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Wayne P. Hughes Jr.

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The Power in Doctrine

Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy, Retired

I wish to preach, not the doctrine of ignoble ease, but the doctrine of the strenuous life.

Theodore Roosevelt, 1899

TEDDY ROOSEVELT WAS A LEADER WHO spoke and wrote with rare clarity. He believed that good ideas that do not lead to action are hollow and that the purpose of words is to foster nobler beliefs and deeds. The pen is mightier than the sword only when education occurs, beliefs change, and actions ensue. The first President Roosevelt is remembered for his forcefulness and resolution. He sponsored reform through legislation—and laws, as we shall see, are an especially obligatory form of doctrine. A man wise in the ways of the world, he plainly understood that good laws are enforceable laws and that the best laws are those that serve the common weal. Bad law, like unworkable doctrine, is evaded, and the activity it spawns is not the activity it dictates. Good or bad, laws with power prescribe the people's activity. Power is our subject here. Doctrine must be powerful: it must cause the Navy to fight better; generating powerful military action is the deepest, the teleological, purpose of doctrine. This article will describe doctrine that has such power.

The Source of Combat Power: United Action

In the United States Navy interest in doctrine is resurgent. Part of the attraction is that doctrine is a way of explaining to those outside the Navy the roles it expects to play in wartime—in other words, of describing its strengths and limits. While this is proper enough, description of naval capabilities is not

Captain Hughes holds the Chair of Applied Systems Analysis in the Department of Operations Research at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He is the author of the books *Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice* and *Military Modeling*, the article "Naval Tactics" in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, and two U.S. Naval Institute Prize Essays. On active duty he commanded the USS *Hummingbird* (MSC 192) and USS *Morton* (DD 948), was Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Navy, and served in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts.

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the goal of doctrine. Its main purpose is to improve the effectiveness of forces in combat.

The power of doctrine lies in its ability to unify forces with singleness of purpose. To unify belief and action, doctrine must prescribe and govern. "Prescription" and "requirement" are words that stick in the American craw and are virtually expunged from the written doctrine of the U.S. armed services; but doctrine loses its power to the extent that the response to it is optional. Doctrine has power when it establishes command relationships that are clear, simple, and durable; recognizes not only the desirability of superior force but specifies how, tactically, to gather such force and apply it; designs formations for the probable combat circumstances and arranges effective options for every likely situation; provides for execution of each formation and option at a single brief and unmistakable signal; and prescribes a repertoire of standard procedures so that a force can execute a mission under an operation order that is about one page long.

Let us illustrate with a concrete example, a single item of Soviet doctrine: "Except for SSBNs, the basic administrative and tactical unit for both submarines and surface ships is a pair."¹ The statement contains no justification nor is one needed; the evidence of the doctrine's advantages is that it was in fact complied with and practiced. Neither is the statement of every conceivable exception necessary; it was understood that on some occasions the pair would have to be waived as unexecutable. When circumstances were compelling, exceptions could be granted before the fact or forgiven afterward.

Many tactical details would flow from this single bit of doctrine if—let us pursue the example—the U.S. Navy prescribed it. Standard formations, including alternative distances between the pair of ships, and sector assignments for search and firing would be established. Methods of communication or of cooperating without them would be devised, with particular attention to submarines. The familiar tactic of a single antiair picket (the "silent SAM") would be reevaluated, weighing its presumed advantages against the helplessness of a solitary, unsupported ship. Doctrine would specify immediate actions of the consort when the other ship is hit, either to counterattack, succor the casualty, or both.

Apparently, Soviet doctrine envisioned pairs of like units. But another possibility would be to combine mutually supporting types having complementary combat attributes, as in the British "42-22" frigate pairing in the Falklands War. Many useful dissimilar pairs suggest themselves: a carrier and a missile cruiser (CG); an amphibious assault ship (LHA) and a guided missile destroyer (DDG); a multipurpose assault ship (LHD) and an amphibious transport dock (LPD); a minehunter (MHC) and a ship armed with surface-to-air missiles,

screening astern; or a CG competent to destroy tactical ballistic missiles guarded by a DDG able to deal with sea-skimming, antiship cruise weapons.

Administrative consequences, if pairing were applied to the U.S. Navy, would be equally important. Task forces would be assembled two by two, and all routine movements and missions would commit two ships instead of one. Some operational demands would have to be foregone or reconsidered, because ships in pairs can be in only half as many places at a time as they can individually. If one ship could not get underway, the other would either remain behind as well or work with another ship assigned temporarily. In-port training would be done pair-wise, as would underway refresher training, measuring the tactical competence of the two-ship entity. Inspections would be prepared for by the two crews cooperatively and conducted in both ships simultaneously. Assignments of homeports, overhauls, and extended maintenance would envision pairs of ships, with considerable impact on type commanders and yards.

Also, specific relationships, formal and informal, would be established within the pair. Whether one's consort was aggressive, cautious, or timid would soon be known, as would its competence in, for instance, antiair, antisubmarine, or antisurface warfare, or in communications; compensatory adjustments would be made by the companion ship. At sea, each ship would survey the other's acoustic and radar detectability.

There might be many actual advantages in this concept; our concern here, however, is to show how the repercussions of a simple doctrinal step can spread throughout an organization. This "pairing" idea, in fact, would go far toward reminding us of the rewards as well as the problems of unified operations. It is a striking practical demonstration of the power of doctrine.

Balance and the Risks of Powerful Doctrine

Of course—and naval officers know it—doctrine with power poses the risk of inhibiting initiative. For a leader and his staff, the challenge is to construct good doctrine that is prescriptive without being constrictive. If doctrine is constructed and construed so rigidly that initiative is destroyed, then its forcefulness will be channeled too narrowly; the enemy will know what to expect and learn to evade the highly focused combat energy that results. On the other hand, a doctrine that denies its own prescriptive nature must—insofar as the denial is believed by those it affects—be powerless.

When a commander strives to attain the power of united action by issuing doctrine, he must concede the possible accompanying penalty. The perceived rigidity of the Royal Navy's "Permanent Fighting Instructions" during the eighteenth century prompted a resistance that endures to this day. This

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perception of doctrine as dogma has caused generations of naval officers to view it askance.

Therefore the inclination of the U.S. armed forces has been to describe doctrine as mere guidance, influential but not directive. Yet if flexibility of action is overly stressed, then we suffer the risk that the behavior of the armed forces in combat will be disunited, incoherent, even chaotic. There is no escaping either the dichotomy or the choice. An armed force may operate under doctrine that is irrelevant because it has little or no power, or it may conform to a doctrine that unnecessarily constrains freedom of action and inhibits initiative—or, through careful analysis, a good understanding of history, a sagacious appreciation of possible future combat, and strong leadership, that armed force may promulgate doctrine that comes fairly close to the right balance.

In vogue at the moment is a scientific and mathematical paradigm called “complexity theory.” It holds that great progress is likely only at the borderline between order and chaos. Order consumes its energy in clinging to the status quo, whereas chaos squanders its energy in futility; but at their mutual boundary, new ideas ferment, bubble up from below, and find their way into the fabric of the system, as progress. Here we see the sources of good doctrine and the difficulty of creating it. How is the Navy to formulate and exercise its doctrine so that new ideas do in fact bubble up, and within a framework of common understanding and united action? How are both order and freedom to be cultivated at the same time? How is doctrine to be devised that lets the Navy operate in the fruitful zone between order and chaos? In particular, how is it to do so when the political and operational environments and its own capabilities are constantly changing? These are the central questions in the writing and implementing of doctrine.

In striking this balance, the paramount goal is more fighting strength. Given good doctrine, the extent to which its power is instituted in the Navy is precisely the extent to which doctrine is prescriptive. Doctrine’s power comes from united thought and action, cooperative activity in which all know their own tasks as well as those of their nearer neighbors. When doctrine is not prescriptive, it is emasculated.

Cohesion and Doctrine

In military usage, the term “cohesion” describes the bonding of a unit’s fighters that converts it from a group into a force. A cohesive force functions as a unified, interconnected system. The word “discipline” is pertinent, but cohesion is more aptly conceived as the binding energy that arises from within rather than as something that is imposed from outside. Cohesion offers structural, psychological, and purposeful integrity. Like a formation of ships, a cohesive force looks and behaves as if it were a single organism. The contrary condition

has been called disjunction, disorganization, or disorder, but it is best visualized as the absence of cohesion—chaotic, uncoordinated behavior.

There are two determinants of cohesion, both fostered by doctrine; one is structural, the other behavioral. In military affairs, structure is defined by organization, chain of command, lateral coordination, and the choice of equipment at each echelon. A task force and its purpose constitute a structure. Structural cohesion also emanates from beliefs, when they are inculcated as doctrine. Thus, maneuver warfare as a style of combat may be promulgated as superior to, say, attrition warfare.

The form of organization and choice of equipment derives from explicit and implicit doctrinal statements, not all of which come from within the Department of the Navy. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) publications *Command and Control Warfare*, *Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations*, and *Doctrine for Joint Operations* structure the armed forces in a way that affects naval forces' organization and choice of equipment.²

Whereas structural cohesion comes in large part from doctrinal prescriptions of beliefs and arrangements, behavioral cohesion derives from doctrinal choices of action. Organizing and equipping the Navy and Marine Corps, for instance, achieves structural cohesion, but the aim of training them is behavioral. A task force must know what to do to achieve its purpose. Components of a joint task force, especially, must train together. Faith in maneuver warfare does not rest on a declaration of its superiority but, instead, on capabilities and experiences of training under a doctrine that prescribes how to fight more nimbly than the enemy. If surprise is proclaimed as doctrinally desirable, then a cohesive force will be better able to achieve it not only because its sensors see better and its weapons reach farther than the enemy's but also because it will have practiced tactics of speed and stealth. Bonding all participants with faith in their united skills makes maneuver warfare—or any other soundly conceived style—effective.

The U.S. Navy's Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) doctrine specifies functional relationships, but it is almost entirely concerned with structure. There is nearly nothing in CWC doctrine to breed cohesive behavior and winning tactics. By contrast, Horatio Nelson imbued behavioral cohesion. He conceived, infused, and practiced tactics that applied to any and all circumstances at sea. His captains knew what to expect with the enemy to windward, to leeward, or in port. It was not just "an offensive mindset" that won battles for Nelson's fleet but the particulars of maneuver that he inculcated. Nelson won the battle of the Nile not merely because his captains were confident but because he had prepared his fleet to fight in the circumstances at hand: at night against an enemy who had anchored disadvantageously. Later, at Trafalgar, Nelson achieved surprise and concentration of force literally in plain view of the enemy; he could do so

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because his subordinates were well drilled in a plan suitable for the occasion. It is the mark of Nelson's genius that the commander of the disjointed French and Spanish fleets, though he had predicted what the British would do, could not effect a response. No one was better able than Nelson to blend, in the din of battle, tightly orchestrated collective action with freedom of individual action. Much has been made of Nelson's creative departures from the Admiralty's Fighting Instructions; more should be made of the behavioral cohesion established by those instructions, which Nelson used as a springboard for all his force's activity.

Cohesion, then, comes from structure and behavior, both of which are nurtured by doctrine. Structural bonding comes from shared beliefs, sound organization, and superior equipment. Behavioral cohesion comes from relentless training for the combat activities prescribed in doctrine.

Doctrine As Teachings

There is a plethora of definitions and characterizations of doctrine. That is because doctrine is self-defining. It is whatever the issuing authority wants it to be: principles or practice; guidance or prescription; precise or flexible; structural or procedural. There is a time and place for many different emphases. For this reason it is almost impossible to give a universal definition, other than that "doctrine is what is taught" within a group as its corporate beliefs, principles, or faith.

Law can be doctrine, or at least serve a doctrinal purpose. Title 10 of the U.S. Code, for instance, establishes service roles and missions, vests command authority, and specifies joint and service relationships. When doctrine is found in law, Congress has expressed it, and—much to the point—lawyers interpret and the courts enforce it.

Doctrine also appears in the form of directives issued by lawful authority. The Chairman of the JCS, although he is not in the chain of command, is delegated authority to issue standing orders and doctrine, both of which (if the Chairman requires) must be obeyed. Regrettably, at the present time one can draw few inferences from a title alone, or even a directive's place in a hierarchical series. For example, Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, is (upon close reading) no more prescriptive than "Command and Control Warfare," a mere Memorandum of Policy. (Doctrine issued by the Chairman or a service chief has certain distinctive aspects, discussed below.) The unified and specified commanders in chief command forces; the plans they prepare and execute are directive. Orders from superiors that initiate and control operations are also directive. Once missions and tasks are assigned, doctrine assists in uniting the effort to achieve the objective.

Thus it appears that anything from formal law to a collective belief of chief petty officers that authoritatively unites thought and action is effectively doctrine. Across the whole spectrum of military operations, doctrine's power is measured by the degree to which its stipulations are believed and followed.

Self-Creating Doctrine. Hence the need for caution. Doctrine is not only self-defining, it is also self-creating: doctrine is anything, whether or not it *calls* itself doctrine, that serves to unify action. Such unlabelled doctrine can be very powerful, often having more sweeping effects than do officially promulgated practices. A coherent fighting force will have doctrine—its basis for unified action—whether or not it has a doctrine command and whether or not its basis for action is reduced to writing. If it has none, it has instead only disorganization, misinformation, and confusion; the force becomes a rabble.

A related form of failure is incoherence among elements of doctrine. Obviously, a force must have an overarching unity of action—doctrine at the highest level—that effectively coordinates every subordinate level's activities. Hence, the existence of a plethora of "doctrines" will diminish organizational effectiveness. The U.S. Navy had plenty of doctrine, too much of it, before it had a doctrine command. Some of it is in Naval Warfare Publications; most of it that has power is still scattered through the fleet in plans, standing orders, tactical memoranda, and directives. Doctrine has also resided in the minds of commanders—where it is local, transitory, hard to assimilate, and of questionable value for uniting endeavor.

Distinct from the power of doctrine is the *value* of it. A doctrine, even if bad, can still be powerful in uniting misguided activity—thereby making the consequences all the worse. There are bad laws, and there is bad folklore; both, if they affect behavior, are mischievous. One may be jailed by a bad law, and one may be killed by inveteracy in the wardroom. Bad doctrine, including the unthinking application of doctrine (however flexible), has caused far more debacles than has rigid doctrine. In the short-range night battles off Guadalcanal in 1942, U.S. Navy commanders persisted in forming columns, the pre-war tactic for long-range daytime engagements, even after experience showed the idea to be defective and though tactical commanders were not bound to the column by doctrine. More grave was the absence of doctrine on the subject of radar and the failure on the scene to exploit its enormous advantages.

Regarding good and bad practice, a virtue of formally promulgated doctrine is that it can be studied, evaluated, and, when found wanting, explicitly changed. Written doctrine hastens the process of correction and improvement. Doctrine imposed by law, however, is hard to change, and the doctrine of Old Sailors' Tales may be the most intransigent of all.

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What Is Not Doctrine. With so general a view, we need to exclude specifically things that are *not* doctrine. Mere wisdom is not doctrine, for any wise person can propound it. If doctrine were only theory, universal truth, constants of war, or the enumeration of changes wrought by technology, then many people not in authority could write excellent doctrine. But doctrine is an authoritative collection of current beliefs and practices, and as such must be expressed by serving officers.

U.S. military dictionaries say that doctrine comprises “principles” that guide forces. But what are principles? “Basic truths” or “normative behaviors” both miss the mark; “predetermined policies or modes of action” comes closer. Perhaps best of all is to eschew “principles” entirely, in favor of “beliefs and practices.”

Doctrine speaks in the present imperative, and only about weapons in hand. This is not to say that tactics for tomorrow’s weapons may be ignored until the systems are deployed; on the contrary, prospective weapons need a running start against the day they enter service. Recall the achievement of the Marine Corps in developing amphibious “doctrine” in the 1920s and 1930s—a remarkable case of doctrine pushing system development, wherein assault ships and craft of World War II were the fruits, not the seeds, of the Marines’ vision. One may also applaud Navy experimentation with carrier task force tactics in the 1930s, which explored the circular screen formation before radar made it practicable. Notwithstanding, doctrine with power must prescribe tactics for fighting and winning today. New shipboard systems to defend against theater ballistic missiles will in time make a vital contribution, but today’s doctrine must respond to TBMs with the meager means at hand. To mix into fleet doctrine the hoped-for tactics of systems yet to come is to evade the problem of fighting with what one has now.

The difference between standing orders, plans, directives, and doctrine is often unavoidably obscure. The force and power in each is also difficult to differentiate. Take for instance a captain’s Standing Orders to the officer of the deck or tactical action officer. The issuance of such orders is not a captain’s option, but their content is a matter of choice, and they are indeed standing orders that serve the purpose of doctrine to unite action in a crisis.

In any event, truth, wisdom, or knowledge point only weakly to the essence—and power—of doctrine. By our criterion, that doctrine is what unites thought and action, wisdom rarely achieves a doctrinal purpose, for wisdom is only understanding of the nature of war; it is therefore merely the basis of doctrine but not itself doctrine, which is prescriptive. Wisdom as general truth concerns the science of war. Doctrine as good practice concerns the art of war, the question of what is to be done. Much of *Naval Warfare*, the first publication

of the Naval Doctrine Command, is wisdom; the utilitarian, power-laden, unifying guides to concerted action it contains can be reduced to a few sentences.

Doctrine is a teaching, in the sense of being *what is taught*. But as the old saying goes, doctrine is not what is in the book but what soldiers believe in, teach each other, and act on. Doctrine specifies what to believe and how to act. If doctrine is indeed good and true, it tells us how to think wisely and act well. Perfect military doctrine, when it is powerful, is based on wisdom and truth; yet doctrine is no exposition of truth, even less a military philosopher's search for truth. It is a statement of shared beliefs (true or not) and a guide to concerted action (sound or risky). The maxim is that weak tactics perfectly executed are more powerful than perfect tactics weakly executed.

Four Levels and Three Issues

To illustrate good practice in constructing doctrine, we must first acknowledge a second reason that doctrine's power is difficult to achieve. We have already discussed the first, that of the elusiveness of sufficient prescription without excessive constriction. The second is that this balance must be approached in different ways at each of four echelons of command.

Echelon four is the level of single-unit techniques and procedures. In the U.S. naval structure, at this level is the surface ship, submarine, aircraft, or Marine combat team, whose role is to execute assigned tasks effectively. Activity at echelon four is characterized by drilling aimed at achieving nearly automatic and instantaneous action, virtually without thought. Yet this is also the level at which new tactics or revised procedures can most quickly and easily be introduced in response to direct knowledge of the enemy. In war it is a mistake to specify unalterable procedures for similar units everywhere. It is not when doctrine is specific that there is a potential problem, but when it is unresponsive and unalterable.

At *echelon three*, that of fleet tactics, doctrine guides and unifies action by affording choices, with formations, search plans, distributions of fire, and the like. In the U.S. operating structure, this is the level of battle groups and joint task forces, whose role is to transform combat potential into combat power and employ it to accomplish a mission. When teamwork is strong and the choices have been practiced, doctrine can admit, even require, wide latitude in the actions to be taken by individual ships and aircraft according to combat circumstances. Action is the aim, timeliness is the mark of success, and excessive communication is a drag on prompt action.

Campaigns and operational art, constituting *echelon two*, transform strategic thought into activity in support of theater objectives: safe, swift movement of forces, and their alerting, readiness, and sustainment. In the U.S. military system,

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we are speaking of the unified and specified commanders in chief, whose role is to distribute combat potential in peace and war. Their resulting actions should exhibit continuity, singleness of purpose, and standardization.

Echelon one is that of policy and strategy. Here emphasis shifts from guiding activity to unifying beliefs. In the United States, the National Command Authority (that is, the president and the Secretary of Defense) and the JCS act at this level. Their role is to articulate both ends and means. United thought guides all actions, but activity is less the essence of strategic doctrine. Widely shared beliefs and steadfastness are the marks of successful strategic doctrine. Policy and strategy should be durable, because every change affects everyone and everything.

As the U.S. Navy moves to strengthen its doctrine, it will inevitably confront three principal questions at each echelon.

- Does doctrine apply to *action or belief*? To what extent does it prescribe activity, and in what proportion does it govern beliefs?
- How *obligatory* is it? To what degree is compliance in execution mandatory? To what extent is it merely guidance?
- What *longevity* is envisioned? Is doctrine to be long-lived, even permanent, or is it to apply only to present circumstances?

The answers will depend very much on whether doctrine applies to individual units, task groups, campaigns, or policy and strategy. Let us consider how these questions could be addressed at each of the four levels of command.

The Fourth Echelon. Fourth-echelon doctrine aims at fast, smooth teamwork—for instance between the pilot and radar intercept officer of an F-14, within a sensor-weapon-countermeasures watch section under a tactical action officer, or in a special forces team on a rescue mission. Therefore, echelon-four doctrine prescribes individual actions and promotes teamwork in a combat unit. Commonality is sought; each individual should be able to move from one ship or aircraft to another and quickly become familiar with the new tasks and how to perform them. Fourth-echelon doctrine is highly specific, so that it can be learned, remembered, and carried out instantly and automatically in an environment of high pressure, rapid changes, and fear. Tactical decision aids “imbed” doctrine; they are a relatively sure way to achieve commonality and consistency, eliminate some of the errors caused by haste and nerves, and reach multi-step decisions quickly. Some of these shipboard and airborne aids, when operated in automatic mode, execute virtually the whole of a combat procedure.

Nevertheless, even when residing in equipment or software, fourth-echelon doctrine ought to be the easiest to modify, in part because the procedures are very specific, in part because this is where a combat team confronts the actual circumstances of enemy, geography and weather, and in part because so few

participants are affected by local change. Thus, a hazard not yet widely appreciated is that if a tactical decision aid is effectively in control of certain tactics, there may be difficulty in recognizing obsolescence, rigidity, or inappropriateness; there also may be serious impediments to the ability of units in the field to rectify these weaknesses. (Consider the improbability if not impossibility of rewriting computer program code to cope with an unanticipated tactical development.)

Echelon-four doctrine is often taught, for example during refresher training after overhauls, as if it were timeless. In fact, instructors at fleet schools ought to be alert to the obsolescence of tactics and procedures due to new threats and new opportunities, be competent to respond to changing circumstances and technologies, and be empowered in some appropriate way to change this level of doctrine.

According to *Naval Warfare* (NDP-1), U.S. Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures are not doctrine; however, by our working definition, they ought to be. There is a practical reason to include internal procedures in doctrine: otherwise, they are commands, hence more directive and obligatory—in other words, less flexible than doctrine, and therefore too constraining on individual units. Some procedures should be rigidly followed, such as preflight check lists and standard shipboard engineering operation and maintenance procedures. Tinkering with them risks doing more harm than good. The U.S. Navy's Planned Maintenance and Personnel Qualification systems are highly bureaucratized, but they are bases of safe and efficient peacetime operation and of readiness for war.

Here is an example illustrating how shipboard procedures unite action. On 25 February 1991, during Desert Storm, the USS *Missouri* (BB 63) was off the Kuwaiti coast bombarding Iraqi positions with sixteen-inch shells. Two Iraqi Silkworm missiles were launched from land sites; one misfired and was not a threat, while the British destroyer HMS *Gloucester* destroyed the other with a salvo of Sea Darts, in the first and only instance of a surface-to-air weapon shooting down a cruise missile aimed at a warship. Although the *Missouri*, its escorts, and five minesweepers were over fifteen miles offshore, the entire incident, from the Silkworm's launch to its destruction, took barely over two minutes.

Gloucester's radar picture has been preserved, along with an audio recording of events in its Operations Room. The incident was marked by surprise, rapidly unfolding events, unavoidable uncertainty, and cool, calculated, disciplined reaction. Someone who had never been under attack would probably not so characterize *Gloucester's* response—in the recording the tension is obvious, urgent remarks can be heard in the background, and a certain amount of confusion is apparent. But what sounds like confusion was in fact simply the

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strain of doing several difficult things within seconds: identifying a fast-moving, hard-to-discriminate radar blip as an enemy missile and not a friendly aircraft, turning to unmask the ship's Sea Dart launcher without running into a minefield or the other warships present, and dealing with voice radio chatter as other ships detected, or failed to detect, the threat. To the experienced eye and ear, *Gloucester* manifested the strong discipline of a skillful team using practiced procedures to classify, track, and fire at a fast-moving target. The watch team soundly employed broadly applicable shipboard procedures to defeat an immediate threat in a very short time with the almost instinctive teamwork that should be characteristic of fourth-echelon execution of antimissile doctrine.

The Third Echelon. Fleet doctrine is the instrument a tactical commander uses to train and fight the force. It is the basis of cohesion, reliability in battle, common understanding, and mutual support. Fleet doctrine that unites all ships and aircraft in concerted action is the heart and soul—the very core and the great reward—of all other echelons of doctrine.³

Third-echelon, or fleet, doctrine is on the cusp of beliefs and activities. The Officer in Tactical Command is burdened with both making intelligent decisions and causing the decisions to be implemented swiftly and reliably. Tactical decisions are neither automatic nor taken without regard for the intense pressure of time. But tactical doctrine governs coordinated fleet *actions*, acts of moving and shooting. A commander's wish, unfulfilled, is only that; accordingly, combat tactics must be easy to order, understand, and carry out.

At echelon three we might say that sound battle doctrine is "provisionally obligatory." Fleet doctrine is a "play book" (to use an image from American football) of specific formations, scouting and emission control plans, communications schemes, and other tactical decision aids, either in doctrinal publications or imbedded in computer programs. In battle there ought to be latitude for creative activity in fighting units sufficient to foster future Horatio Nelsons and reward genius in action. But battle-winning spontaneous actions occur when initiative starts with the play book. Spontaneous action can breathe new life into a formation that is surprised and hurt, if those who take the initiative know generally what the other members are doing and could be expecting.

Nowhere is it more evident that doctrine is not permanent than at echelon three. There are constants and long-term trends, but fleet tactical doctrine is designed to apply right now. "Right now" means, first, that doctrine is pertinent to the sensors and weapons in service at the moment. "Right now" also means pertinence to *this* battle—the one we are about to fight and win.⁴ That is the reason battle doctrine offers in most circumstances a set of actions the tactical commander can prescribe in one or two signals, directing thereby what must be done by each ship and aircraft.

A threat that lurks particularly at echelon three, beneath a fragile veneer of coordination, is fratricide. Absent both doctrinal and technological means to distinguish foe from friend, a tactical decision maker must either take precious time to clarify and thereby risk his own destruction, or act precipitously and risk that of a friend.

In the Silkworm incident of February 1991, had the two antiship missiles flown truly, the Sea Darts would not have protected the *Missouri* and the rest of the formation. *Gloucester* launched her salvo too late; all the escorts were seaward of the ship they were screening, and nearly dead in the water; being confined to a cleared channel too narrow for maneuvering, they interfered with each other when they accelerated and turned to unmask their missile batteries. In addition, the warships dispensed chaff and other decoys in such extravagant quantities that a few feints beforehand would have drained the formation of such "soft-kill" assets. An incident of ship-on-ship fratricide in the heat of the moment was escaped by a hair's breadth.⁵

This is not to say the tactical commander could have done better at the time but that doctrine to aid him should have been better. All of the problems that inhibited *Gloucester* and the other ships are common in littoral warfare, and so are the problems of coalition warfare, with the special danger of shooting at a friendly unit. The U.S. Navy needs new fleet doctrine for inshore operations that prescribes formations when mines and minesweepers are present, provides screen formations that protect the main body and offer mutual support with designated arcs of gun and antiair missile fire before and during a ship-to-shore movement, indicates minimum and maximum speeds for these ticklish situations, gives courses relative to threat axes that minimize maneuvering to unmask, promulgates soft-kill doctrine that does not hazard nearby ships, and lays down tactical command and control procedures affording the earliest warning and fastest response.

New tactical signal and maneuvering books are needed with doctrine containing inshore formations, maneuvering rules, and scouting plans. Firing doctrine is necessary that, among other things, specifies circumstances in which soft kill takes precedence over "hard kill" and defines procedures to lessen damage to the vital units when an attack comes from an unexpected quarter or by unforeseen ordnance. There should be a system of signals to order the evolutions and tactics to follow after being damaged—for in littoral warfare, hits are going to be sustained. Obviously the new tactical options for inshore warfare are a matter for the best tacticians. This is a tall order, but we won't know what we don't know until we write down what we do know.

The Second Echelon. Second-echelon doctrine is the common denominator of all plans of theater operations, whether a wartime campaign, a regional contingency, or an emergency humanitarian operation. It serves to steer the training

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of forces toward anticipated theaters and modes of operation in third and fourth-echelon detail. It establishes paths and procedures for the collation and flow of intelligence from the highest levels.

Campaign doctrine confronts a paradox. The naval services organize, train, and equip naval forces, but they do not operate them. These trained forces are delivered, as an element of a force, joint or otherwise, to a unified commander in chief who plans and conducts the campaign. All the services, the Navy included, must solve the difficult problem of preparing forces they will not command (at the second echelon) in peace, crisis, or war. Preparation is extraordinarily difficult, because the combinations of forces differ so much from one contingency to another.

Naval campaign doctrine prescribes beliefs about how the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps would conduct a naval campaign if they could. They train and equip their forces for their own vision. Activities that will actually flow from campaign doctrine are generally prescribed in war and contingency plans. The activities were easier to formulate when the Soviet Union was the center of attention than they are now, when possible operations proliferate. At echelon two, emphasis inevitably falls on prescribed beliefs, not actions.

What does this mean? Obligatory beliefs are seemly in the armed forces of the People's Republic of China or North Korea, but in ours a prescribed belief might well be called an oxymoron. Nevertheless, belief is incorporated in structure, and structure (expressed as organizational relationships) is quite firm in U. S. doctrine. There are other sound examples of mandated beliefs.

As to the durability of echelon-two doctrine, perhaps the question of longevity for campaign doctrine has no answer. Reading Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, one would infer that doctrine for joint, combined, and United Nations operations in a theater is neat and orderly. Observing real command relationships in a theater, however, gives one the impression that they are ad hoc, unstable, convoluted, and ever-changing. If operations in Kuwait and Bosnia are representative, then real applications in joint, combined, Nato, or UN settings will result in endless reformulations of intricate command relationships.

Naval doctrine is constrained to be consistent with joint doctrine. On one hand, naval doctrine in NDP-1 or the 1989 Marine Corps publication *Warfighting* (FMFM-1) must fill in details of the more general doctrine; on the other, joint staffs must be conversant with naval doctrine, which describes the activities in which various naval forces assigned to them are trained and competent. One of the most important rewards that will stem from the Naval Doctrine Command's efforts is a listing of the tasks that Navy and Marine forces are trained for and prepared to carry out in joint operations.

An example of second-echelon doctrine concerns the protection of shipping. One method is direct protection by escorting convoys; another is an offensive strategy that seeks to destroy the threat (air, surface, or subsurface) before it reaches the shipping; a third is a hybrid of the two. At different times all three have been used by this and other nations. In fact, at different times during the Cold War each of the three constituted the U.S. naval campaign plan for dealing with the submarine threat. At one juncture that plan could have been paraphrased as "Sail all shipping independently until it is desirable to convoy"—an apparently exasperating statement, but actually both subtle and astute. First, it was unambiguous that convoys would not be formed at war's onset; the reasons were complex and probably remain classified, but they made sense. The power in this straightforward statement was in being clear that because shipping would sail unescorted at the outset, many antisubmarine aircraft and surface ships could be told off for other tasks. Second, there were related antisubmarine and antiair campaign plans in place: "unescorted" did not mean unprotected. Third, the doctrine was desirably ambiguous—which is to say, flexible—as to the circumstances under which protected convoys would be initiated. Substantially more was involved than shipping losses experienced. Fourth, and just as important, the doctrine said that convoying might in fact become desirable, with the clear implication that the Navy had to be prepared to undertake it on short notice—which entailed a control of shipping organization, convoy formations, screen tactics, air and surface escorts, and a campaign plan as to what shipping would be convoyed and where.

Three other points about doctrine can be made with this example. One is that simplicity of expression is not simplemindedness; here, it was the result of extensive analysis and deliberation. The aim of prescriptive, powerful doctrine is clarity and simplicity, but the thinking behind it—certainly in this case—is intricate and sophisticated. Second, the doctrine might have been wrong at the time; we will never know. In any case, had there been no doctrine there would have been nothing to review, find wrong, or change. Third, and strange to say, this particular doctrine was issued as a directive; it appeared in an instruction signed by a Deputy Chief of Naval Operations and was, apparently, never picked up in Naval Warfare Publications—the U.S. Navy's formal doctrine.

Joint doctrine should cover more than joint operations: it must serve as the foundation of all operations, tempering a penchant in the U.S. military to involve all services in every operation. This is by no means to suggest that there ought to be more JCS doctrine. On the contrary, there is already so much of it at the second echelon (and the first) that it can only be assimilated by doctrinaire minds. The power to prescribe is also the power to over-control; joint staffs need to pay heed to the insights of complexity theory, in order to balance between chaos and rigidity.

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The First Echelon. Echelon-one doctrine serves principally to unify beliefs, and only indirectly to unify action. To be powerful it must help the National Command Authority and its agent, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to identify ends and means. At the first echelon, the JCS definition of doctrine as principles is as acceptable as it ever can be, and doctrine—since it is where one finds it—must be evaluated on its own terms. Also, since it is often self-creating, doctrine manifestly appropriate to the first echelon will be found at the seat of government in many documents that are not so titled. These include posture statements, white papers (such as “Forward . . . From the Sea”), directives, and even laws that specify the organization of the defense establishment and service roles and missions.

The power in first-echelon doctrine lies predominantly in the beliefs it expresses. Doctrine at this level prescribes what to think but not, except in the most general terms, what to do. A certain sort of academic will say, “Aha, it’s just as I always suspected: military officers are told what to think!” There seems no possible evasion—for instance, by hinting that we only mean *how* to think. First-echelon doctrine should indeed consist of powerful statements of belief; if not, it has no power to unite. Paradoxically, writing down beliefs is a necessary step in giving them nuance—for what is written can be scrutinized, and what is scrutinized can be reworded, either more delicately or more forcefully. Even Soviet first-echelon military doctrine—given to laws of war and law-governed patterns—came to be regarded (after vigorous debate) not as immutable but as amenable to revision and improvement.

First-echelon doctrine should be obligatory but expressed artfully, with the intended flexibility built in; for example, the criteria of the “Weinberger Doctrine” of 1984 were “shoulds” rather than “shalls.” But it imposes obligations not so much upon those commanded as on the commanders, including the issuing authority. If the doctrine is sound and seen to be sound by the forces in the field (and what could be more heartening to the troops than the stipulation in Joint Pub 1 to use overwhelming force?), then the beliefs it expresses will be unifying and morale-building.

More than all the others, doctrine at the first echelon must aspire to long life. Modifications and adjustments are desirable in themselves, but because all echelons, indeed the whole of the armed forces, are affected, the grand design—the coherence of the doctrine grasped as a unified whole—can be powerful only if it substantially endures. One may regard U.S. doctrine as addressing a universal audience: it includes other components of the executive branch, such as the State Department and the National Security Council, but it often extends as well to the legislative branch, the press and the American people, and every prospective ally or enemy. Such dissemination takes time. A proper aim in formulating first-echelon doctrine is robustness sufficient to survive

anything short of an international epochal change, such as the one from which we are just now emerging.

Formal American military doctrine at the first echelon—as represented by Joint Pub 1—strikes a proper balance and is powerful enough. It achieves balance with specific, contemporary enjoinders, among which are (from Chapter IV, pages 45–48) that campaigns, which are conducted jointly, will be the “unifying focus” in conducting a war; a campaign is to be “influenced by a national military strategy”; a campaign plan accepts logistic constraints, which are to be given due weight; a campaign is to be “oriented on the enemy’s strategic and operational centers of gravity”; and that a commander’s concept will be prepared, and in four parts.

Chapter III, pages 21–24, specifies the contemporary unifying principles. The armed forces are to achieve unity of effort with the aid of a well understood national military strategy, and achieve strategic focus with clear objectives that include the desired state of affairs when the conflict is terminated; strive to operate at every level with overwhelming force, through concentration, to win quickly so as to minimize damage and personnel casualties (“*our own* casualties” notably omitted); further, retain the initiative by exploiting the ability of military people to think for themselves and execute orders intelligently. The doctrine envisions actions that are offensive “in spirit” and countenances calculated risks that achieve major military advantage (“may be required”). Operate with agility (speedy movement), directs Chapter III, but timeliness relative to enemy agility is the watchword, rather than speed per se. Finally, apply the principles themselves broadly, not dogmatically.

Careful reading and thoughtful reflection will reveal the greatest value of first-echelon doctrine. In this publication the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is issuing doctrine whose principal value is not in prescribing the behavior of the troops. Instead, Joint Pub 1 serves as a pledge that the Chairman and the operational commanders will conduct *themselves* as it specifies. All forces can therefore rely on its concise prescriptions as straightforward statements of intent and then train with that expectation.

We have already mentioned an example of doctrine at the first echelon that was not formally promulgated as such—the set of postulates published in 1984 by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger that became known, informally but significantly, as the “Weinberger Doctrine.” It has a peculiar history about which little need be said here, but the document is important to this discussion in two respects. First, the concept was so sweeping that it could have been folded directly into national policy, had not Secretary of State George Shultz disagreed with it.⁶ Second, one of Weinberger’s aides was General Colin Powell, later the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; he was intimately familiar with it, if not its actual drafter. Some terms of the Weinberger Doctrine that were antecedents

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of Joint Pub 1 were: first, if it is thought necessary to introduce combat troops, it should be done wholeheartedly (i.e., presumably, with overwhelming force) and with the clear intention of winning; and second, if forces are to be committed to combat overseas, political and military objectives should be clearly defined.

A proclaimed national military doctrine that sets forth terms for going to war has remarkably powerful stabilizing and unifying value. First-echelon doctrine as exemplified by Joint Pub 1 and declarations like the Weinberger formulation are of the highest usefulness because they look upward and inward more than downward. In the event, the six tenets of the Weinberger Doctrine were followed meticulously in the Gulf war by Colin Powell and George Bush.⁷

A pithy example for echelon one is Israeli strategic military doctrine, arguably the world's most effective. Insofar as can be deduced from open literature and observation of past campaigns, its operational essence is captured in just five elements: commitment to the offensive, preemptive attack and speedy destruction of enemy means of making war, a strong intelligence effort, early resolution, and reliance on combined arms.

The Role of the Naval Doctrine Command

Having explained what doctrine is, why it has power, what separates good doctrine from bad, and how doctrine must be understood and appraised at the four levels of command, we must now reflect on how the U.S. Navy is addressing this topic. The Naval Doctrine Command, established in March 1993, has begun its work at echelon one, with the intention of working its way through the others. Its first publication, *Naval Warfare*, strongly emphasizes generalities, such as the principles of war; its prescriptive content is slender indeed. This was probably unavoidable, for logically the Navy and Marine Corps have no charge to express echelon-one doctrine. The phrasing of NDP-1 was therefore a sensitive matter, and on the whole it merits praise rather than criticism. On one hand, NDC had the task of writing a "cornerstone" publication that would serve as the basis of such second-echelon documents as the forthcoming *Naval Operations* (NDP-3). On the other hand, because its authority to prescribe first-echelon beliefs is minimal, the doctrinal (prescriptive) content of *Naval Warfare* essentially comprises only three statements: favor offensive action; favor maneuver warfare; and organize forces in task-related entities ("task groups").

Not much that is "practical"—that is to say, related to combat action—is appropriate at echelon one. NDP-1's vital task was to dovetail with Joint Pub 1, and in this it largely succeeds. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps are empowered to organize, equip, and train naval forces but not to operate and fight them.

As the Naval Doctrine Command shifts from echelon one to echelons two and three, its doctrine will have to be more utilitarian, focused much less on what to believe and more on how to fight at sea and (probably jointly) in the littorals. Nothing very creative need be attempted in the first round of these new publications; it will be difficult enough merely to gather, sort, codify, and express present practice. One might even say that the Doctrine Command's utility (and that of the Joint Doctrine Command, in its own sphere) will be measured by how *little* it publishes: by how well it slims down the mass of words that now pass for doctrine in the fleet. Its power and utility will be determined by how well it says, in effect, "These are the procedures governing naval operations, how naval forces in collaboration with all others will fight. In specified circumstances this is how every naval component is to organize, deploy, form up, maneuver, collect and exchange information, and fight in order to inhibit, demoralize, and destroy the enemy." Why these specific statements? So that the Navy and Marine Corps can train to operate and fight together, all the while improving upon the statements themselves.

The Voice of a Contrary Tactician

This article has been necessarily somewhat contrarian, putting emphasis on matters that contemporary writings on doctrine have slighted. One would gather from some of these that the real value of naval doctrine is to be found at echelons one and two.⁸ That is a strategist's perspective and, presumably, that of the JCS. In fact, doctrine's greatest power arises when it is focused at the third echelon and is strong and well founded there. That is the tactician's perspective, and tacticians need a bigger voice in framing powerful doctrine. It is also the classical point of view. The prominent debates over doctrine in the past have been over handling fleets in action, as have been the names associated with doctrinal development, among them Robert Blake, the Vicomte de Morogues, John Clerk of Eldin, Paul l'Hoste, Bourd  de Villehuet, Richard Kempenfelt, Julian Corbett, Giuseppe Fioravanzo, Brian Tunstall, and in this country S.S. Robison and Dudley Knox.⁹ The history of the uses and misuses of doctrine suggests that its power, for good and ill, has lain at echelon three, the employment of fleets in battle. Strategists argue that when strategy is ill conceived, everyone suffers, the armed forces and the nation. This truth is well recognized, however, and security policy is now being adequately debated in many arenas; any contribution doctrine might make at echelon one would be marginal.

A view presently shared in all the services is that doctrine is at once authoritative and merely guidance; doctrine is thus characterized in armed forces publications. In July 1994, however, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disconcerted the "guidance" school with these forceful words, which are to

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appear henceforth in joint publications: *The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, commanders will apply this doctrine except when exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.*

The issue of doctrine's applicability has itself become dogmatic and over-abstruse. How so? First, at echelons one and two (which seem to be the levels the Chairman is addressing), the rigidity or flexibility of doctrine is a matter of expression. That is, doctrine can be firm and yet offer sufficient discretion: "shall do," "should do," and "preferably do" all leave room enough. No one would prescribe "thou shalt achieve surprise" on every occasion. Conversely, gross failures to exercise agility, to achieve an information advantage, or to apply preponderant force will be condemned of themselves, however much or little latitude "doctrine" is purported to grant.

Second, the real debate ought to be about the content of the doctrine and the education of officers who apply it. NDP-1 says that "maneuver warfare [in contrast with attrition warfare] . . . is our preferred style of warfighting." Maneuver warfare at sea will need a good deal of interpretation, for the naval maxim is "attack effectively first": kill first, or be killed in a battle of attrition. The Soviet Navy suffered because its first and second-echelon doctrine was attuned to ground warfare; the concept of seizing and holding ocean territory is awkward, to say the least. Bad doctrine causes the most harm; mindless application of good doctrine is nearly as bad; and broad freedom to abjure doctrine, be it bad or good, is no solution at all. The emphasis ought to be on writing and practicing good doctrine. Soundly conceived, clearly expressed, widely popular, firmly grasped, and shrewdly interpreted doctrine that is energetically and faithfully followed will not lead to serious trouble.

Third, doctrine that is at once "authoritative" and "guidance" places upon sailors and Marines too great a burden of responsibility. As much as possible, such divination should be shifted to the shoulders of commanders who promulgate doctrine. While making allowance for, and positively encouraging, deviations from doctrine when they are clearly warranted and advisable in a combat situation, a commander's doctrine should create as few dilemmas as possible for subordinates. The distinctions in this article between echelons and their characteristics, in fact, have been an attempt to help these authorities find the best blend of prescription and flexibility. Just where the line lies between over-prescription and excessive flexibility, between "too tight" and "too loose," depends on the echelon involved. The higher the level of command, the more carefully expressed doctrine must be, the more it must be strictly construed and followed almost without exception.

Echelon-one doctrine should be worded so as to endure; its latitude must be intrinsic. At that higher end of the spectrum, the payoff comes not so much in

sailors and Marines knowing what to do but in their being able to count on the commander himself doing what he prescribes.

At the lower end of the spectrum, echelon-four doctrine is most powerful when it says, "Perform your function this way," and at echelon three when it says, "Here are the tactics that will be useful to you. They are tried and true. But if strange circumstances arise as threats or opportunities, then [as the Royal Navy once warned its commanding officers] 'nor you nor any of you fail, at your Peril.'"¹⁰ Such prescriptions are not to be found in current doctrine.

Perhaps one word is the issue—*prescribe*. Contemporary doctrine eschews prescription. I welcome and champion it.

Much doctrine expresses general and timeless verities, like the principles and maxims of war. I ask doctrine (and those who write it) to skip the truisms and adapt abstract truth to the contemporary environment.

Present-day doctrinal writing is too much given to explanation, illustration, and persuasion; it looks too much like an exercise in marketing. Let doctrine go straight to the What and How, leaving most of the Whys and Wherefores to the educational realm. Successful doctrine is succinct, far more compact than what is now being published. The quality of doctrine depends on its precision, even on its imagery, but never on its eloquence.

Finally, there is the nature of what NDP-1 calls "tactics, techniques, and procedures," now excluded from the province of naval doctrine. If the central thesis of this paper is correct, a strong case has already been made for incorporating them as elements of echelon-four doctrine.

Writing powerful combat doctrine is a great challenge, and it is impossible without confidence in tactical plans and formulations. Perhaps it cannot be done well the first time. Is anyone bold enough, for instance, to prescribe naval operations in pairs, or according to any other such scheme? But I assert without hesitation that the U.S. Navy does not have current tactical doctrine for fighting on the littorals, nor does it have substantial joint, campaign-level doctrine that dovetails with the air-land battle doctrine of the U.S. Army and Air Force. The contrary tactician's point of view is that a new "play book" is needed for winning battles along a hostile coast.

Notes

1. Milan Vego, "Submarines in Soviet Doctrine and Tactics," *Naval War College Review*, March-April 1983, page 7.

2. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff [hereafter JCS], *Command and Control Warfare*, Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 30 (Washington: March 1993); JCS, *Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 6-0 (Washington: June 1991); JCS, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington: September 1993). "C4" stands for "command, control, communications, and computers."

3. Lt. Cdr. Scott A. Hastings, USN, in a prize-winning article on battle doctrine ("Is There a Doctrine in the House?"), U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, March 1994, makes a strong case for third-echelon doctrine.

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Hastings draws heavily upon a previous prize essay, "The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare," by Lt. Cdr. Dudley W. Knox, USN, U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, March-April 1915.

4. For the need to adapt to the uniqueness of each battle, see the author's *Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice* (U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1986), chap. 9, which terms the circumstances of the battle, especially the assigned mission, "The Great Variables."

5. This appraisal, including the potentially fatal fratricide incident, is based upon an unclassified paragraph in Center for Naval Analyses, "Operation Desert Storm: Reconstruction and Analysis of the 25 February 1991 Silkworm Missile Attack," CRM 91-157/Sept 1991, SECRET. "Soft kill" refers to efforts to prevent a guided missile from striking its intended target, generally by maneuvering or by deceiving its homing system, rather than by destroying the weapon in flight (i.e., "hard kill").

6. National policy is identified with presidents. The Monroe Doctrine, Truman Doctrine, Eisenhower Doctrine, and Kennedy Doctrine were substantial enough to be easily described and applied by statesmen. President Reagan's policy was often characterized as aggressive in outlook. If the Weinberger Doctrine had been seen as one of its essential components, as I think it should have been, then a more accurate phrase would have been something like, "Carry a big stick and apply it sparingly."

7. If one believes (I do not) that the war could have been prolonged advantageously, then such a view simply illustrates the dichotomy between doctrine's power and its flexibility. To be lawyerly—and powerful, prescriptive doctrine is akin to law—the Weinberger Doctrine might have been interpreted to permit a longer war. Test number four reads: "The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary." If it permitted enlarged objectives when the advantage in forces turns out to be greater than expected, then the Weinberger Doctrine itself was a constraint on the start but not the finish of the war. There were, however, other constraints. One was legal, the UN mandate; one was political, the support of Congress and the American people; one was geostrategic, the possibility of a vacuum in Southwest Asia that Iran might fill; and one was moral, the need to end the bloodshed, not least among the enemy.

8. See especially Dr. James Tritten, "Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine," *Naval War College Review*, Spring 1995, pp. 22–38.

9. Robert Blake (1599–1657), one of Oliver Cromwell's "generals at sea," was prominent in bringing discipline and control to the Commonwealth's fighting ships in the fierce battles of the Anglo-Dutch wars. He sponsored England's first Fighting Instructions.

Sebastien François Bigor, Vicomte de Morogues (1705–1781), founded the Academie Marine at Brest to study the art of maneuvering fleets in the French Navy. In 1763 he published *Treatise on Evolutions and Signals*, which was far in advance of contemporary thinking in the British navy.

John Clerk of Eldin (1728–1812), a Scots writer on naval tactics, claimed that he had a major influence on Royal Navy prowess through his *Essay on Naval Tactics*, 1790–1797, a view disputed by flag officers who thought him too theoretical for practice—whereas he thought the naval officers too uninformed to be skillful.

Paul l'Hoste (1652–1700) was a Jesuit mathematician who served twelve years at sea under three French admirals and, unlike Clerk of Eldin, was undoubtedly influential. His *L'Art des Armees Navales*, 1697, was widely studied, but not in the British Royal Navy until it was partially translated into English in 1762.

Captain Jacques Bourdè de Villehuet wrote two well respected books on tactics in 1765.

Rear Admiral Richard Kempenfelt (1718–1782) was notable in the Royal Navy as a serious student of tactics in general and French tactical writings in particular. Among his contributions, he influenced Lord Howe's improvements of the British signal code.

Sir Julian Corbett (1854–1922) is probably the most influential naval thinker in the history of the British navy. He is best known for insights on strategy, but as a trusted adviser to the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher, he had vast influence on the British navy's tactics, technology, and education.

Admiral Giuseppe Fioravanzo contributed to tactical thought in the Italian Navy for two generations. His *A History of Naval Tactical Thought* was translated and published by the Naval Institute Press in 1979 and reflected the keen tactical thinking of the Italian school and of such astute quantitative writers as Romeo Bernotti.

Brian Tunstall was one of the world's leading naval historians from the 1920s until his death in 1970; he was an eminent scholar of naval warfare under sail, when "naval warfare" was dominated by interest in fleet tactics, doctrine, and signals.

Rear Admiral Samuel S. Robison, in collaboration with his wife, Mary L., wrote the most comprehensive book on tactics by an American: *A History of Naval Tactics from 1530 to 1930*, published, with an update, in 1942. The book might have been called a history of naval doctrine and signals, since these subjects receive great attention.

Rear Admiral Dudley W. Knox's wide-ranging thought in the first half of the twentieth century and publications on naval subjects led him to deplore, in the aforesaid Naval Institute Prize Essay, the absence of American naval doctrine. To him, the core of it was fleet tactical doctrine.

10. As quoted and adapted in Patrick O'Brian's first "Jack Aubrey" novel, *Master and Commander* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970), p. 13.

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The Surface Navy Association (SNA) and the Naval Institute will once again jointly sponsor the Surface Navy Literary Award, which will be presented during the SNA Eighth National Symposium, to be held 23–27 October 1995. The winner will receive \$1,000 and an engraved crystal memento. The award will be presented to the author of the best article on surface warfare issues published in any publication since the last symposium. Entries will be judged by the editorial board of the SNA newsletter, SITREP, from among those nominated by chapter presidents of SNA, members of the SNA Board of Directors, and the editor of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.

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