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The War That Never Was

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undesirable directions, Quandt asserts that American presidents have more power to overcome these than some of them would have believed. Most presidents have understood that fulfilling U.S. interest in maintaining the flow of oil while simultaneously assuring the survival of the state of Israel is only possible in the context of Arab-Israeli peace. It requires the continuing participation of the United States in the peace process, for the record shows that one cannot expect additional progress if those in the region are left to their own devices.

Quandt concludes on a positive note. He argues that President Clinton has better prospects for a successful policy than have many of his predecessors. Frequently in the past, the presidential paradigm placed the Middle East policy in the larger context of the bipolar superpower rivalry—much to the detriment of the peace process. The end of the Cold War and the consequent concentration on a regional concept is therefore to the good. Too, America's energy policy has improved since the October War, and Arabs and Israelis grow increasingly weary of the violence. So, perhaps there will be continued progress toward a permanent solution.

The attraction of this work is that it speaks with authority not subject to question, yielding a fairly detailed look at the Arab-Israeli problem. However, it may be more detailed than is practical for the *Naval War College Review's* audience, whose reading list is eternally too long. The book is concentrated at the grand strategy level, and there is little with direct application for the military or campaign strategy maker. It

would be most useful to the officer with a special interest in the Middle East or engaged in writing a thesis or dissertation on a related subject. *Peace Process* is a single-volume synthesis that is an excellent starting point, complete with appendices and a short bibliography. It is perhaps the most impressive survey available on American policy in the Middle East.

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author of

Land-Based Airpower in Third World Crises
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Palmer, Michael A. *The War That Never Was*. Arlington, Va.: Vandamere, 1994. 358pp. \$19.95

Have you ever wondered what would have occurred if the United States and Soviet Union had stood toe-to-toe, battling it out to the end? For decades, thousands of analysts made their careers grappling with this question in both Washington and Moscow. Michael Palmer brings one such conception of a global war to life, with an unusual twist—his work explicitly deals with the war that never was.

The book opens with an intriguing premise (and one that could come true). At the end of the 1990s a Russian Navy captain studying at the U.S. Naval War College undertakes a comparative analysis of Soviet and American war planning circa 1989 in collaboration with a U.S. Navy student. It leads to a massive "Global" (the annual high-level war game at the College), involving many of the world's military and political leaders. The Russian, who is not subjected to

the same publishing restrictions as the American military, signs a book contract to tell the story of that war.

Because of Palmer's background as author of *Stoddert's War*, *Origins of the Maritime Strategy*, and *Guardians of the Gulf*, and his years at the Naval Historical Center, it is not surprising that he focuses on the naval war and (remember that this is based on 1989 planning and capabilities) follows the Maritime Strategy's prescriptions for U.S. naval operations. Thus you can expect aggressive, early, and forward deployment of carriers, horizontal escalation to a global war, and a fair share of amphibious assaults. This scenario may be music to the ears of some readers, but I am waiting for the novel that ends the insubstantial debate over "coalition warfare versus maritime strategy" that so dominated the mid-1980s.

Although Palmer's account of the war game captivated me, I found a portion of the epilogue most intriguing. Through the voice of the Russian captain, Palmer argues that "the Cold War was . . . the equivalent of sea anemones fighting for a rock . . . a sort of slow-motion world war. But if it was on video, and if we could fast forward the Cold War . . . we would see it for what it really was—a very deadly conflict." And the resulting total collapse of the Soviet Union was "far worse than any of the scenarios dreamed up by your think tanks, or even the minds of your fiction writers"—a gift of insight at the end of an enjoyable read.

All in all, one cannot miss whiling away a rainy Saturday with Palmer's novel. Be warned, however. The reader will likely find points of disagreement

with Palmer's scenario. I, for one, found his "war" too optimistic from the U.S. perspective. For example, Palmer has forty-four U.S. Navy amphibious ships with about fifty-thousand Marines embarked already at sea on the opening day of the war. But I cannot reject his thinking out of hand, since, when the pundits talked of massive casualties on the eve of Desert Storm, Palmer only wondered whether the U.S. had enough military police deployed to handle all the Iraqis who would surrender. Well, he turned out to be right on that one. For this one, happily we will have to rely on dueling novelists to tell us the story of the war that never was.

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Bathurst, Robert B. *Intelligence and Mirror: On Creating an Enemy*. London: Sage for the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1993. 131pp.
(No price given)

Robert Bathurst is a former faculty member of the U.S. Naval War College, a well known author, and a former intelligence officer in Moscow. This book is his attempt to answer why, despite enormous investments, U.S. intelligence still hasn't got it right. He states that the intelligence community must understand the important role that culture plays when gathering intelligence, and that not until then will it improve. To make his case, the author offers examples of intelligence analysis from the Cold War.