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## U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads

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useful to a wide audience interested in key theoretical and policy issues relating to nuclear proliferation. It may be particularly interesting to those who are too young to remember the "first generation" of debates about nuclear deterrence, and also for those who are unfamiliar with research that uses an organizational behavioral perspective to understand the behaviors of nation states.

Although the authors use different theoretical lenses, their analyses share commonalities that limit the book's usefulness. Both men focus on future probable behaviors of nuclear nation-states and use examples gleaned from the experiences of the two superpowers during the Cold War. Only Waltz briefly considers (but quickly dismisses) the possibility that terrorists may use nuclear materials, including warheads, in the future. In light of the reports of efforts to sell or smuggle nuclear fuel and advanced weapons components from former Soviet states, the idea of terrorist attacks should be seriously considered. Unfortunately, the rapid spreading of nuclear weapons by covert arms deals between nations, crime syndicates, current and former civilian and military employees, and free-agent arms merchants is absent here.

Also absent is any discussion of the lessons we should learn from the leaders of such diverse countries as Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa, who made the decision to abandon all nuclear weapons programs. Both authors have also ignored the findings of a growing body of systematic comparative studies that have examined and compared factors promoting or inhibiting the decision to "go nuclear." Instead, Sagan and Waltz use similar intuitive methodologies of logic and plausibility, bolstered by selective examples, to support their conclusions.

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Godson, Roy; May, Ernest R.; and Schmitt, Gary, eds. *U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads*. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1995. 315pp. \$25.95

Intense discussion on the future of the U.S. intelligence community dominated, in that sphere, the first part of the 1990s. Although some changes have been made since then and more are sure to come, redesigning U.S. intelligence is so grand an undertaking that changes cannot and should not be implemented without serious discussion. An important contribution to that discussion is this volume of eighteen essays written by academics and senior producers and consumers of intelligence.

In 1992 the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence formed the Working Group on Intelligence Reform. The essays in this book were either presented at group meetings or authored by its members.

Aside from a brief introduction by editors Roy Godson, Ernest May, and Gary Schmitt, the essays are divided into three groups: "Defining the Debate," "Elements and Reform," and "Policies and Policymakers." In "Defining the Debate" the authors explain that at the same time that the U.S. military and intelligence communities are becoming smaller, the distinction between strategic and tactical intelligence is becoming blurred, as policymakers request more information on such topics as economic competition, ethnic conflict, weapons proliferation, and trade negotiations.

The first essay, "What is Intelligence?: Information for Decision Makers," by Jennifer Sims, sets the underlying theme,

which Walter Jajki captures succinctly: "As policy without intelligence is thoughtless, so intelligence without policy is purposeless; the challenge has been to tie the two together." Yet in today's world, "policy" can range from a platoon leader who needs to know what is on the other side of the hill to the president requesting information on the intentions of a foreign leader.

In Part II, Douglas MacEachin recounts the efforts made by the CIA to make analysis more responsive to consumer needs. Since most policymakers view themselves as analysts in their own right, intelligence analysts cannot expect their judgments to go unquestioned. MacEachin recommends making the facts and logic so apparent that no one could disagree. Joseph Nye, in "Estimating the Future," notes that estimators are not fortune tellers but educators. Their analyses should deal with uncertainty by presenting alternative futures, highlighting what is not known, and providing signposts that would indicate which scenario appears to be emerging. Robert Kohler in "The Intelligence Industrial Base" argues for the necessity of keeping a robust intelligence community due to the need to respond quickly in a national crisis.

Essays on denial and deception, counterintelligence, the changing mission of the FBI, and covert action round out Part II. Roy Godson, in his thought-provoking essay "Covert Action: Neither Exceptional Tool nor Magic Bullet," argues for the use of covert action as a normal part of statecraft. Richard Kerr agrees with Godson and urges cooperation between intelligence analysts and covert operators to define opportunities clearly. Ernest May, however, takes gentle exception and would restrict its use to exceptional circumstances.

In Part III, in "Policies and Policymakers," Randall Fort writes about economic intelligence and concludes that it

should remain about as it is, a valuable source of information for government officials. However, economic espionage should be avoided, in part because of the difficulty in sharing the information and determining what exactly is a U.S. company. Britt Snider notes that crime can no longer be classified as foreign or domestic; it knows no borders. Cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence is risky because disclosure of evidence in the courtroom is both likely and necessary. Finally, James FitzSimonds, in "Intelligence and the Revolution in Military Affairs," warns of the prodigious intelligence demands generated by modern weapons and doctrine. The relationship between intelligence and military operations will—and must—grow closer.

*U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads* is first-rate. For those who will chart the future of U.S. intelligence, it should be required reading. Failure to heed its central theme—closer ties between producer and consumer—could have grave consequences.

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Greenberg, Maurice R. and Haass, Richard N. *Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996. 39pp. (No price given)

The Council on Foreign Relations assembled a group of distinguished individuals from both the private and public sectors to discuss what to do with the U.S. intelligence community in the post-Cold War era. They concluded that "intelligence is a critical resource and