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Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V: British , French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons

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general nuclear testing, and antisatellite (ASAT) weapon testing.

Whereas the first part is devoted to a fairly conventional view of arms control, Part 2 looks at such items as strategy and procurement decisions. It opens with another interesting piece, by Colin Gray, who explores "the proposition that nuclear strategy, force procurement, and deployment can perform functionally as arms control" and that "to approach arms control nearly exclusively as a process of formal negotiation is to fail to understand the nature and opportunities of the subject." Gray is followed by chapters on "Technology Deployment and Denial," "Negative Consequences of Arms Transfers," and two on self-denial—first, the decisions by Canada, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland to forego nuclear development, and second, the unilateral nuclear-free zones in the South Pacific.

Part 3 opens with the only historical chapter in the entire book. In "The Politics of Unilateral Control between the Two World Wars," Bradford Lee, of the Naval War College, points out that unilateral military budget limitations by the British, French, and the U.S. had more impact than any of the more famous interwar arms agreements. This is followed by chapters on the "Western Antinuclear Movements during the 1980s" (which includes sections on the influence of pacifism, moralism, antinuclearism, and even feminism), and there is also another on "Congressional Politics to Induce Reciprocation" (looking at the role of Congress). The editor's concluding chapter contains a useful matrix table of "Possible Approaches" comparing

bilateral, multilateral, and unilateral methods.

If there is one compliant—and although virtually all the pieces are balanced—it would be the lack of a critical summary chapter on the whole topic, looking at such questions as the problems of verification, false senses of security, what one does when it does not work, and worse, when there is outright cheating. In general, this is a comprehensive and evenhanded book, and the articles are well written and researched, with good footnotes. *Arms Control Without Negotiations* appears to fill an important gap in the arms control literature.

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Norris, Robert S.; Burrows, Andrew S.; and Fieldhouse, Richard W., eds. *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994. 437pp. \$85

Perhaps the most difficult task confronting the student of nuclear weapons is securing access to accurate data in the open literature. Whereas information on national nuclear policies, deterrence doctrines, and system acquisitions is readily available, this is not necessarily the case with respect to nuclear weapons data, since such data have a linear connection to a nation's strategic posture. Precisely because it is just such a comprehensive source of data on

British, French, and Chinese nuclear weapons, the recent volume by Norris *et al.* is a tremendous intellectual achievement.

This study, volume V in the Nuclear Weapons Databook series, was produced for the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. The authors have presented in a systematic and meticulous fashion charts, graphs, tables, and photographs of nuclear weapons systems and facilities. They have also identified, in tabular form, all the nuclear tests conducted by these nations since the births of their respective programs. Henceforth, no serious student of nuclear weapons can afford to evaluate trends in the historical development of the three programs without reference to this book.

The authors establish early their authority as highly informed observers. Thus, for example, in their treatment of Britain they take note of the British penchant for secrecy: "Britain has one of the most extensive systems to control the flow of official information of any Western democracy." This practice is elevated to an art by its practitioners—"Even what is made public in Britain must be used with a healthy skepticism. The written historical record may be, on several key matters, inaccurate and dishonest." Hence, right at the outset, recognition of the tenuous nature of the data relative to British nuclear weapons establishes the authors' *bona fides* as scholars who have taken the measure of their subject.

Accordingly, Robert Norris and his colleagues squarely confront what they consider the *raison d'être* for Britain's effort to develop a thermonuclear

weapon in 1954: "Among British officials there were strong feelings at the time that U.K. possession of the H-bomb could exert a restraining influence on U.S. policy. There was less concern about Soviet aggression at the time than there was about American adventurism." The independent British nuclear deterrent thus emerges as a political instrument, fashioned as much to assure a measure of control over American strategic policy as to be a military instrument to contain Soviet expansion westward. If Norris and his colleagues have presented an accurate hypothesis, as I believe they have, then there must be major reassessments of Anglo-American relations since 1945 and, concomitantly, some thought given to Britain's singular contribution to the containment and collapse of Soviet power as a result of its possession of an independent nuclear deterrent.

The authors have presented the French effort as a nationalist one, inspired by Charles de Gaulle's notion of a France restored to world power status. Yet the French were apparently deeply dependent upon U.S. technical assistance in this effort. Richard Ullman's characterization of the "negative guidance" provided by the U.S. is illustrative: "Through winks, head shakes, silences, and the like, U.S. experts would guide their French counterparts down the right path toward the solution of a problem without technically transferring the forbidden Restricted Data on the design of nuclear weapons."

In recent years Anglo-French nuclear cooperation has evolved as the first step in the evolution of a genuinely

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European nuclear deterrent. On 26 July 1993, the Franco-British Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine became a permanent organization. With the rebirth of the Anglo-French *Entente Cordiale*, the Anglo-French nuclear deterrents have collectively the potential to alter the strategic calculus, and not only in Europe. This development alone justifies the inclusion of British and French deterrents together in the same volume. As the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons arsenals are reduced over the next decade, the British and French deterrents will attain greater geostrategic significance.

Writing in the *Armed Forces Journal* over a decade ago, Anthony Cordesman observed that French nuclear deterrence doctrine was premised upon a "‘nuclear trigger force’ policy that relies for deterrence on its ability to trigger a theatre wide, or world-wide nuclear conflict . . ." Since the French Force de Frappe was and is strategically inferior to the British deterrent, then it follows that Britain also commands a "nuclear trigger force." Both nations, then, have the capability to affect unilaterally the strategic balance, albeit that France's ability is not in any way equivalent to that of the United Kingdom.

With reference to China, however, no such claims can be made. In their evaluation of Chinese nuclear weapons, the authors have rescued a hitherto obscure topic from even more obscure sources. Although they have included much data and photographs of rockets and aircraft, their section on China could have been left to a study of lesser nuclear powers such as India; China's nuclear capability cannot really be compared with either that of France or

Great Britain. Nevertheless, the data on China will provide an excellent starting point for further research into its nuclear weapons program.

The book's only flaw, if flaw it is, relates to the size of the introductory chapter. It would have been more helpful to have a larger introductory chapter and also a concluding chapter that dealt with the post-Cold War world. These observations aside, Norris and his colleagues have approached their subject without polemics and in so comprehensive a manner that their efforts will set the standard for similar works in the future. A great debt is owed to the authors for their magnificent achievement.

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Feshbach, Murray and Friendly, Alfred, Jr. *Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature under Siege*. New York: Basic Books, 1992. 376pp. \$24

"I have seen the future, and it works!" declared journalist Lincoln Steffens after his visit to the Soviet Union in the early 1930s, becoming thereby forever a symbol of liberal reformers dazzled and duped by the false promises of communism. For what Steffens observed turned out to represent anything but the future, even for the Soviet Union—and as the authors of this seminal work demonstrate, it most certainly did not work. Page after page, chapter after chapter, Feshbach and Friendly present the