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## War in the Indian Ocean

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rogue states may not remain as static in their capabilities or intentions as the author apparently believes.

The fear of the expansion of small wars also leads to an internal inconsistency in Klare's argument. We can trace to the presence of peacekeepers little or no appreciable mitigation of violence in the Balkans, so it would appear that a formidable military presence is essential to preventing the spread of certain conflicts—which, it might be added, may well involve one if not more of these fairly well armed “backlash” (Anthony Lake) states.

Perhaps we have been too hasty to determine how the new world is different. Maybe we should look at how much it has stayed the same.

J. MICHAEL ROBERTSON  
Palmyra, Virginia

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Roy, Mihir K. *War in the Indian Ocean*.  
Hartford, Wis.: Lancer, 1995. 298pp.  
\$27.50

Aside from the sterile data found in such works as *Combat Fleets of the World* and *Jane's Fighting Ships*, Americans have had little opportunity to discover anything about a navy that is not only fairly new but also, by current standards, fairly large, the Indian Navy.

In his new book, Vice Admiral Mihir K. Roy, both a naval aviator and a surface warrior, shows how the Indian Navy began, how it has progressed, how it has fought, or not fought, in its country's wars, how its leaders have succeeded or failed; how it struggles continually against both the indifference and sometimes even hostility of its

political leaders and the suffocating power of the army; and (delphically) what its (or at least the author's) judgments are on future adversaries.

Before India regained independence in 1947, Midshipman Roy served in both a minesweeper and a battleship in the Royal Navy. He later won his wings, and commanded an antisubmarine squadron based on the carrier *Vikrant*, a frigate, a squadron of frigates, and the *Vikrant*. During the 1971 war with Pakistan the author headed naval intelligence and, after forty years of service, retired as Commander in Chief Eastern Naval Command.

What we see in this book are the experiences, and, more importantly the thoughts, of a capable officer who has made the most of a full naval career, one in which the individual is encouraged to expand his range, rather than narrow the focus of his interests and skills.

The navy had no part to play in, and thus no share in the shame of, India's inadequate performance against China in 1962. In preparing for the war against Pakistan in 1965 the army's chief of staff, who was also chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, believed that “the Navy's role did not look like being a very big one” and excluded the Chief of Naval Staff—the equivalent to excluding the Chief of Naval Operations—“from even attending the chiefs of staff meetings!” Not surprisingly, the country's lone carrier, the *Vikrant*, was allowed to languish in drydock during the short war. The rest of the fleet did nothing useful either.

When six years later, in 1971, war with Pakistan loomed once again, the navy found it wise to formulate its

own plans. For these "no approval was sought from the Ministry of Defence and none given." So the navy fought its own war. It showed that in general it could do the jobs it had assigned to itself. It also showed, particularly in the Arabian Sea, where it appears to have crushed the spirit of the small and impoverished Pakistani fleet, that it played a useful role, one unforeseen (and perhaps not valued) by the field marshals.

Among other matters Admiral Roy discusses the development of India's naval aviation, the creation—against the wishes of both the British and American governments, and their navies in particular—of a submarine force, the Western attitudes that helped to drive India into a long naval partnership with the Soviet Union, and India's three-year experiment with a Soviet-built nuclear-powered attack submarine.

In looking to the future, Admiral Roy shows himself concerned about China, quoting a general of the People's Liberation Army who, in 1993, said that "the PLA Navy would extend its naval operations into the Indian Ocean to prevent India from dominating these waters. . . . This is something we cannot accept as we are not prepared to let the Indian Ocean become India's ocean."

Without naming any country, Admiral Roy also makes plain his concern about "self-appointed policemen" who "interface in the internal governance of some weaker states," and "outside powers" who "intervene against India's vital interests."

This is a book well worth the attention both of U.S. officers and of those

academics interested in foreign affairs, politico-military matters, and strategic concerns.

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Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul, ed. *Sea Power and Indian Security*. New York: Brassey's, 1995. £29.95

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury has written a balanced book that I recommend to those interested in Indian naval developments. His work contains a concise history of the evolution of seapower within India from its ancient origins to India's stature today as a respected regional naval power. He also provides insight regarding the relationship between the Indian Navy and other significant navies, both regional and extra-regional, that operate in the Indian Ocean.

As a research analyst at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis in New Delhi, Roy-Chaudhury appears well qualified to document the progress of the Indian Navy and provide forecasts of its evolution into the next century. His book started as a postgraduate thesis at Oxford University and was completed some years later.

Roy-Chaudhury's objectivity is the book's strength. Writing from an Indian perspective, he has nonetheless retained his intellectual honesty, and he questions decisions of the Indian leadership. This has not been true of all authors writing from the subcontinent, and this approach lends credibility.

India's position as a major littoral state and its long history both stress the