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Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws

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deletions occur in the original (noticeable because of changed type fonts), and the pagination, the works are identical. Indeed, given the amount of time passed since the original study and the new information and interpretations that have arisen, it is remarkable that Murray's additions to the original text, written nearly four years ago, are so sparse. One wishes that Murray's serious scholarship had demanded more than this.

Also, this is not the work of a single author as stated on the cover, spine, and title page, nor does it stand alone. It was a team study. Lieutenant Colonel Gary P. Cox and Dr. Wayne Thompson were the principal contributors and coauthors, a fact that is buried on the inside book jacket and in the acknowledgements. In addition, this is only half of one of five volumes that make up the complete report. While it certainly deserves to be published, widely read, and discussed, it is regrettable that neither the publisher nor Murray felt strongly enough to republish the entire series—which would have been the real service.

This is particularly true because the GWAPS study got caught up in Air Force politics and is deserving of wider distribution. Originally, 2,500 copies were to be printed, but after a number of senior Air Force officers and Air Force historian Richard Hallion tried to squelch the report because it was critical of the U.S. Air Force, only a few hundred copies of the unclassified version were printed. Distribution was limited to a carefully selected group.

The members of the GWAPS study did extensive interviews with participants, reviewed Air Tasking Orders

(ATOs) and targeting data, and had nearly unlimited access to all relevant personnel and data sets regarding the air campaign. Its special value is that it is a far more detailed presentation and interpretation of data on the air campaign in the Gulf war than are most others on the same topic. This said, even the GWAPS report is overly laudatory, as a GAO study on the air campaign in the Gulf war reveals.

This book's major flaw is the uneven coverage of the war as a whole. As principal author, Murray was in a position to give the same coverage to the last few weeks of the war's air campaign that he devoted to the first, but he did not. The chapters on the beginning of the air campaign are roughly twice the length of those on the rest of the war (58 and 62 pages versus 26 and 34 pages, respectively). As one reads, one sees the declining level of detail.

Despite this, *Air War in the Persian Gulf* is a good book, and a valuable one. But it is less than it could have been—and more than it appears to be.

GRANT T. HAMMOND
Air War College

Klare, Michael. *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1995. 231pp. \$25

Michael Klare, professor at Hampshire College and defense correspondent for *The Nation*, offers a critique of post-Cold War U.S. defense policy. Relying on government documents and secondary sources, Klare views the two-war scenario that grew out of the Bottom-Up Review as a Pentagon boondoggle

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intended to maintain a higher percentage of Cold War budgets than he believes necessary.

The tenor of his argument parallels those of former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Paul Kennedy (both of whom Klare cites) that a "peace dividend" should be the prize for the end of the Cold War and that it should be spent on a number of deserving domestic programs. Not mentioned is that an earlier proponent of this thesis was Georgetown scholar Carroll Quigley, the mentor of, among others, young Bill Clinton. Thus the book, understandably, coincides with many of the Clinton administration's foreign policy precepts.

The end of the Cold War, Klare writes, ended a "symbiotic" relationship between Soviet and U.S. armed forces, where each justified budget increases for the other side. With the Cold War's end, no replacement existed for the respective main enemies; both the Soviet Union and the Pentagon were left with what Senator Sam Nunn calls a "threat blank." It fell to General Colin Powell and other senior officers to find a replacement. They settled on the "rogue states" theory, which posited that the new threat to U.S. security arose from the existence of a group of Third World states (some former Soviet clients, some not) bent on expansion, with massive armies and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

With the appearance of validating its new theory, fortune smiled upon the Pentagon, when, with almost perfect timing, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. It is here that Klare embarks upon the most effective part of his

book—a critique of the U.S. performance that, without mentioning Clausewitz, employs "friction" in assessing the Gulf war as a paradigm for future conflicts. He follows with an analysis of potential "rogues" and concludes by following Martin van Creveld, arguing that the main security concern for the United States in the foreseeable future is "the potential of smaller wars to escalate into region-wide conflagrations or merge together into a generalized condition of global chaos." His prescription is enhanced peacekeeping, nonproliferation, and disarmament capabilities, as reflected in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*.

Some minor errors dot the book. For instance, many observers in the Pentagon will be surprised to learn that it has a "historic interest" in guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency; to the contrary, a former head of the office for counterinsurgency has confided to me its relative neglect of that subject.

More troubling intellectually, however, is the persistence with which Klare attributes all sort of intentions to U.S. policy makers yet drains other foreign actors of the same sense of purpose. "To insure the survival of a large military," Klare writes, "American leaders began constructing a new demonology based on WMD-equipped Third World powers." Yet there is no comparable exploration of the intentions of many of the "demons" he examines. One would think there was no rational basis for fearing them—but the military might of North Korea or China, however, existed long before the Bottom-Up Review. And, it should be added, other

rogue states may not remain as static in their capabilities or intentions as the author apparently believes.

The fear of the expansion of small wars also leads to an internal inconsistency in Klare's argument. We can trace to the presence of peacekeepers little or no appreciable mitigation of violence in the Balkans, so it would appear that a formidable military presence is essential to preventing the spread of certain conflicts—which, it might be added, may well involve one if not more of these fairly well armed “backlash” (Anthony Lake) states.

Perhaps we have been too hasty to determine how the new world is different. Maybe we should look at how much it has stayed the same.

J. MICHAEL ROBERTSON
Palmyra, Virginia

Roy, Mihir K. *War in the Indian Ocean*.
Hartford, Wis.: Lancer, 1995. 298pp.
\$27.50

Aside from the sterile data found in such works as *Combat Fleets of the World* and *Jane's Fighting Ships*, Americans have had little opportunity to discover anything about a navy that is not only fairly new but also, by current standards, fairly large, the Indian Navy.

In his new book, Vice Admiral Mihir K. Roy, both a naval aviator and a surface warrior, shows how the Indian Navy began, how it has progressed, how it has fought, or not fought, in its country's wars, how its leaders have succeeded or failed; how it struggles continually against both the indifference and sometimes even hostility of its

political leaders and the suffocating power of the army; and (delphically) what its (or at least the author's) judgments are on future adversaries.

Before India regained independence in 1947, Midshipman Roy served in both a minesweeper and a battleship in the Royal Navy. He later won his wings, and commanded an antisubmarine squadron based on the carrier *Vikrant*, a frigate, a squadron of frigates, and the *Vikrant*. During the 1971 war with Pakistan the author headed naval intelligence and, after forty years of service, retired as Commander in Chief Eastern Naval Command.

What we see in this book are the experiences, and, more importantly the thoughts, of a capable officer who has made the most of a full naval career, one in which the individual is encouraged to expand his range, rather than narrow the focus of his interests and skills.

The navy had no part to play in, and thus no share in the shame of, India's inadequate performance against China in 1962. In preparing for the war against Pakistan in 1965 the army's chief of staff, who was also chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, believed that “the Navy's role did not look like being a very big one” and excluded the Chief of Naval Staff—the equivalent to excluding the Chief of Naval Operations—“from even attending the chiefs of staff meetings!” Not surprisingly, the country's lone carrier, the *Vikrant*, was allowed to languish in drydock during the short war. The rest of the fleet did nothing useful either.

When six years later, in 1971, war with Pakistan loomed once again, the navy found it wise to formulate its