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The Inevitable Strategic Collision between the United States and China

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ON 27 OCTOBER 1994, THE U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIER *Kitty Hawk*, conducting routine operations in the international waters of the Yellow Sea, encountered a Chinese *Han*-class nuclear submarine.[1] The carrier launched an S-3 antisubmarine aircraft, which deployed sonobuoys to track the Chinese *Han*—only to discover that it was being watched, in turn, by two Chinese F-6 fighters.[2] For China, it was a close and serious encounter; for the United States, it was an unavoidable one. In Beijing, a U.S. attaché was informed that China "would take appropriate defensive reactions if there were violations of their airspace and territorial waters."[3] Washington, on the other hand, downplayed the event, indicating that with China beginning to send the fleet beyond its shores into waters that have been the sole domain of the U.S. Navy, "there's inevitably going to be more and more of this kind of thing."[4]

The Yellow Sea incident underscored the prevailing chill in U.S.-China relations. Once drawn together by a shared concern about the Soviet Union, the two countries drew apart when Washington imposed sanctions on Beijing after the attack on unarmed demonstrators in Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989.[5] Relations have marginally improved since; however, a perception lingers in the United States that Chinese attitudes on a broad range of issues run counter to American interests.[6] At least one congressional China expert believes that "there is a body of opinion in this country, I don't know how big, that thinks China is

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the enemy."[7] In Beijing, where the leadership is busily "fanning the flames of nationalism" in order to hang on to power, the attitude is equally hostile.[8] Hard-liners believe that the United States, having disposed of the Soviet Union, will now move against China to eliminate a major barrier to global American supremacy.[9] More significantly, the Chinese military, aiming for expanded budgets, leads in promoting aggressive nationalism and an unyielding atmosphere in Beijing.[10]

Is China a threat? Admiral Richard Macke, the former commander of U.S. Pacific Command, once observed that a combination of capabilities and intentions makes a threat.[11] China's continuing military modernization program, started in the 1980s and including a new forward-looking maritime strategy, has already made the Chinese navy a potential regional power. However, it is more difficult to evaluate China's intentions than its military strength. Indeed, according to certain State Department officials under President George Bush, China has a policy of "calculated ambiguity to mask its ambitions."[12]

This article explores those "ambitions." East Asia having an intrinsically maritime character, the focus is naval, befitting the primary medium of power in such a theater. Specifically, therefore, the article analyzes the Chinese navy's shift in strategic direction from the support of land operations to the conduct of war at sea, arguing that though the Chinese navy's present concept is one of forward defense, limited wars, and local conflicts, China clearly wants to be a global sea power. The implication is that China's long-term goal of becoming a blue-water naval power is placing it on a strategic collision course with the United States, as each nation pursues its own interests in East Asia.

East Asia and U.S. Interests

Winston Lord, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, has asserted that of all the world's regions, East Asia is "the most relevant to the President's highest priority—namely his domestic agenda, the renewal of the American economy, getting the deficit down, getting more competitive, promoting jobs and exports."[13] President William Clinton himself described the region as " the most promising and dynamic area for American foreign policy."[14] Access to East Asia's riches has always been one of America's primary goals;[15] it was trade that prompted the American merchant ship *Empress of China* to anchor off Canton more than two centuries ago.[16] The new republic, isolated from the lucrative European markets, saw a bright future waiting across the Pacific; in today's era of global interdependence, the United States looks again to the "far west" in a quest for economic renewal.

Noting that East Asia already accounts for 2.5 million American jobs, Admiral Charles Larson, when he commanded the U.S. Pacific Command, prophesied that

"our economic future" is in this region.[17] The numbers are already impressive: "Thirty-six percent of U.S. trade is in East Asia ($120 billion of U.S. exports), three times our trade with Latin America, and one-and-a-half times our trade with Europe. East Asia has almost half the world's population. It contains some of the most rapidly growing economies in the world. Japan is already the second-largest industrial economy in the world. China already has a gross national product of about $1.2 trillion. According to the International Monetary Fund, East Asia will, by the turn of the century, account for thirty percent of the world's gross national product."[18]

On the surface, East Asia, preoccupied with the pursuit of wealth, appears tranquil. But under its calm surface, it is a cauldron of competing interests. From the Russia-Japan quarrel over the Kuril Islands to the Malaysia-Philippines squabble over Sabah, territorial disputes in the region abound. The dispute over the Spratly Islands (referred to by the Chinese as the Nansha Archipelago) is, possibly, the most volatile. The competing claimants include China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei.[19] Apparently (though not certainly) rich in oil and other natural resources, the Spratlys straddle major sea lines of communications through the South China Sea, which gives the dispute the potential to destabilize the entire region.[20]

In 1949, when the communists took power, China observed the internationally accepted three-nautical-mile territorial limit. However, instead of using the low-water mark on the mainland coast as the baseline, China began to measure its territorial waters from a baseline connecting the outermost offshore islands, such that all the disputed offshore islands lay within China's territorial waters.[21] In February 1992 the National People's Congress passed a "Law of the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone" that reasserted Chinese claims and authorized the use of military force to prevent other nations from occupying the islands.[22] Moreover, in 1993 a book entitled *Can China Win the Next War?* appeared in China. The authors, almost certainly naval officers, discussed in alarming detail the scenarios for war in the disputed areas.[23]

The implications are worrying. Geographically, the scope of this vast area closely resembles the extent of Chinese influence during the seventeenth century, when East Asian states paid tribute to China.[24] The chief of the Malaysia Institute of Maritime Affairs, Hamzah Ahmad, summed up fairly the foreboding felt in the region: "China should not attempt to revive the Middle Kingdom mentality and expect tribute from Southeast Asia."[25] Strategically, the South China Sea can be considered a maritime "heartland";[26] domination of it would give the Chinese political, economic, and military influence over the "rimland" nations and other states in the region. Japanese, Taiwanese, and South Korean imports, for instance, come through the South China Sea.

Beyond these security concerns lie more challenges for the United States. In the capitals of East Asia, American foreign policy resolve is being questioned;[27] there is a growing perception that the "U.S. has become inward-looking."[28] This may not be far from the truth. Indeed some Americans believe that the nation should go back to being, in the words of former ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick, a "normal country."[29] Voices for disengagement and protectionism, though few, are growing louder. Further, domestic problems continue to dominate American politics. It did not help that the U.S. withdrawal from Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base, both in the Philippines, were accompanied by a massive downsizing of the overall military force. In addition, the budget deficit and the burden of the national debt threaten further cuts. Based on America's "long history of not understanding [its] own policy, being dislocated, sidetracked, and short-sighted," it is no wonder that allies are beginning to question the U.S. commitment to the region.[30]

China and Regional Security

The American interests in East Asia that Winston Lord implies are of such significant, even vital, importance include peace and security, preventing the rise to dominance of any regional power, and guaranteeing commercial access.[31] The fundamental objectives of U.S. policy in East Asia have remained basically unchanged for almost a hundred years. Today, China is challenging those interests.

In February 1995, the People's Liberation Army expanded its presence in the disputed Spratlys in the South China Sea by taking over an island claimed by the Phillippines.[32] Washington hardly noticed the incident, but the Chinese navy's enforcement of a territorial claim just 130 miles off the Philippine west coast sent a grim message across East Asia. Raising the Chinese flag in the appropriately named Mischief Reef was "an act that both in symbol and substance may foreshadow a role reversal in the Pacific, with the PLA Navy ultimately displacing the traditional U.S. Navy preeminence."[33]

After centuries of decline, China today is an emerging maritime power, and the PLA Navy has become a considerable factor in the strategic equation in East Asia and the Western Pacific.[34] Although China has a naval history that goes back about two millennia, it is not a continuous or invariably proud legacy;[35] periods of unprecedented expansion were followed by much longer stretches of almost complete neglect. Consequently, when the PLA Navy was established in 1949, it inherited no seagoing tradition. Naval forces were viewed as merely a coastal arm of the ground forces; in 1950 Xiao Jingguang, their commander, dictated that the fleet "should be a light-type navy, capable of inshore defense. Its key mission is

to accompany the ground forces in war actions. The basic characteristic of this navy is fast deployment, based on its lightness."[36]

Lacking in naval warfare thought and experience, the PLA Navy adopted the naval doctrine of its military mentor, the Soviet Union, then based on the "Young School" of naval strategy, which promoted "coastal submarines, torpedo boats, and other coastal craft, supported by naval aircraft based on shore."[37] Over the next three decades, the PLA Navy built a virtual "wall at sea" comprising hundreds of small vessels. It was, in effect, a navy for coastal defense only. Subservient to its more influential army brethren, the PLA—as evident in its very name—Navy followed a subordinate and limited naval strategy until the latter 1970s.

In 1974 the PLA Navy forcibly took the Paracel Islands (Xisha Dao) from the Vietnamese, but in doing so it was badly bloodied by a smaller force. Alarmed by the exposed deficiencies, the Chinese leadership set in motion a plan to modernize the fleet. More importantly, its strategic focus was shifted from coastal to open-water operations.[38] Ultimately, with the end of the Cold War, Chinese planners realized that new international conditions required new assumptions: though in the near future a world war was unlikely, limited wars were a distinct possiblity.[39] Since then, the development of naval strategy has been concentrated on what the Chinese call "active defense and inshore warfare."[40]

The concept of "active defense" is, in reality, offensive in design and intent. Deng Xiaoping, the Party leader, explained in 1980 that active defense includes "our going out, so that if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack."[41] The building of a navy capable of expanding China's defense perimeter at sea is accordingly a key element of the new Chinese maritime strategy.[42] Under the current "People's War in Modern Conditions" doctrine, which emphasizes high technology in modern warfare, the fleet would aim to oppose the enemy "outside the country's gates."[43]

The PLA Navy has made somewhat unclear public pronouncements about the actual distance implied by "inshore waters" or "green water."[44] Admiral Liu Huaqing, as the commander in chief of the PLA Navy in the early 1980s, asserted that "the Chinese Navy should exert *effective control* of the sea within the first island chain."[45] As defined by Admiral Liu, the "first island chain" includes the Japanese archipelago, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippine archipelago, and Indonesia. He added that "inshore" means the ocean expanse within the "second island chain"—which includes the Bonins, Marianas, and Carolines.[46] Accordingly, this new strategic interpretation extends Chinese naval operations far out into the Pacific Ocean.

Land powers react to maritime threats by going to the sea themselves to fight their enemies on the sea.[47] Sparta built hundreds of triremes to defeat the

Athenians, Carthage compelled Rome to build a navy, and Russia extended its defensive lines out into the oceans during the Cold War.[48] Today, China is building a modern fleet and, simultaneously, pushing its defensive depth hundreds of miles from the mainland shores. Eventually, China's transformed "active defense strategy" will oppose the United States *on* the sea. There, on the "inshore waters" of the Pacific, as the *Han* incident suggests, the PLA Navy's emerging strategy of "forward defense" is already sailing straight across the bow of the U.S. Navy's primary mission of "forward presence." Washington has been watching, and with growing concern. Last year, according to a Republican congressional staff member, the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment ran a simulation exercise using a scenario that showed China successfully invading Taiwan;[49] in another, involving war between China and the United States, China won.

Warring States

Collision appears inevitable. On the eve of Taiwan's first presidential election in March 1996, the PLA Navy placed its forces on alert as China fired "test" missiles menacingly close to the Taiwanese shores. The United States quickly assembled two carrier battle groups near the straits. Taiwan's initial bid for democracy was the latest rupture in a series of crises that, over the years, have drawn China and the United States closer to confrontation. Neither side has been willing to cross the line so far; the Chinese and U.S. naval forces seem determined to stay clear of each other's way, at least until the next wrong assumption, or miscalculation.

Domain of the Dragon. China and Russia both have long coastlines, and most of the other states of East Asia are islands, peninsulas, or archipelagos. Of these littoral actors, China is potentially the most powerful. In Northeast Asia, the U.S. Seventh Fleet, homeported in Japan, provides a stabilizing counterweight; in Southeast Asia, on the other had, the PLA Navy may fill the strategic gap created when the U.S. and Soviet navies left their bases in the area. The South China Sea, like the Strait of Malacca, is a vital link between the Pacific and Indian Oceans; passage through this area is very important for the economies of the United States and its allies.

China's new orientation toward its maritime interests is a key factor in guiding the PLA Navy's future course. Zhang Liangzhong, its present commander, has said that "to defend China truly and effectively from raids and attacks from the sea, we must strengthen the defense in depth at sea and possess naval forces that have the capability to intercept and wipe out the enemy."[50] On a related point, Liu Huaqing, now the deputy secretary general of the Central Military Commission, observed that "for mankind, the oceans today are not just paths to new

continents or keys to the control of the world; of more importance is the exploration and exploitation of the oceans themselves."[51] The upshots of these two statements are, first, that development and modernization of forces is central to the PLA Navy's maritime strategy, and second, that a major task for the navy in the coming years will be to control and protect maritime biological, mineral, and energy resources.

The configuration of the South China Sea makes it ideal for the PLA Navy, in fact one of the principal "domains of the dragon."[52] Chokepoints can be guarded by small craft and fishing vessels. In addition, the shallow water favors submarines, which can "hide between the layers of the underwater thermals and maneuver among the rocks and shoals, where the acoustics are clouded."[53] Moreover, some strategically located islands can be used as stationary "carriers" from which aircraft can be launched to support naval forces. Other smaller islands, rocks, and shoals can serve as missile platforms, communication relay stations, observation and listening posts, and temporary logistics bases.

The PLA Navy's strategic focus of forward defense is suited to its improving capability and, importantly, the perceived threat. Moreover, the concept fits well with the fundamental national defense objective of "winning local wars under high-tech conditions."[54] However, while the PLA Navy is adequate for missions close to home, ability to confront a modern opponent like the U.S. Navy must be viewed as a matter for the future. The PLA Navy is planning to attain such a capability over three phases. In the first, which is expected to be complete by the end of the century, the focus is on new equipment that will quickly enhance the navy's combat capability in order to deter local threats and win battles at low cost and quickly. In the second phase, which extends to the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the projection capability of the navy is to expand beyond the Western Pacific to all the oceans of the world; high-technology task forces will center on aircraft carriers. The third phase extends beyond 2020 and envisions China as a global sea power.[55]

China understands clearly that its oceanic aspirations are, for the moment, beyond the reach of its power. The navy's new strategic direction is meant to ensure that the "inshore waters" do not always remain a distant domain. But territorial disputes will linger and, as shown by recent events, may sometimes become intense. Therefore it is not surprising the most Chinese leaders continue to assert that "the focus of the Chinese navy must be on modern technology, particularly on preparing for limited wars at sea in which high technology will be used."

Can the Chinese Navy Win the Next War? Many analysts maintain that despite the progress of an ambitious modernization, China's naval strength will remain limited for the near and middle term.[56] Indeed, Zhang Yunling, director of the

Institute of Asian and Pacific Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, recently admitted that China and the United States "cannot have a face to face conflict," simply because it is a lopsided "confrontation between the existing superpower and an emerging power."[57] While such a realistic attitude is comforting for the West, at higher levels an impetuous stance prevails. A pro-Beijing newspaper in Hong Kong has quoted Chinese sources that the "PLA [Navy is] capable of seizing control of the entire Taiwan Strait and of burying any foreign intruder in a *sea of fire*."[58] It is quite possible, then, that miscalculation of Chinese capabilities and of U.S. intentions could cloud Beijing's vision. It does not help at all that many Chinese leaders cling to such bellicose litanies as "the weak defeating the strong, the inferior winning out over the superior, a standoff between weak and strong, and the conversion of weakness into strength."[59]

Chinese analysts have drawn lessons from recent conflicts, particularly the Falklands and Persian Gulf wars.[60] They note that during the Gulf war the coalition "scored a sweeping victory because it enjoyed three major advantages: sufficient time to transport troops, equipment and materiel by air and ship, its ability to cut off the enemy's communication lines and [capacity] to effectively use advanced weapons, and its ability to move around a large number of troops without being monitored or running into resistance, by exploiting Iraq's inferiority in weapons. Faced with this kind of expeditionary force which is equipped with superior hardware but is far removed from the battlefield, what strategy should the country on the defensive take?"[61]

The past reveals an easy, albeit incomplete, answer. Though the Chinese military has embraced new doctrines and strategies tailored to modern conditions, its leaders remain "steeped in traditional military thought."[62] They evoke their ancestors' advice of seeking victory through deception and cunning rather than through passages of arms.[63] Mao Zedong's teachings remain an influence. The PLA Navy once strongly advocated the "Young School" because, theoretically, it amounted to guerrilla warfare on the sea. It fused Sun Tzu's advice and Mao's teachings in a naval context: "the concealment of forces behind islands or among fishing fleets, the rapid concentration of forces for surprise night attacks, and mastery despite technical inferiority through audacity and tactical skill."[64] In contemporary application, the PLA Navy may well simply saturate enemy tactical displays with hundreds of unknown and indistinguishable contacts. Or, China may resort to "irregular" warfare. Already Southeast Asia has become a center of pirate activity, and while it has not been positively established that the PLA Navy is involved, some marauding craft fly the Chinese flag.[65] The PLA Navy may choose to employ these renegades, alongside the country's huge fishing and merchant fleets, near chokepoints so as to get near the enemy, thus overcoming the navy's disadvantages in size, quality, and weapons ranges.

In addition, the Chinese navy has been developing new capabilities of its own. China's purchase of four Russian Kilo-type conventional submarines in 1995 raised both the military stakes and tension in the region.[66] An upgrade of the *Ming*-class patrol boats has also been undertaken, with help from Israel. The first *Song* submarine, a locally produced type that incorporates "many new technologies" including a low-noise screw, was launched in 1994.[67] By the turn of the century China plans to begin building two aircraft carriers, each capable of carrying twenty-eight fixed-wing planes. Several new ships have already joined the fleet: two *Luhu* guided-missile destroyers with French-built sonars, two *Jiangwei* guided-missile frigates, *Huang* and *Houxin*-class missile patrol boats, and two *Dayun* logistics ships.[68]

Despite such actual and planned progress, however, the PLA Navy's power-projection capabilities remain constrained. Its inventory of modern, multipurpose platforms is modest. In addition, it lacks appropriate aircraft to support a large naval engagement.[69] Nonetheless, there is a strong feeling in Chinese military circles that "the strongest does not necessarily win final victory, with the wisest philosophy of war and the best battle strategy and tactics being the only magic weapons for winning ultimate victory."[70] It can be expected therefore that Chinese naval forces will use cunning in any military action, employing surprise to offset qualitative and technological deficiencies.[71] Indeed, the early 1996 Chinese maneuvers near Taiwan exercised the principles of "a war of quick decision":[72] "An effective strategy by which the weaker party can overcome its more powerful enemy is to take advantage of serious gaps in the deployment of forces by the enemy with a high-tech edge by launching a pre-emptive strike during the early phase of the war or in the preparations leading to the offensive."[73]

"Magic" weapons, strategies, and tactics, no matter how superior, are worthless without platforms. Lacking modern ships, aircraft, and equipment, the PLA Navy today would be overmatched by a high-technology enemy. But situations change. Faced with this uncertainty, the U.S. Navy, as it continues to rule the "inshore waters," would be wise to observe that ancient Chinese principle of knowing the enemy and knowing yourself.

The United States wants to be, and in fact needs to be, engaged in East Asia, but its policies sometimes add uncertainty rather than stability to the strategic calculations of the states in the region. Territorial disputes, if unresolved, may therefore eventually lead to war, which could in turn conceivably involve the United States. Before that happens, an evaluation of current U.S. naval strategy is in order.

The Mischief Reef incident confirms the maritime dimension of the conflicting regional interests and suggests that it would be entirely possible for a war to start in the South China Sea "accidentally." Poor communications could allow independent-minded Chinese naval officers to make their own rules.[74] Officially, the United States has distanced itself from the present territorial issues, yet such concerns as maritime access could ultimately drag the United States and the rest of the region into an unwanted confrontation with China.[75] In that event, U.S. naval forces would be indispensable, especially in a conflict that sprang from maritime disputes—and in East Asia almost every hostilities scenario includes such a basis.

Given the many weaknesses of the PLA Navy, the U.S. Navy will remain superior to the Chinese fleet for many years to come. That is not the issue. The danger, rather, is the possibility of an expansive, even bellicose, Chinese foreign policy provoking open conflict with a weaker neighboring state. Arms races and exacerbated regional tensions, on the one hand, and an entangling of American armed forces, on the other, are opposite evils to be avoided. However, the Chinese navy has markedly improved in capabilities and is clearly aiming for a blue-water capacity. It has already developed an "active defense and inshore warfare" strategy commensurate with its improving ability to deal with limited wars and regional conflicts, at the same time as the U.S. Navy is concentrating on the world's littorals in support of its own new maritime strategy. The U.S. Navy's recent white papers "... From the Sea" and "Forward ... from the Sea" have changed its focus to operations near land. There is irony in the fact that while the U.S. Navy is slowly shifting away from its sea control mission, the PLA Navy is actively pursuing command of the regional waters.

While the Somalias and Haitis and Bosnias of today justify the current naval strategy, it must be kept in mind that the U.S. Navy's maritime strategy of the 1980s was abandoned only because of the absence of a major naval competitor. General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned in a recent speech at the U.S. Naval War College of tomorrow's "unicorns"; we may find soon enough that the unicorns have already moved onto the sea. Current U.S. naval thinking is based on two assumptions: "that the U.S. has uncontested command of the high seas, wherever and whenever it chooses," and "that all military operations in response to a crisis will be joint."[76] Today, Chinese naval power, as it gradually spreads into one of the world's most important maritime arenas, may be undermining those very foundations.

Notes

1. Barbara Starr, "'Han Incident' Proof of China's Naval Ambition," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 7 January 1995, p. 5.

2. Nigel Holloway, "Closer Encounters," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 April 1995, p. 30.

3. Starr, p. 5.

4. Holloway, p. 30, quoting Michael Swaine, co-director of the RAND Center for Asia-Pacific Policy.

5. Thomas L. Wilborn, *Security Cooperation with China: Analysis and a Proposal* (Carlisle Barracks, Penna.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), p. iii.

6. David Shambaugh, "The United States and China: A New Cold War?" *Current History*, September 1995, p. 243.

7. Nayan Chanda, "Winds of Change," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 22 June 1995, p. 16.

8. Nayan Chanda and Kari Huus, "The New Nationalism," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 9 November 1995, p. 20.

9. David Winterford, *Expanding Chinese Naval Power and Maritime Security in Southeast Asia* (Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1992), p. 6.

10. Shambaugh, p. 245.

11. Richard C. Macke (Adm., USN), "A Commander in Chief Looks at East Asia," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 1995, p. 13.

12. Holloway, p. 30.

13. "Focus on Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, 20 September 1993, p. 643.

14. Ibid.

15. "East Asia" includes Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. "Northeast Asia" refers to China, Japan, the Russian Far East, the two Koreas, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. "Southeast Asia" comprises the ASEAN countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and Thailand), Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and again (because of its immense size), China.

16. Frank Gibney, *The Pacific Century* (New York: Macmillan, 1992), p. 42.

17. Charles R. Larson (Adm., USN), "America's Pacific Challenge, 1993 and Beyond," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, 1 December 1993, p. 123.

18. Donald S. Zagoria, "Clinton's Asia Policy," *Current History*, December 1993, p. 402.

19. Jon Sparks, "The Spratly Islands Dispute: The Possible Outcomes and Their Effects on Australia's Interest," *Asian Defence Journal*, March 1995, p. 18; and see Henry J. Kenny, "The South China Sea: A Dangerous Ground," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1996, esp. p. 99.

20. Sparks, p. 18.

21. David G. Muller, Jr., *China as a Maritime Power* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983), p. 82.

22. Eric Hyer, "The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China's Earlier Territorial Settlements," *Pacific Affairs*, Spring 1995, p. 41. See also Alexander Chieh-Cheng Huang, "The Chinese Navy's Offshore Active Defense Strategy," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1994, p. 7.

23. "The Potential Crisis of Taiwan: The T Day," *Joint Publications Research Service, China*, 13 December 1994, p. 99, translated from *Chien-Tuan K'e-Chi* (Defense Technology Monthly), 1 October 1994.

24. Bill Gunston et al., *The Chinese War Machine* (London: Salamander Books, 1979), p. 113.

25. Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," *International Security*, Summer 1994, p. 170.

26. Hyer, p. 36.

27. Colin McInnes and Mark G. Rolls, "Post–Cold War Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: Trends and Issues," *Contemporary Security Policy*, August 1994, pp. 1–3.

28. Merrill Goozner, "U.S. Allies in Asia Fear China's Growing Might," *Chicago Tribune*, 30 January 1995, p. 1.

29. Doug Bandow, "Keep the Troops at Home: American Nonintervention," *Current*, July 1994, p. 26.

30. James R. Giblin, Jr. (Capt., USN), "How Did We Get Where We Are? The National Security Calculus of Southeast Asia," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 4 May 1995.

31. U.S. Dept. of Defense, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington: 1995), p. 5.

32. William Branigin, "China Takes Over Philippine-Claimed Area of Disputed Island Group," *Washington Post*, 11 February 1995, p. A18:1.

33. Robert A. Manning and James J. Przystup, "China's Syndrome: Ambiguity," *Washington Post*, 19 March 1995, p. C1:5.

34. Muller, p. 1.

35. Gunston, p. 150.

36. You Ji and You Xu, "In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy's Maritime Strategy in the 1990s," *The Pacific Review*, 1991, p. 139.

37. Muller, p. 47. The early Soviet Navy had adhered to the "Old School" of Russian naval strategy, a tsarist inheritance that emphasized battleships and cruisers. Economic realities, however, prevented modernization. In 1921, when the Baltic Fleet mutinied against the government and was decimated, the "Young School" was born. It

rejected the "imperialistic" purposes of the Western navies' major combatants and opted instead for a mission closer to home shores (ibid., p. 48).

38. Winterford, p. 11.

39. Chen Zhou, "The Differences between the Chinese Theory of 'Modern Local War' and the U.S. Concept of 'Limited War,'" *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report, China*, 1 April 1996, pp. 50–1, translated from *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue* (China Military Science), 20 November 1995.

40. Ai Hongren, "An Inside Look into the Chinese Communist Navy," *Joint Publications Research Service, China*, 16 July 1990, p. 14, translated from the book *Zhonggong Haijun Toushi—Maixiang Yuanyangde Tiaozhan* (An Inside Look into the Chinese Communist Navy—Advancing toward the Blue Water Challenge), October 1988.

41. Chen, p. 52.

42. Mi Zhenyu, "The Hundredth Anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War Naval Battle and Contemporary Maritime Concepts," *Joint Publications Research Service, China*, 13 December 1994, p. 91, translated from *Guofang* (National Defense), 15 September 1994.

43. Ai, p. 25.

44. Where does "green water" end and "blue water" begin? Common dictionaries vaguely define "inshore" as close to land, while that area beyond the territorial jurisdiction of a country is called the "high seas." One China expert has put the distinction in terms of capabilities; according to him, the phrase "green water" describes a navy's capability between "brown water," or coastal defense, and "blue water," or full open-ocean operations. (Bradley Hahn [Lt. Cdr., USNR], "Hai Fang," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, March 1986, p. 116).

45. Ai, p. 14.

46. Ibid., p. 27; and see Huang.

47. Jan S. Breemer, "The End of Naval Strategy: Revolutionary Change and the Future of American Naval Power," *Strategic Review*, Spring 1994, p. 48.

48. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War* (London: Everyman, 1993), p. 398; Geoffrey Barraclough, ed., *The Times Concise Atlas of World History* (London: Times Books, 1982), p. 30; and Breemer, p. 48.

49. Chanda, p. 16.

50. Ai, p. 25.

51. Ibid.

52. Mi, p. 94.

53. Frank C. Borik (Cdr., USN), "Sun Tzu & the Art of Submarine Warfare," U. S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, November 1995, p. 67.

54. Jen Hui-wen, "Beijing Political Situation," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China*, 8 March 1996, p. 40, translated from *Hsin Pao* (Hong Kong Economic Journal), 9 February 1996.

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