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Book Reviews

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BOOK REVIEWS

A book reviewer occupies a position of special responsibility and trust. He is to summarize, set in context, describe strengths, and point out weaknesses. As a surrogate for us all, he assumes a heavy obligation which it is his duty to discharge with reason and consistency.

Admiral H.G. Rickover

"Can Simple Induction Discover the Causes for War?"

Vasquez, John A. *The War Puzzle.* Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Vol. 27. Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1993. 378pp. $59.95

THE STUDY OF WAR IN RECENT DECADES has proceeded along three paths: game theoretic and other structural studies of war, historical studies of particular wars, and survey-based studies of multiple wars. The first path uses deductive logic, the second deploys the logic of narrative, and the third embraces the canons of induction.

Vasquez's *The War Puzzle* is a dry but splendid example of the third sort of study. For Vasquez, Quincy Wright shows the way, Singer and Small and the Correlates of War project provide the data, and the task of the scientist is to find patterns. Vasquez claims to have found patterns and struck gold: "The analyses offered in this book satisfy the formal criteria for scientific explanation. . . . They distinguish the correlates from the causes of war."

By limiting his field to fifty interstate wars between roughly equal rivals, Vasquez discerns that such wars are caused by territorial disputes, exacerbated by multipolar alliances, and compounded by the political belief that the gains of war will outweigh the losses. Since territorial disputes can, and often are, settled by nonmilitary means, "the conditions necessary for world war can be prevented. World wars are the great accidents of European history." Realist arguments that war is inevitable and peace is best obtained through strength and deterrence are vigorously combatted by appeals to the database.

The impact of all this on readers will depend partly on their faith in such inductive studies of war. Vasquez includes nineteenth-century wars in his data,

but for children of Hegel (right and left) who think that history proceeds in dialectical surges and that the rules of the game get rewritten at each new stage, the use of nineteenth-century data detracts from insight. Since the Vasquez parameters (e.g., presence or absence of territorial disputes) are non-numerical, his generalizations emerge from simple induction and not from concomitant quantitative variation. Can simple induction discover the causes for war? If we find that territorial disputes are involved in 90 percent of major wars and religious disputes in only 10 percent, do we now know that the root cause of the Iran-Iraq war was territorial and not religious? Granting the prevalence of territorial disputes, should we conclude with Vasquez that the absence of a territorial dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union (not, say, fear of nuclear destruction) explains the absence of war between the superpowers from 1946 to 1991? Many will be skeptical, and not just David Hume. Perhaps human affairs are chaotic, and of two epistemically indistinguishable situations one may lead to war and the other may not. If so, one can no more predict future wars by studying a database than by examining the entrails of birds.

Vasquez's emphasis on territorial disputes is striking, hinting that it "is part of humanity's collective genetic inheritance." Wisely, he spares us the details, but his analyses could use a little conceptual clarification: When is a dispute "territorial," and when is it not? Is the question of whether South Vietnam shall have a communist or noncommunist government a territorial problem? (As a child in school, I was shown world maps with red and blue areas, and in a Mercator projection, the red loomed.) If we construe the Vietnam War as territorial, there *was* a superpower territorial confrontation leading to war. But if this dispute is territorial, perhaps all disputes can be so construed, and the causal law collapses into tautology.

Vasquez writes as a social scientist, never announcing his ethics. He seems to believe that all war is bad and all its causes (e.g., alliance systems) should be avoided. Now, Russia's connection with Serbia dragged Moscow (and therefore France and Germany) into the Great War, and that was bad. But England's alliance with Poland dragged Britain into war with Germany in 1939—and on the moral scales, that was a plus. Surely Vasquez is right that all wars are avertible by wise choices, and he provides nice hints (buffer zones in particular) about how to facilitate wise behavior. What he does not tell us, however, is how we ought to behave with an opponent who is persistently unwise.

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Kaufman, Yogi and Kaufman, Steve. *City at Sea*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 192pp. $39.95

Retired Vice Admiral Yogi Kaufman and his son Steve have teamed up on an interesting project about naval aviation that is part coffee-table book and part status report. The project is all the more interesting because neither Kaufman possesses any experience with their subject; it is to their credit that they have produced a book, as good as any that I have seen, that captures the feel of life aboard the modern aircraft carrier. *City at Sea* tells its story through over 170 color photographs and interspersed text that is just terse enough to avoid putting off the casual browser, yet compelling enough to capture the reader's interest. (The danger of placing this book on your coffee table is that you may lose a guest for long periods of time.)

There are plenty of similar books on the market containing pictures as dramatic and artistic, but what distinguishes this book from the others is the authors' decision to tell the carrier story through the words of the crew. From captain to mess cooks, key crew members have their say, which makes this a book with a surprising and gratifying edge to it.

While you will not find any of the profanity that sailors are known for, you will find an honest critique of the Navy. As a result, the reader gets a good feel for the pulse of today's naval aviation. Although the aircraft squadron commander expresses concern about future reductions and seems to feel that naval career progression consists of "just getting checkoffs," and the Marine grouses about being stuck on a ship, the main impression that comes through is the intense pride, commitment, and professionalism that characterize all ranks of today's "airedales." While recent scandals may have dented naval aviation's image among the public, the Kaufmans have clearly observed an organization that is self-confident and reflects the best of our society.

No book is perfect, however. There are some technical flaws. For instance, in several photos the captions refer to the subjects as pilots when their breast insignia clearly indicate that they are not. And while the Kaufmans state, on page 25, that the carrier can carry eighty-five to ninety aircraft, anyone familiar with carrier operations knows this is a bit of an overstatement. (That number is certainly possible, but a carrier normally operates with seventy-five to eighty-five.) Although these errors are minor and do no harm to the book's overall accuracy, what does make me a little uneasy is the feeling that some of the sailors' words had been edited. The authors visited seven different carriers while researching their book, and it may be that some of the "monologues" are composites of what a number of people said; it is not clear which are direct quotes. If any quotations are in fact composites, the authors should have made it explicit in their preface.

One person's words that were not "edited," however, are those of Admiral Arleigh Burke. His foreword must be one of his last written statements. As such, it alone is worth the price of the book. Burke's description of his transition from destroyer squadron commander to chief of staff to Admiral Marc Mitscher, Commander Fast Carrier Task Forces, Pacific, is an especially

compelling narrative that is must reading for anyone interested in naval aviation.

My compliments to the Kaufmans. They have produced more than just another coffee-table book; they have created a conversation piece.

ROBERT C. RUBEL
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Webb, Thomas G. and Dulin, Robert O., Jr. *Battleships: United States Battleships, 1935–1992.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995 (first edition 1976). 404pp. $65

This is an update of the first definitive book on U.S. World War II battleships. As in the first edition, the authors, both of whom are formally trained naval architects, rely heavily on official plans and data. The most significant change is a new chapter, "Return of the Dreadnought," which covers the reactivation and employment of four ships of the *Iowa* class—the last U.S. battleships and the only ones still available to the Navy. This is an excellent summary of the extensive updating and recommissioning of these ships from 1981 to 1988, and it includes details on many of the more ambitious design conversions that were to take place in subsequent years. Of course it was cost that limited the modifications to the bare (but still expensive) minimum, and none of the second-phase conversions studied was ever realized.

Webb and Dulin provide a thorough summary of the turret explosion on the USS *Iowa* in April 1989, as well as all the known facts about the case, but offer no conclusions. They do, however, criticize the newly reported captain of the *Iowa*, who was a missile and machinery specialist, for not paying closer attention to 16-inch turret-crew training. Ironically, the previous skipper, Captain Lawrence Seaquist, a gunnery specialist, had made *Iowa* "the best shooting battleship ever." Eventually, the entire class, but particularly the *Iowa*, achieved "deadly accuracy at any range with little shell dispersion." The book follows all four ships of the *Iowa* class operationally until their decommissioning, the last being *Missouri*, in 1992. The ultimate fate of these beautiful ships, favorites of the Marines, remains unresolved.

The first six chapters, which cover the other three battleship classes and the controversial battle cruisers of the *Alaska* class, remain as they were in the original, with some updated text and a few additional and more interesting photographs. The conclusions in chapter 8 have been suitably modified. The appendixes now include "President Roosevelt and His Navy" and "Preliminary Designs of *North Carolina* and *South Dakota*." Dropped from this edition, however, is the original chapter "The Tosa Experiments."

The *Montanas*, which would have had twelve 16-inch, 50-caliber guns in four turrets and displaced 68,000 tons of water, were never built. That is regrettable for the battleship enthusiast, for they would have been the size of the Japanese *Yamato* class, the world's biggest. It was the advent of the aircraft carrier and the realization of its potential that doomed the *Montana* class. Their complex machinery space arrangement did, however, survive in the *Midway*-class carriers, our most formidable at the time.

This work remains an authoritative reference, now fully updated. It will be of particular interest to naval architects, historians, and battleship buffs, especially when combined with Friedman's *U.S. Battleships*, also published by the Naval Institute Press. Line drawings from official plans, in sufficient detail for model-building, are included for every class covered, and there is good photography of all ten ships of the three battleship classes built in those years. This is particularly important for the *South Dakotas*, which saw lots of action but really existed only during World War II. Unfortunately, the ships' plans are no longer foldouts; they have been reduced to one page, which makes them more challenging to understand. Also, the inboard profiles of the *Montana* class have been inadvertently exchanged for those of the *South Dakota*.

Despite its substantial price, this is a book worth owning.

RICHARD F. CROSS III
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Sumrall, Robert F. *Sumner-Gearing-Class Destroyers: Their Design, Weapons, and Equipment*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 289pp. $59.95

In 1975, prior to the introduction of the *Spruance*-class (DD 963) destroyer, a phrase prevalent on the waterfront was, "When you're out of FRAMs, you're out of destroyers." In 1958, with the emergence of the post–World War II Soviet submarine threat and the introduction of high-performance jet aircraft, the FRAM (Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization) program was introduced to preclude block obsolescence. It was the final alteration stage in the life of the class that also provided a "test platform" for the early versions of several missile and electronic countermeasures systems installed in destroyers today. The FRAMed destroyers of the *Sumner-Gearing* class, originally constructed for World War II service, became the mainstay of the surface force for thirty years following the end of the war. It was no wonder that the passing of this class was viewed as the end of an era by the hundreds of thousands of personnel who had served in the 168 units. Indeed, the *Sumner-Gearings* epitomized the general-purpose versatility of a naval warship and rendered yeoman service far above and beyond design expectation.

Robert Sumrall provides a worthy historical account of the political considerations and naval vessel design specifications that led to the commissioning of USS *Allen M. Sumner* (DD 692)—the first of the class—in January 1944. A requirement to increase cruising radius made an additional 160 tons of fuel storage necessary, which in turn caused the *Sumner* class to be lengthened by fourteen feet. The USS *Gearing* (DD 710), commissioned approximately one year later, although technically the first of its own class, was essentially a stretched version of DD 692. The short-hulled *Sumner* and the long-hulled *Gearing* were tactically identical and differed only in endurance.

There are three major components to this book: a general background of ship design that led to the *Sumner-Gear-*

ings, the design of the *Sumner-Gearing* class, and its numerous conversions and modernizations. The chapters dealing with armament, fire control, radar, electronics, sonar, engineering, and damage control provide technical details that illustrate the multimission capability of the ship's basic design and the specific improvements subsequently implemented. As threat perceptions changed, so did missions, which, along with weapon improvements, resulted in conversions from the basic DD hull. *Sumner-Gearing* units became destroyer minelayers (DM) and minesweepers (DMS), as well as the better-known radar picket (DDR) and escort (DDE) variants.

The book's illustrations, tables, and drawings depicting the various stages of equipment and hull modifications are first-rate. They not only reflect the author's extensive knowledge of naval architecture and marine engineering but guide the reader through the intricate and diverse modifications. The generous use of graphics helps the reader visualize the way it was and how it was changed.

While this book offers a comprehensive and technically accurate review of the *Sumner-Gearing* class destroyer, it does not address the issue of the human element, life at sea of the 274 crew members. This class of ship was built to fight. Its service in three major wars was marked by a pragmatic, functional approach, both in the initial design and the changes that followed—little in the Fleet Rehabilitation and Maintenance Program was associated with habitability.

For those who think they knew these ships, this book will demonstrate just how much we took for granted. For the thousands who served in these ships for over forty years, this work will provide a cruise to days gone by. A technical, professional library is incomplete without it.

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Van der Vat, Dan. *Stealth at Sea: The History of the Submarine.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995. 374pp. $30

This book provides an overview of the history of the submarine, from the first "inventions and devices" of the fifteenth century through the nuclear-powered, technological marvels of today. Van der Vat devotes the bulk of his attention to the period 1900–1945, thoroughly describing submarine developments preceding both world wars and submarine operations during them. The years before 1900 and after 1945 are covered in a brief prologue and a short epilogue, respectively. The book's title is somewhat misleading, however, for there is little analysis of the inherent stealth of the submarine or of the struggle waged over the years between submarines and the antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces intent on overcoming their stealth.

Dan van der Vat is a former correspondent with the London papers *The Times* and *The Guardian*. He has published several books on naval history, including excellent works on the Atlantic and Pacific submarine campaigns of

the Second World War. It follows that the strongest aspect of this work is his grasp of details for submarine and ASW operations during the two great wars of the first half of the century. Although he adds little to his previous work, this presentation is thorough, readable, and almost always on the mark.

The author's expertise in other areas is less evident, however, and the absence of detailed analysis and footnotes detracts from the credibility of his more controversial conclusions. For example, he asserts that the main British and German battle fleets spent most of World War I in port due to "the unexpected deterrent effect of the submarine." A few pages later, he claims that the main Austrian fleet remained in port to serve as "a 'fleet in being,' to offset which the enemy would always have to keep on hand superior forces that would therefore be unable to operate elsewhere." He examines no other plausible explanations, nor does he offer any references for these two seemingly inconsistent positions.

Other such unsupported conclusions are presented as fact throughout the book. For example, the reader is instructed (without evidence) that "after the Cold War the main preoccupation of American submariners . . . was to justify the retention of such a stupendously expensive fleet." The author simplistically claims that since the 1960s the two principal tactical targets of the Soviet-Russian submarine force have been American aircraft carriers and SSBNs, not mentioning at all the bastion defense-in-depth for Soviet-Russian SSBNs. Also, van der Vat entirely dismisses the nuclear deterrence theory in a single paragraph, denying that nuclear deterrence contributed to peace between the two superpowers. He cites as evidence the limited wars against proxies in which both superpowers found themselves embroiled. He also argues that the submarine, a weapons delivery platform that "has matched or overtaken . . . the battleship and battlecruiser, the aircraft-carrier and cruiser, the strategic bomber and even the land-based missile," has become "a white elephant, if not a strategic dinosaur."

The absence of rigorous analysis is a serious flaw of this work. *Stealth at Sea* may have a place on the bookshelf of the general reader interested in World War I and World War II submarine history, but there is little here for the serious military analyst or the professional naval officer. The definitive history of the submarine has yet to be written.

DAVID HILDEBRANDT
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Beach, Edward L. *Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor.* Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 212pp. $24.95

On 7 December 1941, the devastating success of the Japanese naval air attack on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, as well as on nearby air and military installations, resulted in the relief from command of both Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, commander of the U.S. Army's Hawaiian Department. In light of the many subsequent investigations

into the disaster, one finds it incredible that Captain Edward L. Beach, USN, Ret., can state in his 1995 publication that the United States has "never come to grips with the question of who was responsible . . . for the unawareness of our troops and naval forces in Hawaii" (p. 1).

There was more dereliction of duty in Washington, Beach believes, than on Oahu. His view suggests a "revisionist" theory that, simply put, declares that those in Washington (reading Japan's high-level diplomatic [PURPLE] cipher) possessed information that could have alerted Hawaii to impending danger but failed to share it with Kimmel and Short. Beach faults Washington for not warning them.

Yet on 27 November 1941 a "war warning" was sent; on 1 December, the Japanese navy abruptly changed its call signs; and as late as 2 December Kimmel's fleet intelligence officer confessed that he had no idea where the Japanese carriers were. A destroyer and one of the seven (not one, as Beach states on page 136) PBY Catalinas aloft on 7 December attacked a midget submarine operating off the harbor entrance around 0640. Even more damning is the evidence furnished by Short's early warning radar, which actually detected the incoming Japanese planes around 0720. It was disregarded. Commanders possessing even a rudimentary concern for the defense of their forces should have detected clues of hostile intent. Edward S. Miller's *War Plan Orange* speculates that Kimmel's prevailing obsession with the offensive so obscured his vision that the admiral did not in fact make the proper defensive deployment directed by the warning of 27 November. Beach contends, however, that Kimmel and Short were "wrongly used by circumstances far beyond their control, and in which they had no part."

Beach declares that his goal is to "reinterpret" history, not to revise or rewrite it. To do so, however, the author must thoroughly know his sources. Beach does not. The nature of the errors in *Scapegoats* prompts one to wonder how the author can "reinterpret" the larger issues when he is so careless with the details. For example, concerning the transfer of ships to the Atlantic Fleet in the spring of 1941, Beach states that the carrier *Wasp* was "held in the Atlantic and employed in the support of Malta" (p. 14)—something that did not happen until the spring of 1942. He gives the arrival of the Japanese envoy, Kurusu Saburo, in Washington as on 4 November 1941—an interesting feat since that diplomat did not leave Manila until 8 November (p. 30). It was the carrier HMS *Indomitable*, not the *Illustrious*, that was earmarked to accompany HMS *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* on their ill-fated mission to the Far East (p. 92), and he refers to the stores ship *Antares* as a "small repair ship" (p. 100). The author also contradicts himself when he states that Pearl Harbor, "the principal U.S. Navy base in the Pacific Ocean," had been put out of action by the Japanese attack (p. 102); soon thereafter, he asserts that the United States benefited from Japan's *failure* to put the base out of action by not attacking tank farms or repair facilities (p. 107).

There in no bibliography but rather an annotated list of "references" that range from the thirty-nine-volume *Congressional Hearings*, through secondary works of varying quality and applicability, to personal correspondence. Two important bibliographic omissions are Forrest Pogue's biography of General George C. Marshall, and B. Mitchell Simpson's biography of Admiral Harold R. Stark.

Scapegoats is an unfortunate title, reflecting a misunderstanding of Leviticus 16. Far from being mute creatures sacrificed or made to bear the sins of others, Kimmel and Short suffered for their own sins of omission. Short seems to have understood this, but Kimmel's stubborn refusal to admit any responsibility for his role in the Pearl Harbor disaster demonstrates that he never did.

ROBERT J. CRESSMAN
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Mullins, Wayman C., ed. *1942, Issue in Doubt: Symposium on the War in the Pacific by the Admiral Nimitz Museum.* Austin, Texas: Eakin, 1994. 310pp. $29.95

"The reader will find this book fascinating and uniquely informative," promises Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, former Chief of Naval Operations, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a contributor to this work. Overall, this is an accurate observation about a book that addresses one of the most critical years in the Pacific War. It covers the dark days following the Pearl Harbor disaster, to the second half of that year, when the Allies blunted the Japanese offensives and gradually seized the strategic initiative.

In March 1992, veterans of the Pacific battles of 1942, along with a group of distinguished writers and historians, gathered in San Antonio, Texas, to take part in a symposium to ensure that the lessons of that fateful year would be recorded for future generations. They did not rehash strategies and tactics of the Pacific but instead looked at the impact that the first full year of war for the United States had on the human element. Wayman Mullins has compiled a collection of essays presented at that symposium, held in the Admiral Nimitz Museum.

In the preface and in short introductory comments for each essay, Mullins serves as moderator, placing each narrative in context. All the major battles of 1942 are examined. Roughly a third of the book deals with the grimmest portion of 1942, when the demise of the American-British-Dutch-Australian ("ABDA") command, the fall of Singapore and the Philippines, and a string of similar disasters made the Japanese appear invincible. The remaining essays are concerned with the gradual turning of the tide at the Coral Sea and Midway, and on New Guinea and Guadalcanal.

If this were all the book had to offer, however, it would be nothing more than a review of previous works. What makes it unique is its treatment of the human dimension. For example, the role of women caught in the maelstrom of the Pacific in 1942, largely ignored in earlier histories, is given adequate treatment, as is the Japanese view-

point—three presenters were former Japanese combatants.

The reader enjoys a "you are there" perspective. Of the contributors, Hattie Brantley, an army nurse, was a Japanese prisoner of war from 1942 to 1945. Frank Ficklin, also a prisoner of war, worked on the "Death Railway" in Thailand. Richard Best tells us how it felt to be a dive bomber at Midway. Japanese torpedo officer Teiji Nakamura describes his life in the Imperial Japanese Navy destroyer *Yudachi*. We discover that Shiro Hashimoto was the real "Pistol Pete" on Guadalcanal, and Ted Waller tells us what it was like to be an eighteen-year-old seaman in the USS *Portland* during the naval Battle of Guadalcanal.

From these personal narratives the editor shifts to the historians' presentations. One can almost visualize Fred Parker and John Costello seated together at a table arguing some of the finer points of American cryptologic efforts. It is dismaying to read about the internecine struggles between Admiral Nimitz's codebreakers at Pearl Harbor and their counterparts in the Department of the Navy. It appears that had Nimitz deferred to Washington's assessment, the near-run victory at Midway might have gone the other way. Pettiness resulted in Lieutenant Commander Joseph J. Rochefort's being consigned from Pearl Harbor to duty as the commanding officer of a floating drydock—an action bordering on the criminal, considering how desperately Rochefort's talents were needed to help decipher Japanese naval codes.

The chapter dealing with the struggle for control of New Guinea graphically portrays how nightmarish fighting in the jungles can be. Nature can be less forgiving than enemy soldiers; starvation, disease, and death are constant threats. We learn that some Japanese were forced to cannibalism to survive the siege at Buna.

There are some distracting errors, such as that the battleship *Kirishima* is misidentified as a carrier; the historians E.B. Potter and Samuel Eliot Morison are referred to as Professor E.M. Potter and Samuel Morrison; and the syntax could use a little cleaning up. Nothing, however, seriously detracts from this fine history.

Mullins has done an excellent job demonstrating that 1942 was indeed a pivotal year in the Pacific War. For those not present at the symposium, this book is the closest thing to actually having been there.

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Mulligan, Timothy P. *Lone Wolf: The Life and Death of U-Boat Ace Werner Henke*. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1995. 247pp. $15.95

The eye-catching cover, bearing German naval artist Claus Bergen's dramatic painting of a U-boat knifing its way through daunting seas under the protection of six bombers, might suggest that Mulligan's biography is yet another book about U-boat aces, with all their derring-do and bravado. So conventional are the numerous contributions to U-boat literature that one cannot be blamed for the inference. However, Mulligan offers us some-

thing quite different—a critical evaluation of a maverick whose life and death provide uncommon insight into the complex relationships between the individual and the state, and truth and propaganda, in the Third Reich. With his balanced, well researched, and clearly written study, which lacks neither vivid action nor thoughtful discourse, Mulligan will appeal to a broad range of readers.

An experienced historian and archivist with the U.S. National Archives, Mulligan explains that while new sources have come to light since the book's first publication (by Praeger) in 1992, nothing has emerged to alter his interpretation of Henke's career, character, or fate.

In June 1944, Werner Henke was shot and killed while trying to escape a prisoner of war camp at Fort Hunt, near Washington, D.C. He had led a life that in many ways cut against the grain of the stereotypical U-boat "Nazi." Born in Imperial Germany in a town on the Vistula River, now in Poland, Henke eventually resettled with his family in the German lowlands of Luneburg. Entering the merchant marine, he experienced the lures of the sea and foreign travel until the Depression forced him out. A German navy burgeoning after the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement offered Henke a career. He proved to be an eccentric officer. His confrontations with authority often led to disciplinary action, including temporary reduction in rank; and at one point, his open scorn of the dreaded SS required the personal intervention of Dönitz himself, and a letter of apology from Admiral von Friedeburg to Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler. By this time, however, Henke was a "protected species"—a highly decorated "ace." He had become a war hero who had received the honours of a political system he essentially deplored.

Mulligan traces Henke's life in detail, always illuminating his social, political, and naval links, as well as assessing the conventions and values that determined his fate. The "lone wolf" image, then, has little to do with the conventional iconography of the U-boat commander preying on enemy shipping but with Henke's being trapped "between his enemies' propaganda image of the U-boat Captain and his own navy's image of a decorated line officer." Mulligan concludes in part that "Henke fell victim to a propaganda legacy of World War I, the image of the cold-blooded, professional U-boat commander who routinely committed war crimes." Mulligan's sympathetic yet critical treatment of Henke invites us to ponder further.

The image of the World War II German submariner (as Mulligan explains with polite understatement) has long been clouded by emotion and controversy. Indeed, a recent study of Germany's popular image of the U-boat and its crew has pointed out the distortions that German writers themselves have marketed over the years. This work would serve as a useful corrective to many German accounts. Should anyone now produce a study of the German submariner from the British and North American perspectives, the pattern would be complete. But whoever does attempt to explain such icons runs the risk of becoming a messenger disparaged for having an un-

seemly message. This too may well be Mulligan's fate. Despite his sterling scholarship, Mulligan subscribes in this work to a canon that may well rankle some German veterans: the German navy started the war by bombarding Polish territory; Admiral Dönitz was a Nazi ideologue and a war criminal; and National Socialism launched "a sea of crimes," including Auschwitz and the final solution. That such a canon should startle anyone today attests to the discomfort that an unresolved past can still cause in some quarters of German society. In many respects, U-boats and U-boat aces are the litmus of German naval tradition.

MICHAEL L. HADLEY
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Sadkovich, James J. *The Italian Navy in World War II.* Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1994. (No price given)

The pattern among historians writing in English about operations in the Mediterranean theater during the Second World War has been to emphasize the success of British forces, whose skill and determination, combined with the aid and assistance of the United States, allowed them to stem and eventually outmatch the numerical and material superiority of their Italian and German opponents. The Italians especially have been ridiculed for cowardice and ineptitude, not only compared with their British opponents but also in contrast to the performance of their German allies. Virtually all works in English, with the exception of the translated *The Italian Navy in World War II*, by Marc'Antonio Bragadin and Giuseppe Fioravanzo, have particularly noted the failures of the Regia Marina Italiana (RMI), whose originally favorable strategic position and numerical and material superiority were dissipated by hesitant leadership, an ineffectual officer corps, and incompetent crews. James J. Sadkovich's purpose is to overturn this paradigm completely. His method is to attack, at every opportunity, the premises upon which this conclusion is based.

Sadkovich commences by reexamining the accuracy of the consensus view of prior Italian superiority. He highlights the RMI's lack of an organic air arm, the absence of aircraft carriers, and the fleet's failure to secure effective cooperation from the Regia Aeronautica Italiana (RAI) for its operations. He notes also that the RMI's prewar development had been conditioned by the expectation of contesting control of the Mediterranean against the French rather than the British, a factor that exerted a powerful influence on the design of its vessels. The author assesses Italian warships to have been comparable in quality to those of the British, with the exception of destroyers and some older, rebuilt battleships. He notes, however, such dangerous deficiencies as lack of radar, no doctrine or equipment for night-fighting, limited antisubmarine warfare capability, an inadequate industrial base, and a chronic lack of bunker fuel. Overall, he contends that these factors gave the qualitative edge to the Royal Navy.

Sadkovich also disputes that the strategic advantage lay with the RMI.

He emphasizes that the Italian fleet's operations were restricted geographically to within the Mediterranean and were tied completely to maintaining the essential flow of supplies to North Africa. Its difficulties were further exacerbated by limited dock facilities in Libyan ports and inability to gain access to French North African harbors. The British, on the other hand, could readily reinforce the Mediterranean Fleet and their ground and air forces through exterior lines secure from Italian attack, and they could amass overwhelming force to support the resupply of Malta.

In general, Sadkovich considers the RMI to have acquitted itself well in combat. He emphasizes the readiness of the Royal Navy to disengage whenever it lost the tactical advantage, and also the success, for much of the war, of the Italian fleet in convoying supplies and troops, both Italian and German, to North Africa without excessive casualties while inflicting considerable losses on British forces. He notes that major Italian combat losses occurred only during actions for which the RMI was ill equipped, untrained, or outnumbered. Sadkovich also highlights the refusal of the Germans to cooperate fully with the Italians and the disastrous consequences of the Italian adoption of German coding machines, which allowed the British from mid-1942 to use ULTRA to devastate Axis naval operations.

Sadkovich presents a strong case. However, he displays a tendency to overreact and attempts to rebut every earlier accusation against the RMI's war record. He also has not been well served by his editors—his text is riddled with typographical and grammatical errors. This monograph argues that Italy would have been well advised to avoid involvement in World War II, yet that the Italian fleet nevertheless fought creditably with its inadequate tools.

PAUL E. FONTENOY
Beaufort, North Carolina

Allen, Thomas B. and Polmar, Norman. *Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. 351pp. $25

Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar have once again demonstrated their impeccable timing when writing on controversial subjects. Previous topics tackled by this team include Admiral Rickover (shortly before his retirement), the Walker spy ring (not long after it had been exposed), and the first history of the Gulf war (written for CNN). In *Code-Name Downfall*, Allen and Polmar examine President Truman's decision to use the atomic bomb in the overall context of Allied planning for the invasion of the home islands of Japan.

Code-Name Downfall begins with a brief depiction of the Doolittle Raid, the Allies' first attempt to strike back at the Japanese homeland. The authors then proceed to an analysis of War Plan Orange, the prewar American assessment of a potential war with Japan. The main difference between plan and reality was the importance and effectiveness of naval and ground-based airpower. Yet as the authors demonstrate, the new tool of strategic bombing simply did not

achieve all that its proponents claimed —until the destructiveness of atomic weapons was demonstrated. Without the atomic bomb, amphibious invasion seemed the only sure way to end a conflict characterized by suicidal Japanese defenses.

On the surface, the debate concerning President Truman's decision should have ended years ago. Ninety-nine percent of the key decision makers—both American and Japanese—agreed that it took the shock of the "absolute weapon" to cause Japan's surrender. Most official assessments credit the bomb with being a critical (if not the *most* critical) factor in convincing Emperor Hirohito to sue for peace. The testimonial evidence is overwhelming. Japan knew that the war was lost yet planned to fight on until it achieved a more favorable treaty than unconditional surrender. In fact, many Japanese military leaders were determined to fight to the death in the "decisive battle" that would fix their immortality as true samurai.

Most confusing are the parochial claims of airpower and seapower advocates that the war could have ended without bomb or invasion. These revisionist scholars, determined to prove the evils of atomic weapons, capitalism, or American foreign policy in general, have seized upon the few contradictory sources to "prove" that the atomic bombing was immoral. Allen and Polmar cut through this confusion in a nonpolemic fashion, by simply laying out the American plans for invasion and estimates of its cost, the Japanese military commitment to a "decisive battle," and the face-saving excuse which atomic destruction provided to the Emperor of Japan. They also detail the attempted military coup that nearly prevented the surrender.

In a final assessment, the authors recount the words of a billboard outside the atomic components factory at Oak Ridge, Tennessee: "Whose son will die in the last minutes of the war?" Many died in World War II, but the final invasion and occupation of Japan (Operation *Downfall*) began with the stroke of a pen and not the crash of a kamikaze. If you still need convincing, reading *Code-Name Downfall* should prove decisive. And if you are already convinced but want a clearer picture of the decision-making process of Allied and Japanese leaders, this is the best single-volume source currently in print.

SAM J. TANGREDI
Commander, U.S. Navy

Isenberg, Michael T. *Shield of the Republic, 1945–1962.* Vol. I. New York: St. Martin's, 1993. 948pp. $35

Shield of the Republic is an epic account of the U.S. Navy during the stormy years following the end of the Second World War. Its comprehensive sweep ranges from highbrow issues of national security strategy to the relentless technological advances that drove institutional change, down to detailed portrayals of the lives and problems of sailors during the postwar period. Along the way, the author intersperses numerous vignettes and character sketches, which keep the narrative moving smartly.

The scene opens in Tokyo Bay on the morning of the Japanese surrender,

with a detailed description of a Navy that had just won one of the most overwhelming maritime victories in history, leaving no conceivable future foe in the field. And therein lay the problem. With no Mahanian enemy, a powerful new service rival claiming the atomic mantle for itself, and few apparent missions, the Navy struggled to justify its existence. "In the new, uncertain world taking shape in the terrible shadow of atomic energy, what purposes the awesome collection of naval power within and beyond Tokyo Bay might serve remained to be seen."

The author traces the Navy's often demoralizing fight in the late 1940s for a significant place in national military strategy. He then describes the sudden reversal in fortunes when events in Korea demonstrated in no uncertain terms that the Navy was still powerful and useful to have around. American political leaders came to find the naval forces indispensable in a host of situations when the use or threat of force could usefully underpin diplomacy, from Matsu and Quemoy, to Lebanon in 1958, to the Cuban Missile Crisis. By 1962, far from the demoralized postwar service, "the incomparably powerful instrument that was the Cold War Navy steamed on, at its triumphant peak."

Rampantly advancing technology also drove change. Isenberg skillfully weaves into the narrative accounts of technical advances like the development of the large carrier, nuclear-powered submarines and their marriage to the ballistic missile, fleet missile defense, and the electronics revolution. Underlying all these developments was the Navy's extraordinary involvement in basic scientific research of all kinds, whether through the Office of Naval Research and its associated laboratories or by sponsoring work in the civilian world.

People and personalities are not neglected either. The author traces the rise of the aviators to dominance, followed later by the growing influence of the submariners. He dedicates separate chapters to discussions on senior leadership, the "wardroom," and the enlisted community, from multiple perspectives ranging from personnel training and management problems to sociological considerations.

In short, there is much to like about this book. However, it has some significant weaknesses. There are numerous typographical errors as well as distracting errors of fact that good editing should have caught. More seriously, the narrative is frequently tainted by "political correctness." For example, "To the service's discredit, however, the Navy . . . remained a rock-solid pillar of male supremacy, hypermasculine attitudes, and male-oriented sexual discrimination—against both women and homosexuals." The problem is not the author's particular views, but rather the sneeringly contemptuous attitude he takes toward those who have qualms, for serious reasons, about the desirability of open homosexuals in the military or of women in combat roles.

Similarly, the author is contemptuous of certain other "types." Throughout the book he looks dismissively on those who believed the Soviet Union was a malignant force, accusing the senior leaders of "what Cold Warriors euphemistically called the Free World"

of "almost unthinking opposition to communism." Admirals were another unenlightened class, "archaic as well as conservative," leaders of a "Navy . . . usually top-heavy with traditionalism and inertia." There are even "two-fers" —"Admirals were almost to a man knee-jerk anti-Communists." Such ad hominem comments detract from an otherwise excellent narrative.

Still, there are lighter moments. For example, after forty-five years, even naval officers can laugh at the Air Force's claim, following USS *Missouri*'s hard grounding in 1950, that "the battleship is here to stay!" And the author's reference to the "delights of Rotterdam" is wonderfully oxymoronic, at least to an ex-resident.

Michael Isenberg is an associate professor at the U.S. Naval Academy. He is the author of numerous books, including *Puzzles of the Past: An Introduction to Thinking about History*. A retired Naval Reserve captain, Isenberg is a veteran with eleven years active duty as a surface line officer.

Shield of the Republic is entertaining history, but more importantly, it is also a useful book for those struggling to determine the direction in which the Navy should go. The circumstances we presently live under bear striking resemblance to the period following the Second World War. As was the case then, recent combat experience suggests that the conduct of warfare might be changing in major, though as yet unforeseen, ways. Just as in the 1950s, we are experiencing rapid advances in a variety of technologies that have military relevance. And, following the collapse of our major foe after prolonged national exertion, we too are in a new world situation, and it is not clear who our future foes will be or what the nature of the conflict may be. *Shield of the Republic* is an instructive account of how our predecessors dealt with the uncertainties they faced fifty years ago.

JAN VAN TOL
Commander, U.S. Navy

Maloney, Sean M. ed. *Securing Command of the Sea: NATO Naval Planning 1948–1954*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995. 292pp. $38.95

Sean Maloney is a Canadian military historian with a special interest in the Cold War. His latest offering depicts how Nato maritime commands evolved from historical precedents and trial by fire in the World War II experience. The evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization command structure unfolds like a mystery thriller, highlighting the difficulties encountered by the victors of the war—the United States, Great Britain, and Canada. Only these three countries had significant military forces available to resist the Soviet Union.

Beginning with the chain of command used during the war, and giving prominence to the difficulties experienced, Maloney clearly describes the founding of Nato against the backdrop of such grim events as the 1947 coup in Hungary, the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, and the Berlin blockade. It was apparent that the Marshall Plan would not be enough to stop Soviet aggression.

Developing complex, trilateral war plans appeared easy, however, when compared to dividing up the command, as the military arm of Nato took shape. The essential principles agreed upon were that the nation providing the majority of the forces had first pick of command positions, unless some vital interest of another nation was involved, in which case command boundaries were often altered to accommodate the vital interest.

When it was recognized that only two major Nato commanders were required, and that the greatest number of forces in both commands would be from the United States, the vital-interest card quickly came into play. The underlying, fundamental issue in this arrangement was the rise of a new superpower, the United States, and the decline of a great power, Britain, whose resources had been decimated by war. Since Britain could not provide the majority of forces to any area in question, it had to rely on its claim to vital interest. Because Britain required absolute control over the waters surrounding it, an independent major command was formed (Commander in Chief Channel), and to protect its lines of communication to the Middle East the Mediterranean was divided in patchwork fashion with Italy, Greece, and Turkey, becoming Allied Forces South (with land, air, and U.S. naval forces [STRIKEFORSOUTH]). This command protected British vital interests and ensured that American nuclear weapons aboard aircraft carriers remained under U.S. control.

This easy-to-read account fills an important gap in the literature and will be of interest to historians of the Cold War. The numerous organizational charts are clearly laid out and help tell the story. It is essential reading for the serious student of Nato and for present and future naval planners wrestling with problems of coalition command and control at sea.

WILLIAM D. SMITH
Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired

Kingseed, Cole C. *Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1995. 166pp. $22.50

Colonel Cole Kingseed, U.S. Army, researched and wrote the early drafts for this important study in the Advanced Research Department at the Naval War College. He set out to examine how President Dwight D. Eisenhower made decisions in times of crisis. In laying out his agenda for his research in documents at Princeton, the Naval Historical Center, the Eisenhower Library, the National Archives, and a variety of oral history interviews, Kingseed asked whether Eisenhower borrowed exclusively from his military experience or was flexible in his approach. This central issue posed a number of subsidiary questions. In the foreign policy area, did Eisenhower subordinate himself to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, or did he take the lead? How effective was the president when personally dealing with allies and adversaries? Under Eisenhower, what were the roles of the CIA, the National Security Agency, and the State and Defense departments?

Looking to the Suez crisis as a principal case study, Kingseed examines in the first of his eight chapters the organization of the Eisenhower White House, showing how it served as the sole coordinating agency for national security decision making. Although Eisenhower drew together the key, responsible officials for discussion, clearly all final decisions rested on the president, and strategic management coalesced only at the level of the president as well.

Turning to the details of the Suez Crisis, Kingseed examines its background in the Aswan Dam problem, arguing that Eisenhower shares responsibility for igniting the crisis. And as the crisis intensified, he continued his involvement and began to examine ways to influence European allies as a means to enhance the outcome of the situation.

In a diplomatic marathon during the London conferences, Eisenhower did all in his power to prevent war over Suez. He believed that any military intervention over the Suez issue would be both unwarranted and self-defeating. Seriously miscalculating the situation, however, he failed to understand that Prime Minister Anthony Eden and French Premier Guy Mollet still considered military action a viable option and that both the United Kingdom and France were prepared to intervene without prior consultation with the United States.

In Kingseed's view, Eisenhower's inability to understand and prevent the situation was not a failure of his techniques in crisis management but merely showed that while he could control his own administration, he could not enforce his will on allies who pursued policies that were diametrically opposed to those supported by the United States. Faced with the Atlantic alliance in peril at the same time that he entered a presidential election, Eisenhower doubled his efforts to end the Suez Crisis and prevent the Soviet Union from exploiting the situation. Nearly simultaneously, there was a cease-fire in the Middle East, and a Republican victory in the election.

Interestingly for the naval reader, Eisenhower commented, "You remember that story of Nelson—dying, he looked around and asked, 'Are any of them still left?' . . . That's the way I feel." Kingseed likens Eisenhower's personal leadership to the "Nelson Touch"; where Nelson employed superior seamanship, Eisenhower used economic and diplomatic pressure.

Kingseed argues that the Suez crisis tested every aspect of Eisenhower's ability to manage a crisis and direct foreign policy. He reaffirms the current trends in research that show Eisenhower as an extraordinarily active leader and one who was not tied to any rigid military model in decision making.

The author's fruitful research provides readers with an extremely valuable and readable historical case study of presidential decision making in national security affairs.

JOHN B. HATTENDORF
Naval War College

Rhodes, Richard. *Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb.* Simon & Schuster, 1995. 731pp. $32.50

If the goal were purely commercial, this volume might have been titled, "The Making of the Atomic Bomb, Part II, the Sequel." Richard Rhodes completes the chronicle of "the Bomb" with *Dark Sun*. Rhodes's earlier, Pulitzer Prize–winning book presented an epic description of the science, politics, and history culminating in the dropping of "Little Boy" and "Fat Man" on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, respectively. These events only marked the beginning of our ability to destroy civilization. The development of the greater thermonuclear power is documented in this book, with the same thoroughness and gusto of Rhodes's earlier volume.

The race for the atomic bomb was driven by fear of a German bomb. The race for the hydrogen bomb was dominated by the Cold War, which began even as the United States and the Soviet Union were still allies. *Dark Sun* describes how espionage kept the Soviet political leadership abreast of American atomic bomb efforts and enabled Lavrenti Beria, head of the Soviet secret police, successfully to direct the Soviet fission bomb project even though he neither understood nor trusted his own scientists. This knowledge also gave Igor Kurchatov (the Russian scientist who played a role comparable to that of Oppenheimer in the West) the confidence to build an atomic bomb in far less time than generally thought possible. Soviet scientists were certainly capable of creating the bomb without the information passed on by Klaus Fuchs, but without it their efforts would probably have been delayed considerably because of political interference.

Rhodes describes how Edward Teller delayed the development of the hydrogen bomb by his hyperbole and his insistence on pursuing a design that would not have worked. The creation of the hydrogen bomb required the efforts of many. If fatherhood were to be bestowed, it would be Stanislaw Ulam who should claim paternity. The Polish emigré mathematician proved through laborious calculations that Teller's "Super" would not work. Shortly thereafter, he invented the staged, radiation-imploded hydrogen bomb. After reading this book, my impression is that Edward Teller acted externally as a cheerleader for a megaton-yield device but internally obstructed the development of a working thermonuclear weapon.

The sad episode of the unfair treatment of Oppenheimer is placed in the context of the interplay of personalities and politics in the 1950s. Lewis Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), who lifted Oppenheimer's security clearance, is described by another AEC commissioner: "If you disagree with Lewis about anything, he assumes you're just a fool at first. But if you go on disagreeing with him, he concludes you must be a traitor." As seen through the eyes of the intellectually insecure and thin-skinned millionaire, the urbane, well educated Oppenheimer was bound to fall into the second category.

The strength of this book is that it can be read at many levels. For the scientist, such technical intricacies are provided as how neglecting the role of lithium 7 caused the yield of the 1954

Castle Bravo test to be three times that predicted. (This miscalculation had deadly consequences for the Japanese fishing boat *Fukuryu Maru*, the "Lucky Dragon," which was outside the declared exclusion zone.) For the Sovietologist, Rhodes's account means in particular that the result of espionage by agents like the Rosenbergs was that Beria would not hinder the Soviet development effort. The physicist notes that the bulk of the yield of a thermonuclear weapon comes from the fission of the normal uranium isotope casing. The political historian appreciates the importance of the climate of McCarthyism, which led to Oppenheimer's loss of his security clearance and the ostracism of Teller from the mainstream physics community. The military historian realizes how close the United States came to a thermonuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis, and how Strategic Air Command's Curtis Lemay tried to gain control of U.S. nuclear weapons, independent of the White House. There is such rich detail here that the scientist can see the politics and the political scientist can see the science.

However, *Dark Sun* is not light reading. The book takes commitment but is well worth the time. It is the comprehensive story of the development of the hydrogen bomb, detailing personalities in the scientific, military, and political communities on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The end of the Cold War has brought disclosures that help to make this history rich and complete. Rhodes illustrates how each discipline is connected to the others; no decision can be made in isolation.

Also recommended is *Dark Sun*, on tape, for an abridged version read by the author.

XAVIER K. MARUYAMA
Naval Postgraduate School

Murray, Williamson. *Air War in the Persian Gulf*. Baltimore, Md.: Nautical and Aviation Pub. Co. of America, 1995. 338pp. $34.95

This book is of special value to the national security community because it gives a detailed account of airpower in the Gulf war. The maps are exceptional, the tables and annex on disposition of aircraft invaluable. While one cannot accept some judgments—the KARI air defense system was not taken down in its entirety in the first six hours of the war; Iraqi pilots did come close to damaging Saudi oil fields; and there were problems with targeting pods, laser guided munitions, and rules of engagement that had greater significance than did those discussed here—the bulk of the book is instructive and useful. However, I would have liked it to have been advertised for what it is—a reprint of a three-year-old government study (Part I, "Operations," vol. II of the *Gulf War Airpower Survey* [GWAPS], Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.) (N.B.—The shortfalls of this volume noted above are dealt with elsewhere in the GWAPS.)

Thus, this book is not a new scholarly work on air war in the Persian Gulf. Save for a few pages of new introduction, the elimination of some pictures, occasional additions where classified

deletions occur in the original (noticeable because of changed type fonts), and the pagination, the works are identical. Indeed, given the amount of time passed since the original study and the new information and interpretations that have arisen, it is remarkable that Murray's additions to the original text, written nearly four years ago, are so sparse. One wishes that Murray's serious scholarship had demanded more than this.

Also, this is not the work of a single author as stated on the cover, spine, and title page, nor does it stand alone. It was a team study. Lieutenant Colonel Gary P. Cox and Dr. Wayne Thompson were the principal contributors and coauthors, a fact that is buried on the inside book jacket and in the acknowledgements. In addition, this is only half of one of five volumes that make up the complete report. While it certainly deserves to be published, widely read, and discussed, it is regrettable that neither the publisher nor Murray felt strongly enough to republish the entire series—which would have been the real service.

This is particularly true because the GWAPS study got caught up in Air Force politics and is deserving of wider distribution. Originally, 2,500 copies were to be printed, but after a number of senior Air Force officers and Air Force historian Richard Hallion tried to squelch the report because it was critical of the U.S. Air Force, only a few hundred copies of the unclassified version were printed. Distribution was limited to a carefully selected group.

The members of the GWAPS study did extensive interviews with participants, reviewed Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) and targeting data, and had nearly unlimited access to all relevant personnel and data sets regarding the air campaign. Its special value is that it is a far more detailed presentation and interpretation of data on the air campaign in the Gulf war than are most others on the same topic. This said, even the GWAPS report is overly laudatory, as a GAO study on the air campaign in the Gulf war reveals.

This book's major flaw is the uneven coverage of the war as a whole. As principal author, Murray was in a position to give the same coverage to the last few weeks of the war's air campaign that he devoted to the first, but he did not. The chapters on the beginning of the air campaign are roughly twice the length of those on the rest of the war (58 and 62 pages versus 26 and 34 pages, respectively). As one reads, one sees the declining level of detail.

Despite this, *Air War in the Persian Gulf* is a good book, and a valuable one. But it is less than it could have been—and more than it appears to be.

GRANT T. HAMMOND
Air War College

Klare, Michael. *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995. 231pp. $25

Michael Klare, professor at Hampshire College and defense correspondent for *The Nation*, offers a critique of post–Cold War U.S. defense policy. Relying on government documents and secondary sources, Klare views the two-war scenario that grew out of the Bottom-Up Review as a Pentagon boondoggle

intended to maintain a higher percentage of Cold War budgets than he believes necessary.

The tenor of his argument parallels those of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Paul Kennedy (both of whom Klare cites) that a "peace dividend" should be the prize for the end of the Cold War and that it should be spent on a number of deserving domestic programs. Not mentioned is that an earlier proponent of this thesis was Georgetown scholar Carroll Quigley, the mentor of, among others, young Bill Clinton. Thus the book, understandably, coincides with many of the Clinton administration's foreign policy precepts.

The end of the Cold War, Klare writes, ended a "symbiotic" relationship between Soviet and U.S. armed forces, where each justified budget increases for the other side. With the Cold War's end, no replacement existed for the respective main enemies; both the Soviet Union and the Pentagon were left with what Senator Sam Nunn calls a "threat blank." It fell to General Colin Powell and other senior officers to find a replacement. They settled on the "rogue states" theory, which posited that the new threat to U.S. security arose from the existence of a group of Third World states (some former Soviet clients, some not) bent on expansion, with massive armies and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

With the appearance of validating its new theory, fortune smiled upon the Pentagon, when, with almost perfect timing, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. It is here that Klare embarks upon the most effective part of his book—a critique of the U.S. performance that, without mentioning Clausewitz, employs "friction" in assessing the Gulf war as a paradigm for future conflicts. He follows with an analysis of potential "rogues" and concludes by following Martin van Creveld, arguing that the main security concern for the United States in the foreseeable future is "the potential of smaller wars to escalate into region-wide conflagrations or merge together into a generalized condition of global chaos." His prescription is enhanced peacekeeping, nonproliferation, and disarmament capabilities, as reflected in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace.*

Some minor errors dot the book. For instance, many observers in the Pentagon will be surprised to learn that it has a "historic interest" in guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency; to the contrary, a former head of the office for counterinsurgency has confided to me its relative neglect of that subject.

More troubling intellectually, however, is the persistence with which Klare attributes all sort of intentions to U.S. policy makers yet drains other foreign actors of the same sense of purpose. "To insure the survival of a large military," Klare writes, "American leaders began constructing a new demonology based on WMD-equipped Third World powers." Yet there is no comparable exploration of the intentions of many of the "demons" he examines. One would think there was no rational basis for fearing them—but the military might of North Korea or China, however, existed long before the Bottom-Up Review. And, it should be added, other

rogue states may not remain as static in their capabilities or intentions as the author apparently believes.

The fear of the expansion of small wars also leads to an internal inconsistency in Klare's argument. We can trace to the presence of peacekeepers little or no appreciable mitigation of violence in the Balkans, so it would appear that a formidable military presence is essential to preventing the spread of certain conflicts—which, it might be added, may well involve one if not more of these fairly well armed "backlash" (Anthony Lake) states.

Perhaps we have been too hasty to determine how the new world is different. Maybe we should look at how much it has stayed the same.

J. MICHAEL ROBERTSON
Palmyra, Virginia

Roy, Mihir K. *War in the Indian Ocean.* Hartford, Wis.: Lancer, 1995. 298pp. $27.50

Aside from the sterile data found in such works as *Combat Fleets of the World* and *Jane's Fighting Ships*, Americans have had little opportunity to discover anything about a navy that is not only fairly new but also, by current standards, fairly large, the Indian Navy.

In his new book, Vice Admiral Mihir K. Roy, both a naval aviator and a surface warrior, shows how the Indian Navy began, how it has progressed, how it has fought, or not fought, in its country's wars, how its leaders have succeeded or failed; how it struggles continually against both the indifference and sometimes even hostility of its political leaders and the suffocating power of the army; and (delphically) what its (or at least the author's) judgments are on future adversaries.

Before India regained independence in 1947, Midshipman Roy served in both a minesweeper and a battleship in the Royal Navy. He later won his wings, and commanded an antisubmarine squadron based on the carrier *Vikrant*, a frigate, a squadron of frigates, and the *Vikrant*. During the 1971 war with Pakistan the author headed naval intelligence and, after forty years of service, retired as Commander in Chief Eastern Naval Command.

What we see in this book are the experiences, and, more importantly the thoughts, of a capable officer who has made the most of a full naval career, one in which the individual is encouraged to expand his range, rather than narrow the focus of his interests and skills.

The navy had no part to play in, and thus no share in the shame of, India's inadequate performance against China in 1962. In preparing for the war against Pakistan in 1965 the army's chief of staff, who was also chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, believed that "the Navy's role did not look like being a very big one" and excluded the Chief of Naval Staff—the equivalent to excluding the Chief of Naval Operations—"from even attending the chiefs of staff meetings!" Not surprisingly, the country's lone carrier, the *Vikrant*, was allowed to languish in drydock during the short war. The rest of the fleet did nothing useful either.

When six years later, in 1971, war with Pakistan loomed once again, the navy found it wise to formulate its

own plans. For these "no approval was sought from the Ministry of Defence and none given." So the navy fought its own war. It showed that in general it could do the jobs it had assigned to itself. It also showed, particularly in the Arabian Sea, where it appears to have crushed the spirit of the small and impoverished Pakistani fleet, that it played a useful role, one unforeseen (and perhaps not valued) by the field marshals.

Among other matters Admiral Roy discusses the development of India's naval aviation, the creation—against the wishes of both the British and American governments, and their navies in particular—of a submarine force, the Western attitudes that helped to drive India into a long naval partnership with the Soviet Union, and India's three-year experiment with a Soviet-built nuclear-powered attack submarine.

In looking to the future, Admiral Roy shows himself concerned about China, quoting a general of the People's Liberation Army who, in 1993, said that "the PLA Navy would extend its naval operations into the Indian Ocean to prevent India from dominating these waters. . . . This is something we cannot accept as we are not prepared to let the Indian Ocean become India's ocean."

Without naming any country, Admiral Roy also makes plain his concern about "self-appointed policemen" who "interface in the internal governance of some weaker states," and "outside powers" who "intervene against India's vital interests."

This is a book well worth the attention both of U.S. officers and of those academics interested in foreign affairs, politico-military matters, and strategic concerns.

FRANK UHLIG, JR.
Naval War College

Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul, ed. *Sea Power and Indian Security.* New York: Brassey's, 1995. £29.95

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury has written a balanced book that I recommend to those interested in Indian naval developments. His work contains a concise history of the evolution of seapower within India from its ancient origins to India's stature today as a respected regional naval power. He also provides insight regarding the relationship between the Indian Navy and other significant navies, both regional and extra-regional, that operate in the Indian Ocean.

As a research analyst at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis in New Delhi, Roy-Chaudhury appears well qualified to document the progress of the Indian Navy and provide forecasts of its evolution into the next century. His book started as a postgraduate thesis at Oxford University and was completed some years later.

Roy-Chaudhury's objectivity is the book's strength. Writing from an Indian perspective, he has nonetheless retained his intellectual honesty, and he questions decisions of the Indian leadership. This has not been true of all authors writing from the subcontinent, and this approach lends credibility.

India's position as a major littoral state and its long history both stress the

importance of maritime affairs. Nevertheless, not all has been easy for the Indian Navy. Since gaining independence in 1947, the Indian state has been consumed by land disputes with its neighbors Pakistan and China. Additionally, the Indian Navy has yet to play a decisive role in any of modern India's most significant military conflicts. Therefore the navy has been relegated to a subordinate position to the larger Indian army. This work offers an interesting description of the bureaucratic debate within India, which has worked against the navy. Roy-Chaudhury describes the navy's new strategy of justifying its role in terms of defense of India's growing maritime interests. These include not only traditional naval missions but emphasize also the importance of maritime resources and tasks in the ocean regime brought about by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

Of interest is the discussion of the U.S., Soviet, Chinese, and Pakistani navies and their interaction in the Indian Ocean. Roy-Chaudhury provides the Indian view of these important naval forces. His description of the Indian reaction to the USS *Enterprise* battle group's deployment to the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war is devoid of much of the rhetoric usually associated with this event.

Roy-Chaudhary presents an honest appraisal of the association between India and the Soviet Union. His view is that due to the reluctance of Western nations to make naval hardware available to the Indian Navy, there was no alternative to dealing with the Soviets. He expresses gratitude for Soviet help and admits that the Indian Navy's rate of expansion would not have been possible without their assistance. He realizes, however, that the disintegration of the Soviet state has created difficulties for the Indian Navy. The severity of this problem can be gauged from the extent of the Indians' dependence on Soviet sources. In early 1994, twenty-three of the navy's thirty-eight principal combatants were of Soviet origin.

Although generally fair and forthright, Roy-Chaudhury has some difficulty remaining detached when dealing with the complex equation involving India, Pakistan, and China. The 1962 Chinese incursion into India, and the lack of preparedness it unveiled, has developed into an understandable paranoia regarding the Chinese threat. India would dearly like to be seen on the world stage in relation to China, and it bridles when the Indian military is compared to the much smaller and less capable Pakistani forces. However, Indians themselves often tend to overplay the Pakistani capability. The author describes the implementation of the Pressler Amendment as an acknowledgment of Pakistan's nuclear weapons status and decries any relaxation of the ban on transfer of arms. There is no mention of the one-sided nature of the amendment or of the fact that India is not held to any similar standard.

In closing, this book has value for those interested in national security affairs. India is a major regional player and remains a nation often misunderstood by American policy makers. The undeniable danger that exists within the India-China-Pakistan relationship makes knowledge of the region important. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury's book

provides a balanced treatment of the subject.

W.F. DORAN
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Volkogonov, Dmitri. *Lenin: A New Biography*. New York: The Free Press, 1994. 529pp. $30

General Dmitri Volkogonov—World War II Soviet tank commander and combat veteran, former dean of Soviet military history, biographer of Trotsky and Stalin, advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and co-chair of the U.S.-Russian commission on prisoners of war and missing-in-action matters, died in December 1995. He possessed undoubtedly the best possible credentials for writing what many reviewers have lauded as the definitive biography of Lenin. Volkogonov had access to the innermost sanctum of the Communist Party archives, which houses documents written by Lenin and about Lenin that the Party deemed too embarrassing to reveal or that otherwise illuminated too clearly the true nature of the founder of the Soviet state.

These documents confirm what good Western scholarship has pointed to for decades: that Soviet totalitarianism, embodied by the dreaded secret police, the GULAG prison camp system, the use of terror, and the repression of potential opposition, had its roots in Lenin, not Stalin. For this alone, Volkogonov's book is of immense value. I only wish that it had been available to me during innumerable debates in graduate school over the nature of the Soviet Union. By citing specific documents in the various archives, Volkogonov's work essentially ends the debate. Lenin and the totalitarian state he wrought were, from the beginning, devoted to the maintenance of Bolshevik power and nothing else.

Volkogonov provides much corroborating evidence of Lenin's utter ruthlessness once in power and faced with opposition. In coded telegrams to Bolshevik functionaries, Lenin exhorted them to take hostages among the populace, shoot without trial priests and peasants, use poison gas against rebels, and so forth. The use of any means, however violent, was justified to preserve his regime, and the violent and often crude language that Lenin used in his directives should once and for all destroy the myth of the "good Lenin" whose legacy was distorted by Stalin.

Beyond his personality and its implications for the nature of the USSR, there is much more that will interest Lenin scholars. For example, Volkogonov reveals that in the final months of Lenin's life, he requested poison and trusted Stalin to provide it. Also, Lenin was able to live comfortably before the Revolution, as a "professional revolutionary," despite the fact he had worked as a wage earner for only about two years in his entire life. The sources of Lenin's livelihood included German generosity and Bolshevik bank robberies. Volkogonov also presents strong evidence that Inessa Armand was Lenin's lover, as well as conclusive proof of Lenin's Jewish heritage. However, the author explains that these facts are less important than the lengths taken by the Soviets to suppress them for decades.

What makes this book particularly fascinating is that Volkogonov had to shatter his own mental icon of Lenin to write it. Brought up on the hagiographical lies that constituted Soviet history, Volkgonov, in post-Soviet Russia, had to deal honestly, even painfully, with the damning evidence he unearthed. He explains, "None of us—the present author included—could begin to imagine that the father of domestic Russian terrorism, merciless and totalitarian, was Lenin." Volkgonov's conversion was complete, however: he routinely describes Lenin as "totalitarian" in his policies and proclivities, a moral cynic who betrayed the Russian people.

Despite its value as a reference book, and quite in contrast to the one-sided praise Volkogonov has received from other reviewers (for example, Peter Rodman in *National Review*), I cannot recommend this book for the general reader. I hold to the old-fashioned view that books are meant to be read, and this one is nearly unreadable.

Organizationally, it is a mess. It is more a collection of essays than an integrated work. It jumps around enough chronologically and thematically to make one's head spin. One could say it is a breathtaking narrative, but not in a positive sense. As just one of many possible examples, a discussion of Lenin's creation of the Politburo as the primary instrument of Bolshevik control is gratuitously interrupted by a lengthy paragraph about Lenin's personal hatred for the Mensheviks, followed by an overview of the Politburo up to Krushchev's era, and then by a description of Soviet grain purchases in the 1970s.

There are other serious problems. Despite apparently severe editing by the translator, there are many redundant passages, non sequiturs, and verbose passages that detract from the focus of the entire work, which is, after all, supposed to be about Lenin. Volkogonov's writing, at least in translation, lacked the beauty, coherence, and wit of a Richard Pipes or Adam Ulam.

Overall, one would more profitably and enjoyably spend time reading these authors' treatments of Lenin and his crimes, either Pipes's *Russia under the Bolshevik Regime* or Ulam's classic from the late 1960s, *The Bolsheviks*. Volkogonov's contributions are that he has made public whatever nuggets the Russian archives provided and confirmed Western beliefs about Lenin. However, for now, the best histories of the Soviet Union and its leaders continue to be written by Western scholars.

NICHOLAS DUJMOVIĆ
Washington, D.C.

Dobrynin, Anatoly Fyodorovich. *In Confidence*. New York: Times Books, 1995. 672pp. $30

In Confidence is Dobrynin's memoirs of his years of service in the Soviet diplomatic corps, the majority of which (1962 to 1985) were spent as Soviet ambassador to the United States. He takes great pains to convince the reader that his philosophy was based upon a sincere attempt to learn as much as possible about the United States and its culture, and that, with this knowledge, he would transmit to his

superiors in Moscow what he believed was factual and reliable information, along with advice upon which he hoped they would base Soviet foreign policy. Such sensitivity often earns disparagement rather than acclaim among one's own people (everyone knows about "going native").

A primary goal of Dobrynin in this book is to shed light on his role in the grand policies of, and the internal diplomacy conducted between, the United States and the Soviet Union, from the Kennedy administration to that of Ronald Reagan. Dobrynin writes well and manages to cover a great deal of history and experience without boring the reader. Those who remember analyzing the order of precedence atop Lenin's tomb in Moscow to advise the U.S. government of critical Soviet government power shifts will revel in the wealth of information that Dobrynin provides.

He believes his greatest diplomatic achievement (possibly for history as well) was his successful efforts at opening a diplomatic back-channel for the Soviets and Americans during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. In fact, he claims the honor of helping to resolve the crisis. Both President John Kennedy and Attorney General Robert Kennedy at first believed Dobrynin to be a bold-faced liar. Within days, however, he was able to win some measure of trust and worked through Robert Kennedy to form the compromise between the United States and the Soviets. It makes interesting reading from the Soviet point of view.

An amusing part of the book is Dobrynin's terse characterizations of the Americans with whom he dealt. He found Robert Kennedy quick-tempered and often rude and difficult to deal with, especially in foreign affairs. The former American ambassador to the Soviet Union, Llewellyn Thompson, was a pleasant person, a competent professional who spoke Russian well. However, most interesting are Dobrynin's relationships with Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. Dobrynin is at his best detailing how he worked so hard to convince both sides (American and Soviet) to accept difficult bargaining positions on real issues.

Although this is an important book, written by a key player in the Cold War, naturally the warning *caveat emptor* applies. Yet it offers insights into not only Soviet political power struggles but America's, as well. If a criterion for the worth of a book is the time spent reading it versus what you learn from it, then this book is well worth the effort. Dobrynin has certainly been a "good fellow" to provide us with such a rich diet.

PAUL J. SANBORN
Havertown, Pennsylvania

Weiner, Tim; Johnston, David; and Lewis, Neil A. *Betrayal: The Story of Aldrich Ames, an American Spy*. Random House, 1995. 297pp. $25

The strange story of Aldrich "Rick" Ames, the CIA operations officer who spied for the Russians, continues to attract analysis and attempted explanations. This book is the latest in a series of such offerings, representing the efforts of three Washington-based *New York Times* journalists. Their work is a competent piece

of journalism, providing the reader a balanced understanding of Rick Ames the man, as well as Rick Ames the turncoat, and of the organizational culture in which he worked.

Unlike most earlier works on this subject, the most noteworthy thing about this book is its lack of bias. The authors claim to have no institutional connections with either the CIA or the FBI and stress that their information has been derived from legitimate research augmented by selected personal interviews. The result is that the book points out mistakes and questions judgments without concern for agency or bureau approval.

The authors point out, for example, that the series of "blown" spy operations in the mid-1980s that resulted in the imprisonment or death of dozens of Soviet "sources" working for the CIA was not considered a priority for internal investigation. The initial indifference shown by the CIA to the real meaning of these losses was subsequently compounded by the tortoise-like approach of the FBI investigation; even after Ames was considered a prime suspect, it took almost two years to arrest him. While the authors blame no one, the reader is left with the impression that neither the CIA nor FBI aggressively pursued this investigation.

Why? Part of the answer may be found in the organizational culture of each institution. The authors discuss this in the aptly titled chapter, "Bordeaux and Budweiser." They write, "FBI agents said that many CIA officers treated them with polite condescension, were ignorant of the justice system, and were unschooled in the realities of criminal investigation. To their CIA counterparts, FBI agents were blind to the intricacies of intelligence, where people stole secrets and refined them into subtly shaded reports for the nation's leaders. Each saw the other in stereotypes. The CIA was Bordeaux; the FBI was Budweiser. The Agency was college professors; the FBI was cops."

In addition to mutual distrust, the authors allude to different views held by the agencies on counterintelligence and investigative priorities. The CIA's mission is to understand and contain the damage done by a spy. The FBI's mission is to develop an airtight legal case for a successful prosecution. These differing perspectives usually lead to conflicting approaches toward counterintelligence investigations, as demonstrated in the Ames case.

When examining any case of espionage, it is important to consider its context. This is particularly important with any Russian operation, because the Russians have proven themselves capable of espionage operations that are complex, intricate, and often interlinked. For example, the authors discuss the likelihood (as seen in retrospect) that many of the mid-1980 compromises attributed either to corrupt Marine security guards at the Soviet embassy or to physical and technical penetration of embassy communications, were actually caused by Ames. The implication would be, if the insight is valid, that the Russians were able to manipulate our perception of where the compromises were coming from to protect their source in the CIA. This would appear to be a demonstration of a sophistication

in espionage that far outmatches the disjointed U.S. efforts to combat it.

In their final chapters, the authors discuss the consequences of this case for the FBI and the CIA. They make much of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1995, which requires that the CIA inform the FBI immediately if it suspects any loss of classified information, and that it cooperate fully in any subsequent investigation. As the authors put it, the Ames case "wrote the epitaph for a dying world of secrecy and deception."

While this conclusion betrays either a need to end their book on a positive note or a real naivete regarding the way intelligence works, the authors have put their journalistic expertise to good use, providing a good overview of the Ames case. It will be of value to anyone interested in national security. It is useful for the background it supplies as well as for the questions left unanswered.

A postscript to this review is warranted by recent congressional hearings in which the CIA has admitted to knowing that Russian double-agents were feeding to the United States disinformation based, in part, on what Ames was telling them. What is surprising is not that the Russians were trying to deceive us but that senior CIA officials concealed the fact. Was it done to protect the agency from embarrassing probes by the FBI, or was it simply part of a larger individual or institutional political agenda? An intelligence agency that cannot police itself is one thing; one that willingly deceives its consumers is quite another.

The CIA's motto is "The Truth Shall Make You Free." Our policy makers should be asking themselves, whose truth?

E.D. SMITH
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Recent Books

Brennan, Joseph G. *Foundations of Moral Obligation*. Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1994. 269pp. $14.95

This book is based on a series of ten lectures on moral philosophy, offered as an elective at the Naval War College. It was co-created in 1978 through the inspiration of the president of the College, Vice Admiral James Stockdale and the author, Professor Joseph Brennan. Stockdale credited his study of moral philosophy with helping him survive his long, brutal captivity in North Vietnam.

After jointly teaching the highly popular course with Stockdale in its initial year, 1978, Brennan continued to teach it twice yearly until his retirement in 1992. This volume contains the essence of the course lectures, which included a range of subjects such as "Job and the Problem of Evil"; discussions of major moral philosophers such as Aristotle, Kant, and Mill; influential philosopical movements such as Utilitarianism and Existentialism; as well as contemporary problems of evil and ethics.

For those who question the practical rewards of studying moral philosophy, Admiral Stockdale's 1975 letter to Brennan explaining how philosophy helped him survive is included in the preface. In short, this is an eminently readable book for people without any formal background in philosophy. It will richly repay the time spent reading it.

Goldstein, Donald M.; Dillon, Katherine V.; and Winger, Michael J. *Nuts! The Battle of the Bulge, the Story and the Photographs*. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1994. 186pp. $30

The authors of the best-sellers *Miracle at Midway* and *At Dawn We Slept* have compiled this unique and compelling commemorative of the fiftieth anniversary of the Battle of the Bulge. With its extensive collection of photographs, many previously unpublished, *Nuts!* masterfully depicts both the harshness of life in the front lines and the quieter moments behind the lines. This illustrated history of the Ardennes Offensive, which was the *Wehrmacht*'s last-ditch surprise campaign on the Western Front, and of the Allies' valiant repulse and counteroffensive, contains photographs made from four captured rolls of German motion picture film. These snapshots appear for the first time as a block, in their original order. *Nuts!* is arranged in an accessible documentary-style format. In it are depictions of the soldiers, machines, materiel, and the severe living conditions experienced by the troops in the Ardennes in the winter of 1944–1945.

Longyard, William H. *Who's Who in Aviation History: 500 Biographies*. Novato, Calif: Presidio, 1994. 210pp. $29.95

Though the author (an air enthusiast, private pilot, experimenter, and a high school teacher) drew upon the resources of a variety of museums and aviation associations, his subject is "aviation's true history," which is not to be found in such places, or, in a sense, anywhere else. He refers to the dreams of those who made aviation history, and those sources are now "mostly buried or burned." This *Who's Who*, then, is an attempt to draw together (uniquely, to the author's knowledge) the lives of those who "lived and died" aviation history. It comprises brief recapitulations and assessments of the lives and contributions of the five hundred figures, of many nations and backgrounds, to which Mr. Longyard limited himself. They include theoreticians (e.g., Douhet—"arrogant, precocious, and tactless"), designers, the first man to die (in 1785) in a flying accident, the first jet squadron commander, the Wright brother's mechanic, rocketry pioneers, aces, heroes and heroines, and Harriet Quimby—"whose beautiful smile died when she failed to use a seat belt." Fifty-seven black-and-white photographs.

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