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Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence

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which Walter Jajki captures succinctly: "As policy without intelligence is thoughtless, so intelligence without policy is purposeless; the challenge has been to tie the two together." Yet in today's world, "policy" can range from a platoon leader who needs to know what is on the other side of the hill to the president requesting information on the intentions of a foreign leader.

In Part II, Douglas MacEachin recounts the efforts made by the CIA to make analysis more responsive to consumer needs. Since most policymakers view themselves as analysts in their own right, intelligence analysts cannot expect their judgments to go unquestioned. MacEachin recommends making the facts and logic so apparent that no one could disagree. Joseph Nye, in "Estimating the Future," notes that estimators are not fortune tellers but educators. Their analyses should deal with uncertainty by presenting alternative futures, highlighting what is not known, and providing signposts that would indicate which scenario appears to be emerging. Robert Kohler in "The Intelligence Industrial Base" argues for the necessity of keeping a robust intelligence community due to the need to respond quickly in a national crisis.

Essays on denial and deception, counterintelligence, the changing mission of the FBI, and covert action round out Part II. Roy Godson, in his thought-provoking essay "Covert Action: Neither Exceptional Tool nor Magic Bullet," argues for the use of covert action as a normal part of statecraft. Richard Kerr agrees with Godson and urges cooperation between intelligence analysts and covert operators to define opportunities clearly. Ernest May, however, takes gentle exception and would restrict its use to exceptional circumstances.

In Part III, in "Policies and Policymakers," Randall Fort writes about economic intelligence and concludes that it

should remain about as it is, a valuable source of information for government officials. However, economic espionage should be avoided, in part because of the difficulty in sharing the information and determining what exactly is a U.S. company. Britt Snider notes that crime can no longer be classified as foreign or domestic; it knows no borders. Cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence is risky because disclosure of evidence in the courtroom is both likely and necessary. Finally, James FitzSimonds, in "Intelligence and the Revolution in Military Affairs," warns of the prodigious intelligence demands generated by modern weapons and doctrine. The relationship between intelligence and military operations will—and must—grow closer.

U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads is first-rate. For those who will chart the future of U.S. intelligence, it should be required reading. Failure to heed its central theme—closer ties between producer and consumer—could have grave consequences.

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Greenberg, Maurice R. and Haass, Richard N. *Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of U.S. Intelligence*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996. 39pp. (No price given)

The Council on Foreign Relations assembled a group of distinguished individuals from both the private and public sectors to discuss what to do with the U.S. intelligence community in the post-Cold War era. They concluded that "intelligence is a critical resource and

tool and its maintenance and improvement ought to be a national priority." This small book is the result of that study.

It outlines intelligence priorities, including the status of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union; political and military developments in Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and China; terrorism; and unconventional weapons proliferation. Also important are political developments in Russia and its relations with neighboring states; the stability of Mexico, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia; Indian-Pakistani relations; Middle East peace negotiations; and international criminal organizations. Also, of course, political-military developments in the Balkans would necessarily be a high priority. The task force did not include environmental protection, population growth, or general political and economic developments, for which open sources are normally sufficient.

The task force focuses on both intelligence collection and analysis. It calls for greater contact between analysts and policymakers, arguing that irrelevance is potentially a greater problem than politicization. Also, economic intelligence should be used to protect American firms from unfair foreign trade practices but not to help U.S. firms win contracts. Further, robust human intelligence capabilities are essential for shedding light on the intentions and capabilities of adversaries; strong covert action serves as an alternative or complement to diplomacy, sanctions, and military intervention.

Making Intelligence Smarter does, however, call for some organizational changes. Although there have been arguments for an "intelligence czar," the task force concludes that it would be preferable to give the Director of Central Intelligence more budgetary power and nomination authority for top community posts. It also argues that overseas FBI and Drug Enforcement Agency

operations be subordinate to the CIA, because foreign policy ought to take precedence over law enforcement. There is also the suggestion that Congress consider merging its oversight committees to streamline the process.

The task force offers a warning about the military's influence over intelligence: "a danger that spending on intelligence to support military operations will take priority over other important or even vital national security ends." Although the task force supports the consolidation of imagery and mapping functions into a single agency, it questions whether that agency should be located in the Department of Defense. It is a paradox that a society that does not question civilian control of the military is allowing intelligence collection and analysis, which informs national policy, to come increasingly under the control of the military. It is unfortunate that media attention on the suggestion to use journalists in operational roles has unfortunately overshadowed the lion's share of the task force's findings, which deserve careful consideration.

This report is a strategic road map for refocusing and retooling the American intelligence community. The study's attention to the intelligence process, to American foreign policy, and the substance of international relations should make this book the centerpiece of companion studies by the Brown Commission and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. This is a concise and expert study that could not have been written within the intelligence community, due to the bureaucratic interests that preclude strategic thinking.*

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* The views expressed in this review are solely those of the author.