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Chinese espionage operation against the U.S. yet exposed, that of longtime CIA employee Larry Wu-Tai Chin.

With these limitations in mind, this book provides an excellent overview of China's use of espionage in support of its global interests. The best primer for understanding the philosophy behind Chinese intelligence operations is still Sun Tzu's *Art of War*. More recent works have examined the historical development of China's intelligence services. Books such as Flauger and Kauffer's *The Chinese Secret Service* (William Morrow, 1987) and Richard Deacon's *The Chinese Secret Service* (Taplinger, 1974) focus more on personalities than on organizations. Estiniades' study adds to our understanding of Chinese intelligence by describing how China's intelligence bureaucracy is organized and by identifying the groups that constitute extensions of that organization. He has done a real service to the national security community.

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The collapse of communism in eastern Europe and, in particular, the 1989 reunification of Germany overturned political arrangements in Europe that had been remarkably stable for over four decades. The basic security structures and underlying principles that had driven European policy went generally unquestioned among politicians, academics, and analysts alike, for virtually none of them foresaw the scope of the changes or the astonishing speed with which they would occur.

The shattering of the old European bipolar security paradigm has reopened many fundamental questions. Among the most important is the renewed "German Question"—namely, how a disproportionately powerful central European state can prosper and at the same time be a threat to its neighbors. Will Germany continue its pre-1989 support for an increasingly unified Europe, or will a more "purely German" policy emerge as a consequence of Germany's reunification, conflicts in eastern Europe, increased growth of nationalism, and the growing skepticism toward a "United Europe"?

John Breuilly, a lecturer in history at the University of Manchester, England, argues that understanding both the past and present nature of Germany is central to addressing the "German Question." *The State of Germany* is based on a collection of talks given by several academics about various historical periods of Germany. The conference was held during the 1989–1990 academic year and was supported by the Goethe Institute of Manchester and the University of Manchester. Breuilly asked the speakers to address two questions: "What was meant by ideas such as
German, Germany, and nationality” during its different historical periods? “What, if any, were the political consequences of such ideas?”

After an introductory examination of the national idea in modern German history, contributors then discuss Germany during the Holy Roman Empire, the Napoleonic era, the 1848 crisis, the Bismarckian unification, the Second Reich, and the (temporary?) collapse of nationalism following the Nazi debacle. A succeeding chapter devotes itself to the nation, state, and political culture in the divided country, while another addresses “Germany in Europe.” In his final chapter, Brennig concludes that German nationality—being German rather than a citizen of East or West Germany—mattered decisively in the events leading up to reunification. He also states that “the character of recent German history has meant that Germans are less politically committed to the idea of the nation-state [not to be confused with nationality] as a hard concentration of sovereignty,” implying that Germany remains committed to “Europeanism.”

Likewise, Europe in Transition is a set of essays based on discussions held at a meeting in the autumn of 1990 of the Nato-financed Committee on Atlantic Studies. Editor Robert Jackson is a professor of political science at Carleton College, Ottawa, and a senior policy advisor to the Canadian Liberal Party. In his introductory chapter he discusses the “Changing Conditions of European Security in the Post–Cold War Era,” arguing that there are six broad, changing conditions of security with respect to Europe. These include the position of a united Germany, the need to consolidate democracy and ensure economic viability in eastern Europe and the ex-USSR, the destabilizing effect of different economic growth rates both globally and in Europe, the loss of Soviet and U.S. hegemony in the East and West respectively, and the new stresses in Europe over German capabilities and potentialities.

The next section discusses the “Economic Bases of European Security,” and it argues that a true European security system will in large part be dependent on successful economic integration along the lines of “Europe 1992.” Succeeding sections address “North American Perspectives on the New Europe,” “European Perspectives on the New Europe,” and “Future Models for the New Europe.” The latter contains three essays that respectively address an “Emergent Europe” and whether there is a place for the U.S. in it, the future of Nato as a maritime alliance, and a “Lesser Atlanticism.”

The State of Germany and Europe in Transition, compilations of academic discussions held soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, are necessarily somewhat dated by the cascading events of subsequent years. For example, the contributors could not have anticipated the almost immediate irrelevance of the Soviet Union, the virtual stillbirth of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the detailing of European integration just before its culmination, and the growing debate over the relevance of Nato. They showed an excessive optimism concerning the prospects for European integration.
and for rapid political and economic development in eastern Europe as well as a correspondingly excessive devaluation of U.S. dominance. These ideas and assumptions were perhaps understandable at the time, but later events have shown them to be substantially misplaced. This is not really a fault of the writers—even Francis Fukuyama was wrong when he predicted that we were at the “end of history.”

Except for a few of the historical essays in *The State of Germany*, which remain topical, these books retain only limited value, and that only insofar as they show how academics tried to understand the upheavals of 1989 as they were occurring. In times of extraordinary change, it would seem that political analysts and academics are condemned to the frustration of rapid obsolescence of many of their products.

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Peter Schweizer’s account of the Reagan administration’s strategy to discombobulate the Soviet Union in the 1980s presents a quandary for both the reader and this reviewer.

The major events Schweizer cites are essentially matters of public record, and he has interviewed the right administration sources. Yet the interpretation he places on these is remarkable. We are asked to accept that the administration coordinated support for the Afghan rebels. Solidarity in Poland, denial of technical support to Soviet industry, and aggressive defense buildups, all in a comprehensive strategy to roll back Soviet political power on every front.

Schweizer’s conclusions are based on his interviews with John Poindexter, Richard Allen, Fred C. Ikle, Robert McFarlane, Edwin Meese, William Clark, George Shultz, Casper Weinberger, other figures from the former administration, and on several National Security Decision Directives. While Schweizer’s style is that of a contemporary journalist and not a historian, he does tell a striking story of orchestrated strategy, policy, and action.

According to Schweizer, Ronald Reagan entered the presidency in January 1981 with a deep, visceral conviction that the Soviet political and economic system could not and should not survive. For a number of economic and political reasons, the Soviet Union was already tottering in 1981, although not much of the Western world had noticed. Reagan and his foreign policy advisors decided to press and stress the Soviet Union in all possible ways.

On the industrial technology front, when Reagan took office the Soviet Union was well behind and without funds to acquire the new advances. To rectify this, the Soviets planned to build two great pipelines from their gas fields to Europe, then to sell gas to Europe’s energy-hungry economy for hard currency. The technology to extract and recover the gas, as well as the hundreds of miles of large pipe, were to come from the West. The administration undertook a vigorous application and