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Sea Power and Indian Security

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own plans. For these "no approval was sought from the Ministry of Defence and none given." So the navy fought its own war. It showed that in general it could do the jobs it had assigned to itself. It also showed, particularly in the Arabian Sea, where it appears to have crushed the spirit of the small and impoverished Pakistani fleet, that it played a useful role, one unforeseen (and perhaps not valued) by the field marshals.

Among other matters Admiral Roy discusses the development of India's naval aviation, the creation—against the wishes of both the British and American governments, and their navies in particular—of a submarine force, the Western attitudes that helped to drive India into a long naval partnership with the Soviet Union, and India's three-year experiment with a Soviet-built nuclear-powered attack submarine.

In looking to the future, Admiral Roy shows himself concerned about China, quoting a general of the People's Liberation Army who, in 1993, said that "the PLA Navy would extend its naval operations into the Indian Ocean to prevent India from dominating these waters. . . . This is something we cannot accept as we are not prepared to let the Indian Ocean become India's ocean."

Without naming any country, Admiral Roy also makes plain his concern about "self-appointed policemen" who "interface in the internal governance of some weaker states," and "outside powers" who "intervene against India's vital interests."

This is a book well worth the attention both of U.S. officers and of those

academics interested in foreign affairs, politico-military matters, and strategic concerns.

FRANK UHLIG, JR.
Naval War College

Roy-Chaudhury, Rahul, ed. *Sea Power and Indian Security*. New York: Brassey's, 1995. £29.95

Rahul Roy-Chaudhury has written a balanced book that I recommend to those interested in Indian naval developments. His work contains a concise history of the evolution of seapower within India from its ancient origins to India's stature today as a respected regional naval power. He also provides insight regarding the relationship between the Indian Navy and other significant navies, both regional and extra-regional, that operate in the Indian Ocean.

As a research analyst at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis in New Delhi, Roy-Chaudhury appears well qualified to document the progress of the Indian Navy and provide forecasts of its evolution into the next century. His book started as a postgraduate thesis at Oxford University and was completed some years later.

Roy-Chaudhury's objectivity is the book's strength. Writing from an Indian perspective, he has nonetheless retained his intellectual honesty, and he questions decisions of the Indian leadership. This has not been true of all authors writing from the subcontinent, and this approach lends credibility.

India's position as a major littoral state and its long history both stress the

importance of maritime affairs. Nevertheless, not all has been easy for the Indian Navy. Since gaining independence in 1947, the Indian state has been consumed by land disputes with its neighbors Pakistan and China. Additionally, the Indian Navy has yet to play a decisive role in any of modern India's most significant military conflicts. Therefore the navy has been relegated to a subordinate position to the larger Indian army. This work offers an interesting description of the bureaucratic debate within India, which has worked against the navy. Roy-Chaudhury describes the navy's new strategy of justifying its role in terms of defense of India's growing maritime interests. These include not only traditional naval missions but emphasize also the importance of maritime resources and tasks in the ocean regime brought about by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.

Of interest is the discussion of the U.S., Soviet, Chinese, and Pakistani navies and their interaction in the Indian Ocean. Roy-Chaudhury provides the Indian view of these important naval forces. His description of the Indian reaction to the USS *Enterprise* battle group's deployment to the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war is devoid of much of the rhetoric usually associated with this event.

Roy-Chaudhury presents an honest appraisal of the association between India and the Soviet Union. His view is that due to the reluctance of Western nations to make naval hardware available to the Indian Navy, there was no alternative to dealing with the Soviets. He expresses gratitude for Soviet help and admits that the Indian Navy's rate

of expansion would not have been possible without their assistance. He realizes, however, that the disintegration of the Soviet state has created difficulties for the Indian Navy. The severity of this problem can be gauged from the extent of the Indians' dependence on Soviet sources. In early 1994, twenty-three of the navy's thirty-eight principal combatants were of Soviet origin.

Although generally fair and forthright, Roy-Chaudhury has some difficulty remaining detached when dealing with the complex equation involving India, Pakistan, and China. The 1962 Chinese incursion into India, and the lack of preparedness it unveiled, has developed into an understandable paranoia regarding the Chinese threat. India would dearly like to be seen on the world stage in relation to China, and it bristles when the Indian military is compared to the much smaller and less capable Pakistani forces. However, Indians themselves often tend to overplay the Pakistani capability. The author describes the implementation of the Pressler Amendment as an acknowledgment of Pakistan's nuclear weapons status and decries any relaxation of the ban on transfer of arms. There is no mention of the one-sided nature of the amendment or of the fact that India is not held to any similar standard.

In closing, this book has value for those interested in national security affairs. India is a major regional player and remains a nation often misunderstood by American policy makers. The undeniable danger that exists within the India-China-Pakistan relationship makes knowledge of the region important. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury's book

provides a balanced treatment of the subject.

W.F. DORAN
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Volkogonov, Dmitri. *Lenin: A New Biography*. New York: The Free Press, 1994. 529pp. \$30

General Dmitri Volkogonov—World War II Soviet tank commander and combat veteran, former dean of Soviet military history, biographer of Trotsky and Stalin, advisor to Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and co-chair of the U.S.-Russian commission on prisoners of war and missing-in-action matters, died in December 1995. He possessed undoubtedly the best possible credentials for writing what many reviewers have lauded as the definitive biography of Lenin. Volkogonov had access to the innermost sanctum of the Communist Party archives, which houses documents written by Lenin and about Lenin that the Party deemed too embarrassing to reveal or that otherwise illuminated too clearly the true nature of the founder of the Soviet state.

These documents confirm what good Western scholarship has pointed to for decades: that Soviet totalitarianism, embodied by the dreaded secret police, the GULAG prison camp system, the use of terror, and the repression of potential opposition, had its roots in Lenin, not Stalin. For this alone, Volkogonov's book is of immense value. I only wish that it had been available to me during innumerable debates in graduate school over the nature of the Soviet Union. By citing

specific documents in the various archives, Volkogonov's work essentially ends the debate. Lenin and the totalitarian state he wrought were, from the beginning, devoted to the maintenance of Bolshevik power and nothing else.

Volkogonov provides much corroborating evidence of Lenin's utter ruthlessness once in power and faced with opposition. In coded telegrams to Bolshevik functionaries, Lenin exhorted them to take hostages among the populace, shoot without trial priests and peasants, use poison gas against rebels, and so forth. The use of any means, however violent, was justified to preserve his regime, and the violent and often crude language that Lenin used in his directives should once and for all destroy the myth of the "good Lenin" whose legacy was distorted by Stalin.

Beyond his personality and its implications for the nature of the USSR, there is much more that will interest Lenin scholars. For example, Volkogonov reveals that in the final months of Lenin's life, he requested poison and trusted Stalin to provide it. Also, Lenin was able to live comfortably before the Revolution, as a "professional revolutionary," despite the fact he had worked as a wage earner for only about two years in his entire life. The sources of Lenin's livelihood included German generosity and Bolshevik bank robberies. Volkogonov also presents strong evidence that Inessa Armand was Lenin's lover, as well as conclusive proof of Lenin's Jewish heritage. However, the author explains that these facts are less important than the lengths taken by the Soviets to suppress them for decades.