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Arms Control Without Negotiations: From the Cold War to the New World Order

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D. Blackwill and Ashton B. Carter provide an insightful look at the most difficult problem of coping with proliferation—detecting it early enough for effective action. They probe the capabilities required and the challenges inherent to the intelligence process in support of preventing proliferation.

Where *The Road Away from the Brink* provides the reader with a comprehensive approach to dealing with global nuclear danger, the contributors to *New Nuclear Nations* present a detailed menu of considerations and options for dealing with uncooperative states. Both works recognize that the United States cannot resolve its nuclear problems alone but must support and nurture a coalition of states willing to work together to reduce the nuclear threat to mankind. These books also have in common a considerable value for students of U.S. security policy.

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Ramberg, Bennett, ed. *Arms Control Without Negotiations: From the Cold War to the New World Order*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993. 281pp. \$42

Whatever happened to arms control? Just a few years ago the papers were full of stories about the strategic nuclear arms talks (Start), the intermediate theater nuclear (INF) talks, and the various conventional arms negotiations in Europe. Today what passes for arms control are concerns about North Korea and nuclear proliferation; while these are certainly important, they are

only a narrow slice of a much larger subject. Bennett Ramberg's interesting collection of essays may go a long way toward answering my question; and despite the title, the contributors are not woolly-headed idealists but include such well known strategists and realists as Colin Gray and Rose Gottemoeller, both formerly of RAND and the National Security Council staff.

Ramberg defines arms control without negotiations as "a menu of *unilateral* actions, including but not limited to weapons reductions and limits, as well as *unilateral* research, development, procurement, and reconfiguration decisions that collectively are as important, if not more important, than formal agreements"—which, as these essays later illustrate, covers quite a large area. The book is divided into three parts: "Unilateral Arms Control to Induce Reciprocation," "Defense Practice of Unilateral Arms Control," and "The Domestic Politics of Unilateral Arms Control."

As with any edited book, the essays are uneven; the very first, unfortunately, "The Psychology of Arms Control and Reciprocation," is rather ponderous and should not be read in bed. However, it is followed by an interesting piece by Rose Gottemoeller on "Unilateralism in Soviet and Russian Arms Control," which discusses Russia's various initiatives, including naval proposals, and argues in an epilogue that with Yeltsin being challenged from the right, further actions "are no longer productive." The last chapter in part one focuses on four moratorium case studies concerning biological weapons, atmospheric nuclear testing,

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general nuclear testing, and antisatellite (ASAT) weapon testing.

Whereas the first part is devoted to a fairly conventional view of arms control, Part 2 looks at such items as strategy and procurement decisions. It opens with another interesting piece, by Colin Gray, who explores "the proposition that nuclear strategy, force procurement, and deployment can perform functionally as arms control" and that "to approach arms control nearly exclusively as a process of formal negotiation is to fail to understand the nature and opportunities of the subject." Gray is followed by chapters on "Technology Deployment and Denial," "Negative Consequences of Arms Transfers," and two on self-denial—first, the decisions by Canada, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland to forego nuclear development, and second, the unilateral nuclear-free zones in the South Pacific.

Part 3 opens with the only historical chapter in the entire book. In "The Politics of Unilateral Control between the Two World Wars," Bradford Lee, of the Naval War College, points out that unilateral military budget limitations by the British, French, and the U.S. had more impact than any of the more famous interwar arms agreements. This is followed by chapters on the "Western Antinuclear Movements during the 1980s" (which includes sections on the influence of pacifism, moralism, antinuclearism, and even feminism), and there is also another on "Congressional Politics to Induce Reciprocation" (looking at the role of Congress). The editor's concluding chapter contains a useful matrix table of "Possible Approaches" comparing

bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral methods.

If there is one compliant—and although virtually all the pieces are balanced—it would be the lack of a critical summary chapter on the whole topic, looking at such questions as the problems of verification, false senses of security, what one does when it does not work, and worse, when there is outright cheating. In general, this is a comprehensive and evenhanded book, and the articles are well written and researched, with good footnotes. *Arms Control Without Negotiations* appears to fill an important gap in the arms control literature.

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Norris, Robert S.; Burrows, Andrew S.; and Fieldhouse, Richard W., eds. *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994. 437pp. \$85

Perhaps the most difficult task confronting the student of nuclear weapons is securing access to accurate data in the open literature. Whereas information on national nuclear policies, deterrence doctrines, and system acquisitions is readily available, this is not necessarily the case with respect to nuclear weapons data, since such data have a linear connection to a nation's strategic posture. Precisely because it is just such a comprehensive source of data on