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## We All Lost the Cold War

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missiles. This is solid, basic ethics, offering more than the "preliminaries" promised in his title.

Next, Major Kuenning deftly argues that the ethical aspect of U.S. involvement in small wars often becomes a strategic issue, because our declared national objectives, as well as other institutional factors, can lead to a style of warfare that is inappropriate and appears to give adversaries a moral advantage. The examples are rich, and the author offers clear recommendations. Left for another treatment (perhaps yours?) is the hinted-at, tempting, exploration of strategic leverage.

The final paper makes an attempt to illuminate the propriety of placing women in combat roles through formal, set-logic parsing of the problem. I found this the least satisfying essay in the book. Some weak assertions are too prominent, and I hope more persuasive points exist to support placing women in combat roles.

Officers who care about their role in the profession of arms will find this book valuable. Some essays could be referred to day-to-day, while others will stimulate debate. Clear thinking on tough issues is a great strength in the military profession. This book is a light, fresh workout for those muscles.

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Stein, Janice Gross and Lebow, Richard Ned. *We All Lost the Cold War*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1994. 542pp. \$24.95

In this book the authors analyze two prominent nuclear-alert episodes of coercive diplomacy: the 1962 Cuban

missile crisis and the Soviet threat to intervene in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Political scientists Stein and Lebow challenge the conventional wisdom that purports to explain the resolution of each crisis as one side's threat and the other's capitulation. This is valuable insight, because leaders on both sides learned invalid lessons from conventional thinking.

Nikita Khrushchev, who was frustrated by the power of the United States, tried to sneak weapons into Cuba and hoped that the United States would accept them as a *fait accompli*. Bellicose arguments for an air strike convinced President John F. Kennedy that even conventional warfare could become uncontrollable; he substituted a naval blockade. Deceiving even themselves into believing that in the end Khrushchev had simply yielded to escalating pressure, American officials soon after tried, disastrously, to coerce North Vietnam.

In fact, interviews with officials of the Bush administration after the Gulf war indicate that "the president and at least some of his advisors saw many parallels between the two confrontations and that the president hoped to replicate Kennedy's success." In their first chapter, the authors state that "President George Bush modeled his unsuccessful attempt to coerce Saddam Hussein to withdraw the Iraqi army from Kuwait on Kennedy's success in compelling Nikita Khrushchev to withdraw Soviet missiles from Cuba."

Interviews with former Soviet officials for this book offer an interesting check on U.S. estimates. Taking a commendably broad view, Lebow and Stein analyze Soviet motives, American and Soviet micromanagement of confrontations, and political influences on strategic decisions. Applying accepted psychological models of decision making, they notice, for example, that Khrushchev exaggerated his weapons'

military value and suppressed consideration of potential U.S. reactions to their deployment. His behavior is evidence of wishful thinking that impairs judgment.

It was learning and reassurance that resolved the crisis. For example, the blockade against Soviet ships awoke Khrushchev to the reality that Kennedy would not acquiesce, while Kennedy agreed that the Soviet deployment was strategically defensive but politically unacceptable. Despite several uncooperative military commanders in both the Soviet and American military, each leader did his best to reassure the other that he was not escalating the situation.

Cold War tactics for deterrence also take their share of criticism from the authors. The Soviets and Americans avoided trade-offs, a significant point since deterrence depends upon one's adversary facing trade-offs squarely. U.S. officials, convinced that national security depended upon the universal applicability of deterrence, attributed any lapse or irrelevance of deterrence to their failure to communicate resolve, which therefore required increasing the American threat posture, which in turn aroused domestic and bureaucratic opinion and made it harder to back down. Officials in both crises shunned intelligence assessments that might show that deterrence was failing.

In 1973 both superpowers' intelligence analyses and political decisions lagged far behind battlefield events. Soviet officials threatened to intervene in Egypt, hoping or gambling that there were no trade-offs between maintaining their position in Washington and attempting to advance it in the Mideast. Suspecting that Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev was bluffing, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger instigated military alerts without having any strategy actually to block Soviet intervention if deterrence failed. He and other authorities micromanaged escalation but did not

grasp important military aspects, in particular the exposure of the Sixth Fleet to a hair-trigger confrontation. Deterrence was not really tested, since Israel had halted its advance before the Soviet threat and thus never forced Moscow's hand.

The authors stumble in presuming that the Soviet Union would not have intervened in 1973 anyway, regardless of the U.S. alert. But they adequately support their fundamental conclusion: that evidence from both sides of the Cold War's most intense confrontations contradicts major assumptions and beliefs behind deterrence strategy.

Strategists, diplomats, historians, and force planners definitely should read this fascinating book. Since deterrence is the rationale for many aspects of the U.S. military as they exist today, open-eyed recognition of its costs and of its very limited practicality should force us to reappraise the relative utility of many of our weapons, doctrines, command organizations, and deployment patterns.

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Gardner, Lloyd. *Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995. 610pp. \$35

In the wake of the furor created by Robert McNamara's memoir, historian Lloyd Gardner has published a riveting book that attempts to explain Lyndon Baines Johnson and the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam. Relying heavily on the recently declassified manuscript collections and other holdings of the Johnson Library in Austin, Texas, Gardner examines the Vietnam tragedy from Johnson's perspective, focusing not on the president's personality but on his ideas and contexts. The result