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Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during WWII

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war, Korea too would take its toll in casualties to the very end.

At his request, Anderson's family saved many of the letters he wrote home from Korea. Forty years later he would fulfill his quest to document his "rite of passage" as a combat Marine in Korea. The title of the book was inspired by the last line of the Marine Corps hymn, "We are proud to claim the title of United States Marine."

This work is as much about being a Marine as it is about the war in Korea. Early chapters chronicle a unique and emotionally powerful process—the transition from civilian to "boot" to Marine. Anderson's close ties to his boot camp experiences were reinforced during the reunion of "Platoon I-65," which he chronicles at the end of the book. The reunion, bringing together a number of individuals bonded in combat, undoubtedly added fuel to Anderson's burning desire to write this book. I believe this is a book that Anderson had to write. It is a book that other Korean vets will want to read, and it is a book that those of us who were not there *should* read.

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Legro, Jeffrey W. *Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1995. 255pp. $35

War is violence pushed to the extreme. It is a time when nation seeks to destroy nation, the destruction of the enemy is paramount, and moderation is illogical. Why is it then that warring nations cooperate and agree to refrain from using certain types of violence?

Jeffrey Legro is assistant professor of political science at the University of Minnesota. In this new book he presents an academic analysis of the dynamics of violence-restraint exhibited during World War II. Despite the perception of World War II as a total war, it offered remarkable examples of restraint between combatants.

Prior to the outbreak of World War II, all the major powers had strong negative views about the use of unrestricted submarine warfare, strategic bombing, and chemical warfare. However, after the war began, restraint and cooperation took some surprising forms. In spite of Hitler's desire to avoid provoking Britain, he unleashed the German campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare. Although the British could have done the same, they did not. The United States launched its own unrestricted submarine warfare campaign against the Japanese, yet the Japanese never considered doing the same. Excepting some isolated incidents, Legro claims the Germans did not use strategic bombing during the war. Yet the British, although outnumbered and more vulnerable, initiated strategic bombing against Germany as early as 1940. The restriction against the use of chemical warfare was observed by all major combatants throughout the war. Why?

In his analysis, Legro applies the three theories of cooperation—realism, institutionalism, and organizational culture—to determine which is most influential on national

decision making with respect to wartime restraint.

The realism theory of cooperation fits in nicely with the theory of chaos of nations, so loved by political scientists. It is the traditional view of national security wherein restraint is related only to a nation's perception of advantage or disadvantage; escalation or restraint of violence is balanced against the warring nation's "survival at the expense of all other objectives." Institutionalism describes wartime cooperation using the model that nations are not unitary and anarchic but rather a "collective of entities" whose behavior is shaped by such universally accepted rules and norms as treaties, protocols, and accords. But Legro believes that the third theory, organizational culture, is the driving force behind cooperation and restraint between warring nations; specifically, he identifies a nation's political and military cultures, both of which are very powerful influences on national decision making.

Legro's application of each theory of cooperation to the forms of combat used during World War II reveals, however, that all three theories played a significant role in the limitation of violence. Whatever restraint was observed was not based on benevolence toward mankind but on the pure calculation of gain or loss for each combatant.

This is an interesting work that brings to light a fascinating subject. Yet shifting motives and resources, point and counterpoint, and inadvertent escalation will always conspire to make war one of the most unpredictable phenomena known to man.

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Horne, Alistair with David Montgomery. *Monty: The Lonely Leader, 1944–1945*. New York: Harper Collins, 1994. 381pp. $25

This is one of the plethora of books published in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of the climactic year of World War II. Yet because the principal subject of the book is British, in all probability it is less likely to be read by an American audience, which would be unfortunate because Bernard Law Montgomery was one of the most important military commanders responsible for the final campaigns against Hitler's Third Reich. There are no end of insights here, into both the strategic conduct of U.S. European campaigns and British perceptions of senior American generals, in particular Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The principal author, Alistair Horne, is a first-rate British military historian and a superb writer: recall for example, *The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916* and *To Lose a Battle: France, 1940*. Horne's coauthor is General Montgomery's son David, from whom the idea for the book evolved when he decided to retrace his father's journey from Normandy to the end of the war. Their research involved visiting all twenty-eight sites that were occupied by the Field Marshal's command post between June 1944 and May 1945.

However, this book is no encomium. Horne was entirely free to express himself, and the result is a balanced treatment of a brilliant soldier, who was arrogant,