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# A Contract with Central Europe

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Przemyslaw Grudzinski

**T**HE TIME HAS COME TO CONSOLIDATE the gains of the post-Cold War period. There is an urgent need to overcome the present transitional and fluid phase in European history. After the understandable hesitations of the last five years, the time is ripe to conclude a series of geopolitical deals in Europe that will overcome the legacies of the Cold War. The Central European agenda is not at all different from the European one; we have no special interests or fears. Nevertheless, at the heart of any successful rearrangement of European affairs is the modification of Central Europe's geopolitical and strategic role in the context of East-West relations. These East-West contracts would not be about Central Europe, but they should not be written over the heads of Central Europeans.<sup>1</sup> In short, this is a call for action to prevent the reemergence of Central Europe as a gray (or buffer) zone, and for establishing a realistic pattern of relations between the three constituent parts of the European system: the United States, as a European power; greater Europe, including the Central European states; and Russia, as a Eurasian regional power.

The single most important impediment to the realization of this vision is lack of interest on the part of the remaining great powers, who carry the responsibility for the management of the European state system, to accept the burdens it entails. This tendency to avoid making new commitments is not new. But it is the same tendency that led to hesitance to contain Germany in the thirties. Yesterday no one was prepared to die for Gdansk; today nobody is willing to die for Sarajevo.

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This indifferent approach can be amply documented in the present debate about current and future Western security commitments. In a commentary for the *New York Times*, Thomas L. Friedman shared the advice his father once offered him: "My daddy always said to me: 'Son, never go into a global thermo-nuclear war to protect a country you can't find on the map.'" The country Friedman had in mind was Slovakia; he went on to say, "I would bet serious money that of the members of Congress who voted to bring Slovakia into NATO there aren't 10 who could name its capital or the countries that border it."<sup>2</sup> One might ask how much they know about the geography of Portugal, Greece, or eastern Germany, all of which are fully protected under the American nuclear umbrella. Do they know where Halle is, or Rostock? Does Mr. Friedman or the many others who read his work want to die for Magdeburg?

In a nutshell, this is the same old problem of extending deterrence to cover so-called "faraway countries." Do they merit protection by security guarantees? Extended deterrence is about avoiding costly wars; it is a preventive measure. This idea worked admirably during the Cold War for Western Europe, under difficult circumstances. Why should it not work for others now, when there is no immediate threat? Why not repeat the trick that gave Western Europe years of tranquility and prosperity? The issue is not one of sacrificing American lives for Slovakia or Poland but of removing even the distant possibility of a repetition of Sarajevo in Central Europe.\* That somebody cannot find an important city on the map is less than an adequate strategic argument; sometimes one is forced to learn many awkward-sounding names when it is already too late. (But I hope that at least everybody knows where Warsaw is.)

Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War created confusion in many good minds. Richard Cohen wrote in the *Washington Post* that "Americans, too, are creatures of geography. From Kansas City, it's not only a long way to Tipperary, but it's even farther to Bratislava, the grim capital of Slovakia. How is the administration—which wants NATO expanded—going to explain to some guy in Kansas the strategic importance of Bratislava? Most Americans probably think Bratislava is a sausage. Whatever it may be it's a long way from both America and American concerns."<sup>3</sup> It is true that poor Bratislava, the object of this eloquent irony, cannot equal Budapest or Prague, but it is only an hour away from another important city in Central Europe—Vienna. Is anybody willing to erase Vienna from the list of strategic European capitals?

It is clear that the end of the bipolar order has brought with it a loss of interest in a large portion of the periphery, on the part of the most advanced Western countries. The question, however, is whether it would be unwise to write off

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\* Central Europe, for the purpose of this article, includes Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Slovakia and other states of the region. The better way is to try to make some of the "semi-peripheral" areas of Europe a part of the stable and advanced whole.

### The Geostrategic Predicament of Central Europe

Central Europe's strategic culture has been heavily influenced by its geopolitical position. In contrast to Great Britain or the United States, which both derive a great deal of strategic reassurance and comfort from their insular positions, Central Europe has had no option but to withdraw into a shell whenever it has become weak and vulnerable. But Central European geopolitics should not be mistaken for a stable, motionless environment. To the contrary, throughout modern history this part of Europe has been subject to the most sudden and dramatic shifts. The majority of states in the region are still very young as modern entities, and their most powerful neighbors have been anything but stabilizing and predictable factors. Thus, the states of Central and Eastern Europe face two contradictory sets of challenges: one is geopolitics—the permanent vulnerability of states lacking naturally defensible political habitats and borders; the second is the breathtaking pace and scale of change during the past decade.

In the thirties, Poland was—against her own aspirations, naturally—a classic buffer state. Fluctuations of power between Germany and the Soviet Union made the Polish position unstable and led finally to the fourth Polish partition, as a result of the Polish refusal to become simply a client state of either neighbor. One can argue that the realist, balance-of-power assumptions that underlie the idea of "buffer zones" and "buffer states" have now lost relevance, in the light of the changing nature of international relations. But the return to a multipolar world and in consequence to the complexities of Central European pressures and patterns of domination gives cogency to buffer-zone terminology. "It is broadly true," says a British theorist, "that politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum, and a buffer state cannot achieve security on its own. The first condition of its stability is an equivalence of political pressure from surrounding great powers; the second is a readiness on the part of distant great powers to go to war in its defense; only the third is its own strength."<sup>4</sup>

The buffer zone concept lost its relevance in August 1939, when Hitler and Stalin decided to annihilate Poland, which had been buffering both German and Soviet aspirations. After the Second World War, Central Europe was directly incorporated into the Soviet sphere of influence, and its buffer-zone role was eliminated or considerably modified for the next forty-five years. (After 1989, however, the concept resurfaced both in the West, less openly, and in the still-existing Soviet Union, more conspicuously. I shall return to this point.)

It has taken Central Europe almost half a century to regain its full independence. Central European policy makers have faced a tremendous challenge

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over the last decade, a set of strategic choices that superficially resembled those of their predecessors in the wake of the Great War. The prevailing opinion has been that the chances of avoiding a relapse to a satellite status or a permanent buffer-state position are better now than seventy years ago. Why is this so?

For one thing, Central Europe today is sandwiched not between two hostile powers but between an integrated sub-system in the West and a weak sub-system in the East. Some analysts think that with the end of the Cold War the smaller countries of Central and Eastern Europe will return to the multipolar instabilities of the prewar era and that the old balance-of-power logic will reassert itself, with disastrous consequences. But the Europe of today is not exactly the Europe of the twenties or thirties. Central Europeans themselves have been able to defy most of the gloomy forecasts.

The Central European states are reemerging as independent entities in a continent that, whatever its current problems may be, has itself been transformed by economic, political, social, and defense integration. The countries of the Visegrad Group have been quite successful in putting past grievances behind them and in creating a working partnership.\* Also, Poland and Germany, in spite of the difficult legacies of the past, have been able to establish unprecedented bonds of cooperation and trust. Similar trends in Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Lithuanian relations have stabilized the entire area. The ethnic minority problems between Hungary and Slovakia, and between Hungary and Romania, have been kept under control and do not threaten a repeat of the Yugoslav model. The former Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern Europe, in a very short time and during a difficult period of internal transition to a free market, have been able to create a zone of stability of their own. They are firmly set upon a pro-Western course, which means not only high political declarations but also so-called "anticipatory adaptation," by which these countries adopt the norms of the European Union and Nato (and act accordingly) prior actually to being accorded full status in them.

Still, one should not underestimate the danger of a restoration of the buffer-zone concept in Central Europe. Since the collapse of the Soviet empire there has been a tendency to rediscover a need for a new type of buffer zone in the area between Germany and the disintegrated Soviet Union. Richard H. Ullman was among the first to define the benefits of such a device, as early as May 1990: "There will now be a vast buffer zone between the Soviet Union and Germany that, especially when accompanied by changes in force composition to de-emphasize heavy armored vehicles, should considerably increase Western confidence in the practicability of non-offensive defense. Properly implemented, such a buffer zone—perhaps even augmented with physical

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\* The members of the Visegrad Group—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak republics—are bound by a series of political agreements to work toward union with Europe and integration with Nato.

barriers—should be the most effective confidence-building measure of all. That would obviously be the case for Western nations, who for four decades stood nose-to-nose with powerful Soviet forces at the inter-German border. But a buffer zone in Eastern Europe should be equally reassuring for the Soviet Union as well. Moscow will no longer have open-ended commitments to maintain in power unpopular client governments. And, because of the transparency of the security regime, it will know that nowhere within the region are the forces gathering that might suddenly jeopardize Soviet security.”<sup>5</sup> This statement is remarkable and revealing in its sincerity. It does not even mention the aspirations and security concerns of Central Europeans.

More significantly, similar arguments have found their way into contemporary Russian foreign policy debates. They are widely shared among those policy makers and experts who consider themselves democrats and are not unhappy about the demise of the Soviet system. They are at pains to point out that with the collapse of the Soviet European empire, Russia itself won a great victory that even transcended the relatively short-lived and costly Yalta gains. Moscow, while accepting the loss of untrustworthy and expensive allies in Central Europe, at the same time improved its strategic position. It gained a zone some 1,500 kilometers wide, whose very existence has made the concept of a renewed confrontation with the West absurd. And, as Sergei Karaganov claims, if the Western system of collective defense is not expanded to include Central and Eastern Europe, “one may assume that the existence of that semi-demilitarized zone between Russia and the West will fully eliminate the mutual perception of a threat.”<sup>6</sup>

One can easily see common elements in some of the Western and Eastern approaches to the future rule of Central Europe, and one can understand their rationale. Those in the West who think this way are motivated by the desire to contain and filter the immediate effects of instabilities within the area of the former Soviet Union. They are also reluctant to incur the double risk of integrating poor Central European relatives into the well-established Club and at the same time of risking offense to real and imagined Russian sensitivities.<sup>7</sup> But the underlying assumption is questionable. The sense of unique strategic comfort derived from a newly created buffer zone is deeply misleading. If, as is the case in Russia now, there is a perception of reassurance simply in keeping the West at arm's length, that is not a good omen for the future integration of Russia itself into Europe. How can Russia be integrated into Europe over the suffering body of Central Europe? The basic factor overlooked here is that Russia is not threatened by the West, not even potentially.

On the Russian side, the supposed historical imperative of a Central European buffer zone has found its way into official foreign policy making. The State Secretary of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Andrei Kokoshin, warned his

Western colleagues at a high-level conference in Munich that unless such a Central European buffer zone was created, "unforeseeable political consequences" would follow.<sup>8</sup> Among American foreign policy experts there have been renewed calls for a durable peace in Europe, "such as that which followed the Congress of Vienna," based on an assumption of a striking symmetry of Western and Russian interests and fears in Central Europe. "We and the Russians," writes Mark Helprin, "have in regard to these states the same interests and the same fears. Neither we nor they wish to surrender the roughly 400 miles of separation between us." His advice is that "the creation of a strong intermediary system in Europe, a belt of neutral states, should be the first priority in the foreign relations of the United States."<sup>9</sup>

Naturally, from the Central European perspective things look quite different. The role of a redefined buffer zone is not an appealing one. The conspicuous attempt of these states to join both Nato and the European Union is motivated by their historically based perception of the danger of a chronic strategic limbo, a permanent exclusion from the European mainstream. In the minds of Central Europeans, a buffer zone amounts to a very significant impediment to the overall modernization of their countries.

### The Contracts of 1945 and 1990

Contemporary European history has been the result of a series of arrangements of a partial nature, not of grand Wilsonian designs. After the failure of the Peace of Paris (the Versailles Treaty) of 1919, the most important actors have not put much faith in comprehensive solutions. Despite this established view, we have seen since 1989 an endless list of general proposals to save mankind by creating a European security architecture or a pan-European security system. I consider these attempts rather harmful, because they tend to conflict with partial but workable solutions that are actually at hand. Waiting for a comprehensive pan-European security system amounts in practice to waiting for Beckett's Godot.<sup>10</sup>

World War II and the Cold War did not simply end; they were concluded with deals. If we really want to end the transitory and shaky post-Cold War phase, we must have another deal. In the years between 1943 (the "Big Three" conferences in Tehran) and 1945 (the conferences in Yalta and Potsdam), the prime objective of the West was to avoid conflict among the victors of the war without, if at all possible, stooping to appeasement. The practical result of this unhappy series of arrangements with "Uncle Joe" Stalin was the division of Europe into spheres of influence.

As early as 1944, Winston Churchill wanted to enter into detailed negotiations with Stalin based on the foreseeable power distribution after the war. Their

face-to-face, businesslike talks in Moscow in October 1944 (in the absence of the American side) concerned the fate of five Central and Eastern European states: Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary (Poland's fate having been already sealed). On 9 October Stalin and Churchill agreed on the distribution of relative influence in these countries, expressing this agreement as percentages; during the subsequent two days their foreign ministers, Anthony Eden and V.M. Molotov, haggled over the precise numbers. Churchill accepted overwhelming Soviet control in Romania and Bulgaria in exchange for British control over Greece, and he hoped that some kind of Anglo-Soviet influence-sharing might still be possible in Hungary and Yugoslavia. Molotov struggled hard to increase Soviet influence in Hungary, while Eden preferred to talk about the Balkans. In the end Molotov won new concessions in Hungary that raised the overall Soviet influence from 50 percent to 80 percent.<sup>11</sup>

This was *realpolitik* pushed to the extreme. But what was interesting about this cynical deal was that it was complied with by Stalin after the war ended. It is true that Stalin consolidated control over territories freed by the Red Army and established Soviet presence deep in the heart of the European continent. Nevertheless, in strict conformity to the deal made with Churchill, he refrained from putting Greece under Soviet influence, contrary to the best strategic interest of the Soviet Union. As a Russian expert recently put it, "Greece would have been the most valuable geostrategic prize along with Poland, yet Stalin gave it away even though in Greece the Soviet Union had far greater opportunities to assert its influence than in Central and East European countries: a powerful Greek insurgent movement led by Communists, who took their cue from Moscow, beat seven SS and then three British divisions."<sup>12</sup> This is an outstanding example of history being made through agreements and not through outright conflict, a good precedent set by two outstanding cynics.

Even without Greece, Stalin succeeded in creating a strategic glacier between the Soviet Union and the West in the years 1943–1948. The division of Europe was accepted by both sides and became the iron rule of Cold War history. But other elements of the European order were not cast in iron; they were subject to negotiations and deals. These agreements, tacit or written, assured the stability of the bipolar world under conditions of nuclear and ideological rivalry. The West secured its safety in exchange for, first, giving some legitimacy to the Soviet empire and, later, for goods and money. The flow of Western credits to the Central and Eastern European states beginning in the early seventies helped to open these states but also deferred the already obvious demise of the "really existing socialism" experiment. Still later, with *détente* came efforts to enlarge the scope of contractual understandings in a package including human rights, recognized through the Helsinki Agreement of 1975.



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European history since Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to power has had a distinctively contractual nature. The West did not seek the end of Soviet hegemony in Central and Eastern Europe but was not unhappy to see the demise of the Soviet empire. That meant, by implication, substantial changes in the status of both Germany and Central Europe. President George Bush and his European allies considered it vital to convince Moscow that the West was neither inspiring this change nor seeking to take advantage of it.<sup>13</sup>

Thus, from 1989 to 1991 the West tried to reassure Moscow that it could let Central Europe (called "Eastern" Europe at that time) go without facing a new strategic problem in Europe. Bush repeatedly and consciously stressed that point in order to induce the further relaxation of Soviet power. Whether Gorbachev actually believed it or not, this policy obviously worked. A fundamental concession was demanded from Moscow, one that would in itself change the strategic situation in Europe—the unification of Germany on West German terms, including the continued membership of Germany in Nato. Gorbachev agreed to this deal, which was written into the most important document signed to end the Cold War, the Two Plus Four Treaty of 12 September 1990. His price was special Nato status for the territory of the former German Democratic Republic, lavish German economic assistance to the Soviet Union, German disavowal of territorial claims, and, in general, the promise of good mutual relations.<sup>14</sup>

The initial contract of 1945, symbolized by the results of the Yalta conference in February of that year, was about the belt of countries between France and the Soviet Union. The postwar structure of Europe rested upon a divided Germany, with Central Europe politically relocated into the Soviet Eastern European sphere of influence. This arrangement, actively pursued by Stalin and Churchill, became in the next three years the solid geopolitical foundation for the bipolar international system of the Cold War period. Although Roosevelt did not favor the outright division of Europe, he did, by promoting his idea of a global Concert of Powers (in the form of four policemen—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China) actually create favorable conditions for a spheres-of-influence solution for Europe. Any radical change of the Cold War international system would have had to address this post-World War II distribution of geopolitical resources, which led to four decades of cold war in Europe.

The "Final Settlement" of 1990 was also about Germany.<sup>15</sup> To many, the unification of Germany did not seem at the time a very natural or wholly beneficial event in European history. The exemplary cooperation and determination of President Bush and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, however, produced the optimal outcome for Europe: a united Germany entrenched within Nato. They succeeded in overcoming deeply felt reservations about an enlarged

Germany, especially among Germany's neighbors. The most prominent example of this attitude was and still is Margaret Thatcher, who resigned as prime minister of Britain in November 1990; she was bent on creating an Anglo-French political axis to ensure that "in future economic and political developments the Germans did not have things all their own way."<sup>16</sup>

The communist satellites of the Soviet Union, despite their unique contribution to the ending of the Cold War and the unification of Germany, were not included in the essential contract on that nation. At the most, they were considered candidates for a weaker, inferior deal that was still based on the notion of the special, although much relaxed, Soviet domination over that part of Europe. As Lawrence Freedman put it, "It must be recalled that the most small states can ever look forward to in great power diplomacy is to be patronized." According to this logic, "the West was careful to avoid any suggestion that its contract with the East involved an offer of alliance. In fact, it wanted to avoid the impression that *any* security issues of consequence now existed at all. The idea was that Europe could be pulled together not by alliances but by shared political values and economic interdependence. There was no need for a deal: the West's ideological triumph in the cold war meant that all states would now follow its example and cultivate liberal democracy and free market values."<sup>17</sup>

From the Western perspective, there was no urgent need for a new deal on Central Europe. With the gradual decline of Soviet power, Moscow's grip on the satellite states could be expected to melt down. In the meantime the West worked hard to avoid any impression that the independent futures of the post-communist states were at stake along with that of Germany. The most important consideration was to assure the safe delivery of a unified Germany without incurring additional risks to the strategic stability of Europe. The controlled process regarding Germany was completed in almost no time; what remained was the evolutionary rationalization of Soviet control over Central Europe. At the early stage, all this was a logical approach; clearly, the unification of Germany was key to the liberation of the whole of Central Europe.

But at times caution was carried too far. Some important Western political thinkers raised their voices to support what to them looked like an endangered and still fragile stability in East-West relations. To reduce the risk of straining Soviet nerves, in January 1990 George Kennan proposed a three-year moratorium on basic changes in both Nato and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) structures. Two months later Samuel Huntington stated that "security in Eastern Europe is likely to be enhanced by the continued existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact providing mutual security guarantees among their members." In the summer of 1990, when the German issue seemed to have reached an impasse, Henry Kissinger suggested creating a neutral belt of countries including Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary as a buffer between the Soviet

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Union and Nato. On the other hand, Zbigniew Brzezinski favored a different path, a Central European confederation, as an alternative to the Soviet-dominated security arrangement.<sup>18</sup>

The vast majority of official and expert Western thinkers assumed in 1989 and 1990 that not only the Western but Eastern institutions (the WTO and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, or COMECON) would have a relatively long and productive life after the Cold War—a strange assumption in view of previous Cold War rhetoric. Nato itself seemed to anticipate the continued existence of the Warsaw Pact. That approach led in November 1990 to the joint declaration of twenty-two Nato and WTO countries that they were “no longer adversaries.”<sup>19</sup>

The assumption underlying this Western approach toward replacing the Cold War in Central Europe with something better was that the regional transition process would be rather long and the influence of the Soviet Union would be a dominant factor in it. What is even more important from today's perspective is that the march from full dependency to sovereignty was envisioned as a purely Central and Eastern European (the Soviet Union included) affair. (I will return to this aspect in a moment.) The West was to be a rather passive, although very concerned, observer of this liberation, definitely not an active initiator but a cautious moderator. Western governments and experts frequently addressed “prudent advice” to the Central Europeans. The rationale behind this advice was that it was “premature to bank on early dissolution” of the Warsaw Pact, as Bennett Kovrig wrote at the end of 1990. “It may be in the West's interest to dissuade democratic forces [in Central Europe] from exploiting their freedom to sever all security links with the Soviet Union.” He asked Central Europeans to establish a strong tie between the “consolidation of political autonomy in individual East European countries” and the acceptance of “voluntary constraints on that autonomy”—in other words, Finlandization of Central Europe.<sup>20</sup>

Nato, as an expression of Western political will, was not in a hurry to do something important to or with the Central Europeans. Secretary General Manfred Woerner advised President Lech Walesa five months before the August 1991 Moscow putsch that Western strategy was bent on preserving Nato and at the same time creating a new pan-European structure embracing the Soviet Union. In his view, Poland and other Central European countries could ensure their security through relations with both Nato and the USSR. Polish membership in Nato seemed to Woerner inadvisable, as being an additional complication for an already difficult situation in the Soviet Union.<sup>21</sup> Actually, the connection of the Soviet coup attempt to the issue of Nato enlargement was absolutely nil.

The Soviet view of the future of Central Europe before the putsch was one of bowing to the inevitable in order to retain a considerable measure of influence. Soviet policy makers and analysts were aware of the possibility of a total

reorientation of their former allies toward the West but hoped that there were "obvious limits to the westward drift of Eastern European countries. The WTO countries have [deep-seated] common interests. These include the need for reformist forces to lean on each other for support, the importance of having a stable external environment at a time of swift internal changes, dependence on arms deliveries, and just economic interdependence, which goes deep and will persist in the foreseeable future. Lastly, East European countries, which are much weaker politically and economically than their leading Western neighbors, need political support to have room for maneuver in the dialog with the West. From this point of view, they are probably more in need of alliance with the Soviet Union than vice versa, although interest is mutual and deep-going."<sup>22</sup>

The basis for this wishful thinking was the belief that although both Nato and the WTO had been undermined, a complete dissolution of the Warsaw Pact would serve neither the Soviet nor European security interests. The Soviets had not welcomed "the prospect of a rapid disintegration of the bloc system," but they saw its advantages in managing the transition to a pan-European security system when neither Nato nor the WTO would continue to exist. For the time being they viewed the Soviet-led international institutions of the Cold War as a useful means of meeting the major challenges during the period of transition: "The Warsaw Treaty is needed, if in new forms, as a means of preventing a 'Balkanization' of Eastern Europe."<sup>23</sup>

Of course, actual developments in Central and Eastern Europe defied these expectations. By the time of the Soviet putsch of August 1991, Central Europe had acquired all the important elements of sovereignty. The Brezhnev Doctrine was effectively dead: democratic transition was well advanced, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact was completed, and Soviet troops had either withdrawn entirely or were in the process of withdrawal from the former Pact states. Externally this picture was complicated by the increasing danger of rapid reversal in the Soviet Union, which wanted to retain its *droit de regard* over future Central European security policies, and in particular over alliance membership. Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, during a meeting in Budapest in February 1991 to dissolve the military structures of the Warsaw Pact, warned his colleagues from Central Europe that creating alternative security structures in Central and Eastern Europe could only destabilize the situation in Europe. He reacted even more negatively to the prospect of former WTO members associating with Nato.<sup>24</sup> The attempts of the Soviet Union, in a series of bilateral treaties, to restrict the freedom of security choice of the Visegrad countries were strongly and successfully resisted by Central Europeans in the months preceding the putsch; after the failure of the coup and the collapse of the Soviet Union,

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\* The assertion by Leonid I. Brezhnev, as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1964 to 1982, that the USSR had the right to intervene to suppress "anti-socialist degeneration" in bloc nations.

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this issue died quietly. Thus, in the span of less than two years, Central European states reemerged as independent European nations and began their difficult search for moorings.

I have sketched the elements of agreements between 1989 and 1991. But these agreements did not approach the nature of a great peace treaty among the former adversaries. No one had either the courage or the vision to undo Yalta in one fell swoop. Most of the agreements, except for the Two Plus Four Treaty, were tacit and understated, assuming that a new international order in Europe would develop only very slowly. The essential change was the unification of Germany; Central and Eastern Europe were left on the fringe.

It is therefore quite surprising to note that five years later there is a feeling in Russia that the question of Nato expansion was in fact addressed and settled in 1990. Former president Gorbachev now claims that Secretary of State James Baker assured him on 9 February 1990 that the United States would not strive for Nato expansion. The next day, supposedly, Chancellor Kohl also dismissed the possibility of Nato expansion. And finally, President Bush himself, we are told, assured Gorbachev during his visit to Washington at the end of May 1990 that Nato would not be expanded eastward. The former Soviet leadership contends that although these promises were not reflected in documents, they constituted a deep moral commitment on the part of the West; without these promises, which led to the establishment of mutual trust, German unification would have been impossible.<sup>25</sup> This line of argument is frequently employed today by leading Russian experts arguing against the alliance's expansion. They claim that the West committed itself not to expand Nato not only in 1990 but also earlier, in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.<sup>26</sup>

German politicians, like Kohl's former advisor Horst Teltschik, confirm that the Nato question was touched upon in 1990, but only superficially, and in connection with the problem of German unification, not the future of the Central European states.<sup>27</sup> The truth, we must imagine, is that in 1990, when the Warsaw Pact still existed, any serious talk about the expansion of Nato to the east seemed very far away; certainly it was not on the mind of a prudent man like Bush.

But the argument about the finality of the 1989–1991 understanding on Central Europe has resurfaced also in the West, especially among those reluctant to see Nato expand. However, the U.S. ambassador to West Germany, Robert Blackwill, an important participant in those historic talks with the Soviets, denies that such a commitment was ever made. At that point in history there simply was no extensive, serious thought about the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact or the collapse of the Soviet Union. A guarantee about the nature of what was to follow events that hardly had been imagined was, therefore, out of the question.

The fact that no Western guarantees to the Soviet Union were even considered has been indirectly confirmed by the fact that no reference to them was made in Gorbachev's recently published memoirs.<sup>28</sup> That it did not happen and could not have happened does not prevent the exploitation of this non-event by Russian governmental and semigovernmental circles.<sup>29</sup>

History at the end of the twentieth century is being made step by step, by crisis or by contract, the latter clearly being much the preferable method. Attempts to replace the Cold War system with a comprehensive security architecture are doomed to failure: there will be no more Viennas or Yaltas. Voices raised on behalf of such a comprehensive international solution will remain largely unheard. Fareed Zakaria, the managing editor of *Foreign Affairs*, is one of those who would like to offer Russia "a Peace of Vienna": "one requiring that, in return for a place at the table of the principal powers, Russia will abandon any lingering dreams of empire. Membership in the G-7 and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development would be granted in return for arms reductions and peaceful conduct.\* The U.S. and Russia will always disagree on many issues, but so will the U.S. and France. The trick is to help make Russia into another France."<sup>30</sup>

This is an ineffective approach, based on a false assumption. It is not yet feasible to convert french fries into Idaho potatoes. Instead of concentrating on such alchemy we should try to recreate a reformed balance of power based on improved norms of international behavior, and to build a decalogue of standards that will slowly transcend the rules of absolute sovereignty. Such an international structure should be based not on a concert-of-powers approach (the indiscriminate use of such instruments, such as the Contact Group for Bosnia, may erode European solidarity), but on those strengths of Western-integrated mechanisms that have allowed small and medium-sized European countries to become genuine players, with a say in all important European matters. In reality, the West is not prepared to conclude such a peace, which would transform Russia into France and Boris Yeltsin into Charles de Gaulle; but it might be ready to enter into a series of partial deals with and about Central Europe and Russia, deals that would help Europe develop a more stable order.<sup>31</sup> Russia, in particular, is in need of help to find a way to match dwindling resources with the real interests of a medium and regional power. Such an approach might allow Russia to find its Turgot rather than its Napoleon. The great advantage of a contractual approach is psychological. One comprehensive peace could be risky,

\* The Group of Seven, or "G-7," comprises what were at its formation in 1985 the seven major noncommunist economic powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Germany, Canada, and Italy.

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for it might easily be considered treason, a stab in the back; a series of contracts may well be easier to swallow.

### **"Contract 2000"**

Two fundamental facts lead to what I call "the contract for the year 2000." One is the unification of Germany and its emergence as the leading economic and political force in Europe. The second is the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991. Neither fact has yet led to a series of contracts that would reflect the new distribution of power and interests in Europe. Such contracts are desperately needed in order to forestall the growing tensions within the Western Alliance, between the West and the East, and also in Central Europe. They also are necessary to take the wind out of the sails of the powerful Russian political forces that dream of a comeback of the Empire. Those communist and nationalist groupings that came out very strongly for restoring the nation's lost greatness, claiming that the former Russian and Soviet variations of imperialism had played on the whole a very positive role in Eurasian history, were able to secure a comfortable majority in the Russian parliament (Duma) in the December 1995 elections. The winner of the upcoming presidential race, be it Boris Yeltsin, the communist Gennadi Zyuganov, nationalist General Alexander Lebed, or even the reformer Grigori Yavlinsky, will have a similar popular mandate to conduct foreign policy, incorporating many of the prescriptions of old Soviet power politics.

The most important agreement of all that must be specified and sustained is that among the Western states themselves. Many previous agreements are currently under stress and political attack, both in Western Europe and in the United States. They include such issues as the future of the Atlantic Alliance, collective defense institutions in general, and the backbone of European security, with elements such as the Franco-German understanding. The priority must be not only to preserve essential institutions but to adapt them fully to the new requirements. It is crucial that the 1996 intergovernmental conference of the European Union produce meaningful results on several key issues pertaining to the cohesion of the Union and its real opening to the East.

But it is also clear now that the Western European leaders will not be able to complete the project of an enlarged Europe without the active interest and support of the United States. As a leading German commentator, Christopher Bertram, suggests, without American involvement neither Nato nor the European Union would have been created—even if "the 'Community' was," according to Eric Hobsbawm, "like so many other things in post-1945 Europe created both by and against the USA." The very presence of the United States in Europe allows toleration of the growing differences in potential among the

various European states. The role of the United States is generally appreciated in post-Cold War Europe; the question marks are on the American side. There is a need to create new projects, whether inside or outside existing institutions, to revitalize transatlantic ties in an era when more and more Americans are turning toward Asia. This should be done today, not postponed. If the Americans do not stay actively engaged, the project of enlarging European institutions may die.<sup>32</sup>

The key element of Contract 2000 must be security. Symbolically, this contract concentrates on the future of Nato. Whether or not such a contract extending Nato membership to the key Central European countries is concluded will determine a host of issues: the future of transatlantic relations; the future of a common European foreign, security, and defense policy; the position of Germany; the whole matter of renationalization of European defenses; the future of Central and Eastern Europe; and the places of Russia and Ukraine in Europe.

The major obstacles to Contract 2000 are twofold. The first and most decisive is the tendency displayed by Western politicians and their electorates to postpone decisions and allow Europe to drift into crisis; Bosnia is a prime example. The second is a tendency exemplified by the typical attitude toward Russia: "It is, after all, the largest country in the world, endowed with an educated population, abundant natural resources and a colossal quantity of nuclear weapons, [which] commands respect if not admiration."<sup>33</sup> Thomas L. Friedman of the *New York Times* is more straightforward: "The price is not a bigger NATO that can threaten Russia more, but a denuclearized Russia that threatens America less."<sup>34</sup> The trouble with this argument is that it places undue emphasis on building post-Cold War relations around the nuclear factor. Russia's military doctrine, as proclaimed in 1993, has already moved in this direction by dropping its no-first nuclear use pledge. Since 1995, the Russian military leadership has begun to brandish the possibility of a new deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, as a countermeasure to Nato enlargement. That might lead in time to the nuclearization of the national policies of several states, including Germany and other countries that are at present happy to rely upon multilateral nuclear protection.

The contract for the year 2000 is by no means only about the security and geopolitics of Central Europe. No one, least of all a Polish analyst, would say that these issues are unimportant. At the same time, however, it is clear that a real appraisal of Nato's future cannot take place without addressing a much more fundamental question: What character will Europe itself assume now that the Cold War division of the continent has come to an end?<sup>35</sup>

During the Cold War, both the Warsaw Pact and Nato were, in their respective ways, instruments of superpower control over European processes. The states of Central Europe were the obvious pawns of the Soviet Union. Just as obviously, the nations of Western Europe were not fully at liberty to advance



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their own foreign and security policies, particularly in the European theater. This situation was disagreeable but inevitable.

Everything, of course, changed with the revolutions in the Central European states and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. This transformation led to a radical reduction in the political and military domination of Central Europe by the Soviet Union (Russia), as well as to a significant scaling-down of the military (and political) presence of the United States in Western Europe. Europe in this new situation has been presented with an unprecedented opportunity to find a new global role for itself.

It is within this context that it is valuable to discuss the future of Nato, which is today by no means clear. On the one hand, Nato could begin to atrophy and, though its name might remain, ultimately all but vanish as an effective military and political alliance. On the other hand, it could experience a genuine renewal on a new foundation that would preserve intact its transatlantic dimension and its core mission of collective defense.

Two factors nudge the Alliance toward atrophy. The first is anachronistic treatment of Nato as primarily an instrument to manage American-Russian relations in Europe. President Clinton's letter to Yeltsin before the May 1995 VE-Day commemoration in Moscow was an example. This letter, sent without prior consultation with the allies, was a clear and painful signal to the Europeans that the future of Nato would be discussed first and foremost in the context of bilateral relations between America and Russia.

Also, in Nordvik, Norway, on 30 May, shortly after President Clinton's visit to Moscow, Nato adopted a new formula for relations with Russia. The Alliance statement spoke of "a broad, enhanced NATO/Russia dialogue and cooperation beyond [the] Partnership for Peace," the PfP.<sup>36</sup> That has to be seen in the context of the Russian demand to be granted a special position vis-à-vis Nato. At the moment, it is not quite clear what this new formula was intended to signal, other than that there is a fundamental inconsistency in Nato's political strategy. On the one hand, Nato has allowed that it recognizes Russia's "special part and responsibility in the building of a new security order in Europe"—*outside* of the PfP.<sup>37</sup> On the other hand, American officials have placed increasing emphasis on the PfP as the foundation for post-Cold War military and security cooperations in Europe. Where, one wonders, does this leave Nato and the nations of Europe? This inconsistency should trouble not only the Central Europeans. It is difficult as well to see why Western Europeans should agree to so little change in the old Cold War idea of bilateral control. Consent would mean postponing for at least a decade the development of a genuinely European concept of foreign and security policy. It might also lead to a serious loss of support for Nato in both parts of Europe.

The other factor tending to a Nato decline relates to Russian projects and ambitions. The "Russian variant" for Nato's future leads to the same atrophy, only much more quickly. Russia claims that it can accept the Alliance in a future pan-European security structure solely on the condition that the organization undergo an essential transformation, "from a military alliance to a political organization with corresponding changes in Nato institutions and basic documents." This Kremlin position does not rule out the temporary acceptance of Nato as an instrument of Russian-American dialogue about the system of European security, former foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev has said, but from the position of "special relations between Russia and Nato and members of the alliance."<sup>38</sup>

The vision of a special partnership with Russia exists, for the most part, only on paper. One important exception is the "special" Russian participation in the U.S. and Nato-engineered multinational coalition in Bosnia. This unprecedented example of military cooperation comes, however, at a time when the political enmity in Russian-Nato relations is growing visibly. The gap between a possible success on a "micro-scale" in Bosnia and an attempt at the common macro-management of larger European security issues cannot be overcome by simply building trust from the bottom up. It still remains to be seen whether this working arrangement in the field, involving a handful of Russian military commanders, can be translated into a political agreement concerning the direction of European security.

Nevertheless, it is quite clear that both the U.S. government and its major European allies, facing the prospect of a dramatic turnaround in Russia as a result of the June presidential elections, decided in the winter of 1995-1996 to engage in a major damage-control campaign. Nato expansion is being put on the back burner, as a form of rescue operation for a weakened President Yeltsin. Chancellor Helmut Kohl has played down Germany's previous championship of Central European security integration. In a strange reversal of roles, Germany has now assumed America's former advocacy of the "Russia first" platform.

A definition of the "special role of Russia in Europe" and of Russia's relations to Nato and the United States is the crucial point. To specify the unique U.S.-Russian relationship with regard to global nuclear security and the proliferation of modern weapon systems is relatively easy. It is far more difficult to define Russia's place in Europe. Do the proponents of "a special role" mean that Russia will now assume the old, albeit more civilized, sphere of influence the Soviet Union had (with the exception of East Germany), while Western Europe will be the same unit as before? One needs no great insight to notice that when there is talk of a "special role of Russia" in Europe, that role always begins right at the German-Polish border! But remarkably, many analysts today try somehow to conceal exactly what they mean. Thus one commentator

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opposes in one breath the eastward expansion of Nato (because Russia "is not destined" to disturb the peace in Europe) and in the next insists on preserving the Alliance in its present shape as a guarantor of Western Europe (just in case—"if Russia does resume an imperial foreign policy").<sup>39</sup>

A genuine renewal of Nato must face head-on the question of how the Western nations plan to use the victory that the democratic forces in Central and Eastern Europe handed to them on a silver platter. During the six years since the Eastern bloc began to collapse, the prevailing logic in the West has been that of "cautious consumption" of the fruits of the communist system's disappearance. This approach in and of itself has not produced a meaningful breakthrough in European security; its intensity is too low to generate a new contract for Europe. Volker Ruehe, the German defense minister, clearly saw the problem in this approach: "We are not talking about expansion [of Nato] and the pressure is not coming from our members, some of these members would be very happy if we stayed with the club of those which have arrived, but the pressure comes from outside, and the pressures that we open ourselves. The alternative to opening is to close, to freeze the situation of the last 50 years and there is no normal or historical reason to do this."<sup>40</sup> This logic yields solutions based on the rise of a Nato-controlled, united Germany (special American-Russian relations should be seen in this context, too) and on a return to the idea of open and benign spheres of influence in Europe.

On the other hand, a logic of *unconstrained* consumption (definitely a project never seriously considered) would push Russia as far away from the center of Europe as possible and provide for radical Nato expansion, stronger support for non-Russian republics (Ukraine in particular), and even the disintegration of Russia into elements of a new *cordon sanitaire*. There is clearly room for a prudent middle way between these two options, a space for a *Contract with Europe*. Sergei Karaganov, a member of President Yeltsin's Security Council, is correct when he cautions, "The victors cannot want too much."<sup>41</sup> There is no need to drive the present Russia into a corner. Still, in a compromise deal, the conditions must be specified very precisely.

To begin with, the formulae of the strategic role of the American-Russian dialogue and of Russia's special role in Europe require sharp separation. It is obvious that, with or without Nato, the American-Russian dialogue will go on; the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission is not tied to Nato.\* However, for democrats like Karaganov, this is not enough. They simply portray such a "middle way" as both a U.S.-Russia strategic dialogue and a distinct return to Yalta, but undebauched by Stalinism. Karaganov insists on maintaining the

\* The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission is a bilateral American-Russian working group established by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to deal, primarily, with economic issues. Led on a sub-presidential level (on the American side by Vice President Albert Gore, Jr., and on the Russian by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin), it meets every six months, alternately in Moscow and in Washington.

1,500-kilometer neutral belt between Russia and Western Europe. However, this belt has in fact shrunk. As a result of the Tashkent Treaty and agreements on joint defense of the borders of the Commonwealth of Independent States and on common air defense, Russia is present not only in the Kaliningrad enclave but also on the Bug River, six hundred kilometers from Berlin.\* Meanwhile, Nato remains where it was.

Bearing these facts in mind, I consider that to mingle the bilateral American-Russian dialogue with a special Russian role in Europe is a conceptual mistake, one that will inevitably lead to wrong choices and agreements. The new Europe has become well enough established that it will find a modernized Cold War system hardly palatable. At the same time, however, Europe is in its infancy as regards its own foreign policy and security identity. Therefore it needs the American presence on the continent—but as a partner, not as an “empire by invitation,” as in the late forties. It also needs room to grow, in a system in which Russia is not permitted to claim a role larger than the one its actual potential merits. In brief, Europe needs an answer to the question asked by George Kennan, Henry Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Robert Oppenheimer in 1949: “In what geographic area and in what framework of membership [do] we wish to see the movement toward European unification proceed, over the long term, and how far [do] we really wish it to go?”<sup>42</sup> This question still begs an answer. This time, the answer should take heed of the ramifications of the 1989–1991 revolutions and should be given collectively by all nations concerned.

### The Contours of the Contract

The core element of the proposed Contract 2000 is a modification of the existing European and Euro-Atlantic institutions in a way consistent with the key features of international relations and with the new shape of domestic policies in the most important countries and regions. We will need solid institutions to withstand both the fragmentation of political authority in much of the world and the widespread conflict. Global and pan-European institutions will only slowly and painfully be able to alter the traditional concepts of sovereignty and national interests. We should recognize the limitations on international action but at the same time build effective institutions and coalitions when and where it is possible. The one obvious area is Europe—of course, a wider, integrated Europe. Integration is not an easy option, and it will require further concessions

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\* At a summit meeting in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, of the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a collective security treaty was signed on 16 May 1992 by Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. Since its signing, other CIS states have also expressed interest in various aspects of defense cooperation within the former Soviet space (in particular Belarus). Whether this accord will lead, in practical terms, to a new collective defense system or to strengthened bilateral military cooperation centering on Russia is not yet clear.

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and special provisions in both the East and West. The biggest obstacle to more rapid progress is the fact that eastward expansion is an idea that is difficult to sell in Western societies. It is unattractive economically, mundane politically, and risky from a security standpoint. There is no tradition in any of the countries of Western Europe of making sacrifices for the countries of the East, and there do exist many solid reasons for some to resist any such sacrifices. But the alternative is a return to the old European pattern of historical division and chronic instability, whereas the promise is of a greater Europe with more than twenty-five countries, more than 400 million people, and an unprecedented level of economic, political, and defense integration. Peace in Europe can be based only on the exclusion of a new hegemonic arrangement in Central Europe, and it requires the enlargement of European security, political, and economic institutions.<sup>43</sup>

The role of the United States in bringing all this about is as important as it is delicate. No more time can be lost in completing the Contract, at the threshold of a new millennium. The year 1999 would be an appropriate one for Nato's enlargement: the Alliance will be preparing itself then for its second fifty years of existence.

Poles and other Central Europeans believe that it is time to finish the unfinished business of 1990. The price, moreover, is constantly growing. It was at its lowest in the months after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But whereas the price of European Union membership is measurable in Ecus, the price for Nato membership is calculated in political currency. Many in the West, regrettably, calculate it in terms of megatons;<sup>44</sup> this is not a good approach. The West, while knowing what it would like to do about Central Europe, is adrift when it comes to what to do with Russia. Paradoxically, however, it actively promotes one new venue after another for strengthening Western-Russian relations, without correspondingly intensifying its links with Central Europe. The American administration's approach of dealing in parallel with Russia and Central Europe, while theoretically correct, could falter because of the uncertainties surrounding the future of Russia. With each passing year the danger is mounting of the erosion of Nato and the European Union as a result of inaction and internal conflict. It is time indeed to reap the harvest of the revolutions of 1990.

Without resolute American support for this European project, the window of opportunity may close. Europe does not need America to sacrifice its standard of living once again, or to commit its military on the scale of the Cold War. What Europe needs now in order to conclude a new European Contract is a critical, idealistic America that will help European states overcome their narcissism. That will not be possible if in America itself the trend towards

ethnocentrism prevails. One may ask what the American stake in this might be. There are many answers to this question, but one of them is: Contract 2000 will offer an integrated and peaceful European partner for the coming century, more balanced in its approach to the United States than is present-day Western Europe.

But above and beyond any tangible gains to be made, we must recover from the present pervasive feeling of loss of direction and of apathy, which undermines the idea of collective defense. Are we really condemned to see emerge from the ashes of the Cold War only the narrowest kind of nationalism? America must once again lead Europe in the right direction—before, and not after, it is too late.

### Notes

1. This is the view of the Clinton administration, expressed recently by Daniel Fried, presidential advisor for Central and Eastern Europe, in an interview with the Polish daily *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 26 July 1995, p. 7.

2. Thomas L. Friedman, "Porgy, Bess & NATO," *New York Times*, 9 April 1995, p. E13.

3. Richard Cohen, "Expand NATO?", *Washington Post*, 27 June 1995, p. 17.

4. Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (London: Penguin, for the RIIA, 1979), p. 166. I am especially indebted to Adrian G.V. Hyde-Price for his analysis in "East Central European Security after the Cold War," a paper presented at the Political Studies Association Conference, University of Lancaster, 15–17 April 1991, pp. 3–4.

5. Richard H. Ullman, discussion paper on institutionalizing European security, Institute for East-West Security Studies, meeting of the IEWSS Working Group, 18–20 May 1990, Bonn, p. 18.

6. Sergei Karaganov, "New Russia in New Europe," *Eurazja* (Warsaw), no. 5/6, 1994, p. 90.

7. A frequently exploited issue in both the East and West is the supposed linkage between Nato expansion and the future of Russian democracy. Susan Eisenhower claims that expanding Nato will diminish the chances for Russia's nascent democracy ("If Central Europeans Aren't Threatened, Why Bait the Bear?", *New York Times*, 21 July 1995), but, as admitted by one of the most vocal opponents of Nato enlargement, Jim Hoagland, "speeding Nato expansion will not sink Mr. Yeltsin; postponing it will not save him or Russian democracy. Russia's own giant political currents will decide who swims and who sinks" ("It Isn't the Time for Eastward Expansion of Nato," *New York Times*, 21 June 1995). The arguments for decoupling Nato expansion and the fate of Russian democracy are to be found in Ronald D. Amus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps," *Survival*, Spring 1995, pp. 7–33; and in Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 1995, pp. 38–51.

8. "Russland warnt scharf vor Ost-Erweiterung der NATO" (Russia issues a strong warning against eastern enlargement of NATO), *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 5 February 1996, p. 1.

9. Mark Helprin, "For a New Concert of Europe," *Commentary*, January 1996, pp. 36–7.

10. For more on this point, see the author's "The Post-Cold War Imperialism of Fine Concepts," in *Redefining the Concept of Security: Implications for Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Z. Lewicki (Jadwisin, Poland: IEWSS Strategy Group Workshop, 13–15 January 1995).

11. Charles Gati, "Hegemony and Repression in the Eastern Alliance," *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 181–3.

12. Sergei Karaganov, "Fifty Years after Victory," *International Affairs*, no. 4/5, 1995, p. 59.

13. Henry Kissinger in the early spring of 1989 suggested that President Bush conclude a deal with the Soviet Union with respect to Eastern Europe: liberalization of the Soviet grip as a *quid pro quo* for Western agreement not to take advantage of such moves to harm legitimate Soviet security interests there. On 27 March 1989, Bush, while describing this idea publicly as "worthy of consideration," indicated that it had not been adopted by the administration, mainly because Eastern European countries were liberalizing themselves without any arrangement normalizing a continuing status for the Soviet Union there—an arrangement that was, to say the least, not viewed warmly in Eastern Europe. Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), pp. 14–21, 45–6; and Raymond L. Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1994), pp. 377–8. The Baker interview was reported by Thomas L. Friedman,

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"Baker, Outlining World View, Assesses Plan for the Soviet Bloc," *New York Times*, 28 March 1989, pp. A1-A6.

14. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Erinnerungen* (Memoirs) (Berlin: 1995), pp. 700-27. Igor Maximychev, the former minister-counsellor of the Soviet embassy in Berlin, accused Gorbachev of giving Chancellor Kohl "unexpectedly . . . two presents" during their talks in Moscow on 9 February 1990: Soviet consent to German unification on the Federal Republic's terms and to the two-plus-four formula, "which assigned the four powers a virtually secondary role." As a result a chance was lost to create "a reliable all-European security system, which is still outstanding, and for proper publicity, such as would have helped Soviet people (Russians) to form a clearer idea of how far the end of the German split objectively met their national interests." In other words, in exchange for concessions on Germany, Gorbachev should have claimed a *quid pro quo* on the European security system. Igor Maximychev, "A Missed Chance of Four-Power Cooperation in Berlin," *International Affairs*, no. 4/5, 1995, p. 115.

15. I owe the idea of the contract of 1990 to Lawrence Freedman, "Power and Insecurity in Europe," lecture delivered at the George C. Marshall Center for European Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, October 1994, pp. 6-19.

16. Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 736. In a recent interview Thatcher confirmed that she was afraid of German unification, which would change the balance of power in Europe; the era of European harmony would slip into the past. "We are facing [a] dominating Germany, thus [a] German Europe." This interview originally appeared in *Le Figaro* and was reproduced in *Rzeczpospolita*, 13 July 1995, p. 7.

17. Lawrence Freedman, p. 10.

18. Samuel P. Huntington, "Democratization and Security in Eastern Europe," in *Uncertain Futures: Eastern Europe and Democracy*, ed. Peter Volten (New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1990), p. 48; and "Kisinger planuje neutralna Polska" (Kisinger is planning a neutral Poland), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 20 June 1990, p. 2.

19. "Charter of Paris for a New Europe: A New Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity," Paris, 19-21 November 1990.

20. Quoted in Henryk Szlajfer, "Central Europe's Security: The Search for Peaceful Transition," lecture delivered at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, 1995, p. 7.

21. Walesa met Woerner in Brussels on 3 April 1991 (author's notes).

22. Sergei Karaganov, "The Problems of the USSR's European Policy," in *The United States and the USSR in a Changing World: Soviet and American Perspectives*, ed. Andrei G. Bochkarev and Don L. Mansfield (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 261.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 262.

24. Political Advisory Committee of the WTO Meeting, Budapest, 25 February 1991.

25. "Gorbatschow angeblich Nicht-Erweiterung der Nato zugesagt" (Gorbachev supposedly promised that Nato would not be enlarged), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 8 May 1995. See also Yeltsin's letter to the Nato leaders, September 1992.

26. "Moskau hat die Lektion aus Afghanistan nicht gelernt" (Moscow has not learned the lesson of Afghanistan), interview with General Boris Gromov, *Die Welt*, 12 June 1995, p. 5.

27. See note 25.

28. Unpublished discussion by Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill after his lecture, "German Unification and the End of the Cold War," delivered at the George C. Marshall European Center on Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 2 November 1995. See also Philip Zelikow, "NATO Expansion Wasn't Ruled Out," *International Herald Tribune*, 30 October 1995; and Gorbachev, *Erinnerungen*, pp. 700-7, 839-47, 863-79.

29. Yuri Ivanov, in the semi-official newspaper *Rossiiskie vesti*, derives the Russian right to veto the Polish accession to Nato from two documents: the first the 1 July 1991 instrument on the dissolution of the WTO, the second the Polish-Russian treaty on Good-Neighborly Relations signed on 22 May 1992 ("Nuzhno li stremitsya v obliatiya NATO?" [Need we rush into the arms of NATO?], *Rossiiskie vesti*, 12 April 1995). Needless to say, these claims are legally groundless. More importantly, Andrei Kokoshin claimed at an annual conference on security in Munich in February 1996 that the West had obliged itself not to expand eastward after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact; in particular, by extending its nuclear umbrella to include new Nato members, the West would be breaching its former pledges. This thesis was energetically repudiated by the German defense minister, Volker Ruehe, and U.S. Senator William Cohen ("Kohl: Bei Out-Erweiterung der NATO muessen Russland Sicherheitsinteressen beachtet werden" [Kohl: Russian security interests must be taken into consideration in eastern enlargement of NATO], *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 5 February 1996, pp. 1-2; and Josef Joffe, "Das Therapieangebot der NATO" [Therapeutical proposal of NATO], *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 5 February 1996, p. 4.)

30. Fareed Zakaria, "A Peace of Vienna," *New York Times*, 9 May 1995.

31. I believe that a contract with Russia on Nato extension may still be possible, but that it would now be more difficult to achieve. Even very negative statements from Moscow seem based on the assumption that it should face the inevitable and not treat the enlargement as the end of the world, ruining Kremlin relations with the West. For a very characteristic mix of negative and positive elements, see the important document "Russia-NATO," produced by the Council of Foreign and Defense Policy of the Russian Federation, 25 May 1995. Although rejecting categorically the idea of compensating Russia as a *quid pro quo* for enlarging Nato and enumerating several interesting alternative solutions, it resigns itself to the prospect of enlargement, under the condition that Nato transform itself from a military to a political organization.

32. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991* (New York: Pantheon, 1994), p. 240; and Christopher Bertram, editorial, reprinted in *Rzeczpospolita*, 26 May 1995.

33. Francois Heisbourg, "NATO: A Cautious Path to Enlargement," *International Herald Tribune*, 5 April 1995.

34. Thomas L. Friedman, "The Priority with Russia Ought to be Nuclear Trinit," *New York Times*, 11 May 1995.

35. This part of the article draws upon Przemyslaw Grudzinski and Henryk Szlajfer, "Nowu Europa i pozostalosci zimnej wojny" (New Europe and cold war temptations), *Rzeczpospolita*, parts I and II: 31 July and 1 August 1995.

36. "Areas for Pursuance of a Broad, Enhanced NATO/Russia Dialogue and Cooperation," Nordwik, Norway, 31 May 1995.

37. "Beyond PFP," remarks by the Secretary General at the Russian Acceptance of the Partnership for Peace, 31 May 1995.

38. Statement by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Nordwik, Norway, 31 May 1995.

39. Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace: The Case against NATO Expansion," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1995, p. 13.

40. Volker Ruehe, German Minister of Defense, in an unpublished speech to the class of the College of Strategic Studies and Defense Economics at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 10 August 1995, p. 4.

41. Sergei Karaganov, "Nato Enlargement in Russian Eyes," *Rzeczpospolita*, 9 May 1995, p. 27.

42. J.L. Harper, *American Visions of Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 213-4.

43. See Przemyslaw Grudzinski, "National Interests: European Institutions," in *A Lasting Peace in Central Europe*, ed. Ian Gambles, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Chaillet Papers no. 20, October 1995, pp. 20-1.

44. Leopold Unger, "Weto na wysoli procent" (Veto at a high price), *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 15-17 April 1995.

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## The 1996 Surface Navy Literary Award

*The Surface Navy Association (SNA) and the U.S. Naval Institute once again jointly sponsor the Surface Navy Literary Award, which will be presented during the SNA Ninth National Symposium, to be held 15-18 October 1996. The winner will receive \$1,000 and an engraved crystal memento. The award will be presented to the author of the best article on surface warfare issues appearing in any publication since the last symposium (October 1995) and before 1 July 1996. Entries will be judged by the editorial board of the SNA newsletter, SITREP, from among nominations made by SNA chapter presidents, members of the SNA board of directors, and the editor of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. The SNA hopes to encourage the publication of new ideas on, especially, how surface combatants, equipment, and training should evolve. For further information call Ruth Kane, SNA Awards Coordinator, at (703) 765-7447.*