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Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine

James J. Tritten

IN ITS FULLY ELABORATED FORM, doctrine is somewhat new for the U.S. Navy, and naval officers have a good deal of catching up to do. It is not new for some other services (to say nothing of other nations), however, and in the near future formally promulgated doctrine will constitute the fundamental guidance and direction for the American armed forces as a whole. Right now, at the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, overarching—"keystone" and "capstone"—doctrinal publications are being prepared, and their organizing, rationalizing effect will rapidly be felt through all the services. Very soon, approved military doctrine—of various kinds and at various levels, but all of it consistent in content and compatible in form—will constitute a basic tool and standard for every military—and every naval—officer. Unless naval officers understand doctrine, they will find themselves unable to lead effectively or even understand operations, whether naval, joint, or multinational. It is time for all of us to become comfortable with doctrine.

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The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy.

The purposes of this article, then, are primarily to explore military doctrine, review its definitions, and set specifically *naval* doctrine in context. The discussion will consider the influences upon doctrine, and what it in turn influences; it will exclude, for clarity, certain matters from the doctrinal rubric; and, after addressing the question of standardization, will conclude by examining the imminent use of doctrine by the Navy and Marine Corps. These purposes are important for a naval audience (largely unfamiliar with the term and unsure of its implications) and for writers of other categories of military doctrine, and they should assist both groups to understand how the U.S. naval services will operate in the future.

From an organizational perspective, doctrine comprises those shared beliefs and principles that define the work of a profession.[1] It is the codification of what the members of a profession believe and practice in the normal course of their functions. The military profession, like others, has always had doctrine to define how its job is to be done. Unlike that of some professions, however, military doctrine does not have a common element unifying the armed forces of all nations and all the military services of each. As regards form, the doctrine of some armed forces has been written and centralized, and of others it has been informal, traditional, and diffuse. Doctrine in the military profession, then, is an extremely complex concept.

Properly developed doctrine strengthens the professional aspects of the military calling but does not diminish the freedom of judgment and individual initiative that commanders and others must exercise in battle. While we must be specific as to types of military doctrine and the levels of warfare to which it applies, there are two essential elements common to all its forms: how the military profession thinks about warfare, and how it acts. Without each element, doctrine would be incomplete. A doctrine reflecting only thought about war would be merely the unfulfilled wishes of the leadership; doctrine that is simply the codification of behavior is ultimately random, and therefore useless.

Types of American Military Doctrine

In the U.S. military, doctrine has been deliberately made a province of the uniformed services rather than of the civilian leadership (specifically the Secretary of Defense). In 1992 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered issuing a document to be entitled *Basic National Defense Doctrine*, Joint Publication 0-1; it would have defined doctrine as "an accepted body of professional knowledge."[2] The Joint Chiefs of Staff do provide, as the official basis for definition of doctrine, the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02.[3] This authoritative publication defines

doctrine as "fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application."[4] This language is consistent with that used by the U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy.[5]

The definition implies that doctrine applies at every level of warfare, from the tactical and the operational to the strategic. Hence—although at the tactical level it may have a purely military perspective—military doctrine can interact with policy. As warfare issues exceed that of the immediate battle area and become important to an entire campaign or war, it becomes difficult to separate the "purely" military aspects. In addition to the level of warfare being discussed, doctrine also can be considered with regard to the activity to which it pertains. Let us examine these aspects, with reference to four kinds of forces.

Joint Doctrine. Joint Publication 1-02 offers, in addition to the general definition of doctrine, another specifically for joint doctrine: "fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, services, and Joint Staff." That is, just as nothing becomes Marine Corps doctrine until it is promulgated by the Commandant, no proposal is joint doctrine until it is issued by the Chairman. Further, and according to a different Joint Staff publication, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces,* "Joint doctrine deals with the fundamental issues of how best to employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends. . . . Joint doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war."[6] There is, then, a hierarchy. Joint doctrine applies only to that level of warfare—generally the strategic or operational—which can achieve strategic ends; by implication, the tactical level remains the province of the individual services.

Multiservice Doctrine. To allow military services to cooperate outside the direct purview of the Chairman, the Joint Staff, and the unified commanders in chief, provision has been made for multiservice doctrine: "fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more services in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is ratified by two or more services, and is promulgated in multiservice publications that identify the participating services, e.g., Army-Navy doctrine." Multiservice doctrine is primarily designed for the operational and strategic levels of warfare; an example is the Air–Land Battle concept. Institutionally, in 1975 the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC) founded the Air–Land Forces Applications Agency (ALFA), which expanded into the current Air-Land-Sea Application (ALSA) Center.[7] Another agency for multiservice doctrinal is

the Center for Low Intensity Conflict (CLIC), the Army and Air Force focal point for certain categories of military operations other than war.[8]

The present tendency is for this kind of doctrine, which dates largely from before the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, to be subsumed by joint concepts; it is possible that such organizations will be absorbed by the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC). There are, however, counterarguments on that point.[9] The joint and multiservice categories can coexist and benefit from each other. Certainly the Navy, a service still new to the formal development of doctrine, might well find the process more congenial in the familiar context of the Navy–Marine Corps team than it might otherwise.

With the formation of the Naval Doctrine Command (NDC), the Navy now has, for the first time, a single agency responsible for the publication of doctrine for the fleet and fleet Marine forces. Interestingly, NDC is a multiservice command, and a significant part of its product is multiservice doctrine. Its Naval Doctrine Publications, in fact, bear the signatures of both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Service Doctrine. There are many documents that promulgate doctrine for service-specific tasks and missions. If only by default, the individual services have primary responsibility for tactical doctrine, but the dividing lines can be somewhat blurred. For example, the commander in chief of the U.S. Special Operations Command generates tactical-level doctrine for his forces; also, the Atlantic Command is developing tactical concepts for joint task forces. Conversely, services, as they attempt to fulfill their roles in training and equipping forces, naturally extend their influence into the operational and even strategic realms; accordingly, service doctrine must be recognized in the preparation of joint doctrine.

Combined Doctrine. Besides its multiservice dimension, doctrine is also needed for multinational operations—bilateral, regional, global, ad hoc, alliance, etc. Multinational doctrine, in fact, is long established. During the Cold War, campaigns in and around Europe would have been conducted primarily under Nato, rather than national, doctrine. Today, the importance of multinational operations is reflected in the separate chapter devoted to the subject in U.S. Joint Publication 3-0.[10] Combined doctrine comprises "fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more nations in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is ratified by participating nations." The emphasis here is on formal promulgation by the participating nations. On the other hand, combined doctrine is but one type of multinational doctrine, although it is the most common, and it is associated with entities other than Nato. Indeed, combined doctrine exists for multinational defense arrangements outside of the Nato umbrella, such as with South Korea.

Nato doctrine is especially significant in that within the alliance arena its doctrine is binding: national forces operating under alliance command operate under that

command's, rather than national, doctrine. The United States largely assumes, in fact, that in warfare in and around Europe, U.S. forces will be part of a Nato rather than a national command structure. Where the alliance lacks doctrine for a specific task, a national approach is used until combined doctrine is promulgated.

Military doctrine also exists or is being planned for use in ad hoc multinational contexts. Nato material is being applied outside of the Nato area and by command structures not having doctrine of their own; the most prominent example, of course, is the United Nations. It is also the case for the operations of the Western European Union (WEU) in the Adriatic, with the WEU coming to recognize the need for its own peacekeeping doctrine.[11]

Multinational doctrine, in its many possible forms, has an extremely important role to play for the American armed forces. As U.S. forces respond to crises under the auspices of an international organization, alliance, or ad hoc coalition, they will need some form of multinational doctrine to guide naval and military actions. In the absence of formal multinational doctrine, it is entirely permissible to substitute some form of national military doctrine, including U.S. joint doctrine, as a temporary surrogate.

Functional Doctrine. In addition to categorization by the kinds of forces involved, doctrine has been officially prescribed for specific types of activities. For example, both the U.S. and Nato recognize tactical air doctrine: "fundamental principles designed to provide guidance for the employment of air power in tactical air operations to attain established objectives." Although omitted from Joint Publication 1-02, functional doctrine exists in written form for basic warfare disciplines (e.g., amphibious, air, and space) as well as supporting functions (medical, logistics, intelligence, etc.). This body of doctrine, however, is gradually being replaced by joint documents, so that what now remains should be seen as amplification of the joint formulation.

Within each service, individual combat arms have their own individual doctrine, e.g., submarines. Combined arms doctrine integrates the different combat arms within a single service, e.g., the air, surface, and subsurface elements of antisubmarine warfare. The Navy is making NDC the coordinator for such matters, while the Marine Corps has a separate doctrine division in the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

What Influences Military Doctrine?

Concepts applicable to military doctrine can come from policy, available resources, strategy and campaigns, preexisting doctrine, threats, and such other influences as historical lessons, strategic culture, technology, geography and demographics, and government.

Policy. National policy at any one time derives (at least in theory) from overarching national goals and objectives, and it in turn affects military doctrine. Yet it does so in complicated ways. For example, the 1992 *National Military Strategy of the United States*, not having been superseded, may appear to constitute the standing policy that underlies military doctrine.[12] This document, however, was issued by the previous administration; subsequent publications (such as the October 1993 *Report of the Bottom-Up Review*, the 1994 *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, and the July 1994 *National Security Strategy of the United States*) establish that much of that seeming "standing policy" is no longer in effect. Other published policies, however well thought out (as, for example, some consider the Weinberger Doctrine to have been), may represent the views of only one administration or its secretary of defense.[13] In the absence of promulgated official national policy, officers who devise doctrine must search for guidance among the hints and clues in the public and private comments of senior government figures.

Similarly, the policies influencing a military's doctrine may be those of other nations; services need also to be alert to international sources. For instance, U.S. armed forces operating in a multinational environment need policy guidance from the international organization, alliance, or ad hoc coalition under whose rubric they act. The war-termination phase of Operation Desert Storm provides ample illustration.

Resource Restraints. Further complicating the policy input to military doctrine is the relationship of policy to planning of future forces. Many policy publications are issued in a programming context; writers of doctrine must separate the programmatic (and thus future-oriented) aspects of such papers from those applicable to present-day doctrine. For example, in the February 1984 *Annual Report* the secretary of defense was much concerned with providing for the defense of the United States by space-based systems;[14] no doctrine was in effect, however, for these weapons did not exist. To the contrary, the defense of the United States was governed by doctrine that was in itself primarily offensive.

Nonetheless, it is sometimes necessary and proper to develop doctrine for weapons for which resources are unavailable at the time. For example, although the U.S. Army no longer has tactical nuclear weapons in its operational inventory, as long as such weapons exist in the arsenals of any nation the Army must maintain a doctrine for fighting on a nuclear battlefield—albeit perhaps with a priority significantly less than that of the effort associated with current planning and anticipated campaigns.

Strategy. Strategic and campaign concepts should certainly have a major influence on military doctrine. One of the clearest examples is the development of amphibious warfare in the 1920s and 1930s, when the Joint (i.e., Army-Navy) Board was exploring contingency plans for the relief of the Philippines.[15] The

Navy's General Board suggested that as part of such plans the Marine Corps could be assigned to seize unoccupied islands, so as to support the forward movement of the fleet. Major Earl H. Ellis, USMC, went further, developing a concept for seizing occupied islands as well. This concept was approved by General John A. Lejeune, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and over the next thirteen years it was integrated into war plans. Eventually, conducting opposed landings became an element of force structure programming.

The U.S. military today faces large-scale doctrinal changes, necessitated by a host of new (and newly important) tasks, many to be performed through existing or ad hoc coalitions. Accordingly, there is particular need for strategic and campaign input and for the full benefit of exercises, games, and simulations. On the other hand, current strategies tend to reflect programming concerns in a way that may actually preclude doctrinal development. For example, current national policy virtually discounts the possibility of a new, or resurgent, global threat, and accordingly any need for reconstitution and global warfare strategies previously advanced.[16] It could be argued, however, especially in view of the high stakes involved, that the very absence of programming for such capabilities makes it incumbent on the military to continue to develop doctrine for them.

As doctrinal development matures, existing campaign concepts should have less impact on new doctrine. In a perfect world, strategy would guide military doctrine, which in turn would drive campaign planning. For the time being, though, in view of the need to produce whole bodies of new doctrine, it is likely that existing campaign concepts will be a major resource.[17]

Existing Doctrine. Another component of doctrinal development is current doctrine itself. In writing its first systematic, service-wide doctrine, the Navy benefited from the existing doctrine of the U.S. Marine Corps. Also, certain naval forces exist principally to support Marine Air Ground Task Forces; just as the Navy is likely to take particular account of Army doctrine (inasmuch as it has been a major influence in joint and combined doctrine, which, presumably, will be reflected in naval doctrine), the Navy's doctrine involving another service draws on, and strives to be compatible with, that service's existing doctrine. Correspondingly, joint and combined doctrine having a maritime character will obviously impinge on Navy doctrine. Where service practice conforms to joint and combined doctrine, we should expect to see identical service doctrine— where, indeed, there is any need for a service-specific or multiservice doctrine at all. If one service possesses doctrine in a functional area that meets the needs of another service, the latter ought to adopt it *en toto*, sponsor it as multiservice doctrine, or at least borrow heavily from it. An example is the Army's chemical warfare doctrine, which has generally been recognized by the other services.

For the U.S. Navy, new doctrine is naturally much affected by the informal doctrine that, by and large, preceded it.[18] When Navy ships form into battle

groups and forces, they inherit customary (and frequently written, though not centralized) doctrine upon which their tactics, techniques, and procedures are based. Indeed, the very assembling of ships into such groups and forces is a matter of existing naval doctrine.

Threats. Threats tend to drive force programming, strategy, and campaign planning, but today the threat has become more difficult to visualize than in the Cold War, when the military focused on operations against the Soviet Union and considered others "lesser included cases." One result was little interest in developing doctrine for limited war and military operations other than war. Today the focus has shifted to precisely those areas, with the ironic upshot that it has become difficult to write doctrine for general war. Also, the United States has now to address simultaneously a number of different threats and types of threat—there may be no single military doctrine valid for all of them. Hence, while some doctrinal interest in general war would seem advisable, the recognition of possible threats that are both more numerous and lower in the spectrum of conflict than the American armed forces have been accustomed to deal with can be expected to lead to a substantial upsurge, perhaps a renaissance, of doctrine.

Other Influences. A major factor in any sound, carefully thought-through presentation of doctrine must be a considerable input from history. Since most of the new tasks the Navy will be asked to perform will be executed in a multinational and joint context, lessons must be drawn from outside the individual service perspective. Such lessons can come only from the historical experience of actual combat and operations other than war, from major exercises, and from simulations and games (the last two constituting the "history" of wars and campaigns not yet fought).[19] Moreover, the historical record allows lessons to be learned from all nations and all times.[20] In addition, distillations or abstractions of military history (e.g., the principles of war) are a major input into doctrine. The insights and discoveries of scholars, analysts, and practitioners when they study history need to be reviewed continually to ensure that better understandings of past events are incorporated into planning for tomorrow's operations.[21]

Sometimes limiting military doctrine, but always influencing it, is the strategic culture of a nation and a military service. Nations and services develop specific styles; the discipline of operations research has long recognized these differences and often assigns in its calculations weightings to account for them.[22] An example is a nation that in military terms has generally been ranked highly, Israel. That nation's doctrine emphasizes the offensive, which might prove disastrous for another nation of similar size; but Israel's strategic culture and military traditions have allowed such a doctrine to work well in most cases. Contrarily, Switzerland's military doctrine is an excellent model for states that must defend

themselves on their own soil and whose only strategic capability is defensive. Among U.S. services, the past employment (and accordingly the traditions) of the U.S. Marine Corps makes it amenable to tasks that are atypical of many "naval infantries."

Another influence upon military doctrine is current technology; immediate intentions must remain firmly rooted in present capabilities. For instance, the advent of modern aircraft with extremely accurate delivery systems has removed the need of doctrine for massed bomber formations attacking city-size targets; in fact, a better resource for future bomber doctrine than its own history might be that of submarines searching for high-value, defended targets. On the other hand, a related and equally important source for military doctrine is the area of future weapons, because doctrine can be arranged to capitalize on breakthroughs and it can be used to focus scientific efforts on anticipated requirements. One approach—a discovery-based system—is for industry and the research community to offer technological opportunities to the military, which then considers doctrine for their employment. The military thereby reaps the benefit of visionary thinking (although it also subjects itself to intense and conflicting advocacy as it attempts to identify those few proposals that might be fruitful). The other approach is to begin by conceiving doctrine for modes of warfare the nation would like to be capable of undertaking and then refining specific requirements for which innovations would be sought—a concept-based system. The risk here is that innate bureaucratic conservatism—the difficulty many organizations (including military services) have in conceiving radical alternatives—might result in missed opportunities. In reality, of course, both approaches have been used, and doctrine has been pulled along by, as it has also pushed, revolutionary technological advances.

Underlying most apparent influences upon doctrine, and therefore themselves not to be overlooked, are geography, demographics, and government. The classic historical example is Great Britain, whose insular location preordained the importance for it of sea power. Another is Russia, for which not only the extent of its borders but the distribution of its population have mandated a point-defense approach to air defense. Also, cultural and educational traditions have made some populations more amenable to high-technology solutions than others. Finally, the type of a nation's government—more specifically, the nature of its polity—influences its military doctrine. Whether or not, as is widely argued, democracies as such are disinclined to go to war, it is demonstrable that their publics are reluctant—certainly the U.S. public is—to countenance the possibility of lengthy military involvement and the loss of lives. The militaries of democratic states must respond with doctrine that minimizes such risks. (On the other hand, prudence suggests preparation of doctrine for operations that do

extend beyond the originally envisioned period and that result in more than the predicted casualties.)

In summary, the major sources of and influences on military doctrine are topical in nature rather than enduring: current policy, resources, strategy, campaign concepts, existing doctrine, threats, and technologies. There are topical factors that should *not* influence doctrine: such things as repudiated policies (e.g., of a former government), resources that can never be expected to become available, strategies and concepts deemed outdated, former threats, and obsolete technology. There are, however, doctrinal lessons to be learned from history and the factors of strategic culture, geography, demographics, and government. Inputs to doctrine from these sources are much less volatile than those of the topical influences, though they do change. The importance of geographic factors is reconsidered, demographic trends alter, history is revisited, new lessons are learned, and strategic cultures of a nation or service are changed by reorganization or re-equipment. Also, as much as Americans take for granted their type of government, some other nations cannot do so.

What Does Military Doctrine Influence?

Simply put, military doctrine affects how one fights, trains, exercises, and plans, and it organizes what one buys. Military doctrine influences some of the higher-level concepts driving doctrine itself, and it affects a number of subordinate concepts as well. Among them are tactics, techniques, procedures, rules of engagement, training and education, organization and force structure, analysis, programming, campaign planning, strategy, and policy. Of these concepts, doctrine has a particular impact upon three: tactics, techniques, and procedures. Prescribed tactics, techniques, and procedures establish, in effect, *how* forces will be employed, and they constitute the bulk of the written combat direction available to the fleet officer.[23] They conform, of course, to overarching doctrine (here, tactical doctrine), which is the "play book" from which tactics, techniques, and procedures are chosen and ordered by organizations at the multinational, joint, multiservice, or service level.

Let us make these concepts a little more concrete by considering a set of publications familiar to many seagoing naval officers, one relating to antisubmarine warfare. Above all is the functional doctrine, found in the *Allied Antisubmarine Warfare Manual*, ATP (Allied Tactical Publication) 28; next down, intra–battle group command relationships (in a U.S. context) are established by the *Composite Warfare Commander's Manual*, NWP (Naval Warfare Publication) 10-1; finally, signals for use in the conduct of antisubmarine tactics are found in the *Allied Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book*, ATP-1, Volume II. As we know, the tactical commander employs forces in modes selected from these

three "play books"—regulating task groups in accordance with the general antisubmarine guidance of ATP-28, signalling their movement and actions in accordance with ATP-1, and employing a command structure described in NWP 10-1.

Doctrine bears directly upon standing orders, operations orders, tactical memos, and similar local directives issued by commanders to supplement those provided by their services. These directives are based upon the "first principles" found in doctrine, the demands of local conditions, the tools of tactics, techniques, and procedures, and the desires of particular commanders. These local directives may introduce new tactics that exploit previously unused capabilities of equipment or forces.

Particularly important in this connection are rules of engagement (ROE), which regulate and limit the use of force. They are orders having the force of law, and they draw legitimacy from the authority of national or international law and that of the commander who issues them. Though the point has been questioned, ROE must be influenced by doctrine. They are derived from national (or multinational) political guidance and are rendered into military terms by senior military commanders who (when current military doctrine would be severely affected by the proposed ROE) request reconsideration of the guidance. ROE do not constitute fundamental, enduring principles; ROE are not doctrine, but they must be supported by it. The need to establish ROE, on the other hand, is itself a matter of doctrine.

One of the most important functions affected by doctrine is initial, or basic, training.[24] Though advanced training and education may encourage exploration beyond current doctrine, forces must have at the outset some basis for understanding what they are expected to do. Indeed, this is made evident by the fact that the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command has cognizance over both areas.[25] Military doctrine will also affect exercises, games, and simulations developed in support of training and education. Further, it is disseminated among the services by educational facilities, primarily the various war and command and staff colleges. In general, then, doctrine influences training and education, which in turn influences the development of future doctrine.

One of the major inputs to military doctrine, campaign planning, also must be affected by tactical doctrine. Planners naturally apply their individual service or combat arms doctrines, and joint and multinational doctrines form the basis of joint and multinational campaign planning. In turn, strategy must be affected by campaign planning. Strategy for armaments such as intercontinental and submarine–launched ballistic missiles will be affected by the military doctrine for their employment. Indeed, the 1993–1994 Nuclear Posture Review represents the basis of a new U.S. military doctrine for nuclear weapons, which will prompt a revised declaratory policy.[26] It might be noted that this is a case of current

policy being affected by a revised strategy which was itself influenced by military doctrine. The implication is that in some cases military doctrine—which represents the capabilities of the military—can stabilize policy, even inhibit a government from making radical departures.

Finally, each different type of military doctrine affects other types of military doctrine. As long as military formations normally operate in conjunction with other types of formations, they cannot help affecting each other. Planning combined arms activities within one service, joint interactions between services, and operations on a multinational basis all require that each branch of the military know how the others plan to act.

What Naval Doctrine Is *Not*

The use of the term "doctrine" in what are properly local, tactical, or functional connections blurs its meaning. For example, one publication set out local air base "doctrine" governing the use of afterburners and high engine power.[27] The U.S. Army tends to use "doctrine" even for the tasks of an individual soldier. We have characterized what doctrine is and how it behaves; long-standing ambiguity in usage—anyone who develops doctrine can define its content and level—requires us now to urge the exclusion of specific matters and issues from this rubric.

Because the vast majority of campaigns in the future will be joint or multinational, *naval* doctrine is not a substitute for joint or multinational doctrine. Service and multiservice doctrine should be seen as an "input" to joint and multinational doctrine or as a guide for operations when joint and multinational doctrine are nonexistent or inappropriate.

Tactics, techniques, and procedures are not doctrine. Multiservice naval (i.e., Navy and Marine Corps) doctrine will be the bridge between higher-level policy documents, strategy, and tactics, etc.; it will concern itself primarily with the operational level of warfare. "Doctrine" will not replace the term "tactics," and naval doctrine will not extend into the tactical level except to shape multiservice or Navy and Marine Corps individual-service tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Is Doctrine Authoritative?

Doctrine is a form of policy—less perishable than current policy, but policy nonetheless. While policy in general is not designed to standardize behavior, military doctrine *is*. One implication is that the creation of new doctrine must itself be regulated to ensure consistency. As formal military doctrine rapidly

evolves within the naval services, we can expect the consistency issue to arise in some acute forms.

One specific question that has given trouble in other countries is that of whose doctrine should dominate when one service supports another. In the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, there was a major literature debate over the role of Long-Range Aviation in support of the Navy. The essential problem was whether Long-Range Aviation's "operational art" (that is, doctrine) or "naval art" would govern these specialized aircraft when they were acting on behalf the navy.[28] Although mature joint doctrine should preclude such problems, they are likely to be contentious as long as that body of doctrine is under development. Nato has addressed the doctrine standardization issue with two concepts, commonality (the use of "common doctrine, procedures, or equipment") and standardization (the process of achieving that state). Doctrine provides the basis for both, enabling different types of forces to work together, building a common understanding and approach to their tasks.

The degree of standardization and consistency desired between service and national doctrines depends upon the degree of integration involved. Where two services routinely operate together, such as the Navy and Marine Corps or the Army and Air Force, one would expect a high level of doctrinal standardization. Multinational units, however, do not necessarily fight together as an integrated whole. For example, in the Pacific theater of World War II, the British Pacific Fleet was given its own area of operations, in which it could operate in accordance with its own doctrine. In Operation Desert Storm, of course, the American ground forces operated in one area and multinational formations in others.

Some commanders are concerned that once written doctrine exists they will be held accountable for deviations that fail. The same kind of fears were expressed decades ago among naval aviators when "Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization" (NATOPS) was introduced. Like NATOPS procedures, military doctrine is authoritative but not dogmatic—that is, it does not dictate action. In a given instance one may find it necessary to reject a doctrinal application if specific conditions differ from those for which it was developed. Also like NATOPS, however, doctrine should not be discarded without careful consideration of the consequences. If it is set aside, subordinates must be given the principles that are to be applied instead. A commander deciding to depart from doctrine must ensure that his revisions, and their results, are evaluated for possible incorporation into improved doctrine.

Military doctrine offers standardization without loss of freedom of judgment or initiative in battle. A doctrinal document should indicate the degree of latitude it envisions. If it is directive, then its policies govern as written. If it is guidance, it must be so identified. *Naval* doctrine is authoritative *but not directive*.[29] In short,

there is no ground for concern that Army doctrine will be forced on the Navy or that joint doctrine will force naval doctrine into "ideological" conformity.

As for joint doctrine itself, however, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, responsible for developing joint doctrine, has appointed an "evaluation agent," the Joint Warfighting Center (formerly known as the Joint Doctrine Center). The Joint Staff also sponsors a Joint Doctrine Working Party, comprising service and combat command representatives, which systematically examines joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. Joint doctrine is written primarily for the combatant commanders, the unified commanders in chief. The services play a vital role, though they have no veto power over joint doctrine. Setting aside the unique functions that the Atlantic Command and the Special Operations Command play in training and equipping forces, the services man, train, and equip forces, whereas the unified commanders in chief employ those forces. Therefore, the Chairman is the final arbiter of joint doctrine; service input is offered during the development process, either directly or by means of either service components of the unified commands or officers assigned to the staffs of unified commanders or of the Joint Chiefs. Service and multiservice doctrine commands and centers play an important role in that process.

Shared, Harmonious Thinking

The primary attribute of military doctrine is that it comprises the fundamental principles, not specific procedures, that guide the employment of forces. Military doctrine defines, in general terms, the nature of forces, and it establishes a rational basis for their use. It is a commonly understood and shared framework upon which specific operations can be planned and executed. It represents a carefully considered body of structured thought meant to guide all forces in effective action. Military doctrine is not a set of orders that govern operations; it provides a commander the experiences and best professional judgments of others confronted with similar situations. In other words, military doctrine is a bridge from the past and future to the present. It is a shared mode of harmonious thinking.

Well developed military doctrine lessens the need for operational commanders to communicate detailed instructions. In the absence of orders and in the absence of communications, subordinates who act in accordance with military doctrine are very likely to be conforming with their superiors' wishes. In a chaotic combat environment, doctrine has a cohesive effect; it offers mutually intelligible terminology, relationships, responsibilities, and processes, thus freeing the commander to focus on the real job—combat itself.

Notes

1. In general usage, "a principle or body of principles presented by a specific field, system or organization for acceptance or belief." *Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary* (Boston: Riverside, 1984, 1988). The lack of a universally accepted definition of doctrine was addressed by Dr. Donald S. Marshall in his essay "Doctrine" in the *International Military and Defense Encyclopedia*, Trevor N. Dupuy, ed. (Washington, D.C., and New York: 1993), v. 2 C-F, pp. 773–5.

2. Joint Staff, Proposed Joint Publication 0-1, *Basic National Defense Doctrine*, 27 January 1992, p. iv. This publication was never issued, perhaps on grounds of apparent intrusion into governmental policy.

3. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off. [hereafter GPO], 23 March 1994). This document will be used herein for all definitions unless otherwise noted. It is important to note that the Joint Electronic Library (JEL) is routinely used to update the paper edition of this publication. The CD-ROM version of the JEL is more current than the paper; the on-line version of the JEL is even more up to date. Unfortunately, one needs to consult the electronic version to ensure currency of terms.

4. Theoretically, the definition in Joint Publication 1-02 has been accepted by all services. The use of other definitions in individual service publications indicates an attempt to translate that definition into more familiar terms.

5. For the Army: "Doctrine—fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. Doctrine is authoritative but requires judgment in application." (U.S. Army Dept., *Operations*, FM [Field Manual] 100-5 [Washington: GPO, 14 June 1993], p. 3.) This definition is also used in the draft revision of the *Dictionary of United States Army Terms*, Army Regulation 25-X, which also defines "doctrinal and tactical training" as "training provided to commanders, staffs, leaders, and operators on how to employ a new system. It is a component of both new equipment training and displaced equipment training. Tactics and techniques are covered through battle drills and situational training exercises which embody the 'how to fight' doctrine."

For the Air Force: "Aerospace doctrine is, simply defined, what we hold true about aerospace power and the best way to do the job in the Air Force." (U.S. Air Force Dept. *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, AFM [Air Force Manual] 1-1, v. 1 [Washington: GPO, March 1992], p. vii. Interestingly, in the formal glossary found in vol. II, p. 282, doctrine is defined using the Joint Pub 1-02 definition along with definitions attributed to specific individuals. The previous edition of AFM 1-1 had several Air Force–approved definitions of doctrine, such as: "Aerospace doctrine is a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs and warfighting principles which describe and guide the proper use of aerospace forces in military action." Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, AFM 1-1 (Washington: 16 March 1984), p. v. Doctrine is not defined in the *Air Force Glossary of Standardized Terms*, AFM 11-1, of 29 September 1989.

For the Marines: "Doctrine is a teaching advanced as the fundamental beliefs of the Marine Corps on the subject of war, from its nature and theory to its preparation and conduct. Doctrine establishes a particular way of thinking about war and a way of fighting, a philosophy for leading Marines in combat, a mandate for professionalism, and a common language. In short, it establishes the way we practice our profession." Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, *Warfighting*, FMFM [Fleet Marine Force Manual] 1 (Washington: 6 March 1989), p. 43. Doctrine is not defined in the *USMC Supplement to DoD Dictionary of Military Terms*, FMFRP [Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication] 0-14, 27 January 1994.

For the Navy: "The doctrine defines standard concepts and terms for execution of current operations, and for the derivation of operational planning factors which are required for the formulation of programs and the analysis of readiness." Department of the Navy, *Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy*, NWP [Naval Warfare Publication] 1 (Rev. A), May 1978. Doctrine is not defined in *Naval Terminology*, NWP 3 (Rev. E).

6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*, Joint Publication 1 (Washington: National Defense Univ. Press), 11 November 1991, pp. 5–6.

7. John L. Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973–1982*, TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] Historical Monograph Series (Washington: GPO, June 1984), p. 65; and Richard G. Davis, *The 31 Initiatives* (Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1987), pp. 2, 25–33.

8. Davis, pp. 81–2.

9. There is obvious concern at multiservice doctrine centers about their role and long-term viability. There are benefits in retaining such organizations. For example, sponsoring services retain direct control over their operations —generally outside of the formal, joint process and without the required participation of the Joint Staff and the staffs of the joint commanders in chief. Multiservice doctrinal activities offer sponsoring services the ability to coordinate directly their input, generally at a lower level of activity. Also, a multiservice doctrine offers a mechanism for coordinated doctrinal development in support of the participating services.

10. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington: The Joint Staff, 9 September 1993), pp. VI-1 through VI-16.

11. Discussed by a number of European participants at the "Role of International Navies after the Cold War Symposium," sponsored by the Naval War College and Georgetown University at Georgetown University, Friday, 25 March 1994. Specifically, the war colleges of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom were collectively preparing such a military doctrine during 1994.

12. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, January 1992).

13. For the Weinberger Doctrine, see "The Uses of Military Power," Remarks Prepared for Delivery by the Honorable Casper W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, 28 November 1984, distributed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) News Release No. 609-84. A slightly modified version appears in Casper W. Weinberger, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1987* (Washington: GPO, 5 February 1986), pp. 78–81. For an analysis, see Alan Ned Sabrosky and Robert L. Sloane, *The Recourse to War: An Appraisal of the "Weinberger Doctrine"* (Washington: GPO, for the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1988). For an example of how preliminary statements can serve as "trial balloons," see the author's *Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to Come Back* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992), pp. 1–16.

14. See Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report of the Bottom-Up Review* (Washington: GPO, October 1993), p. 9, and *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington: GPO, January 1994), pp. 65–6, for Les Aspin's political-military "doctrine" (much like Weinberger's) for peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions. This "doctrine" has apparently been codified as Presidential Decision Directive 25. The New York Times Service, "Clinton sets rules for U.S. involvement in U.N. peacekeeping," *The Virginian Pilot and Ledger Star*, 6 May 1994; and U.S. Department of State, *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* (Washington: May 1994).

15. Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1991), pp. 66–7, 80–5.

16. Barton Gellman, "Pentagon War Scenarios Spotlight Russia," *The Washington Post*, 20 February 1992, p. 1, citing a 4 February 1992 "1994–1999 Defense Planning Guidance Scenario Set for Final Coordination."

17. I am indebted to Colonel John Collins, USA, Ret., of the Congressional Research Service, for discussing this point with me. Colonel Collins feels strongly that military doctrine should drive campaign plans. Although I agree, I argue that in doctrinal voids, one must start somewhere: prepared campaign concepts are excellent inputs to blank sheets of paper (and computer screens).

18. This view is in specific disagreement with that of Lt. Cdr. Scott A. Hastings, USN, expressed in his prize-winning essay "Is There a Doctrine In the House?", U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, April 1994, on p. 35. The form in which current naval doctrine exists is the subject of a series of Naval Doctrine Command technical papers, some of which are to be collected in a projected Naval War College Press "Newport Paper."

19. Dennis M. Drew, "Of Trees and Leaves: A New View of Doctrine," *Air University Review*, January–February 1982, p. 42.

20. In his prize-winning essay "The Rôle of Doctrine in Naval Warfare" (U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, March–April 1915, pp. 325–54), Lt. Cdr. Dudley W. Knox, USN, used British, French, and German historical examples in his call for doctrine.

21. I[rving] B[rinton] Holley, Jr. (Major General, USAFR), "The Doctrinal Process: Some Suggested Steps," *Military Review*, April 1979, pp. 5–8. The influence of secondary literature on official doctrine is significant but difficult to prove. On the one hand, we have the case of the writings of experts as an acknowledged source of international law. At the other extreme there is the creation within the military itself of operational war and contingency plans. Yet even where the military works without formal external interaction, it cannot help but be influenced by its own education and training, and by exercises, which have themselves been shaped by doctrine. Many of these latter factors have themselves been influenced by classic works of history and theory, such as the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Julian Stafford Corbett, and Raoul Castex.

22. Before the battle of Trafalgar, Napoleon Bonaparte reportedly instructed his admiral, the Comte de Villeneuve, to count two Spanish ships as equivalent to one French. See Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793–1812* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968 [reprint of Little, Brown & Co. edition of 1892]), v. I, p. 78.

23. While we have taken "tactics, techniques, and procedures" together for the present purpose and have referred to them generally as "tactics," there are, of course, distinctions. Techniques are typically more specific than tactics, possibly involving detailed equipment operating instructions; they apply to individual systems and forces in particular functions. One technique may support one tactic, or many; necessarily, techniques conform to tactics. Procedures, on the other hand, are detailed instructions for equipment; aimed at the operator, they are inevitably fairly rigid and directive in nature. One set of procedures may support many techniques or tactics; procedures, accordingly, conform to techniques.

24. A British Army publication commences by defining doctrine as "put most simply . . . what is taught." Chief of the General Staff, *Design for Military Operations—The British Military Doctrine*, Army Code No. 71451, D/CGC/50/8, 1989.

25. TRADOC, as it is known, recently produced a visionary pamphlet that attempts to set forth future doctrine, technology, and resultant training. See *Force XXI: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-first Century*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 (Fort Monroe, Va.: 1 August 1994).

26. Les Aspin, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington: GPO, January 1994), pp. 62–3.

27. Joint Publication 1-02, s.v., "gate."

28. Soviet (and now Russian) "Military Doctrine," *voennaia doktrina*, was and is not equivalent to military doctrine as discussed here, but rather a political document that stated the relation of warfare and the military with the highest aims of the state.

29. The commander of the Naval Doctrine Command, responding to an article in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, recently characterized naval doctrine as neither prescriptive nor directive. See Frederick Lewis (Rear Admiral, USN), "Is There a Doctrine in the House?" Comment and Discussion, U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, June 1994, p. 24. The current head of TRADOC has also emphasized that Army doctrine is not prescriptive. The complexities of an uncertain future appear to make the U.S. Army unwilling to consider its doctrine as anything more than "as 'nearly right' as it can be." See Frederick M. Franks, Jr. (General, USA), "Army Doctrine and the New Strategic Environment," *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions*, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Richard H. Shultz, Jr., eds. (Washington: GPO, for the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1994), pp. 275–80.

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