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Air War in the Persian Gulf

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Castle Bravo test to be three times that predicted. (This miscalculation had deadly consequences for the Japanese fishing boat *Fukuryu Maru*, the "Lucky Dragon," which was outside the declared exclusion zone.) For the Sovietologist, Rhodes's account means in particular that the result of espionage by agents like the Rosenbergs was that Beria would not hinder the Soviet development effort. The physicist notes that the bulk of the yield of a thermonuclear weapon comes from the fission of the normal uranium isotope casing. The political historian appreciates the importance of the climate of McCarthyism, which led to Oppenheimer's loss of his security clearance and the ostracism of Teller from the mainstream physics community. The military historian realizes how close the United States came to a thermonuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis, and how Strategic Air Command's Curtis Lemay tried to gain control of U.S. nuclear weapons, independent of the White House. There is such rich detail here that the scientist can see the politics and the political scientist can see the science.

However, *Dark Sun* is not light reading. The book takes commitment but is well worth the time. It is the comprehensive story of the development of the hydrogen bomb, detailing personalities in the scientific, military, and political communities on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The end of the Cold War has brought disclosures that help to make this history rich and complete. Rhodes illustrates how each discipline is connected to the others; no decision can be made in isolation.

Also recommended is *Dark Sun*, on tape, for an abridged version read by the author.

XAVIER K. MARUYAMA
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Murray, Williamson. *Air War in the Persian Gulf*. Baltimore, Md.: Nautical and Aviation Pub. Co. of America, 1995. 338pp. \$34.95

This book is of special value to the national security community because it gives a detailed account of airpower in the Gulf war. The maps are exceptional, the tables and annex on disposition of aircraft invaluable. While one cannot accept some judgments—the KARI air defense system was not taken down in its entirety in the first six hours of the war; Iraqi pilots did come close to damaging Saudi oil fields; and there were problems with targeting pods, laser guided munitions, and rules of engagement that had greater significance than did those discussed here—the bulk of the book is instructive and useful. However, I would have liked it to have been advertised for what it is—a reprint of a three-year-old government study (Part I, "Operations," vol. II of the *Gulf War Airpower Survey* [GWAPS], Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.) (N.B.—The shortfalls of this volume noted above are dealt with elsewhere in the GWAPS.)

Thus, this book is not a new scholarly work on air war in the Persian Gulf. Save for a few pages of new introduction, the elimination of some pictures, occasional additions where classified

deletions occur in the original (noticeable because of changed type fonts), and the pagination, the works are identical. Indeed, given the amount of time passed since the original study and the new information and interpretations that have arisen, it is remarkable that Murray's additions to the original text, written nearly four years ago, are so sparse. One wishes that Murray's serious scholarship had demanded more than this.

Also, this is not the work of a single author as stated on the cover, spine, and title page, nor does it stand alone. It was a team study. Lieutenant Colonel Gary P. Cox and Dr. Wayne Thompson were the principal contributors and coauthors, a fact that is buried on the inside book jacket and in the acknowledgements. In addition, this is only half of one of five volumes that make up the complete report. While it certainly deserves to be published, widely read, and discussed, it is regrettable that neither the publisher nor Murray felt strongly enough to republish the entire series—which would have been the real service.

This is particularly true because the GWAPS study got caught up in Air Force politics and is deserving of wider distribution. Originally, 2,500 copies were to be printed, but after a number of senior Air Force officers and Air Force historian Richard Hallion tried to squelch the report because it was critical of the U.S. Air Force, only a few hundred copies of the unclassified version were printed. Distribution was limited to a carefully selected group.

The members of the GWAPS study did extensive interviews with participants, reviewed Air Tasking Orders

(ATOs) and targeting data, and had nearly unlimited access to all relevant personnel and data sets regarding the air campaign. Its special value is that it is a far more detailed presentation and interpretation of data on the air campaign in the Gulf war than are most others on the same topic. This said, even the GWAPS report is overly laudatory, as a GAO study on the air campaign in the Gulf war reveals.

This book's major flaw is the uneven coverage of the war as a whole. As principal author, Murray was in a position to give the same coverage to the last few weeks of the war's air campaign that he devoted to the first, but he did not. The chapters on the beginning of the air campaign are roughly twice the length of those on the rest of the war (58 and 62 pages versus 26 and 34 pages, respectively). As one reads, one sees the declining level of detail.

Despite this, *Air War in the Persian Gulf* is a good book, and a valuable one. But it is less than it could have been—and more than it appears to be.

GRANT T. HAMMOND
Air War College

Klare, Michael. *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995. 231pp. \$25

Michael Klare, professor at Hampshire College and defense correspondent for *The Nation*, offers a critique of post-Cold War U.S. defense policy. Relying on government documents and secondary sources, Klare views the two-war scenario that grew out of the Bottom-Up Review as a Pentagon boondoggle