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BOOK REVIEWS

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

“Objectivity Is Impossible in the Face of Genocide”

Vulliamy, Ed. *Season in Hell: Understanding Bosnia's War*. New York: St. Martin's, 1994. 370pp. \$22.95

OUR TELEVISION SCREENS ARE FILLED with images of war. Of them all, those that make the greatest impression are from Bosnia. Each night we watch terrified civilians in Sarajevo living day to day under the constant threat of a quick and silent death from a sniper's bullet. There are starving prisoners of war, devastated rape victims, and a multitude of newly orphaned children.

Many view this war simply as the continuation of the historical quest of Serbia and Croatia for Bosnia. It is for this reason that the West has been reluctant to get involved. Vulliamy, however, refutes this idea. He demonstrates that the war is actually about which of the two major ethnic groups in today's Bosnia-Herzegovina (Croats and Serbs) will ultimately control the territory currently dominated by the Bosnian Moslems.

Before the war began, Bosnia's population was 47 percent Moslem, 34 percent Serb, and 17 percent Croat. When Yugoslavia collapsed, the new governments of Croatia and Serbia encouraged their compatriots in Bosnia to exert pressure on the new Bosnian government to enhance their joint nationalistic interests. Of course, the best way to protect those interests was to make portions of Bosnia part of a "Greater Serbia" or of a new Croatia. However, the people of Bosnia do not live in convenient ethnic enclaves but are spread throughout the country, and when it was realized that in such a multiethnic society peaceful annexation was impossible, the leaders turned to military force. When military action failed to dislodge the Bosnian Moslems from areas

dominated by the Serbs, Serb leaders adopted the policy of "ethnic cleansing." If the Bosnian army could not be defeated, at least Bosnian civilians could be forced from their homes and the land given to the "more deserving" Serbs.

The solution most often offered by desperate diplomats is simply to divide the country, each side getting some territory—no winners, no losers. The result, however, has been continued fighting and more carnage. Whatever the solution, there will be many losers. *Season in Hell* is a literary montage of the losers.

The author presents a cacophony of depravity of which no real army is capable. In fact, the Serbs appear more a heavily armed band of thugs than an army. It is not surprising that there are few large-scale confrontations between the opposing military forces. Instead, the war is conducted by artillery shelling, snipers, out-of-control freelance warriors who engage in mass rape and deportations, and siege warfare tactics not appreciably different from those of the Middle Ages. It is the civilians who are bearing the brunt of the military's wrath. In fact, the primary strategy against the Moslems appears to be nothing more than an ongoing, escalating string of atrocities: maternity clinics are targeted, Red Cross volunteers are attacked, civilians are deliberately shot, and prisoners of war are tortured. Very little, if anything, is done to punish the perpetrators or to prevent future violations.

Even if the Croats, Moslems, and Serbs were somehow equally responsible for starting the war, Vulliamy provides page after page of evidence clearly showing that it is the Serb forces that are mostly responsible for the carnage. Violations of the laws of war are so numerous that one can only conclude that they are committed with the tacit, if not the express, approval of those who claim to exercise military command over the troops. When confronted with overwhelming evidence of atrocities, the response of the accused leadership is nothing more than a rehash of the historic feuding now presented as the cause of the war, and the idea that if the tables were turned, the other side would do exactly the same thing.

Ed Vulliamy is a British journalist who visited the forces of all three factions. He saw the destruction close-up and understands fully the despair of the people. He is aware of the need for objectivity in a story but admits that it is impossible to be objective in the face of genocide. How can one be objective when confronted with overwhelming evidence of a soldier's brutal rape of a six-year-old child? In such cases objectivity approaches complicity.

Although the author does make a commendable attempt to explain the background of this war, he does not fully meet the promise of his subtitle, *Understanding Bosnia's War*. For this reviewer at least, "understanding" the war implies some acceptance of the methods employed in its prosecution. No military professional can accept what is happening in Bosnia.

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Vulliamy concludes that the international community mistakenly identifies the Bosnian conflict as a humanitarian crisis and has therefore responded to it by sending professional soldiers to care for its victims. The author suggests that a more appropriate course of action would be to give the Bosnian government the aid and weapons it needs to defend itself and prevent the atrocities in the first place.

If the peace process does result in the creation of a smaller Bosnia accompanied by Serb or Croatian cantons, what of the hatred that is sure to follow? When war crimes are committed on such a large scale and go unpunished, the victims of those crimes are not likely to forget. Bosnia's war of inhumanity will certainly make it easier for us to understand at least one reason for what will surely be the next war in the former Yugoslavia—a war of revenge. As a portrait of the war's carnage and as a prognostication for the future, *Season in Hell* is to be recommended.

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Haass, Richard N. *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994, 258pp. \$24.95

Richard N. Haass provides an excellent, brief (156 pages of text plus notes, eight appendices, and index), and concise introduction to the history of intervention, the issues surrounding its methods, and its expected future. Haass is well qualified to address this topic. He taught at Harvard University and worked with both the State and Defense departments before serving as a senior member of the National Security Council staff in the Bush administration.

This book is highly recommended for anyone in the national security community and for students of U.S. foreign policy, given the immediacy of the issue and the likelihood that in the future we

will often confront circumstances conducive to intervention.

Intervention is a more complex phenomenon than is commonly understood, and a virtue of this book is that Haass makes it understandable. He begins by reviewing the debate over intervention and recaps recent cases. He then elucidates its vocabulary, identifying fully a dozen forms of conduct ranging from deterrence and preventive measures to war. Midway within this spectrum are found those forms of intervention so recently the focus of U.S. action and public discussion: peacekeeping, peacemaking, nation-building, and humanitarian assistance. All of these are discrete activities, Haass explains, and each must be understood in order to avoid confusion of efforts and expectations.

Haass believes that no single set of precisely defined, specific, U.S. interests justifies either intervening in the affairs of another state or refusing to do so. Flexibility is crucial for responsible decision making and is essential to the formulation of a "sustainable strategy" for intervention itself. A clearly stated purpose is required, as well as a means carefully selected to meet the criteria for success. However, neither an exit date nor victory should be prerequisites for intervention; by setting such "artificial boundaries" one runs the risk of playing into the hands of adversaries. But when intervention has been decided upon, Haass calls for an early rather than late involvement, for more strength to be made available than the minimum one expects to need, and for decisive application of force rather than gradualism.

Haass argues that the U.S. must not degrade the readiness of military units that would carry out intervention or renounce the willingness to choose that option, because to do either would directly threaten U.S. interests abroad and, indirectly, threaten the quality of life at home. Potential international instability poses risks to U.S. trade and investment, "increase[s] immigration pressures, make[s] action against terrorism and narcotics-trafficking more difficult," threatens American access to needed foreign natural resources, and leads other states to build up arms. Specific threats to U.S. interests lie in the Korean peninsula and in the Persian Gulf, where the United States must remain vigilant against Iraqi or Iranian attacks upon Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or other states. The spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons vastly

complicates responses to political instability across the globe. Given the potential lethality of these weapons, Haass believes that to be successful in the future the U.S. will have to consider preemptive measures ("preventive missions").

Haass believes "internal interventions"—humanitarian, nation-building, and peacemaking activities—will be common in future international relations. Decisions to intervene in this way will only add to the traditional calculation of national interests the quantification of human misery. How much starvation or egregious political repression will be enough to compel humanitarian action? Haass believes that the U.S. should retain the capability to intervene unilaterally, which is most efficient for short-term incursions. But in the more complicated peacemaking and nation-building scenarios, multinational intervention is usually best.

There is evidence that this book was hurried into publication. An occasional error of fact in recounting past interventions and (infrequent) grammatical lapses are to be noted. But it is informative and timely, given the conclusion of the U.S. and United Nations intervention in Somalia, the UN presence in Haiti, and the possibility of increased intervention in the former Yugoslavia.

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Murray, Williamson; Knox, MacGregor; and Bernstein, Alvin, eds. *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War*. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994. 656pp. \$34.95

Strategy has long been understood as the balancing of ends and means by rulers and states to achieve political goals. Nations that have matched military, economic, and political strategies with their vital interests have been successful, and those that have not have suffered dire consequences. In *The Making of Strategy*, the editors, Murray, Knox, and Bernstein, seek not to examine strategic theorists as much as to analyze the strategic process. The result is a superb exposition of the means by which nations and states develop national strategies.

Graduates of the Naval War College will readily identify the themes and processes outlined in this text. Indeed the project is an outgrowth of a 1985 conference convened in Newport and of a series of lectures delivered during the Strategy and Policy sub-course of the War College's curriculum. In addition to the editors, the contributors include such luminaries as Donald Kagan, Colin S. Gray, Geoffrey Parker, and the Naval War College's own Arthur Waldron and Michael Handel. Not surprisingly, the seventeen case studies range from Thucydides' description of the Peloponnesian War to American strategy in the nuclear age.

The editors' purpose is to offer readers an introduction to the wide variety of factors that influence the development and adoption of national strategies. Focusing on how geography, history, culture, economy, and

governmental systems affect strategy formulation, the editors view strategy not as an inflexible paradigm but as a process requiring constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate. A few examples illustrate their conclusion that strategy is an evolving process.

No state so epitomized the concept of a warrior-state as Rome in the third century B.C. In the words of Machiavelli, the Roman Republic was the ideal polity. Roman strategists, states co-editor Bernstein, sought to keep the Republic and the Empire at war for six centuries in order to preserve the uniqueness of the Roman state and its martial culture. Not surprisingly then, it was Rome's ability to exact military vengeance that preserved the loyalty of its allies and ensured the survival of the commonwealth. The fear of Roman retribution was particularly evident in the Punic Wars against Carthage.

William S. Maltby, in his analysis of English strategy from the Elizabethan period to the onset of the eighteenth century, examines the development of the first global strategies. Maltby argues persuasively that English strategy derived from the tension between England's naval and imperial commitments and its periodic need to intervene with land forces on the European continent. By 1713, however, Great Britain had defeated its most powerful adversary in the War of Spanish Succession and had solved its greatest internal crisis by the revolution of 1688. National wealth, built on the foundation of imperial possessions, soon generated revenue sufficient to support both maritime

and continental commitments. Thus a unified Great Britain developed a global strategy that achieved the Elizabethan dream of dominance of the seas and a military balance of power on the continent.

The Making of Strategy also examines the strategy-making process in the United States. Peter Maslowski states that by mid-1865 the United States had achieved the essential elements required for great power status. The Civil War demonstrated conclusively that the federal government would endure as a single entity characterized by unparalleled economic strength, abundant natural resources, and a large and enlightened population. Eliot Cohen continues the examination of factors affecting American strategies by questioning the assumption that innocence and naiveté were the hallmarks of strategic thought in the interwar period. Colin Gray then concludes that the American army is a direct reflection of the society that produces it. In short, the American way of war is a direct reflection of this nation's ethos, its institutions, and its resources.

In summary, *The Making of Strategy* is a major contribution to our understanding of the relationship between strategy and policy. This excellent book is likely to be the definitive historical study of strategy making for the current generation. Though the editors and contributors view as futile any search for prescriptive theories to guide strategists, they see the study of history as useful to identify patterns from the past. The future, however, remains elusive, and the great challenge for makers of

modern strategy in war and peace is to balance the vital interests of the nations they serve with the changing conditions that affect the development of strategy.

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Weltman, John J. *World Politics and the Evolution of War*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1995. 263pp. \$38.50

As the title implies, this work addresses geopolitical issues from a historical perspective—and for that the author deserves some credit. Given the relative brevity of the text, Weltman has achieved at least part of his objective of linking history to geopolitical policy.

As a prelude to our understanding of history's connection to military-political grand strategy, Weltman surveys theories underpinning the causes of war, suggesting that grand strategy is merely a political instrument used to achieve political ends. To advance his point, the author depends most heavily upon the writings of eighteenth-century soldier-authors Jomini and Clausewitz, notably contrasting the relatively scientific notions of Jomini (a popularly read product of French and Russian military systems) with those of Clausewitz, who somewhat more abstractly used his Prussian background to theorize about warfare, on the basis of his observations of Napoleonic successes and failures.

Weltman begins with the question of what role war might play in the post-Cold War era. For example, will we usher in the new millennium with a

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period of unprecedented peace or with multipolar, nationalistic conflicts like those brewing in the Balkans?

Taking the ancient historian Thucydides as an exemplar, the author suggests that there are three fundamental causes for war. First, as advanced by Saint Augustine, human nature might prompt war, perhaps when a magnetic persona, such as Napoleon or Hitler, emerges. Second, organizational reasons might be offered for war—for instance, during the rise of certain Marxist or fascist states. Finally, as we have learned from our readings of Hobbes and Locke, war might begin because of a strategic imbalance emerging as nations scramble to protect turf in order to survive.

Weltman tells us that the French Revolution was a watershed in our understanding of warfare, for prior wars had been fought more for a cause than a state. Indeed, those who joined the Grand Armée fought as much for the flag as for the storied triad of Liberty–Equality–Fraternity.

One must conclude that since the 1860s and 1870s, when Bismarck cleverly expanded the German empire, the price for accepting battle has continued to rise with the advance of tools for increasingly horrifying destruction. Thus by the time nuclear weapons were introduced, we must remind ourselves, the abstract “theory” of Clausewitzian absolute war had become chillingly real. Therefore, Weltman suggests that strategies toward the employment of nuclear warheads take on the more concrete implications, as stated by Jomini.

Weltman races through several other theoretical watersheds in the advancement of warfare, but in closing he poses

the ultimate question: Is war now obsolete as a means to achieve political goals?

We are offered the rather safe bet that limited war of a relatively small scale is likely, since the weapons are increasingly distant from the targets. We are reminded that it is one accomplishment to capture and perhaps annex a province, but quite another to win over an entire nation, not to mention a continent.

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Toner, James H. *True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics*.
Lexington, Ky.: The Univ. Press of
Kentucky, 1995. 202pp. \$25

James H. Toner is professor of military ethics at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama. In this excellent volume, he has drawn together the many threads of military ethics into a work readily accessible to military professionals, chaplains, and perhaps even undergraduates in courses that concern themselves with ethics and warfare.

Toner argues for the pivotal importance of ethics for the military professional. He surveys a number of distinct sources for this concern and reviews the sociological literature regarding the nature and function of professions—for example, Huntington’s classic analysis of the military profession. This provides him with the occasion to develop a functionalist account of the place of ethics in allowing the military profession to

meet its obligations to society and to maintain coherent internal discipline. He elaborates on the oath of office and the commitments it entails, showing the place and importance of integrity and fidelity to those commitments. He analyzes the intimate connection between the unique character of military training and the inculcation of professional values. He reviews the major military codes of conduct and explores the values they teach, both explicitly and implicitly.

In addition to surveying the bulk of this more "theoretical" literature, Toner also focuses closely on contemporary practical and topical issues. He treats specific examples where disobedience of unlawful orders may be required by one's professional obligations. He deals with the conditions under which resignation from service may be the only honorable option for the military professional. He briefly but intelligently deals with such topical issues as homosexuals in the military, sexual harassment, and fraternization.

The book concludes with an extremely valuable chapter on the practical aspects of including ethics in the education of military professionals. It also lists a gold mine of teaching resources, such as films, novels, military autobiographies, and more philosophical treatments of issues in military ethics.

There are, however, important topics in the ethical use of military power that are treated cursorily, if at all. There is little classic "just war" theory in this volume. Regarding *jus ad bellum* (the ethical issues regarding recourse to military action in the first place), Toner offers very little

indeed. Regarding *jus in bello* (moral conduct in war), again the book is theoretically and historically thin. There is little elaboration of the theoretical framework within which discriminating judgments about noncombatant immunity, proportionality, and discrimination in war have been worked out. The reader of Toner's book will learn nothing of the principle of double effect and its application to, for example, the selection of bombing targets.

These absences are troubling to one interested in the philosophical grounding of military ethics. On the other hand, for a book aimed primarily at a professional military audience as opposed to an academic one, these omissions are (at least arguably) strengths. By their omission, Toner does an excellent job of staying close to the discourse and culture of military professionals. Like much military training, he illustrates many of his points with concrete examples from military history and experience and minimizes the exploration of more abstract categories. In this respect, I am certain Toner's book will be more readily received and given greater credibility by a military-professional audience than it might have otherwise.

My only criticism of substance concerns the broad-brush development of what I call "the country's going to hell in a handbasket" rhetoric. Perhaps simply because I share neither Toner's fairly dismal estimate of the country's overall moral climate nor his assumption of the moral superiority of military culture,

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I found the tone of these sections off-putting. At the very least, I would like to have seen a more developed and nuanced treatment of these claims.

However, if I were to recommend any single book to the busy military professional interested in some reflection on the ethical foundations of the profession, this would be it.

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Copson, Raymond W. *Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994. 211pp. (No price given)

Raymond W. Copson has been a lecturer at the University of Nairobi, Kenya, and at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. Since 1978 he has specialized in African affairs at the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress, of which he is currently head of the Europe, Middle East, and Africa section.

He offers a neat and tidy contribution to the literature on a very unfortunate and pervasive dimension of Africa, a topic not sufficiently studied. Copson's approach is balanced, well supported with solid references, and lacks the numerous, pesky, little mistakes that pepper so many books on Africa. Regrettably, it is too short.

Copson introduces Africa's wars since 1980 with a sympathetic overview of the cost of war, presenting working data on mortality rates and such social consequences as famines, injuries to and

dislocation of civilians and wildlife, violations of human rights, and the destruction of economies. His holistic presentation is a nice touch that presents the phenomenon in its true human context.

In chapter two, Copson offers a survey of eleven wars. Of these he counts five as "lesser wars" (Liberia, Namibia, Western Sahara, Chad, and Rwanda), which he discusses only briefly; there is slightly more detail, and also useful maps, on the six largest wars (Sudan, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Uganda, and Somalia). He ranks each conflict according to total casualty estimates, which is fair enough, but perhaps a system that correlates the number of casualties to the population of the respective states would have better portrayed the national damage. (Analysts generally agree that in civil wars in poor societies, 90 percent of the dead are civilians.) Following this presentation is a short but thorough list of collectively treated "related internal conflict situations." The inclusion of a table is useful, especially for classroom presentations.

The author's thesis is that although the causes for these wars were internal, the international factor contributed to raising the level of violence. (Neo-Marxists would differ, as would those who see the wars originating in colonial structures.) In his case studies, Copson devotes only short, separate paragraphs to France, Britain, and Cuba, with larger coverage of the former Soviet Union and the United States; and although the presentations are well done, still too much detail is omitted that is germane to understanding the wars.

Notwithstanding, this is a valuable section for its historical content.

The author tackles the challenging task of determining what causes Africa's wars. He states that the roots lie in "what many scholars now acknowledge to be a problem with the African state," suggesting an institutional deficiency. This approach is buttressed with a brief discourse on the widening gap between the African state and society. I would counter that the problem is human failure, and I have to point no further than to Idi Amin, Haile-Mariam Mengistu, and Sese Seko Mobutu, among others, to make my case. (However, I do realize this introduces the "chicken and egg" argument.)

The work's methodology is descriptive-historical, which is entirely appropriate. I am not encouraged with attempts to quantify such a fluid subject as war—mankind's greatest concentration of collective passion—especially Africa's bloody manifestations. However, focusing on Africa's wars since 1980 does pose a problem. A thorough review of such a complex subject would benefit from a wider perspective. After all, most of Africa's wars can be traced back to colonial machinations, and most of the current battles are recurrences of long conflicts whose origins lie in pre-independence structures.

The two concluding chapters are especially strong. They provide a useful assessment of positive attempts and proposed methods to reduce the number of Africa's wars, and although Copson sees some favorable trends, he maintains that poverty will undermine whatever progress is made through better government—a sober view.

The informed expert will find a wealth of new historical commentary in this work but will want larger elaboration of certain topics. Military advisors will find valuable records of the wars in a Third World political context but very little on competing strategies or battlefield tactics. Notwithstanding, due to its broad—albeit selective—coverage, this work would be an excellent addition to the classroom. Therein lies its greatest value.

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Wilson, Peter W. and Graham, Douglas
F. Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm.
Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1994. 288pp.
(No price given)

The title of this book gives the impression that this is just another book about the coming fall of the House of Saud. That is not totally inaccurate. Throughout this work the authors build up a list of indicators that point in that direction; in the end, however, Wilson and Graham hedge on their analysis. They assert in their conclusion that "since the creation of the Saudi state, obituaries of its imminent demise have been written many times. But in each case, the al-Saud survived and triumphed, a tribute to their political skills and acumen. . . . The al-Saud are by no means condemned to defeat. However, the situation calls for prompt and decisive action." The reader is left to conclude what that might be.

Both Wilson and Graham are journalists who lived and worked in Saudi Arabia. One of the book's greatest

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strengths is its comprehensive coverage of the land and its people; but its real focus is on the internal threat to the House of Saud.

The first chapter describes in detail how the dynasty's founder, King Abdulaziz bin Saud, unified the diverse tribes of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Subsequent chapters deal with Saudi Arabia's political system, foreign relations, military and security forces, economy, and social issues. In each chapter the authors explain how the House of Saud today is attempting to apply the lessons learned from Abdulaziz and his successors.

Wilson and Graham identify numerous potential areas of concern. The information is insightful, perceptive, and replete with insider information. The authors appear to be comfortable dealing with the Saudi economy and providing details of its practice of foreign relations. However, in some cases, their discussion of Saudi military and security forces is dated and incomplete.

The main problem with this work is that documentation is journalistic; at times it reads like a newspaper's investigative exposé. (This may be, in part, because of the number of sensitive sources the authors indicate they are protecting.) Bold words and far-reaching analyses often overstate valid points. One concerns the House of Saud's challenge of "how to maintain its grip on power in the face of the greatest concerned domestic unrest and opposition in more than 60 years." This is a real issue, but it leads one to think that the streets of Riyadh and Jeddah are rife with protesting demonstrators. Another example concerns the Royal Family's

key positions in the kingdom: "Prince Turki bin Abdulaziz . . . holds no government portfolio due to the scandals surrounding his in-laws, the al-Fassi family." The prince has held many key positions in the Kingdom throughout the years. It was his decision to retire from public service so that he could improve his economic situation. A final example is the authors' statement about the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF): "The Royal Saudi Air Force has always been the favored service in the military establishment. . . . The Royal Saudi Air Force has also been the most coup-prone service in the Kingdom." It is true that in recent years the RSAF received a larger share of the defense budget because of large expenditures on air defense systems, but both the Saudi Land Forces and Saudi National Guard enjoy more prestige than the RSAF. There was one RSAF coup attempt, and some RSAF pilots have flown to other countries in protest against Saudi policies, but I am not sure that these instances qualify the service as coup-prone. Such overstatements detract from what the authors are trying to convey.

That aside, this is a good look at Saudi Arabia's history and the Saudi Arabia of the present. In particular, Wilson and Graham do a good job of describing the Saudi-American "special relationship" that has existed for sixty years and is still misunderstood by both sides. Their explanation of the dilemma the al-Saud face while they try to balance the demands of the fundamentalists and the modernists is also insightful.

Those who are interested in the key issues that affect one of our more important allies in the Middle East should read this book.

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Quandt, William B. *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution and the Univ. of California, 1993. 612pp. \$38.95

"Lessons of history are invariably drawn, but involve highly subjective judgments. Still, they serve as powerful guidelines in intrabureaucratic discussion." In these few words, William Quandt reveals his mind-set toward the problems of scholarship and government. He does not develop magic formulae with magnificent inferential leaps, nor does he leave the reader puzzled about what his judgments are on important processes, events, and ideas. Quandt strikes me as a practical scholar of the first order, who has produced a significant contribution to our diplomatic history in the Middle East.

Born the son of a teacher two weeks before Pearl Harbor, Quandt went on to graduate from Stanford University and earned his doctorate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was a staff member in the National Security Council during the October War, worked as a researcher for RAND, was a member of the political science faculty at the University of Pennsylvania, and has been a Fellow at

Brookings in Washington, D.C., for a decade and a half. His published works focus on the Middle East and serve as the foundation for *Peace Process*. One of his principal works, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1977*, is among the most definitive on the period surrounding the October War of 1973.

This book is chronologically arranged and concludes with some general guidelines, including positive recommendations and cautions of pitfalls for policy makers grappling with complex problems for the first time.

Quandt makes it clear that the frequent turnover in Washington practically guarantees that American policy makers are far less experienced and educated on the issues than those in the Middle East. He cautions that it is unlikely that the U.S. will protect its interests in the Middle East very well, because of the president's lack of continuing interest and enthusiasm. The president must understand that it is important to pay close attention to the problems in the region itself, while remembering that no long-term U.S. overseas policy can succeed without domestic support—with the consequence that he must also attend to domestic affairs. Also, he must appreciate that problems of both substance and process are significant. Grand designs of substance have seldom been fulfilled in every respect, and coping with problems of process is important and less likely to generate domestic opposition. But the ideas of substance are also essential. While it is true that various parochial interests and political rivalries can skew American choices in

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undesirable directions, Quandt asserts that American presidents have more power to overcome these than some of them would have believed. Most presidents have understood that fulfilling U.S. interest in maintaining the flow of oil while simultaneously assuring the survival of the state of Israel is only possible in the context of Arab-Israeli peace. It requires the continuing participation of the United States in the peace process, for the record shows that one cannot expect additional progress if those in the region are left to their own devices.

Quandt concludes on a positive note. He argues that President Clinton has better prospects for a successful policy than have many of his predecessors. Frequently in the past, the presidential paradigm placed the Middle East policy in the larger context of the bipolar superpower rivalry—much to the detriment of the peace process. The end of the Cold War and the consequent concentration on a regional concept is therefore to the good. Too, America's energy policy has improved since the October War, and Arabs and Israelis grow increasingly weary of the violence. So, perhaps there will be continued progress toward a permanent solution.

The attraction of this work is that it speaks with authority not subject to question, yielding a fairly detailed look at the Arab-Israeli problem. However, it may be more detailed than is practical for the *Naval War College Review's* audience, whose reading list is eternally too long. The book is concentrated at the grand strategy level, and there is little with direct application for the military or campaign strategy maker. It

would be most useful to the officer with a special interest in the Middle East or engaged in writing a thesis or dissertation on a related subject. *Peace Process* is a single-volume synthesis that is an excellent starting point, complete with appendices and a short bibliography. It is perhaps the most impressive survey available on American policy in the Middle East.

DAVID R. METS

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Land-Based Airpower in Third World Crises
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Palmer, Michael A. *The War That Never Was*. Arlington, Va.: Vandamere, 1994. 358pp. \$19.95

Have you ever wondered what would have occurred if the United States and Soviet Union had stood toe-to-toe, battling it out to the end? For decades, thousands of analysts made their careers grappling with this question in both Washington and Moscow. Michael Palmer brings one such conception of a global war to life, with an unusual twist—his work explicitly deals with the war that never was.

The book opens with an intriguing premise (and one that could come true). At the end of the 1990s a Russian Navy captain studying at the U.S. Naval War College undertakes a comparative analysis of Soviet and American war planning circa 1989 in collaboration with a U.S. Navy student. It leads to a massive "Global" (the annual high-level war game at the College), involving many of the world's military and political leaders. The Russian, who is not subjected to

the same publishing restrictions as the American military, signs a book contract to tell the story of that war.

Because of Palmer's background as author of *Stoddert's War*, *Origins of the Maritime Strategy*, and *Guardians of the Gulf*, and his years at the Naval Historical Center, it is not surprising that he focuses on the naval war and (remember that this is based on 1989 planning and capabilities) follows the Maritime Strategy's prescriptions for U.S. naval operations. Thus you can expect aggressive, early, and forward deployment of carriers, horizontal escalation to a global war, and a fair share of amphibious assaults. This scenario may be music to the ears of some readers, but I am waiting for the novel that ends the insubstantial debate over "coalition warfare versus maritime strategy" that so dominated the mid-1980s.

Although Palmer's account of the war game captivated me, I found a portion of the epilogue most intriguing. Through the voice of the Russian captain, Palmer argues that "the Cold War was . . . the equivalent of sea anemones fighting for a rock . . . a sort of slow-motion world war. But if it was on video, and if we could fast forward the Cold War . . . we would see it for what it really was—a very deadly conflict." And the resulting total collapse of the Soviet Union was "far worse than any of the scenarios dreamed up by your think tanks, or even the minds of your fiction writers"—a gift of insight at the end of an enjoyable read.

All in all, one cannot miss whiling away a rainy Saturday with Palmer's novel. Be warned, however. The reader will likely find points of disagreement

with Palmer's scenario. I, for one, found his "war" too optimistic from the U.S. perspective. For example, Palmer has forty-four U.S. Navy amphibious ships with about fifty-thousand Marines embarked already at sea on the opening day of the war. But I cannot reject his thinking out of hand, since, when the pundits talked of massive casualties on the eve of Desert Storm, Palmer only wondered whether the U.S. had enough military police deployed to handle all the Iraqis who would surrender. Well, he turned out to be right on that one. For this one, happily we will have to rely on dueling novelists to tell us the story of the war that never was.

ADAM B. SIEGEL
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Bathurst, Robert B. *Intelligence and Mirror: On Creating an Enemy*. London: Sage for the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1993. 131pp.
(No price given)

Robert Bathurst is a former faculty member of the U.S. Naval War College, a well known author, and a former intelligence officer in Moscow. This book is his attempt to answer why, despite enormous investments, U.S. intelligence still hasn't got it right. He states that the intelligence community must understand the important role that culture plays when gathering intelligence, and that not until then will it improve. To make his case, the author offers examples of intelligence analysis from the Cold War.

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Russia's history demonstrates its need to build fences—what is inside is known and safe, danger and the unknown lurk outside. Hence, geography plays a controlling role in Russia's strategy. In the late 1960s the Soviets feared Western naval capabilities to cross their sea borders, led by U.S. aircraft carriers. They concluded, however, that aircraft carriers were vulnerable to attack out at sea. Therefore, Bathurst explains, the 1970 *Okean* exercise was designed to influence the U.S. to stop building carriers by demonstrating the Soviet capability to destroy them in the open oceans. The response, however, was quite different from what the Soviets had intended—The U.S. built more and bigger carriers designed to stand up to the Soviets and deter war. The Soviets did not understand the centrality of the aircraft carrier to the United States Navy; instead of reducing the threat to their homeland, they had increased it.

On other occasions, however, the Soviets were more successful, deliberately manipulating data they knew was sought after by the Americans. When the commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, published writings that sounded like those of Alfred T. Mahan, the U.S. found a voice it could understand. Gorshkov's words were scoured and analyzed and cross-checked with other evidence. The Soviets learned what the West took seriously and provided it with enough data to keep legions of analysts employed.

Another example offered by Bathurst is that it appeared to the U.S. that the Soviet Navy intended to withhold

the bulk of its forces and fight in "bastions" close to its homeland. The author claims that this assumption was wrong—the Soviets planned to disperse their submarines to the Northern fjords. Yet at the time, the best minds in the West believed they had cracked the Soviet "enigma" and provided good and accurate intelligence. Why did the Soviets encourage incorrect conclusions? Was it merely to deceive the West into making operational war plans to fight in areas where the Soviets did not intend to be? The consequences of their deception included the Maritime Strategy, which was a concept for war that would have brought the U.S. Navy directly off the shores of the Soviet Union. But the U.S. did not know then what it apparently knows today, that the Soviets intended to use nuclear weapons from the outset of any war. The bastion assumptions underpinning the Maritime Strategy would have been undercut, and funding for anti-Soviet programs might have ended. Did the Soviets know how their messages would be interpreted?

While most of the book is concerned with what was and still is wrong with intelligence analysis, Bathurst does offer some suggestions about how the U.S. might do better. He believes that the military is in need of foreign-area officers whose education would include the culture, geography, and ethnic loyalties of the area of their specialty—more than the rudiments of the intelligence cycle and military capabilities. He also notes that promotion in the intelligence community comes from administrative and not substantive achievement.

Where substance is addressed, the culture of intelligence encourages warnings of possible danger rather than predictions of stability. Bathurst also offers cautions about the American bias for technology, which ignores the human and especially the emotional elements of intelligence. The danger is that one day the U.S. may demonstrate its technological prowess against an unsophisticated foe who simply will not be impressed.

Although *Intelligence and Mirror* is not an easy read, it is worth the effort and the attention of the serious scholar who shares Bathurst's vision for peace.

JAMES J. TRITTEN
Norfolk, Virginia

Alexander, Joseph H. and Barnett, Merrill L. *Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare 1945-1991*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 292pp. \$32.95

Amphibious warfare experienced a "golden age" during the Second World War when the ability to project ground forces along an enemy coastline at a point of one's choosing realized one of the greatest advantages of seapower. As Liddell Hart observed, it was allied amphibious power that compelled Hitler to remove forces from the Eastern Front and disperse them from Norway to Greece. The European theater showed that the centuries-old British practice against militarily stronger continental enemies (the "British way in warfare") was still of value in an era of air and mechanized forces.

The authors demonstrate that although in the Cold War the "golden age" was over and the period provided few examples of amphibious operations on the scale of World War II, it was not necessarily a time of stagnation. Indeed, as stated in the Navy and Marine Corps white paper ". . . From the Sea," emphasis on conducting littoral warfare in the post-Cold War era rests on the strong foundation of Cold War amphibious operations. Operational maneuver from the sea, the most recent concept development in amphibious warfare, is based upon technical and doctrinal developments that preceded the fall of communism, and cannot be understood without reference to those antecedents. The model of operational maneuver from the sea is, for the Marines, not a World War II invasion but, in fact, the Seoul-Inchon campaign of 1950.

This book was written by two Marine Corps officers who offer an informative account of amphibious operations, primarily by the U.S. but also by its allies, opponents, and others, between its "golden age" and the "new age." (It includes an excellent seventeen-page bibliography.) Alexander and Barnett demonstrate that progress has been uneven, due in large part to block obsolescence of World War II-era ships, and that obstacles now considered threats to amphibious operations, such as missiles, mines, and weapons of mass destruction, actually have been of major concern since 1945. Indeed, they attribute General Omar Bradley's 1949 statement that future amphibious operations were unlikely to the realization that an armada like that which was anchored off

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Normandy would be a very tempting target for an atomic bomb.

However, Bradley's statement was overtaken by too many trends of the Cold War. First, no major Cold War amphibious operation was undertaken against an opponent armed with weapons of mass destruction, and second, amphibious planners strove to develop systems and tactics to reduce vulnerability to such weapons. The search for an "over the horizon" capability began even before Inchon. Operation theory and execution experienced incremental but continuous changes, so that the amphibious operation of 1991 had small resemblance to those of 1945. On the other hand, since the governing joint doctrinal publication on amphibious operations (Joint Publication 3-02) is mostly based on experiences of World War II, the impression persists that little is new since then.

There are some minor errors which detract from the overall value of the book. For instance, between 1945 and 1950 the World War II amphibious fleet was not gutted by sales of surplus ships to "Third World allies"—Third World allies did not exist at that time. Also, the LCVP is not a "Peter" but a "Papa" boat; the *Paul Revere*-class LPAs were converted *Mariner*-class breakbulk ships, not converted container ships; a helicopter is described as having a design speed of "one hundred knots per hour"; and there were not two U.S. divisions in the Korean battle line by the end of June 1950—Task Force Smith, an understrength 24th Infantry Division battalion with some artillery, did not enter combat until 5 July 1950. Further, it is stated that Major General Ned

Almond and the Army planners of "Chromite" (the Inchon invasion) casually dismissed the Marines' protests for the bridge equipment they would need to cross the Han to take Seoul; since the Marines did cross the Han and take Seoul, the reader is left wondering how they did it. Also, one reads that Chief of Naval Operations Forrest Sherman "shifted his support against the [Inchon] operation to the argument in favor of MacArthur's bold stroke." Better editing would have Sherman "shifting his opposition to support of" Chromite.

WALTER J. JOHANSON
Yonkers, New York

Marolda, Edward, J. *By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia*. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1994. 416pp. \$43

In recent years, the Naval Historical Center has made a conscientious effort to produce historical volumes with greater popular appeal than the specialized monographs and document collections that have always been its forte. *By Sea, Air, and Land* is the epitome of this approach and, by all standards of evaluation, a great success. Combining a richly illustrated, "keep on top of the coffee table" look with solid, well written history, this book is a proud and worthy tribute to the Navy veterans of the Vietnam conflict.

Armed with over five hundred black-and-white and color photographs and useful maps and charts, this work follows the Navy involvement in

Southeast Asia both chronologically and by activity. In fact, every naval community involved is discussed or depicted—from Seabees to chaplains, from harbor pilots to pig breeders (civic action personnel). The photographs selected are both historically illustrative and representative, and as a collection they are of prize-winning quality. Likewise, the marriage between word and image is a fruitful one.

Unlike other attempts to explain the naval operations in Vietnam, the author's approach is not piecemeal. The carrier air bombing campaign, the surface gun line, the amphibious, logistics and sealift efforts, and the river war are all placed in context as a cohesive and mutually supporting whole. Quite frankly, the book is more understandable than the actual Vietnam strategy itself, and it benefits from the fact that Marolda has previously written more scholarly works on the subject. No footnotes here, but there is an excellent selected bibliography for the reader who is interested in acquiring more depth in the subject.

While much of the history presented is as upbeat as any interpretation of a lost war could possibly be, controversy is not altogether avoided. For example, the author has included mention of Vice Admiral James Stockdale's interpretation of the incident that prompted the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, i.e., that the attack did not really happen. Marolda, basing his views on ship's logs and tracking data, has long held that the reported North Vietnamese attack probably did occur.

Those of us who have heard the running Stockdale-Marolda debate

(usually conducted by proxy) at historical conferences have an appreciation for the author's intellectual honesty, shown by his inclusion of the alternative interpretation. I hope that does not mean future conferences will be boring! As a side note, the Stockdale version, based on his pilot's-eye view, has frequently been backed by the former editor of the *Naval War College Review*, Bob Laske, who was an intelligence officer near the scene.

However that may be, the book's best attribute is that it is not geared to the professional historian; it is more "user friendly" than that. As the "cruise book" they never got, *By Sea, Air, and Land* would appeal to every Navy Vietnam veteran, and it is also an excellent introduction to recent naval history for their children and grandchildren. The pictures will retain anyone's interest, and the text is a great source for student term papers.

If you served as a sailor in Southeast Asia or know someone who did, *By Sea, Air, and Land* is definitely the book you want.

SAM J. TANGREDI
Commander, U.S. Navy

Hemingway, Al. *Our War Was Different: Marine Combined Action Platoons in Vietnam*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994. 189pp. \$25

One could dismiss this book as a series of unrelated vignettes about the Marine Corps Combined Action Program in Vietnam, but that would be a mistake. It is a unique book: a bit of a collage, but with structure, it provides first-hand

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accounts of the war by members of the combined-action Marines. A brief biography of each person interviewed is given.

Hemingway divides the book into three components: origins of the program, 1965–1967; Tet, 1968; and the wind-down, 1969–1971. He presents a brief overview of each period, followed by a series of interviews with those who served in some capacity with the Combined Action Program. Unfortunately, the author provides little information about his methodology. One gets the feeling that the interviews were the result of chance rather than scientific sampling. Nevertheless, Hemingway makes good use of the available literature, such as the official histories, supplemented with references to works by those who were there, as well as a mixture of original sources.

Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, Retired, one of the most important supporters of combined action, wrote the foreword. He convincingly makes the case that the program's emphasis on the people in the countryside stands in stark contrast to the search and destroy strategy of the larger units, formulated by General William Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

Beginning in August 1965, a squad of Marines and a Navy Corpsman were sent to the South Vietnamese Popular Forces (PF) and Regional Forces (RF) units located in the myriads of hamlets and villages surrounding various Marine bases. The concept behind the program was that by their example and discipline, the Marines would teach basic military tactics to the poorly trained

militia. In return, information would be traded about the local terrain, the society, and the communist forces. In 1969 and early 1970, at the height of the program, the combined-action force consisted of four groups, twenty companies, and over two thousand Marines and corpsmen serving in 114 combined-action platoons. Considering that the Marine strength was at its highest point in 1968 (approximately 80,000 out of a total force of nearly 500,000 American troops), this was indeed a relatively small investment of men.

After reading the twenty-seven interviews, I was left with mixed impressions. To a large extent, outside the fact that all the interviewees were in one way or the other connected with the Combined Action Program, there is no unifying theme. Most of the former Marines are divided about their feelings about the Vietnamese. Some describe them as useless, undisciplined, and not to be trusted—some actually tell about armed confrontations between the PFs and the Marines. For the most part, however, most of the Marines had some sympathy for the Vietnamese rural population, and despite references to “gooks,” several of the program members refer to themselves as “gook lovers.” One even states that “we [Americans] were the gooks. We were foreigners in their land.”

Was combined action the harbinger of a strategy that if extended nationwide might have won the war, or was it merely a futile gesture in a failed war that should never have been fought? Neither Hemingway nor his Marines can agree on an answer.

In a brief concluding section, Hemingway argues that similar units have a potential that should be considered by military planners for future U.S. low-intensity conflicts, but he does acknowledge that the Vietnam experience was very mixed—the Marines never came near to pacifying the countryside.

These oral histories are the book's core, and their ring of authenticity compensates for the author's rather lackluster analysis. Yet despite its limitations, this work has obvious value for both the military historian and the military professional.

JACK SHULIMSON
Marine Corps Historical Center

Anderson, Burton, F. *We Claim the Title*. Aptos, Calif.: Tracy Publishing, 1994. 428pp. \$14.95

Korea, 1950 to 1953. Is it "the Forgotten War"? I think not. While not nearly as well publicized as World War II, which preceded it, or Vietnam, which followed it, the Korean War is nonetheless well represented in hundreds of books, dozens of which cover the major battles and developments of the war quite nicely. With few exceptions, however, most of those books are about grand strategy and the overall conduct of the war—precious few have managed to capture the essence of small unit actions or the stuff of war in foxholes. *We Claim the Title* does exactly that. It stands as an important contribution to the literature of the Korean War.

Korea is often cited as America's first limited war, at least in the modern era.

It was limited geographically to the Korean Peninsula, limited in terms of American national commitment (the U.S. maintained a very cautious watch on developments in Europe during the entire conflict), and limited in the use of weapons (most notably the U.S. decision not to employ the atomic bomb). However, for the U.S. fighting man in a foxhole, and particularly the more than 103,000 who were wounded, nearly four thousand who were taken captive, the two thousand still unaccounted for, and the more than 54,000 who gave their lives, Korea was indeed a total war in its most brutal sense.

Anderson reconstructs that sense of brutality through the exploits of D ("Dog") Company and other small units of the 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division, from March through September 1951, the second year of the war. This timeframe is notable in that it marked the end of the "war of movement" and the beginning of the "static war" of position. The armistice talks officially began in July 1951 at Kaesong and moved to Panmunjom in October, by which time it was perfectly clear to both sides that a negotiated settlement would be hammered out along the existing battle lines (more or less astride the 38th parallel, the prewar demarcation line between North and South Korea)—hence the decision to "dig in" and wait out the talks. Artillery duels, small unit actions, patrols, and some very heated battles for hills and ridges occurred during the last two years of the war, but overall, Korea became a battlefield reminiscent of World War I trench warfare. And just as in the earlier

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war, Korea too would take its toll in casualties to the very end.

At his request, Anderson's family saved many of the letters he wrote home from Korea. Forty years later he would fulfill his quest to document his "rite of passage" as a combat Marine in Korea. The title of the book was inspired by the last line of the Marine Corps hymn, "We are proud to claim the title of United States Marine."

This work is as much about being a Marine as it is about the war in Korea. Early chapters chronicle a unique and emotionally powerful process—the transition from civilian to "boot" to Marine. Anderson's close ties to his boot camp experiences were reinforced during the reunion of "Platoon I-65," which he chronicles at the end of the book. The reunion, bringing together a number of individuals bonded in combat, undoubtedly added fuel to Anderson's burning desire to write this book. I believe this is a book that Anderson had to write. It is a book that other Korean vets will want to read, and it is a book that those of us who were not there *should* read.

DALLACE L. MEEHAN
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American Military University

Legro, Jeffrey W. *Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1995. 255pp. \$35

War is violence pushed to the extreme. It is a time when nation seeks to destroy nation, the destruction of the enemy is paramount, and moderation is illogical.

Why is it then that warring nations cooperate and agree to refrain from using certain types of violence?

Jeffrey Legro is assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota. In this new book he presents an academic analysis of the dynamics of violence-restraint exhibited during World War II. Despite the perception of World War II as a total war, it offered remarkable examples of restraint between combatants.

Prior to the outbreak of World War II, all the major powers had strong negative views about the use of unrestricted submarine warfare, strategic bombing, and chemical warfare. However, after the war began, restraint and cooperation took some surprising forms. In spite of Hitler's desire to avoid provoking Britain, he unleashed the German campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare. Although the British could have done the same, they did not. The United States launched its own unrestricted submarine warfare campaign against the Japanese, yet the Japanese never considered doing the same. Excepting some isolated incidents, Legro claims the Germans did not use strategic bombing during the war. Yet the British, although outnumbered and more vulnerable, initiated strategic bombing against Germany as early as 1940. The restriction against the use of chemical warfare was observed by all major combatants throughout the war. Why?

In his analysis, Legro applies the three theories of cooperation—realism, institutionalism, and organizational culture—to determine which is most influential on national

decision making with respect to war-time restraint.

The realism theory of cooperation fits in nicely with the theory of chaos of nations, so loved by political scientists. It is the traditional view of national security wherein restraint is related only to a nation's perception of advantage or disadvantage; escalation or restraint of violence is balanced against the warring nation's "survival at the expense of all other objectives." Institutionalism describes wartime cooperation using the model that nations are not unitary and anarchic but rather a "collective of entities" whose behavior is shaped by such universally accepted rules and norms as treaties, protocols, and accords. But Legro believes that the third theory, organizational culture, is the driving force behind cooperation and restraint between warring nations; specifically, he identifies a nation's political and military cultures, both of which are very powerful influences on national decision making.

Legro's application of each theory of cooperation to the forms of combat used during World War II reveals, however, that all three theories played a significant role in the limitation of violence. Whatever restraint was observed was not based on benevolence toward mankind but on the pure calculation of gain or loss for each combatant.

This is an interesting work that brings to light a fascinating subject. Yet shifting motives and resources, point and counterpoint, and inadvertent escalation will always conspire to make war one of the most unpredictable phenomena known to man.

WILLIAM D. BUSHNELL
Brunswick, Maine

Horne, Alistair with David Montgomery. *Monty: The Lonely Leader, 1944-1945*. New York: Harper Collins, 1994. 381pp. \$25

This is one of the plethora of books published in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of the climactic year of World War II. Yet because the principal subject of the book is British, in all probability it is less likely to be read by an American audience, which would be unfortunate because Bernard Law Montgomery was one of the most important military commanders responsible for the final campaigns against Hitler's Third Reich. There are no end of insights here, into both the strategic conduct of U.S. European campaigns and British perceptions of senior American generals, in particular Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The principal author, Alistair Horne, is a first-rate British military historian and a superb writer: recall for example, *The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916* and *To Lose a Battle: France, 1940*. Horne's coauthor is General Montgomery's son David, from whom the idea for the book evolved when he decided to retrace his father's journey from Normandy to the end of the war. Their research involved visiting all twenty-eight sites that were occupied by the Field Marshal's command post between June 1944 and May 1945.

However, this book is no encomium. Horne was entirely free to express himself, and the result is a balanced treatment of a brilliant soldier, who was arrogant,

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testy, enigmatic, and the proponent of some very controversial strategic concepts. Although the authors summarize Montgomery's earlier career, to include the campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, the book is mainly concerned with his role as commander of the 21st Army Group in northwest Europe between 1944 and 1945.

The story line follows the well known chronology from D-Day and the fierce fighting in Normandy (*OVERLORD*), to the breakout and those heady August days of 1944. Then came the terrible blunders of the *MARKET GARDEN* attack (the bridge too far) and the dark December of the Battle of the Bulge. Less extensively covered are the last phases of the war: the battle to the Rhine and the final breakout—the *Götterdämmerung* of the Third Reich and its military forces.

The key issues of each battle were different, and it is around those issues that the book revolves, focusing on Monty's reactions to problems and his solutions. The authors' original contribution is to treat Montgomery in the context of his life style (austere) and daily contacts (warm but didactic) with his immediate staff—particularly his young liaison officers, who became his forward eyes and reported back to him in person each evening.

With regard to Monty's role as the senior ground force commander, perhaps the most interesting aspect developed here is his relationship with Eisenhower, whom he seemed to regard as a necessary evil inflicted by the Americans, who were by now, of course, the major contributor of manpower and resources to the war effort.

He kept Ike and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, at a distance, which led to many misunderstandings on both sides. Though in the end the overall objectives were accomplished, couldn't it have happened sooner and with far fewer casualties? The answer is probably yes, and Ike and some of his subordinates, in particular Omar Bradley and George Patton, must share responsibility, along with Montgomery.

The issues discussed can be viewed in two categories: decision making and the strategic decisions themselves. In the process of decision making there was the perennial question of command arrangements. As it worked out, Monty was the ground force commander until Ike took over on 1 September 1944 (at which point Churchill promoted Montgomery to Field Marshal to help assuage the blow). Subsequently, during the Battle of the Bulge, Monty of necessity headed a large part of Bradley's army group and was reluctant to return it to the American general at the end of the battle.

Regarding strategic decisions there was the overriding question of Ike's "broad front," which prevailed, versus Monty's concept of the narrow thrust. This latter issue had many corollaries, such as whether the Allies' goal should include Berlin, and whether unconditional surrender was counterproductive past a certain point. One of the book's important contributions is its blend of the process of decision making with the substantive outcome of the strategic decisions themselves, followed by a balanced evaluation.

Some of the authors' judgments are:

- Monty never lost a battle . . . and never forfeited the affection of his soldiers or the respect of his officers.

- Without an Ike to weld the coalition together, and keep it together, and without a Monty to convert OVERLORD from a blueprint into reality, victory might never have been achieved.

- OVERLORD was basically Monty's plan . . . which brought about the victory in Normandy . . . and brought the allied armies to the frontier of Germany. Without the grinding battles of Monty's Anglo-Canadians, Patton would never have made his triumphant, almost painless, scamper across France.

- As for the still unresolved issue of broad front versus narrow thrust, the verdict remains unproven with the balance tilting away from Monty.

Horne and Montgomery's book is not intended to be a comprehensive biography. That was done in the 1980s by Nigel Hamilton in his special three-volume effort, which was summarized and published as *Monty* by Random House in 1994. This book is superbly written, interesting, nicely focused, and balanced. Monty was indeed, as the subtitle states, "the lonely leader." He was also one of the few Great Captains of the twentieth century.

DOUGLAS KINNARD
Professor Emeritus
University of Vermont

Alabama Press, 1993. 453pp. (No price given)

The biggest task the U.S. Navy attempted during the Civil War was to blockade the South's ports and thus halt the flow of guns, ammunition, and other supplies the Confederate armies needed to survive and fight.

Numbed by the fact that the country it served had broken into two hostile parts, at first the Navy stumbled. However, after President Lincoln proclaimed the blockade, the Navy gained in vigor and self-confidence; but it was unjustified self-confidence, because the Navy was profoundly unprepared to face the task before it. The problems were those, first, of distance—the hostile stretch from Brownsville, Texas, to the Virginia Capes was enormous; second, of logistics—each ship off an enemy port needed constantly to be replenished, repaired, and, in the new age of steam, refueled; third, of ships—eventually hundreds would prove necessary, whereas when the war opened the Navy had only dozens; and finally, of men—those that had been sufficient to man forty-odd ships were not enough for nearly fifteen times that number.

Quickly the Navy organized its main seagoing force into four separate blockading squadrons: the East and West Gulf and the North and South Atlantic. *From Cape Charles to Cape Fear* focuses on the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, whose responsibilities lay between the lower Chesapeake and North Carolina's southern border. Robert Browning, historian of the U.S. Coast Guard, describes the pivotal struggle in Hampton Roads in 1862 (which was a long drawn-out series of operations in the James River that ended only with the

Browning, Robert M., Jr. *From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War*. Tuscaloosa, Ala.: Univ. of

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war's end); the operationally incomplete campaign in the North Carolina sounds; and the attempt to close the port of Wilmington, North Carolina, to enemy traffic, which was not fully successful until the capture of Fort Fisher near the end of the war.

Browning's choice of subject is first-rate, for until now, no one had concentrated an entire book on the problems, failures, and accomplishments of any of the four blockading squadrons, and thus none have been able to dig deeply and broadly enough to explore the roots of the blockade's problems, failures, and successes.

When the war began, most of the Navy's ships were deep-draft seagoing vessels with a full suit of sails; half of them also had auxiliary steam with which to maneuver when the wind failed. As it turned out, only the steamers proved useful, but the most powerful drew too much to play a big part in the shoal-water struggle. So a whole new fleet of shallow-draft steamers had quickly to be designed and built, and until they were ready the Navy had to make do by arming small merchant steamers and harbor ferries. With such inadequate instruments of war the Navy penetrated the South's rivers and sounds. With them it also tried to carry out the blockade. Although ill suited, they drove the efficient, capacious, slow-sailing merchant vessels out of the trade with southern ports. But Rebel entrepreneurs and their British commercial allies replaced the sailing ships with slender, shallow-draft, low-freeboard, swift and handy steamers. Though able to carry only a small load, these ships had a much better

chance of getting that load to its destination than did any sailing ship.

One of the most useful things that Browning does is to make plain that though the blockaders found steam to be indispensable, it was also a great weakness that the Navy was never able to overcome. The difficulty lay in the fact that the engines of those days were so inefficient and unreliable, and the engineers so inexperienced, that the small blockading ships had hardly returned to their stations from the fuel dock or the repair yard when they had to go back again for one reason or another. Thus though the squadrons would have a lot of ships, few would be on station at any one time. To stretch their endurance, blockaders often anchored; but then, of course, especially at night, they were unready to apprehend a swiftly moving blockade runner.

In bringing to the fore these long hidden issues that were central to the course of the Civil War, Browning performs a major service. But his work suffers from some problems, most of them unnecessary. The book reads like a first draft, not a finished product. Its organization, with later events described before earlier ones, is confusing. Some of the sentences are incomplete, and the author misuses words: "illusive" cannot substitute for "elusive," nor "movement" for "maneuver." The word "terrain" means one thing, "waters" means another, and "gunboat" describes neither a sloop of war nor a monitor. Big, bold statements such as that in eastern Virginia "the navy kept communications open between the army and its supply bases, made a safe movement of

troops possible, and, more importantly, made their weak positions strong," deserve support and elaboration. Other statements, such as the "*Delaware* moved to the wharf and prepared to anchor," leave one with the sense that the sea is a foreign place to the author. There are numerous maps that are clearly marked but lack many of the place-names mentioned in the text, and not one has a scale—one must guess, or seek out an atlas, to determine the distances. A good editor could have spared both the author and his publisher such embarrassments.

Still, Browning keeps getting better, and if his early chapters were as good as his last two they would have been very good indeed. Most importantly, those who have read this book will better understand the Civil War.

FRANK UHLIG, JR.
Naval War College

Taylor, John M. *Confederate Raider: Raphael Semmes of the Alabama*. New York: Brassey's, 1994. 317pp. \$24.95

John Maxwell Taylor, author of several well received biographies, has written an objective and critical biography of Raphael Semmes, the "daring," "petulant," "flinty," mustache-twisting skipper of CSS *Sumter* and CSS *Alabama*. "The most successful practitioner of the naval strategy of commerce raiding," Semmes was lionized by Southerners as "the Stonewall Jackson of the sea" and scorned by Northerners as a pirate.

Do we really need another biography of Semmes? Surprisingly, the

answer is yes. Although several biographers have already written about him, their works are either stilted in style, pro-Southern in outlook, or not comprehensive.

Taylor has done a marvelous job filling in the gaps on the life of the Confederate Navy's most colorful character. Born in Maryland, Semmes pursued a dual career as a U.S. naval officer and lawyer. During the Mexican War he lost his ship, the *Somers*, in a storm. He "went south" during the Civil War because he viewed the struggle as a holy war of good against evil—the exploitative, intolerant "puritans."

The bulk of the book covers the cruises of the *Sumter* and the *Alabama*, during which Semmes personally accounted for 36 percent of the U.S. merchant ships destroyed by Confederate raiders. After the war Semmes worked as a college professor, newspaper editor, and lawyer, and became the "first citizen" of Mobile, Alabama.

Some readers might be disappointed that the book does not address broader questions, such as whether Semmes's actions had any subsequent impact on maritime law. However, Taylor does just what a biographer is supposed to do—focus on his subject. Rather than develop a thesis or central argument, Taylor concentrates on Semmes's personality and exploits and does not fall into the biographer's trap of becoming too fond of his subject. The author's writing is lively and engaging. He has a knack for using just the right anecdote to illustrate his point. For example, Semmes could be a hypocrite. His Mexican War memoir denounced commerce raiders crewed by foreigners,

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yet the crew of the *Alabama* consisted almost entirely of Englishmen. Also, Semmes probably lied about having no knowledge of the *Kearsarge's* chain armor before leading the *Alabama* into battle with the Union warship. Semmes's greatest flaws were his pride and his arrogance, but he did remarkably well with the *Alabama's* drunken, mutinous, desertion-prone crew, whose actions reinforced his view of sailors as lazy and morally corrupt.

But several errors of fact mar Taylor's otherwise admirable book. For instance, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles was not "abysmally ignorant of naval matters" in 1861 as Taylor declares, and Captain Franklin Buchanan of the CSS *Virginia* sent two Union vessels to the bottom at Hampton Roads, belying Taylor's statement that "in defeating the *Hatteras* [Semmes] became the only Confederate captain to sink an enemy warship." In providing background for the decision to fight the *Kearsarge*, Taylor states that Semmes "knew little of the destructive potential of Winslow's eleven-inch guns." This is doubtful. The eleven-inch Dahlgren had appeared onboard U.S. Navy ships in the late 1850s and on the eve of the Civil War enjoyed a reputation in the service as the world's most powerful naval cannon. Several other such errors, a few typos, the absence of a bibliography, and the lack of a map showing the routes of Semmes's cruises also detract from the book.

These matters aside, Taylor has done a fine job. Not only does he include all the color and romance one would expect in a biography of Semmes, but he also answers the most significant questions

surrounding him. The "critical factor" in Semmes's decision to fight the *Kearsarge* was his "aggressive personality." As for commerce raiding, Semmes believed that if Confederate cruisers could sufficiently damage the U.S. merchant marine, the North's shipping interest would force Lincoln to sue for peace. The fact that commerce raiding had little effect on the North's war-making potential was not only "irrelevant" but also "by no means clear" at the time. "If the war could be won by embarrassing the government in Washington," concludes Taylor, "the Confederate cruisers were every bit as successful as Jeb Stuart's cavalymen and John Mosby's raiders."

In sum, Taylor's splendid book is the definitive biography of Raphael Semmes.

ROBERT J. SCHNELLER, JR.
Naval Historical Center

Hebb, David Delison. *Piracy and the English Government, 1616-1642*. Studies in Naval History. Aldershot, U.K.: Scolar Press, and Brookfield, Vt.: Ashfield Publishing, 1994. 303pp. \$69.95

Piracy was a major problem for England in the early seventeenth century. While some might have characterized England as a nation of pirates, it was more true to say that English merchants, particularly those trading in the Mediterranean, were victims of piracy. English ships were not the lone targets, however; piracy had become a general problem, and the major threat was from the North African states. In 1616, Algiers

had even broken out of the Mediterranean Sea and launched an attack on Santa Maria in the Azores, kidnapping hundreds of the island's inhabitants. In this early period, the Navy and the nation were not yet organized in ways that were responsive to a type of threat that has become commonplace in our modern world.

This historical study provides insight into the difficult process that the English government went through, as king, council, and ministers worked with the Navy to organize an effective response. In 1621 a naval expedition under Sir Robert Mansell sailed against Algiers, but it accomplished little except to demonstrate that such problems were not easily solved. Mansell's attempt employed a flawed strategy, lacked a well focused tactical objective, and was improperly supplied.

Problems with piracy continued to increase, and the government next tried diplomacy rather than force to achieve its object. The famous diplomat Sir Thomas Roe undertook an embassy to the Ottoman Empire, attempting to use Turkish pressure on its client states in North Africa to negotiate the release of captured Englishmen. Eventually, he was able to negotiate a temporary peace on the payment of a moderate bribe and arrange for the release of some 240 Englishmen from captivity.

In the 1630s a new threat arose when Sallee became the center of piratical activity, as it threw off whatever restraint had been in place from the Ottoman sultan and Morocco. The government in London turned once again to naval force and sent an expedition under Captain

William Rainsborough. Better equipped than Mansell by virtue of a recent naval expansion, Rainsborough was completely successful, forcing the surrender of Sallee and the release of three hundred prisoners.

Hebb's fascinating account illustrates the evolutionary development of the English government as it began to refine its approach and management, linking diplomacy, naval administration, and naval operations to deal with a serious foreign policy issue. The solutions were transitory but showed marks of later, more mature development. His examination of this subject has made an interesting contribution to English naval history.

Readers of this journal will also be particularly interested in a further point that Hebb makes. Pages 107–122 constitute a detailed critique of Sir Julian Corbett's study of the Mansell expedition of 1621, presented in Corbett's two-volume study, *England in the Mediterranean* (1904). Carefully re-examining the evidence that Corbett used, Hebb determines that an important part of Corbett's conclusions was unjustified. In this specific case, Hebb shows that the pressing strategic problem that Germany presented to England at the time that Corbett wrote inadvertently shaped and colored Corbett's interpretation. "To make the past serve the present, he had first to remake the past," Hebb concludes.

Hebb's work will interest present-day readers for its resonance with recent world events. It makes an important contribution to history, not only for the new material that Hebb brings to light but also for his well founded revisionist

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views and his evaluation of Corbett's historical work in one particular instance.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Levathes, Louise. *When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405-33*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. 252pp. \$23

Between 1405 and 1433 Admiral Zheng He of China led seven trading and flag-showing voyages for the Ming emperor Zhu Di through the East Indies to India, the Persian Gulf, and the East Coast of Africa. Zheng He's fleets were truly remarkable, with as many as three hundred vessels, nearly thirty thousand men, and a four-hundred-foot-long, seven-masted flagship—nearly five times the waterline of Columbus's *Santa Maria*. (By any measure of distance and size, these voyages surpassed those of Columbus.) Yet in 1434 the entire enterprise collapsed abruptly, leaving little trace or impact. Sixty years before Columbus, China withdrew from world commerce, leaving it to the Europeans.

Louise Levathes, a former visiting scholar at Nanjing University in China, has done a timely and scholarly service in recounting Zheng He's voyages, basing her work on original manuscripts in China. The subject of which she writes so well is little known to the ordinary student of maritime affairs, grounded (as is this reviewer) in Western maritime history. As China begins again to assert itself in world

trade and maritime affairs, Levathes's work is especially timely, reminding us that China is not a newcomer to the world stage.

There are two parallel themes in her book, both equally interesting. The first covers details of the seven voyages and of court life in the Ming dynasty. There existed a richness that is scarcely imaginable today. Silk, pearls, tea, wine, hardwoods, iron, spices, and herbs were carried and traded from China to Africa. Court life was elaborate, ritualized, and more brutal than the Medici at their height. Levathes describes all these with an eye for detail that would be the envy of the keenest society reporter.

The second theme, and the most important and interesting to the readers of this journal, is the economic and political significance of the voyages. Although the expeditions were a heavy draw on China's resources, the emperor supported them to demonstrate to China's neighbors near and far the power and majesty of Zhu Di's reign. Elaborate presents were exchanged with local rulers along the way, by which they acknowledged their position as vassals of the emperor in far China. Commemorative tablets were placed, many of which survive today, to testify to the reach of the emperor. Not infrequently Zheng He entered into local civil wars, placing on their thrones rulers who were thus beholden to the emperor. This was showing the flag, and presence, on a grand scale.

The most important part of Levathes's work is her analysis of why the later emperors and palace cliques so abruptly terminated these voyages and

why the voyages never led to exploration and colonization.

Deftly avoiding the swamps of socio-philosophy, Levathes paints a picture of a society so sure that it was the best that could possibly be that it felt no need of anything physical or intellectual from anyone else. The rulers of China believed that China's self-evident superiority would be manifest to all, and all would (and should) come to them with proper fealty.

To trade with the world in goods and ideas and to explore that world became an abomination to China's rulers. One hundred years after Zheng He's last voyage, the building of an oceangoing vessel in China was a beheading offense. Had it not been so, this review might have been written in Mandarin.

FRANK C. MAHNCKE
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Haywood, John. *Dark Age Naval Power: A Reassessment of Frankish and Anglo-Saxon Seafaring Activity*. London: Routledge, 1991. 232pp. \$45

John Haywood has produced a detailed study, originally written as a dissertation for the University of Lancaster, of early seafaring, and one of considerable importance. Students of naval history, and those who teach it, usually skim over this period for lack of solid information. Haywood provides not only details of early medieval naval history in northwestern Europe but offers a thesis as well.

The book opens with a brief introduction setting forth the purposes of the book—to write a history of Germanic

seafaring from the earliest recorded incident, a failed attack on the Romans on the Ems River in 12 B.C., through the age of Charlemagne in the ninth century. The author relies primarily on literary evidence, but where possible incorporates archaeological evidence. This approach differs from work on the succeeding Viking age, where scholarly concentration is primarily focused on ship finds. The results of this approach are revealed in chapters on early Germanic piracy and the raids of the Franks and Germans. Haywood argues correctly that the seakeeping ability of early medieval vessels was so limited that ship-to-ship battles were rare. Readers will be surprised, however, to discover the extent of naval activity during this period.

For those who hope to find answers to questions concerning the migrations of the Angles, Saxons, and other tribes to Britain, the volume both intrigues and challenges. Haywood argues that the Frisians (whose significance is deflated at the expense of the Franks) and other Germanic tribes employed sails on their ships. Although the Nydam and Utrecht ships as well as other early finds are discussed, none provide evidence to confirm use of the sail. The author does not provide a reconstruction of King Alfred's navy, but he does provide useful supplementary information to suggest that it proved successful against the Danes. The emperor Charlemagne (d. 814) and Louis the Pious receive praise for grasping the importance of naval power. They used it to great advantage in campaigns, especially on rivers, where ships were involved in


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communications, transport, and logistics.

Dark Age Naval Power provides a provocative glimpse at the dawn of Germanic seafaring. These people understood the value of a navy and

possessed an understanding of naval tactics and strategy that will surprise many readers.

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The cupola—originally the “circular observatory”—of Luce Hall, which was built for the Naval War College, in the Flemish style, in 1891–1892.