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Monty: The Lonely Leader, 1944-1945

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decision making with respect to wartime restraint.

The realism theory of cooperation fits in nicely with the theory of chaos of nations, so loved by political scientists. It is the traditional view of national security wherein restraint is related only to a nation's perception of advantage or disadvantage; escalation or restraint of violence is balanced against the warring nation's "survival at the expense of all other objectives." Institutionalism describes wartime cooperation using the model that nations are not unitary and anarchic but rather a "collective of entities" whose behavior is shaped by such universally accepted rules and norms as treaties, protocols, and accords. But Legro believes that the third theory, organizational culture, is the driving force behind cooperation and restraint between warring nations; specifically, he identifies a nation's political and military cultures, both of which are very powerful influences on national decision making.

Legro's application of each theory of cooperation to the forms of combat used during World War II reveals, however, that all three theories played a significant role in the limitation of violence. Whatever restraint was observed was not based on benevolence toward mankind but on the pure calculation of gain or loss for each combatant.

This is an interesting work that brings to light a fascinating subject. Yet shifting motives and resources, point and counterpoint, and inadvertent escalation will always conspire to make war one of the most unpredictable phenomena known to man.

WILLIAM D. BUSHNELL
Brunswick, Maine

Horne, Alistair with David Montgomery. *Monty: The Lonely Leader, 1944-1945*. New York: Harper Collins, 1994. 381pp. \$25

This is one of the plethora of books published in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of the climactic year of World War II. Yet because the principal subject of the book is British, in all probability it is less likely to be read by an American audience, which would be unfortunate because Bernard Law Montgomery was one of the most important military commanders responsible for the final campaigns against Hitler's Third Reich. There are no end of insights here, into both the strategic conduct of U.S. European campaigns and British perceptions of senior American generals, in particular Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The principal author, Alistair Horne, is a first-rate British military historian and a superb writer: recall for example, *The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916* and *To Lose a Battle: France, 1940*. Horne's coauthor is General Montgomery's son David, from whom the idea for the book evolved when he decided to retrace his father's journey from Normandy to the end of the war. Their research involved visiting all twenty-eight sites that were occupied by the Field Marshal's command post between June 1944 and May 1945.

However, this book is no encomium. Horne was entirely free to express himself, and the result is a balanced treatment of a brilliant soldier, who was arrogant,

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testy, enigmatic, and the proponent of some very controversial strategic concepts. Although the authors summarize Montgomery's earlier career, to include the campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, the book is mainly concerned with his role as commander of the 21st Army Group in northwest Europe between 1944 and 1945.

The story line follows the well known chronology from D-Day and the fierce fighting in Normandy (*OVERLORD*), to the breakout and those heady August days of 1944. Then came the terrible blunders of the *MARKET GARDEN* attack (the bridge too far) and the dark December of the Battle of the Bulge. Less extensively covered are the last phases of the war: the battle to the Rhine and the final breakout—the *Götterdämmerung* of the Third Reich and its military forces.

The key issues of each battle were different, and it is around those issues that the book revolves, focusing on Monty's reactions to problems and his solutions. The authors' original contribution is to treat Montgomery in the context of his life style (austere) and daily contacts (warm but didactic) with his immediate staff—particularly his young liaison officers, who became his forward eyes and reported back to him in person each evening.

With regard to Monty's role as the senior ground force commander, perhaps the most interesting aspect developed here is his relationship with Eisenhower, whom he seemed to regard as a necessary evil inflicted by the Americans, who were by now, of course, the major contributor of manpower and resources to the war effort.

He kept Ike and Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, at a distance, which led to many misunderstandings on both sides. Though in the end the overall objectives were accomplished, couldn't it have happened sooner and with far fewer casualties? The answer is probably yes, and Ike and some of his subordinates, in particular Omar Bradley and George Patton, must share responsibility, along with Montgomery.

The issues discussed can be viewed in two categories: decision making and the strategic decisions themselves. In the process of decision making there was the perennial question of command arrangements. As it worked out, Monty was the ground force commander until Ike took over on 1 September 1944 (at which point Churchill promoted Montgomery to Field Marshal to help assuage the blow). Subsequently, during the Battle of the Bulge, Monty of necessity headed a large part of Bradley's army group and was reluctant to return it to the American general at the end of the battle.

Regarding strategic decisions there was the overriding question of Ike's "broad front," which prevailed, versus Monty's concept of the narrow thrust. This latter issue had many corollaries, such as whether the Allies' goal should include Berlin, and whether unconditional surrender was counterproductive past a certain point. One of the book's important contributions is its blend of the process of decision making with the substantive outcome of the strategic decisions themselves, followed by a balanced evaluation.

Some of the authors' judgments are:

- Monty never lost a battle . . . and never forfeited the affection of his soldiers or the respect of his officers.

- Without an Ike to weld the coalition together, and keep it together, and without a Monty to convert OVERLORD from a blueprint into reality, victory might never have been achieved.

- OVERLORD was basically Monty's plan . . . which brought about the victory in Normandy . . . and brought the allied armies to the frontier of Germany. Without the grinding battles of Monty's Anglo-Canadians, Patton would never have made his triumphant, almost painless, scamper across France.

- As for the still unresolved issue of broad front versus narrow thrust, the verdict remains unproven with the balance tilting away from Monty.

Horne and Montgomery's book is not intended to be a comprehensive biography. That was done in the 1980s by Nigel Hamilton in his special three-volume effort, which was summarized and published as *Monty* by Random House in 1994. This book is superbly written, interesting, nicely focused, and balanced. Monty was indeed, as the subtitle states, "the lonely leader." He was also one of the few Great Captains of the twentieth century.

DOUGLAS KINNARD
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Alabama Press, 1993. 453pp. (No price given)

The biggest task the U.S. Navy attempted during the Civil War was to blockade the South's ports and thus halt the flow of guns, ammunition, and other supplies the Confederate armies needed to survive and fight.

Numbed by the fact that the country it served had broken into two hostile parts, at first the Navy stumbled. However, after President Lincoln proclaimed the blockade, the Navy gained in vigor and self-confidence; but it was unjustified self-confidence, because the Navy was profoundly unprepared to face the task before it. The problems were those, first, of distance—the hostile stretch from Brownsville, Texas, to the Virginia Capes was enormous; second, of logistics—each ship off an enemy port needed constantly to be replenished, repaired, and, in the new age of steam, refueled; third, of ships—eventually hundreds would prove necessary, whereas when the war opened the Navy had only dozens; and finally, of men—those that had been sufficient to man forty-odd ships were not enough for nearly fifteen times that number.

Quickly the Navy organized its main seagoing force into four separate blockading squadrons: the East and West Gulf and the North and South Atlantic. *From Cape Charles to Cape Fear* focuses on the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, whose responsibilities lay between the lower Chesapeake and North Carolina's southern border. Robert Browning, historian of the U.S. Coast Guard, describes the pivotal struggle in Hampton Roads in 1862 (which was a long drawn-out series of operations in the James River that ended only with the

Browning, Robert M., Jr. *From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War*. Tuscaloosa, Ala.: Univ. of