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## Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power, Politics, and Policies

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Van Ham, Peter. *Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s: Power, Politics, and Policies*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1994. 112pp. \$14.95

This slim volume, part of the respected Chatham House Papers series of monographs from the Royal Institute of International Affairs, should be required reading for students of international relations and national security, and for professionals within the military and intelligence communities. In a concise, well organized style, the author addresses what is emerging as perhaps the greatest threat in an increasingly Hobbesian post-Cold War world—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Van Ham, a research fellow at the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, has produced a primer on the current state of the nonproliferation field, with recommendations for evolving strategies in an unstable, multipolar world. Twelve pages of chapter notes provide ready reference to a variety of sources and researchers. After a brief historical overview of current control regimes, from traditional comprehensive agreements such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to more recent “supply-side” initiatives such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the author examines the reasons why nations cooperate to deter the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. He then outlines the post-Cold War strategic, political, and economic dynamics increasingly fostering that same proliferation—specifically the demise of the Soviet Union, the

emergence of new supplier states (especially in the areas of nuclear and ballistic missile technology), and the globalization of dual-use high technology in general.

Quoting Robert Keohane, van Ham states that control regimes “contribute to cooperation not by implementing rules that states must follow, but by changing the context within which states make decisions based on self-interest.” Self-interest based on the bloc politics of the Cold War has now been displaced by the dynamic chaos of the market; the relatively stable East-West confrontation has been supplanted by an evolving, unpredictable conflict between North and South, the industrialized (and frequently nuclear-capable) powers entangled with the striving nations of the developing world, nations that feel marginalized by traditional control regimes and insecure without the military backing of their former Cold War patrons. In such a world, van Ham sees the pursuit of nonproliferation as “the art of the attainable,” requiring a flexible, diversified approach. “It is as important to devise policies which address the supply side of the proliferation problem . . . as to try to tackle the demand side by confronting the causes of the perceived need for non-conventional weaponry.” He concludes that these objectives may best be met by sustaining existing control regimes such as the NPT, due for review in 1995, and addressing regional security needs through linkage with nonproliferation initiatives. Trade in dual-use technologies and materials can best be regulated by economic incentives and sanctions, and in the nuclear

arena by strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Van Ham advocates invigorating the IAEA with the challenge-inspection mandate granted the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and perhaps with its own (and thus unbiased) intelligence gathering capability. Some in the U.S. intelligence community will find this last proposal controversial, while others will see it as merely quixotic. In the aftermath of the Gulf war, though, such an initiative would clearly increase the credibility of the IAEA, even if the actual capability was limited to analysis of information from open sources and other agencies rather than independent collection.

These points are clearly presented and well argued. However, the reader, and especially the military reader, must bear in mind that while van Ham clearly presents the urgent need for preventing proliferation, he does so strictly within the context of international diplomatic and economic control mechanisms, or "regimes." The final option of internationally sanctioned or unilateral military action is not addressed in detail, nor is the increasing evidence of organized international criminal activity and freelance smuggling on the supply side. Furthermore, some key points have been overtaken by events since publication, an unavoidable scholarly risk in the field of international relations since 1989. For instance, the author cites CoCom, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, a cornerstone of Western Cold War supply-side policy, as a useful proliferation control regime desperately in need of

realignment from East-West to North-South. Its members, however, have decided otherwise: CoCom was disbanded in March 1994. These are minor points. The tone of *Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s* is scholarly and never strident, but it speaks with a quiet urgency to all who work and serve to foster security and stability in an increasingly chaotic world. We would do well to appreciate the author's reasoning, consider his ideas, and heed his warnings.

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Lacy, James L. *A Different Equation: Naval Issues and Arms Control After 1991*. Alexandria, Va.: Institute for Defense Analysis, IDA Paper P-2768, December 1993. 183pp. (No price given)

*A Different Equation* is an Institute for Defense Analysis technical report prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (Conventional Arms Control and Compliance) in late 1992. In February 1993, the acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Conventional Forces and Arms Control Policy requested that the report not be released for six months. The report itself is dated December 1993, but it was not distributed until March 1994.

The official reason given for the delay was that there were "a number of policy issues raised by the report that are particularly sensitive at this time and that will require review by the new Administration." Given this fascinating introduction, the reader surely must