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Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post- Cold War World

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Vulliamy concludes that the international community mistakenly identifies the Bosnian conflict as a humanitarian crisis and has therefore responded to it by sending professional soldiers to care for its victims. The author suggests that a more appropriate course of action would be to give the Bosnian government the aid and weapons it needs to defend itself and prevent the atrocities in the first place.

If the peace process does result in the creation of a smaller Bosnia accompanied by Serb or Croatian cantons, what of the hatred that is sure to follow? When war crimes are committed on such a large scale and go unpunished, the victims of those crimes are not likely to forget. Bosnia's war of inhumanity will certainly make it easier for us to understand at least one reason for what will surely be the next war in the former Yugoslavia—a war of revenge. As a portrait of the war's carnage and as a prognostication for the future, *Season in Hell* is to be recommended.

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Haass, Richard N. *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994. 258pp. \$24.95

Richard N. Haass provides an excellent, brief (156 pages of text plus notes, eight appendices, and index), and concise introduction to the history of intervention, the issues surrounding its methods, and its expected future. Haass is well qualified to address this topic. He taught at Harvard University and worked with both the State and Defense departments before serving as a senior member of the National Security Council staff in the Bush administration.

This book is highly recommended for anyone in the national security community and for students of U.S. foreign policy, given the immediacy of the issue and the likelihood that in the future we

will often confront circumstances conducive to intervention.

Intervention is a more complex phenomenon than is commonly understood, and a virtue of this book is that Haass makes it understandable. He begins by reviewing the debate over intervention and recaps recent cases. He then elucidates its vocabulary, identifying fully a dozen forms of conduct ranging from deterrence and preventive measures to war. Midway within this spectrum are found those forms of intervention so recently the focus of U.S. action and public discussion: peacekeeping, peacemaking, nation-building, and humanitarian assistance. All of these are discrete activities, Haass explains, and each must be understood in order to avoid confusion of efforts and expectations.

Haass believes that no single set of precisely defined, specific, U.S. interests justifies either intervening in the affairs of another state or refusing to do so. Flexibility is crucial for responsible decision making and is essential to the formulation of a "sustainable strategy" for intervention itself. A clearly stated purpose is required, as well as a means carefully selected to meet the criteria for success. However, neither an exit date nor victory should be prerequisites for intervention; by setting such "artificial boundaries" one runs the risk of playing into the hands of adversaries. But when intervention has been decided upon, Haass calls for an early rather than late involvement, for more strength to be made available than the minimum one expects to need, and for decisive application of force rather than gradualism.

Haass argues that the U.S. must not degrade the readiness of military units that would carry out intervention or renounce the willingness to choose that option, because to do either would directly threaten U.S. interests abroad and, indirectly, threaten the quality of life at home. Potential international instability poses risks to U.S. trade and investment, "increase[s] immigration pressures, make[s] action against terrorism and narcotics-trafficking more difficult," threatens American access to needed foreign natural resources, and leads other states to build up arms. Specific threats to U.S. interests lie in the Korean peninsula and in the Persian Gulf, where the United States must remain vigilant against Iraqi or Iranian attacks upon Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or other states. The spread of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons vastly

complicates responses to political instability across the globe. Given the potential lethality of these weapons, Haass believes that to be successful in the future the U.S. will have to consider preemptive measures ("preventive missions").

Haass believes "internal interventions"—humanitarian, nation-building, and peacemaking activities—will be common in future international relations. Decisions to intervene in this way will only add to the traditional calculation of national interests the quantification of human misery. How much starvation or egregious political repression will be enough to compel humanitarian action? Haass believes that the U.S. should retain the capability to intervene unilaterally, which is most efficient for short-term incursions. But in the more complicated peacemaking and nation-building scenarios, multinational intervention is usually best.

There is evidence that this book was hurried into publication. An occasional error of fact in recounting past interventions and (infrequent) grammatical lapses are to be noted. But it is informative and timely, given the conclusion of the U.S. and United Nations intervention in Somalia, the UN presence in Haiti, and the possibility of increased intervention in the former Yugoslavia.

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