 3.
26. Moose, p. 149.
27. Lake, p. 4.
28. Cohen, p. 7.
29. Lake, p. 4.
30. U.S. Departments of State and Defense, *Congressional Presentation for Promoting Peace, Fiscal Year 1995*, p. 4. The Clinton administration's policy on multilateral peace operations is part of a comprehensive framework intended to meet the realities of the post-Cold War period. Its six major elements include making disciplined and intelligent decisions as to which peace operations to support; reducing U.S. costs for UN peacekeeping operations; clearly defining the command and control of U.S. military forces involved in UN peacekeeping; reforming and improving the UN's capability to manage peace operations; upgrading the way the U.S. government manages and funds peace operations; and creating better forms of cooperation between the executive branch, the Congress, and the American public on peace operations. See U.S. State Department white paper issued in May 1994, consistent with the release of Presidential Decision Document (PDD) 25.
31. William Pfäff, "A New Colonialism?," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1995, pp. 2-6.
32. Rocklyn Mark Williams, "South Africa's New Defense Force: Progress and Prospects," *CSIS Africa Notes*, March 1995, p. 8.
33. Shattuck, p. 151.
34. Joulwan, p. 13. See also the very useful "Strategy for Increased Stability in Africa," by Captain Mègna M. Diomandé, Ivorian Navy, *Naval War College Review*, Autumn 1994, esp. p. 78.
35. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement* (Washington: 1995).
36. R.C. Simpson-Anderson (Vice Admiral, South African Navy, SD, SM, MMM, Chief of the South African Navy), "Implications of International Cooperation for the South African Area of Maritime Interest," delivered to the Institute of Defense Policy, Cape Town, 9 August 1994.
37. Joergen Jakobsen, "Implications of a New Revolution in Naval Doctrine and Strategy," unpublished paper, University of the Western Cape, South Africa, 13 May 1994.
38. Geoffrey Till, "Changing Role of Navies," a paper presented at the South African Institute of International Affairs, March 1993, p. 8.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 14. See also Adam B. Siegel, "An American Entebbe," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1992, pp. 96-100, and Robert A. Doss (Capt., USMC), "Rescue from Mogadishu," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1992, pp. 103-5.
41. T.W. Parker (Lt. Col., USMC), "Operation Sharp Edge," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1991, pp. 102-6.
42. John H. Cushman, (Lt. Gen., USA), "Out of Somalia: United Shield," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1995, pp. 129-30.
43. Till, p. 11.
44. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (New York: 1983), p. 18. See also John H. McNeill, "The Strategic Significance of the Convention on the Law of the Sea," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1995, pp. 123-9.
45. Lennox Hinds, "World Marine Fisheries: Management and Development Problems," *Marine Policy*, September 1992, p. 395.
46. Jaime de Ojeda, "On the High Seas," *The Washington Post*, 18 March 1995.
47. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, *World Fisheries Situation*, International Conference on Responsible Fishing, Cancún, Mexico, 6-8 May 1992, p. 5.
48. With 300,000 to 500,000 tons of oil being transported around the tip of Africa daily, there is a constant danger of spills resulting from accidents, which are highly likely given the aging of the worldwide tanker fleet and the notoriously bad sea conditions in those waters. A recent ore-carrier disaster resulting in pollution along Cape Town beaches is a case in point. See Simpson-Anderson.